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All of us bring to our adult lives different memories of childhood.
Many readers of this Symposium undoubtedly had the advantages of a
supportive family and a good education. Others may not have been so
fortunate. Whatever our childhood experiences, we should use them to
benefit today's and tomorrow's children.
It would be inappropriate to suggest that today's children face
problems greater than those faced by children in the past. We may have
forgotten that yesterday's children confronted death caused by diseases
now preventable by vaccines and debilitating injuries now treatable by
modern medical expertise. In the past, children also suffered inhumane
working conditions and often early deaths of siblings and parents. As
quickly as these problems were solved, they were replaced with new
problems. Today's children confront threats of fetal addiction to drugs,
alcohol and exposure to AIDS. They face ever-increasing early expo-
sure to drugs and alcohol, danger from their classmates' lethal weapons
and the realities of one-parent homes or both parents working outside
the home. In addition, many children have long braved neglect, abuse,
poverty, hunger and homelessness.
The problems today's and tomorrow's children face are not so
much greater or lesser than those of yesterday's children, rather they are
different. Today's problems present new challenges for the adults who
attempt to make childhood fulfilling, carefree and a solid preparation for
adulthood, as childhood should be. Children need supportive home en-
vironments and intellectual challenges to develop their bodies and
minds in preparation for the rest of their lives. These goals can hardly
be achieved when children must struggle daily merely to survive. We
must look closely at children's current realities and needs and adjust our
perceptions and support of those who raise the new generation.
This Symposium consists of two parts. The first part is a compila-
tion of articles and student-written pieces on topics that touch children's
lives. Congresswoman Schroeder's article introduces this part and the
entire Symposium. In it, she outlines the challenges encountered by
children and families in the United States and suggests means by which
the Congress and other representative bodies can help meet those
challenges.
The second part is a compilation of pieces written by scholars, prac-
titioners and judges who attended the American Bar Association's April
1991 conference, "Family Law and the 'Best Interest of the Child.' "
Judge Marianne E. Becker's article explains the genesis and goals of the
conference. Conference attendees' contributions address how we can
better serve children's developmental needs, especially when children
come into contact with the legal system.
It is my hope that today's children will someday reflect on this Sym-
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posium and observe the progress forged through the recognition of
problems and the suggested solutions set forth in these pages.
I thank Mary Zuchegno, University of Denver College of Law Class
of 1991, for suggesting children as the topic for this Symposium and
Professor Timothy B. Walker, University of Denver College of Law, for
referring me to Judge Becker. I would also like to thank the contribut-
ing authors and the members of the Review for the considerable efforts
that went into this Symposium. The conference pieces were particularly
challenging as we and the authors strived to reach a middle ground be-
tween the multi-disciplinary and traditional law review writing and cita-
tion conventions. Finally, I extend a special thanks to the members of




TOWARD EFFECTIVE AND FAMILY FRIENDLY
NATIONAL POLICIES FOR U.S. CHILDREN AND
THEIR FAMILIES
CONGRESSWOMAN PATRICIA SCHROEDER*
Over the last decade, the well-being of America's families has be-
come a popular topic of discussion. Research studies and news accounts
have documented profound changes affecting children and families and
how circumstances for many have spiraled downward. Moreover, con-
sumer confidence has fallen to record lows and many believe that their
own government and other institutions do not help and may even thwart
efforts of individuals and families to help themselves.
In 1983, The House of Representatives created the Select Commit-
tee on Children, Youth, and Families (the Committee) to provide an
ongoing assessment of the conditions of American children and families
and to make recommendations to Congress and the public to improve
public and private sector policies. This special Committee serves as the
only forum in Congress exclusively dedicated to making federal policies
more attentive to the needs of the nation's families and children.
Thirty-five members of the House of Representatives serve on the Select
Committee. Two-thirds of the members are Democratic and one-third
are Republican, reflecting the composition of the House of Representa-
tives as a whole.
The priority of the Committee, under my stewardship since Febru-
ary 1991, is to reshape the national agenda and to compel actions that
benefit families rather than ignore or actually harm them. This Article
begins with a description of the profound impact of economic, demo-
graphic and social changes on the well-being of families and children.
Then follows a section that describes the need for more substantial na-
tional debate and strategies for response. The Article also details the
work of the Committee to support new priorities on behalf of children
and families. It also addresses the contributions and responsibilities of
others in the public and private sector to respond to children's and fami-
lies' needs.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES WORSEN
Numerous recent reports affirm the findings of the Select Commit-
tee and point out that the status of young Americans remains dismal,
with high rates of child poverty, violent deaths, child abuse, infant mor-
* United States Representative for the First Congressional District of Colorado
since 1972; Chairwoman of the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Famiiies
since February, 1991; University of Minnesota (B.A., 1961); Harvard Law School J.D.,
1964).
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tality and low birth-weight births. Many of these conditions should
sound loud alarms. Among our youngest children, one in four is poor.
More than one out of every five children lives in a single-parent family.
More than nine million children have no health insurance. Nearly
40,000 babies die each year before their first birthday, millions of chil-
dren are exposed to the toxic effects of lead, and more than 350,000
babies a year are born exposed to drugs. It is estimated that one in
seven preschoolers is at risk of dropping out of school.1
When young people reach their teens, the threats mount and be-
come even more grave.2 This year, one in four students will not gradu-
ate from high school with his or her peers. Another one of those four
will graduate, but will be as deficient in basic skills and work habits as
those who have dropped out. By 1995, some 14 million Americans will
be unprepared for the jobs that are available. Last year the United
States Office of Technology Assessment reported that one out of five of
today's 31 million adolescents has at least one serious health problem.
Teen pregnancy, HIV infection and AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs), substance abuse, dropping out of school and homelessness
among youth continue to rise. Approximately 1.1 million teenage girls
become pregnant every year; the total number of AIDS cases reported
among persons ages thirteen to twenty-four increased by seventy-five
percent between 1989 and 1990; some three million teens are infected
with a sexually transmitted disease annually.
3
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS BUFFET FAMILIES
During the last decade, while family income increased for many
families, the economic base of millions of America's families eroded.
4
At the same time, the costs of raising a child have continued to climb.
The Department of Agriculture estimates the cost of raising a child
(food, housing, transportation, clothing, health care, education, child
care and miscellaneous expenses) born in 1990 through age seventeen
at $151,170 for low-income families, $210,070 for middle-income fami-
lies and $293,400 for upper-income families. 5 Because their incomes
i. See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CHILDREN IN NEED: INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES FOR THE EDUCATIONALLY DISADVANTAGED 3 (1987) [hereinafter COMMITrEE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A
NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 25 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL
COMMISSION]; see generally CHAIRWOMAN OF SELECT COMMITTFEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAMILIES, 102D CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON A PLAN OF ACTION FOR FAMILIES: RESPONSE
TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (Comm. Print 1991) (Chairwoman Patricia Schroeder) [herein-
after CHAIRWOMAN'S REPORT]; SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,
10 1ST CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON U.S. CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES: CURRENT CONDI-
TIONS AND RECENT TRENDS, 1989 (Comm. Print 1989).
2. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ADOLESCENT
HEALTH: SUMMARY AND POLICY OPrIONS (1991).
3. Id.
4. See generally CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY:
INCREASING INCOME DISPARITIES SINCE 1977 (1991) [hereinafter SELECTIVE PROSPERITYI;
Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Chil-
dren, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Reclaiming the Tax Code].
5. FAMILY ECONOMICS RESEARCH GROUP, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Ex-
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have not kept pace with these costs, families are having much more diffi-
culty ensuring their children's healthy development, economic security
and preparation for productive participation in society.
Few families have gone untouched by these changes. The ranks of
the middle class have shrunk6 as the ranks of those living in poverty or
living on the edge and fearing poverty have swelled. 7 In recent months,
budget shortfalls, plant closings, other employment downturns and a
burgeoning health care crisis have increased the challenges confronting
families and children across the nation. The recession that officially be-
gan in August 1990, but which was being felt in regions of the country
long before then, has compounded the economic insecurity that Ameri-
can families live with on a daily basis.'
America's families have been hit with a double economic whammy
over the past ten years. A combination of federal, state, and local taxes,
along with social security taxes, is taking an even bigger bite out of fam-
ily income.9 At the same time, net incomes have stagnated or declined,
despite families' efforts to keep up by sending a second wage-earner into
the labor force.' 0 The economic entrapment of American families is in
part due to changes in the national economy. These changes have cre-
ated millions of new jobs in the service sector, but these jobs pay less
than the jobs they replaced in the manufacturing sector of the economy
and lack the long-term security and benefits, such as health insurance
and pensions, that in the past have been considered standard. I
The impact of this economic squeeze is far reaching. Real wages
have not grown since 1973. As a result, between 1977 and 1990, mid-
dle-income families saw their real income decline by six percent. For
moderate-income families, the drop was nine percent. After-tax de-
clines were even steeper, averaging an additional percentage point for
each income group. 12
Changes in federal tax policy added to the growing income disparity
between the very rich and the rest of Americans. According to a recent
study, the percentage of income paid in federal taxes by the richest one
percent of Americans will decline eighteen percent between 1977 and
1992, while the percentage of income that middle-income households
will pay will remain unchanged. 13 In 1988, the level of household debt
PENDITURES ON A CHILD By HUSBAND-WIFE FAMILIES: 1990 8 (1991). The estimate in-
cludes the costs of food, housing, transportation, clothing, health care, education, child
care and miscellaneous expenses. Id.
6. America's Families: Conditions, Trends, Hopes and Fears: Hearing Before the House Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (testimony of GregJ.
Duncan, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan).
7. See, e.g., William E. Schmidt, Hard Work Can't Stop Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1990, at 1; Leonard Silk, Bleak Job Picture Darkens the .1lood, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. l, 1991, at 2.
8. See generally CHAIRWOMAN'S REPORT, supra note I.
9. See generally Reclaiming the Tax Code, supra note 4.
10. See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID M. FRANKEL, ECONOMIC POI.ICY INSTITUTE,
TIlE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA (1991).
11. Id.; see also BENNETr HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN (1988).
12. Reclaiming the Tax Code, supra note 4.
13. See generally SELECTIVE PROSPERITY, sipra note 4.
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relative to disposable income reached a post-World War II high of
ninety-four percent.14 Skyrocketing prices for child care, housing, med-
ical care and college education also have contributed to the economic
squeeze on families. For example:
" Families spend more than $15 billion a year for child care,
not counting any subsidies that they might be receiving; 15
" The median sales price for existing single-family homes na-
tionwide rose from $23,000 in 1970 to $100,000 in Decem-
ber, 1991;
16
" Absent a major overhaul of the health care system, out-of-
pocket health care expenses for families are expected to in-
crease by 512% between 1980 and 2000, from $63 billion to
$386 billion, excluding the cost of health insurance premi-
ums;' 7 and
" The cost of a college education is rapidly becoming so ex-
pensive that families are having to go even deeper in debt to
pay for it. In 1976/77, the average annual cost of post-sec-
ondary education ranged from $1,935 at a public institution
to $3,977 at a private one. The comparable costs in 1989/90
were $4,979 and $12,348.18
The increasing tax burden carried by American families has further
tightened the squeeze. Rising prices for necessities and stagnating in-
come levels triggered an economic crisis for many families, and the in-
creasing tax burden on families exacerbated the problem. For too long,
America's families-especially middle-income families-have been foot-
ing more than their fair share of the nation's tax bill.
The shift in the tax burden away from corporations and the wealthi-
est of Americans to middle America, and particularly to families, is clear.
In 1967, federal revenues raised from corporate taxes were four percent
of the Gross National Product (GNP). About twenty years later, they
were half of that. During that same time period, social security payroll
taxes went up and personal income taxes took a bigger bite out of fami-
lies' take-home pay. As a result, even though the 1986 tax reform law
was supposed to lower taxes for all families, the effective tax rate for low
and middle-income families was higher in 1990 than it was in 1980.19
The current tax burden on families goes far beyond the original
federal income tax structure. In 1913, when the first federal income tax
act was passed, there was a $3,000 personal exemption for each taxpayer
14. See generally ROBERT POLLIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, DEEPER IN DEBT: THE
CHANGING FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS (1990).
15. MARTIN O'CONNELL & AMARA BACHU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WHO'S MINDING
THE KIDS? (1990).
16. GLENN E. CRELLIN, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, HOME SALES YEARBOOK
(1992).
17. See generally FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, EMERGENCY!: RISING HEALTH COSTS IN
AMERICA 1980-1990-2000 (1990).
18. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1991 (1992).
19. See Reclaiming the Tax Code, supra note 4.
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and a $1,000 exemption for his or her spouse. There was no dependent
exemption, but the standard tax rate was just one percent and accompa-
nied by a surtax of one to five percent. The high personal exemption
played the role of today's personal exemption and standard deduction
and it was large enough that only a small portion of citizens owed any
tax at all.
20
By 1948, the personal exemption was $600 for single taxpayers and
dependents and $1,200 for couples and heads-of-households. More im-
portantly, this per person $600 exemption equalled forty percent of per
capita personal income, resulting in a significant reduction in taxes for
families with dependent children.
2 1
Since that time, the value of these exemptions has eroded due to
inflation. Although the 1986 tax reform law doubled the personal and
dependent exemptions to $2,000 and indexed them for inflation (they
were $2,150 in 1991),22 they represent only eleven percent of per capita
personal income. Clearly, this modest increment was not enough to
make up for nearly forty years of erosion in the value of these exemp-
tions to families. In fact, the current equivalent of the 1948 $600 per-
sonal exemption would be nearly $7,800.23
Tax rates have also increased significantly. In 1948, median family
income for a family of four was $3,187, and families paid just three-
tenths of one percent of their income in federal income taxes. Social
security taxes were two percent of wages. By 1989, the median income
for a family of four had risen to $40,763, but families were paying more
than seven percent of their wages in social security taxes alone. All in
all, families were paying twenty-five percent of their incomes for federal,
state, local and social security taxes. This is nearly double the fourteen
percent tax burden of thirty years ago.
2 4
DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFrS FURTHER COMPROMISE FAMILIES' CAPACITY TO
RESPOND
In 1990, there were 65 million children under age eighteen and
66.3 million families living in the United States. 25 Today, families with
children comprise only thirty-five percent of all American households,
compared with forty-five percent in 1970 and thirty-eight percent in
1980.26 Children continue to decrease as a share of the entire popula-




23. See id. at 23 (statement of C. Eugene Steuerle, Senior Fellow, The Urban
Institute).
24. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PRO-
GRAMS, H.R. Doc. 29, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); ELAINE C. KAMARCK & WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, PUTTING CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAM-
iLY POLICY FOR THE 1990S (1990).
25. See generally O'CONNELL & BACHU, supra note 15.
26. Id.
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between 1980 and 1986, the number of preschool children increased by
nearly eleven percent and will continue to grow. 27 Minorities will con-
stitute an increasing proportion of all children, comprising nearly one in
four by the year 2010.28
Further, during the last decade, the proportion of children under
age eighteen whose mothers work outside the home increased from fifty-
three percent in 1980 to sixty-one percent in 1991. Fifty-four percent of
children under six have mothers in the labor force, and women with in-
fants make up the fastest growing group in the labor force. Two-thirds
of working fathers with children under the age of eighteen have wives in
the labor force. While the vast majority of single-parent families are
maintained by mothers only, just over one million families were main-
tained by single fathers.
29
NATIONAL RESPONSE IS LONG OVERDUE
While national debate about issues affecting children and families is
decades old, it has rightfully assumed a new urgency. The conditions of
America's children and their families have serious implications for the
health and well-being of the nation and its work force in the twenty-first
century.
The United States still has a higher percentage of children living in
poverty than either Western Europe or Canada. 30 Unlike most other
developed nations, the United States does not have a national health
program that provides medical care to virtually all of its population, yet
it spends a greater proportion of its wealth on health care than any other
country.
3 l
In comparison with our Western industrial neighbors and competi-
tors, the United States has fallen short time and again by failing to enact
a floor of support for families and children. A prime example of this
inaction is the Family and Medical Leave Act. It passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate in 1990, only to be vetoed by President
Bush. Both Houses have once again passed family leave legislation, and
now it awaits conference committee action to iron out differences. It
faces, however, the threat of another presidential veto.
Our nation's leadership and ability to compete in an increasingly
global economic system and the very survival of our democratic institu-
tions demand a thriving, healthy, educated and trained population. This
population must be ready and able to enter the labor market, remain
27. See Reclaiming the Tax Code, supra note 4.
28. Id.
29. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (unpublished personal com-
munication) (Mar., 1992).
30. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S WELL-BE-
ING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, H.R. REP. No. 628, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1990).
31. See Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Government Expenditures for Children and
Their Families in Advanced Industrialized Countries, 1960-85, Innocenti Occasional Papers, Eco-
nomic Policy Series, No. 20 (Florence, Italy) (Sept., 1991); CHAIRWOMAN'S REPORT, stupra
note 1.
[Vol. 69:3
FAMILY FRIENDLY NATIONAL POLICIES
there productively, participate in community life and function respon-
sibly. Leaders in all sectors of society-from the classrooms to the boar-
drooms to the halls of national and state governments around the
country-are calling attention to the critical conditions discussed above,
their costs and their serious implications for the future.
In 1991, the bipartisan National Commission on Children under-
scored its findings and recommendations saying that "at every age,
among all races and income groups and in communities nationwide,
many children are in jeopardy."'3 2 Several other eminent national com-
missions, including one headed by former Presidents Carter and Ford,
have echoed this alarm and called for placing children as high on the list
of national priorities as our national defense.
3 3
REALIGNMENT OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES REQUIRED
Notwithstanding the increased attention to children and families,
the nation's priorities for resources and development have far to go to
become aligned with the needs of the nation's families. Over the last
decade, the nation's priorities have fallen more out of sync with families.
Not only has the federal government failed to make needed investments
in successful and cost-saving interventions, but the implementation of
many policies and programs has proven distinctly unfriendly to families.
For example, the Select Committee has documented, in scores of hear-
ings and special reports, that families must often fill out numerous forms
and otherwise battle bureaucracies to obtain services or benefits to
which they are entitled.3 4 Service agencies are likewise besieged due to
overwhelming caseloads, lack of clear and family friendly policies, unco-
ordinated efforts and inadequate resources. In the face of a changed
world order, we have opportunities to reshape our nation's agenda and
redirect its resources.
SUCCESSFUL AND COST-EFFECTIVE PREVENTION PROGRAMS MAKE SOUND
INVESTMENTS
In recent years, researchers have turned more attention to the
problems facing America's children and families, and to possible solu-
tions. Research findings provide increasing evidence of effective pre-
vention and intervention strategies. Three federally supported efforts-
childhood immunization, Head Start and the Special Supplemental
Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC program) 35 -
have shown marked success and cost-savings and have garnered wide
bipartisan support in Congress and executive agencies, yet still cannot
32. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 1.
33. See FORD FOUNDATION, THE COMMON GOOD: SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE AMERICAN
FUTURE (1989); COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note I.
34. See generally The Risk)y Business of Adolescence." How to Help Teens Stay Safe, Hearing
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1992).
35. Head Start Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b, 1786
(1988).
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serve many who are eligible.3 6
Childhood Immunization
Eradication of the major childhood illnesses is among the most sig-
nificant medical breakthroughs of this century. Yet, large numbers of
non-immunized preschoolers threaten a return of communicable disease
outbreaks, which may seriously affect children's health as well as the
health of the general public. In 1985 (the latest year for which data are
available), at least twenty-five percent of children ages one to four were
not immunized against most childhood diseases. From a 1990 Centers
for Disease Control survey of first and fifth grade students in selected
cities, the percentage of children vaccinated by age two against measles
ranged from only fifty-one percent in Jersey City to seventy-nine percent
in Pittsburgh. As a result, the incidence of purely preventable childhood
diseases, such as measles, is on the rise-some 30,000 children fell vic-
tim to measles in 1990, with the highest incidence in the unvaccinated
preschool population. More children died of measles last year than in
any other year since 1971.3
7
Other countries manage to do much better. Immunization rates for
preschool children against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis average
forty-one percent higher in many Western European nations than in the
United States, and mean polio immunization rates are sixty-seven per-
cent above those in the United States.
38
From the 1960s through the 1980s, assessments of the immuniza-
tion program for children against the major diseases of rubella, mumps,
measles, polio, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis and meningitis showed
dramatic declines in the incidence of most of these childhood illnesses
because of widespread immunization. More than 23,000 cases of mental
retardation were prevented and 7,100 children's lives saved from 1963
to 1989 because of measles immunizations alone. 3 9 More than fourteen
dollars is saved for every one dollar invested in the measles, mumps and
rubella vaccine. The cost-benefit ratio for polio immunization is more
than ten to one. The Centers for Disease Control estimates that savings




Experts agree that investing in early intervention and prevention
programs improves academic and social achievement and is cost effec-
36. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, OPPORTUNITIES FOR
SUCCESS: COST-EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN, UPDATE 1990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS].
37. See NATIONAL VACCINE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, THE MEASLES EPIDEMIC: THE
PROBLEMS, BARRIERS AND RECOMMENDATIONS I (1991).
38. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, CHILD HEALTH: LES-
SONS FROM DEVELOPED NATIONS, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
39. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS, supra note 36, at 47-59.
40. Id.
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tive. 4 1 For the past twenty-five years, Head Start has topped the list of
successful federal programs and has provided an invaluable service to
millions of low-income children and their families. Head Start, estab-
lished in 1965 as a nationwide program, provides enriched early child-
hood education as well as a range of other health, nutrition and social
services to primarily low-income children before they enter school.
Head Start aims to reduce the differences in preparedness for formal
education between economically disadvantaged children and their more
advantaged peers.4 2 Today, 596,000 low-income children are served by
more than 1,300 schools and other designated community
organizations.
43
The benefits of Head Start are well documented. 44 Studies are vir-
tually unanimous that children show significant immediate gains in cog-
nitive ability, self-esteem, achievement motivation and social behavior as
a result of Head Start participation. Children who attended Head Start
are less likely to fail a grade in school or to be assigned to special educa-
tion than children never enrolled in Head Start. In addition, because
Head Start provides not only early childhood education, but compre-
hensive and intensive health and social support as well, children's health
and motor development are also improved. Head Start parents are also
engaged in their children's preschool education in a unique way through
the establishment of parent advisory councils and employment training
and job opportunities.
Given that only the most severely disadvantaged children can be
served by the program currently (in 1988, seventy-five percent of all
Head Start families had incomes below $9,000), the gains Head Start
children receive are even more impressive. Report after report from
government, universities, medical schools, business groups and think
tanks demonstrate that investments in prevention for our youngest,
most vulnerable children can save both lives and billions of dollars. The
Select Committee highlighted that every dollar invested in quality pre-
school education can return six dollars in savings because of lower costs
of special education, public assistance and crime.
4 5
Nevertheless, millions of children who could benefit most still fail to
receive these services. Recent expansions in Head Start authorize full
funding to ensure that all eligible preschoolers are served by fiscal year
1994, but such assurances are dependent on continued federal appro-
priations. Despite the $250 million increase Congress voted for Head
Start last year, at least seventy-five percent of eligible, low-income chil-
dren ages three to five are still excluded from the program. President
41. Id. at 61-72.
42. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, FEDERAL PROGRAMS
AFFECTING CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1990) [hereinafter
FEDERAL PROGRAMS].
43. ANNE STEWART, U.S. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, HEAD START: PERCENTAGE OF ELI-
GIBLE CHILDREN SERVED AND RECENT EXPANSIONS 2 (1991).
44. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS, supra note 36, at 61-72.
45. Id.
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Bush's fiscal year 1993 budget proposal to increase Head Start by $600
million will not allow all eligible four-year-olds to be served. Other pro-
posals currently under consideration, although more generous, also fall
far short of keeping on track for full support by 1994, much less 1996.46
Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)
WIC, first authorized in 1972 by amendment to the Child Nutrition
Act of 1966,4 7 provides nutritious supplemental foods to low-income
pregnant and postpartum women, infants and children up to age five,
who are determined to be at nutritional risk.4 8 In 1986, after much de-
lay, the Department of Agriculture released a five-year, $5 million, five-
volume study-the most comprehensive review ever undertaken of
WIC-that unmistakably documented significant effects of participation
in WIC.4 9 The study reported that WIC participation reduces fetal
deaths by one-third; reduces by up to twenty-five percent the number of
premature births among high risk and minority mothers; improves the
diets of pregnant women and children; brings more women into prena-
tal care earlier and improves the likelihood that children will have a reg-
ular source of medical care and be better immunized. The study also
showed evidence of improved cognitive development among infants of
participating WIC mothers and among preschoolers who became WIC
participants as infants. In addition, one of the four studies in the evalua-
tion, a historical study, found an increase in birth-weight of twenty-three
to forty-seven grams.
50
A five-state study based on 105,000 Medicaid births conducted by
the United States Department of Agriculture found that for every dollar
spent on the prenatal component of WIC, the associated savings in
Medicaid costs during the first sixty days after birth ranged from $1.77
to $3.13 for newborns and mothers, and from $2.84 to $3.90 for
newborns alone.5 1 In April 1992, the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO) reported additional evidence of WIC benefits. The GAO
study concluded that "prenatal WIC services reduced the rate of low
birthweight births by twenty-five percent," and further found that the
cost of the prenatal component is more than offset within the year fol-
lowing the appropriations of funds. Underscoring earlier findings, the
GAO estimated that the $296 million spent on prenatal WIC benefits in
1990 averted $853 million in health-related expenditures during the
first year of life and will avert $1.0 billion in these costs over an eight-
46. Unpublished Memorandum, Children's Defense Fund (1992) (on file with author).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1788 (1988).
48. See FEDERAL PROGRAMS, supra note 42, at 77.
49. See generally FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE NA-
TIONAL WIC EVALUATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL FOOD PROGRAM
FOR WOMEN, INFANTS, AND CHILDREN (1986).
50. Id.
51. See generally FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE SAV-
INGS IN MEDICAID COSTS FOR NEWBORNS AND THEIR MOTHERS FROM PRENATAL PARTICIPA-
TION IN THE WIC PROGRAM, VOL. 1 (1990).
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een-year period. 52
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that in fiscal year 1991,
4.7 million pregnant and postpartum women, infants and children up to
age five would receive WIC benefits. 53 Despite the demonstrated suc-
cess of the WIC program, forty-five percent of all low-income, nutrition-
ally at-risk women, infants and children cannot receive benefits because
the program is not fully funded.
COST OF INACTION DWARFS COST OF EARLY INVESTMENT
Keeping the commitment to fund these core interventions fully by
fiscal year 1996 would cost far less than the estimated fiscal costs of ne-
glect. Those costs are estimated at:
* In one year, functionally illiterate adults cost $224 billion in
welfare payments, crime, poor job performance and remedial
education;
54
" Each year's class of high school dropouts will cost the nation
$240 billion in lost earnings and foregone taxes over their
lifetimes;
5 5
* Lost economic productivity attendant to illness and early
death compounds the impact of rising health care expendi-
tures. In 1980, the total costs of illness equalled nearly
eighteen percent of GNP;
56
* According to an unpublished report of the White House
Task Force on Infant Mortality, each of the nearly 40,000 in-
fant deaths each year represents an estimated $380,000 in
lost productivity;
5 7
" Low birth-weight in newborns costs federal, state and local
governments at least $370 million a year for special
education;
5 8
" As childhood communicable diseases escalate among
preschoolers who are not immunized, so do the costs. The
cost of treating congenital rubella syndrome alone is
$354,000 over a lifetime.
5 9
52. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EARLY INTERVENTION: FEDERAL IN-
VESTMENTS LIKE WIC CAN PRODUCE SAVINGS (Apr., 1992).
53. Letters from Congressional Budget Office to Representative Patricia Schroeder,
Chairwoman, Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families (July 26, 1991 and July
30, 1991) (on file with author).
54. See Literacy in the United States: The Overview, YOUTH POLICY INSTITUTE NEWSLETTER
33 (Nov./Dec. 1990) (Youth Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.).
55. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS, supra note 36, at 80; COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
56. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTHY
PEOPLE 2000 5 (1990) [hereinafter HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000].
57. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 21 (Nov.
30, 1989).
58. See STEPHEN CHAIKIND & HOPE CORMAN, THE SPECIAL EDUCATION COSTS OF Low
BIRTHWEIGHT (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Working Paper No. 3461,
1990).
59. HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000, supra note 56, at 5.
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PUBLIC PROGRAMS AND POLICIES REQUIRE BErER ENFORCEMENT AND
RESPONSIVENESS TO FAMILIES
Resetting priorities and investing in young children and families are
needed strategies to improve the circumstances of the nation's children
and their families. However, further action is needed to make sure that
commitments are kept. The Select Committee has increased its efforts
to ensure that government and other consumer services fulfill their
promises and responsibilities to America's children, youth and families
and that they are safe and friendly to the families who depend on them.
We want to know whether programs designed to work for families actu-
ally work for them or work them over. If policies or programs come up
short, are they really being implemented properly, or should they be
redesigned or eliminated? For example, Congress enacted landmark
child care legislation in 1990,60 establishing two new child care pro-
grams that will send new federal dollars to the states to help subsidize
child care for low and moderate-income families, keep families who are
in danger of becoming welfare-dependent employed and improve the
quality of child care. However, implementing regulations proposed by
the Administration severely limit the ability of the states to ensure that
families who receive child care subsidies under the programs will have
access to safe child care.
6 1
For example, the legislation for the At-Risk Child Care Program ex-
pressly prohibits states from imposing health and safety protections for
child care funded under this program that do not apply to similar, un-
subsidized care. 6 2 Since all states allow some unregulated care (e.g., a
provider who cares for a small number of children is not required to be
licensed), states will not be able to ensure that children in subsidized
care are in safe environments. In another recent effort, the Select Com-
mittee propelled the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to act on a truck underride safety regulation to provide
greater safety to children and families on the road. The NHTSA had let
the regulation languish for nearly two dozen years.
6 3
There is no question that much remains to be done. The Select
Committee pursues this agenda of reshaping national priorities, invest-
ing in proven programs and making public policies and programs really
work for children and families by engaging all sectors of society. Fami-
lies, their government, employers and the independent sector all must
contribute to and, ultimately, be held accountable for solutions.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-603, 9801, 9858 (1988).
61. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHILD CARE: IMPLEMENTING REGULA-
TIONS FOR NEW FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1991).
62. 56 Fed. Reg. 29,054 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 255 and 257) (pro-
posed June 25, 1991).
63. Automotive Safety: Are lWe Doing Enough to Protect America s Families ?: Hearing before the
House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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The disease now threatening our society is almost unprecedented in
human history. It does not discriminate and is so widespread that it af-
fects all countries and all people. If you think that it is Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),I you are wrong. AIDS is a terrible
threat, but it can be controlled. Unfortunately, however, nothing pre-
vents the spread of the Acute FeaR of AIDS, or AFRAIDS. It is this
AIDS hysteria that is the truly great danger to society.
Americans are more fearful today than they were in the early twenti-
eth century when polio crippled so many. At that time, the fear had
some basis. Polio spread from child to child, and for a long time no one
knew how. AIDS is incurable, 2 but its means of transmission is well un-
derstood. It spreads from person to person only when bodily fluids,
blood or sexual secretions are shared.
3
The cure for AIDS hysteria, and for AIDS itself, is the understand-
ing, enlightenment and modification of behavior that will come with
learning the truth about the disease. We can reduce the fear of AIDS by
educating people about how to prevent the spread of the disease-most
transmissions are preventable 4-and by dispelling the myth that AIDS is
* Associate Professor, College of Education, Cleveland State University.
1. AIDS is a disease of the immune system. It destroys the body's ability to combat
certain opportunistic infections and cancers. For a more complete description of the dis-
ease, see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LEGAL, MEDICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS
AS A DISABILITY (David Rapoport et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS].
2. AIDS fatality figures are often presented in an inadvertently misleading manner.
At any given moment, the total number of reported cases of AIDS is much larger than the
total number of people who have died from the disease. Thus, if a report states that 9,000
deaths have occurred out of 18,000 reported cases, the inference is that only half of those
who develop AIDS will die as a result of the disease. Yet, the truth is that the 9,000 victims
who are still alive are simply the more recent cases. Eventually they too will die. Robert
Roden, Note, Educating Through the Law: The Los Angeles AIDS Discrimination Ordinance, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1410, 1416 n.48 (1986).
By 1986, 25,000 known AIDS victims had died. By November 10, 1991, 202,843 cases
of AIDS had been reported, resulting in 130,687 deaths. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT (November 30, 1991). Statistics are available from
the Centers for Disease Control by telephone at (404) 330-3020. These numbers un-
doubtedly will continue to increase. AIDS is the most severe disease that has ever affected
mankind.
3. ROBERTA WEINER, AIDS: IMPACT ON THE SCHOOLS 10 (1986). The virus is easily
killed outside the body, since it is more fragile than bacteria, and can be destroyed by
common disinfectants such as bleach and Lysol. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING THE TRANSMISSION OF AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE, INCLUDING
SCHOOLS (reproduced in WEINER, supra at 135, 146). See also PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra
note 1. at 3 (stating that intact skin is an absolute barrier to the AIDS virus).
4. PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 8.
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exclusively the disease of homosexuals and intravenous (IV) drug users.
AIDS is now a global problem, and its victims come from all levels and
segments of society.
5
Compounding the problem is the fact that an increasingly dispro-
portionate number of AIDS victims in the United States are members of
minorities, especially children. Blacks and Hispanics account for over
forty percent of reported AIDS cases.
6
This Article examines the impact of AIDS on schools and on the
lives of school children. The discussion focuses on recent developments
in AIDS law and the effects of these developments on primary and sec-
ondary public education, where the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
of due process and equal protection attach directly. It analyzes state and
local statutes 7 and AIDS policies, as well as national policies such as
those recommended by the Centers for Disease Control, in light of med-
ical research, economics, politics and the United States Constitution. It
also discusses discrimination against the handicapped, statutory enact-
ments, mandatory testing, board of education rules, the authority of de-
partments of health and other school district issues. The Article closes
with a series of recommendations regarding AIDS education in the
schools.
I. SCHOOL CHILDREN WITH AIDS
A. Incidence and Means of Transmission
The number of AIDS cases among boys and girls who were under
thirteen when they contracted the disease is growing at an alarming rate.
The Centers for Disease Control reported 3,426 cases among children
as of November 30, 1991.8 Nearly one-fourth of these children acquired
the disease through IV drug use or sexual contact. Most children with
AIDS, however, contracted it in utero.9 This suggests that at least one
parent was an IV drug user with AIDS. As IV drug use increases, result-
ing in more AIDS cases, the number of children with AIDS is also likely
to increase.
Pre-school children who have Human Immune Deficiency Virus
(HIV)-the virus that causes AIDS-acquired it in one of two ways: they
were born to infected mothers' ° or they received infusions of infected
5. Although linked in the United States with male homosexuals, who were its pri-
mary victims at first, AIDS has been discovered in heterosexuals, infants, women and mi-
norities. Roden, supra note 2, at 1413.
6. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 2. See also Samuel R. Friedman et al., The
AIDS Epidemic Among Blacks and Hispanics, 65 MILBANK Q. 455 (1987).
7. Ohio education statutes, which are similar to those of many other states, will be
used in this Article to illustrate state policy regarding AIDS in the schools.
8. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 2.
9. Laurence Lavin et al., Health Benefits: How the System is Responding to Aids, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 724 (1988) [hereinafter Health Benefits].
10. HIV can be transmitted only under very specific conditions. Carried in the blood,
it is most often spread through sexual contact or the use of infected IV needles. It can also
be transmitted from an infected mother to a fetus developing in utero or to a newborn
infant. The most direct means of exposure to infected blood is a blood transfusion. PER-
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blood. I ' Most AIDS cases transmitted this way are diagnosed by age
two.12 Children born with the virus may become ill, periodically, with
one of the physical conditions associated with AIDS, such as a depressed
immune system.' 3 Many die less than a year after they are attacked by
an opportunistic infection, but some ultimately recover and remain well.
There is no reason why a child whose physical stamina is excellent
should not be allowed to remain in school with his or her unaffected
peers. 14
The argument usually made for keeping children with AIDS out of
school is that they will spread the disease to others. The only valid argu-
ment, however, is that the child with AIDS needs protection. The
chance that a classmate or school employee will "catch" AIDS is negligi-
ble compared with the chance that the student with AIDS will "catch" an
opportunistic infection like a cold, or any other germ, and die. 15
Much of the fear that school children will infect their peers centers
on the possibility that a sick child will bite a healthy one. 16 The medical
consensus, however, is that biting is an unlikely route of transmission.
The concentration of the virus is low in saliva, and young children have
a minimum capacity to penetrate the skin deeply enough for the virus to
enter the circulatory system through the wound. 17 In fact, no record
exists of a child having received HIV from another child, either at home
SPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 4; AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC
(Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) at 31 [hereinafter AIDS AND THE LAW].
11. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 24.
12. WEINER, supra note 3, at 19.
13. AIDS-affected individuals include asymptomatic carriers, persons with AIDS-Re-
lated Complex (ARC) and persons with AIDS. Asymptomatic carriers of the HIV virus-
those in whom the virus is dormant-are extremely dangerous because they have no rea-
son to believe they are infected. They do not change their behavior and may unknowingly
transmit the disease to others. The Centers for Disease Control estimate that more than
one million people are asymptomatic carriers of the virus. WEINER, supra note 3, at 14.
Persons with ARC have symptoms indicating lowered immunity, such as weight loss,
fatigue and swollen lymph nodes. ARC can eventually develop into a full-blown case of
AIDS. Persons with AIDS are unable to resist infection because their immune systems are
affected by opportunistic diseases such as pneumocystis pneumonia, tuberculosis and
Karposi's sarcoma, a type of cancer that attacks the skin and then spreads to the lymph
nodes, lungs and gastrointestinal tract. The incubation period for the disease-the time
between the initial infection of the virus and the onset of AIDS-is more than nine years.
AIDS is fatal, on average, two years after diagnosis.
There are many fewer persons with AIDS than there are asymptomatic carriers and
persons with ARC. Ironically, people who are afraid of AIDS fear acquiring the disease
from a person with AIDS, even though asymptomatic carriers or those with ARC can as
easily infect others. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S RE-
PORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1986).
14. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 339 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
15. Verla S. Neslund et al., The Role of CDC in the Development of AIDS Recommendations
and Guidelines, AMAJ. LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Summer 1987, at 76; WEINER, supra note
3, at 29.
16. Acting on the recommendation of their AIDS medical teams, some schools have
placed AIDS children who have a history of biting in home instruction. Yet research data
and medical opinion support this approach only in the cases of HIV-infected children who
are physically assaultive or incontinent or have weeping (wet) skin lesions. WEINER, supra
note 3, at 29.
17. If a biting does occur, the virus can be destroyed by carefully washing the wound
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or in school.' 8
Although biting is not considered dangerous by the medical profes-
sion, school boards take such occurrences seriously. A child with AIDS
who bites an uninfected child may cause hysteria among parents and
stigma for the families involved. This parental concern is real in the
sense that HIV is found in saliva. ' 9 Thus, an AIDS-infected child's his-
tory of biting is a valid criterion for denying that child admission to
school.
B. The AIDS Crisis and Students' Civil Rights
School officials should be sensitive to the fear and social stigma that
children or school personnel with AIDS may experience if information
about their condition is released, or if false information is transmitted.
20
They should also be mindful of other rights of persons with AIDS and of
the concerns of children and employees about contracting AIDS in the
school environment, and they need to make realistic plans for managing
the school in light of the disease.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have restricted
some of the rights of school children, compared with those of adults,
possibly because the Court believes that educators need authority to
control and regulate increasingly aggressive, crime-prone youth. In New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 2 1 the Court reduced the adult standard of probable
cause to "reasonable suspicion" in a Fourth Amendment challenge of a
student search. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2 2 the Court al-
lowed a school to regulate sexually explicit language through its "dis-
ruptive conduct rule." Bethel clearly gave school officials much greater
discretion in controlling student expression than government agencies
ordinarily would be allowed in controlling adult expression. Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier23 upheld a high school principal's decision to
prevent publication of portions of the school newspaper. A reasonable-
ness standard, not strict scrutiny, was applied to this curtailment of mi-
nors' freedom of speech in a school setting. Evidently the landmark
1969 Tinker decision, 24 which extended students' rights, has been seri-
ously eroded, challenged, and some would argue, eviscerated as a result
of these recent Court rulings.
with soap and water, followed by a disinfectant such as alcohol. WEINER, supra note 3, at
189.
18. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 35.
19. WEINER, supra note 3, at 19.
20. Falsely accusing someone of having a "loathesome disease" such as AIDS consiti-
tutes defamation in most states. A school employee or a prospective employee could sue
for defamation if he or she were wrongly accused of having AIDS or referred to in deroga-
tory comments about lifestyle or job performance.
21. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
22. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
23. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that school officials' ban against students wearing black armbands was an unreasonable
regulation of the students' form of expression).
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1. The Right to Privacy
When a student (or another person) with AIDS is publicly identi-
fied, his or her constitutional right to privacy 2 5 may be violated. In
some states, students generally are protected by a statute providing that
school officials may not release or permit access to personally identify-
ing information (other than directory information) concerning any pupil
attending a public school, without the written consent of a parent,
guardian or custodian, or the written consent of a pupil who is over
eighteen years old.
26
Student records receive additional federal protection. The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)2 7 is much more detailed
than most of the state rights and privacy acts that track FERPA. This
federal law, known as the Buckley Amendment, provides students over
eighteen years of age and their parents the right to inspect and review
educational records, 28 to challenge information 29 and to prohibit the
disclosure of selected records.
30
State privacy protections such as the Ohio Public Records Act 3' and
the Ohio Privacy Act 3 2 usually do not extend to the administrative use of
public school records by authorized school employees, a court or the
federal government.3 3 This creates a problem when a student's records
are transferred to another school. To forward student records in the
standard manner may violate the student's constitutional right of privacy
by making it possible for his condition to become public knowledge
without his consent.3 4 Therefore, the records of a student with AIDS
should be transmitted under special cover directly to an official in the
receiving school who has a "need to know." Otherwise, no one should
be privy to the information.
In Doe v. Borough of Barrington,3 5 a federal district court held that
disclosure of an AIDS victim's condition to people with whom the victim
had not even had casual contact violated that person's Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy. An earlier Fourth Circuit opinion ac-
knowledged the right to privacy but held that the student plaintiff's pri-
vacy was not invaded by a school board policy of AIDS disclosure in
25. See Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 539 (N.Y. 1987) (listing court decisions that
have found a constitutional right to privacy regarding decisions relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception and personal contact).
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.321 (Anderson Supp. 1991). Interestingly, Ohio
law provides less protection for school employees' records than for students' records,
since the public's "right to know" allows anyone to see the public record of a school em-
ployee, with some exceptions.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1984).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (a)(l)(A) (1984).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (a)(2) (1984).
30. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(l)-(2) (1984).
31. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(B) (Anderson 1990).
32. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.09 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
33. Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.321(C) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
34. WEINER, supra note 3, at 92.
35. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
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untraceable and general terms.3 6
2. The Right to Education
Schools must also deal with the right of students with AIDS to at-
tend school. Courts rarely disturb the judgment of a school board in the
exercise of its duties as long as it acted in good faith and its decision was
not arbitrary, unreasonable or in clear violation of the law. 3 7 A court
might intervene, however, when a school tries to exclude pupils with
AIDS or ARC. Injunctive relief has been granted liberally to children
with AIDS who wish to attend regular school classes, 38 and courts have
overturned school board attempts to exclude students with AIDS from
the classroom. In California, for example, parents of an infected child
brought an action against school officials who denied the child attend-
ance in regular kindergarten classes. 39 The court held that in the ab-
sence of evidence that he posed a significant risk of harm to his
kindergarten classmates or teachers, the child could attend regular
classes. In Florida, parents of three hemophiliac, asymptomatic school
children sought a preliminary injunction against the school's segrega-
tion of the children from a regular classroom setting, alleging violations
of the federal Rehabilitation Act, Florida statutes and the Florida and
United States Constitutions.40 The court granted the injunction, unless
and until it could be established that the children posed a real and valid
threat to the school population. In Illinois, a student with AIDS was
excluded from classes and given a home tutor. Alleging discrimination,
the student brought suit against the school district and board of educa-
tion. The court held that the student was not required to exhaust ad-




Children with AIDS may seek admission to a classroom setting
under the Equal Protection Clause,42 which prohibits state governments
from treating similarly situated persons differently. Children with AIDS
or ARC and children who have had no exposure to the virus may be
considered similarly situated because neither group can transmit the dis-
36. Child v. Spillane, 875 F.2d 314 (Table) (4th Cir. 1989) (text in WESTLAW).
37. See, e.g., Brannon v. Board of Educ., 124 N.E. 235 (Ohio 1919). See also 68 AM.
JUR. 2D Schools § 52 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002
(S.D. Ill. 1988).
39. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See
also Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1987) (court upheld state commis-
sioner's decision to overrule local school boards' exclusion of students with AIDS).
40. Ray v. School Dist. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987). One
child was given homebound instruction; the others were segregated from their classmates
at school.
41. Doe v. Belleville Public Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Iil. 1987).
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ease in a normal, unrestricted school setting. Whether, in a particular
case, segregating children with AIDS violates their right to equal protec-
tion will be decided according to the standard the court applies-strict
scrutiny or rational basis.
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review employed when equal
protection is at issue. It requires a close relation between the state inter-
est and the means chosen to achieve it. The state could attempt to jus-
tify barring children with AIDS from regular classrooms by claiming a
compelling government interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.
Since the overwhelming weight of medical authority indicates that AIDS
cannot be spread by causal contact, however, the state's action would
not survive the strict scrutiny test. 4 3 In any event, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny only when a fundamental right is affected. Education is
not explicitly protected by the United States Constitution and, there-
fore, does not merit protection as a fundamental right.
44
When a classification does not merit strict scrutiny, the courts apply
the rational basis test. The test is whether a reasonable basis exists for
treating children with AIDS differently from noninfected children in the
context of regular classroom attendance. 45 Courts usually defer to a
state assertion of power to protect the public health. 46 Medical opinion
cannot guarantee that AIDS will not be transmitted in a classroom set-
ting. A state may be justified, therefore, under the rational basis test, in
barring or segregating children with AIDS from regular classroom at-
tendance, even though such action might be deemed "unwise" or have
an "unequal result."
Thus, courts probably will apply a rational basis test, not strict scru-
tiny, to the issue of whether children with AIDS should be allowed in the
classroom. Further, courts using the traditional rational basis test are
likely to support any state practice intended to protect the public health.
Interestingly, a New York court used a rational basis test to uphold an
anti-discriminatory school board policy. 4 7 The plaintiffs were not ag-
43. Alternatively, the state might argue that fear of AIDS and its disruptive conse-
quences are an adequate reason for dissimilar treatment of a similarly situated class. As
yet, however, the Supreme Court has not endorsed the view that popular opinion should
override the Equal Protection Clause. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
44. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Street v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) can be interpreted to sug-
gest that school children with AIDS should be protected from discrimination by height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In Brown, the Supreme Court
recognized "intangible" factors in segregating students, including stigmatization and feel-
ings of inferiority. These intangible factors also apply to children with AIDS who are seg-
regated from the regular classroom. For an extended discussion, see Susan A. Winchell,
Discrimination in the Public Schools: Dick and Jane Have AIDS, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881
(1988).
46. E.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170 n.44 (Alaska 1972) (schools may exclude
students with contagious diseases from class).
47. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986).
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grieved students, but two local community school boards. Based on a
New York City Board of Education policy that forbade the automatic
exclusion of students with AIDS from the city schools, 4 8 a seven-year-
old student with AIDS was permitted to remain in school. The local
community boards sought injunctive relief to prevent the student's at-
tendance and to require disclosure of the student's name and school.
The court found that an automatic exclusion was not required because
AIDS is not a communicable disease under city or state health statutes;
4 9
that using the required case-by-case determination of the placement of
students with AIDS did not violate state or federal laws relating to hand-
icapped children; 50 and that the requested disclosure of the name of the
child with AIDS would violate city and state health laws.
5 1
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a court should deter-
mine whether a rational basis exists for refusing to admit any category of
AIDS patient to school. Because medical experts agree that AIDS "is
not transmitted by casual interpersonal contact or airborne spread,"
52
there is no rational basis to support a decision to exclude a typical stu-
dent with AIDS.
4. Other Theories that Favor Keeping AIDS-Infected Children
in School
Other theories appear viable for the purpose of protecting students
with AIDS, though they have not yet been developed in any reported
cases. The Due Process Clause 5 3 requires that proper notice and hear-
ing be given before a person is deprived of a property right such as
school attendance, or the liberty rights of privacy and reputation. Be-
cause of the emotion involved in AIDS situations, victims' procedural
due process rights may be ignored. Further, given the unanimity of
medical testimony, a decision to remove or segregate a student with
AIDS is arbitrary, capricious and a violation of the student's substantive
due process rights.
Using the federal guidelines issued in 1985 by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control, 54 many school districts have adopted a case-by-case ap-
48. Id. at 328. No change in placement could occur except when recommended by a
committee that had reviewed the case to determine whether the child posed a threat to
others.
49. Id. at 333. In 1979, the Second Circuit prevented the New York City School
Board from segregating 50 children with hepatitis B, which is far more communicable than
AIDS. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
1979).
50. District 27 Community Sch. Bd., 502 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
51. Id. at 340-41.
52. Id. at 330. See also Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); and
Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V, applied to the states by amend. XIV, § 1.
54. In August 1985, the Centers for Disease Control published two sets of guidelines
for schools-one for employees, based on the Centers' general guidelines for the trans-
mission of AIDS in the workplace, and one for students. The guidelines advise schools to
keep students with the virus in the classroom. For most school-age children with AIDS,
the benefits of attending school outweigh the risk of catching infections from other stu-
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proach. The guidelines suggest that schools exclude only children
whose behavior might expose uninfected children to the virus. They
also suggest that a team composed of the child's doctor, a public health
official, the child's parent or guardian and a representative of the school
make that determination.
Unless intervention is warranted, 5 5 schools officials can ease the
psychological pain suffered by a student with AIDS by allowing him or
her to remain at school, free of the stigma associated with the disease.
5 6
Many terminal cancer patients live much longer than expected when
they are given support to pursue as many of their normal activities as
they can. By analogy, the same would be true for AIDS-infected chil-
dren. Engaging in their normal activities enhances not only the quality
of their lives but also their will to live.
C. Federal Protection for Handicapped Children
The Rehabilitation Act 5 7 was enacted in 1973 to protect handi-
capped people. Section 504 has been used successfully in AIDS cases. 58
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-
142), 59 like the Rehabilitation Act, was intended to discourage institu-
tions from discriminating against the handicapped. While both § 504
and P.L. 94-142 protect individuals with physical, emotional or intellec-
tual handicaps, § 504 goes beyond these handicaps to include individu-
als addicted to alcohol or drugs. Additionally, while P.L. 94-142 has
jurisdiction over handicapped students ages three to twenty-one, § 504
extends their civil rights protection to the adult work environment. To
qualify as handicapped under P.L. 94-142, students initially must com-
plete a formal evaluation establishing them as students with specific con-
ditions. In contrast, § 504 does not require anyone to be formally
evaluated before being designated as handicapped; being perceived as
having a handicap is sufficient.
dents, and the benefits certainly outweigh "the apparent nonexistent risk" of other stu-
dents contracting AIDS from them. A more restricted environment is recommended for
pre-school age children, neurologically handicapped children and those who lack control
of their body secretions, who bite others or who have open lesions. For a more complete
discussion see PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 38-40. The two sets of guidelines
are reproduced in WEINER, supra note 3, at 127-50.
55. In Ohio, a rarely-used provision grants emergency power to a city health district.
In cases of emergency caused by epidemics of contagious or infectious diseases, or condi-
tions or events endangering the public health, a city board of health may issue orders and
regulations, effective immediately, necessary for the public health or the prevention or
restriction of disease. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.20 (Anderson 1992).
56. WEINER, supra note 3, at 126.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
58. The Ninth Circuit strongly supported the use of § 504 in Chalk v. United States
Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). The court declared that Victor Chalk, a teacher
who had "full-blown" AIDS, was handicapped but otherwise qualified to teach. Chalk was
permitted to return to his classroom.
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
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1. The Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance ...... 60 The Act defines a handi-
capped person as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's ma-
jor life activities, and (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 6 1 An "otherwise qualified"
person is "able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of this
handicap."
62
Section 504 requires an employer-or an educational agency-to
make any "reasonable accommodation" necessary that allows the per-
son to perform the assigned tasks, thereby making the person "other-
wise qualified" under the Act.63 The Supreme Court has defined
"reasonable accommodation" as not imposing undue financial and ad-
ministrative burdens, or not requiring "a fundamental alteration in the
nature of [the] program. ' ' 4
What must a school district do, under § 504, to provide a free, equi-
table and nondiscriminatory education for students with AIDS? In Ray
v. School District of DeSoto County, a federal district court ordered a school
district to enroll three brothers-hemophiliacs who carried the AIDS vi-
rus-in a regular classroom setting "[u]nless and until it can be estab-
lished that these boys pose a real and valid threat to the school
population of DeSoto County."'6 5 Although it did not address family
homebound instruction directly, the court determined that this alterna-
tive would violate § 504 because the brothers were otherwise qualified
for regular classroom placement.
6 6
In Martinez v. School Board of Hillsbrough County, Florida, however, the
same court decided that a six-year-old mentally retarded student with
AIDS-related complex (ARC) should be placed in a homebound pro-
gram rather than in a regular classroom. 6 7 Along with her other disabil-
ities, she was incontinent, drooled continually and sucked her thumb or
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
61. Id. § 706(8)(B). A "physical impairment" is "any physiological disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lym-
phatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1991). "Major life activities" are
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1991).
62. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1991).
64. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410.
65. 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
66. See also Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. I1. 1987)
(a student with AIDS was otherwise qualified to attend school in a regular classroom set-
ting rather than with the home tutor that the school district offered).
67. 675 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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finger. 68 The court held that it must weigh the public interest in pro-
tecting health against the child's interest in an education:
[T]he specific potential harm to others clearly outweighs the
interests of plaintiff, and . . . the public interest in this case
weighs in favor of not returning Eliana Martinez to a classroom
setting. Where, as here, there is any question as to whether the public
safety and welfare is threatened, the Court must rule on the side of that
public interest.
69
Whether a child infected with AIDS was otherwise qualified to at-
tend a regular kindergarten class, within the meaning of § 504, was at
issue in a recent California case. 70 Ryan Thomas, who had AIDS, at-
tended a regular kindergarten class without incident for three days. On
the fourth day he bit another child on the leg. Although the other
child's skin was not broken, Ryan was removed from the classroom and
was required to undergo a psychological evaluation. 7 1 The court con-
cluded that Ryan was handicapped within the meaning of § 504 but was
otherwise qualified to attend the regular kindergarten class. 7 2 The rul-
ing was based on a psychologist's finding that though Ryan might be
prone to aggressive behavior because of his undeveloped language and
social skills, there was no indication that he would bite another student
again. 7 3 Weighing Ryan's rights and needs against the safety of the
other students, the court concluded that Ryan's rights should prevail.
74
When local school boards challenged the New York City Board of
Education's policy against automatic exclusion of children with AIDS, a
state court upheld the policy, basing its decision, in part, on § 504.
7 5
The court agreed with the New York City Board that no rational basis
existed for automatically excluding all students with AIDS and that each
student was entitled to a review to determine whether he or she was
otherwise qualified to attend school in a regular setting.
76
Section 504 was used successfully to force a federally financed voca-
tional instruction center to admit a known Hepatitis B carrier. 77 The
plaintiff, Kohl, a blind, mentally retarded adult, exhibited behavior
problems, including scratching and biting. He claimed that he met the
§ 504 criteria for handicap and that he was otherwise qualified for ad-
mission to the program. The court agreed, finding that Kohl, was enti-
tled to admission to the vocational program despite his behavior
problems. Further, the accommodation required for his enrollment was
68. Id. at 1576.
69. Id. at 1582.
70. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
71. Id. at 380.
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id. at 380-81. ,
74. Id. at 381-82.
75. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
76. Id. at 335.
77. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 672 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Mo. 1987) cert. denied,
493 U.S. 892 (1989).
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reasonable in view of the defendant school's four million-dollar budget
and the minimal cost of inoculating the affected employees. 7s The
court's reasoning in Kohl, if applied, would protect persons with AIDS in
public schools, since public schools are instrumentalities of the state.
2. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-
142)79 was enacted to ensure that handicapped individuals between the
ages of three and twenty-one would receive a free and appropriate pub-
lic education.8 0 Public Law 94-142 defines special education as "spe-
cially designed instruction at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet
the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruc-
tion, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction
in hospitals and institutions.- 8 1 The Act requires that each student be
provided an individual education program 82 that specifies the least re-
strictive environment in which his or her education can effectively take
place.8 3 Mainstreaming, where the student is placed in a regular pro-
gram for as much time as possible, is strongly encouraged.
84
Case law has established that if P.L. 94-142 is to apply in an AIDS
case, the child must display "limited strength, vitality, or alertness,
which adversely affects [his] educatonal performance. ' 85 A handi-
capped child who has AIDS cannot be refused admission to the least
restrictive environment for the handicapping condition.8 6 The Act enti-
tles all handicapped children to a public education, regardless of the
severity of their handicapping condition.
8 7
A mentally handicapped child with Down's syndrome who was also
a Hepatitis B carrier successfully relied on P.L. 94-142 in Community High
School District v. Denz.88 The court upheld an independent hearing of-
78. Id. at 1232-33. The cost for inoculation was projected at $10,000 to $12,000 ini-
tially plus $4,500 for each future year based on expected employee turnover.
79. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
80. The purpose of the Act was to assure that all handicapped children have access to
a free appropriate public education "which emphasizes special education and related serv-
ices designed to meet their needs;" to protect the rights of handicapped children and their
parents and to assist states and localities in providing for the education of handicapped
children. Id. § 1400(c).
81. Id. § 1401(16) (1988).
82. Id. § 1401(19) (1988).
83. Id. § 1412(5)(1988).
84. Id. (states required to establish procedures to assure that, "to the maximum ex-
tent appropriate, handicapped children .. . are educated with children who are not
handicapped").
85. Doe v. Belleville Public Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
86. Parents of Child, Code No. 870901W v. Coker, 676 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (E.D.
Okla. 1987). The child had been diagnosed with emotional problems and had also tested
positive for the HIV virus. The court held that the student was handicapped under the
definitions of P.L. 94-142, that the emotional disability classroom was the least restrictive
environment and that the student could not be refused admission to the school system's
class for emotionally disturbed students.
87. Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 983 (1989).
88. 463 N.E.2d 998 (1984).
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ficer's order requiring mainstreaming in a special education center,
which was the least restrictive environment for the child's educational
needs. The court held that in view of the child's behavioral history and
the individualized instruction program at the center, the risk of transmit-
ting hepatitis did not outweigh the injury to the student if she remained
isolated from her peers.
89
A plaintiff who brings an action under P.L. 94-142 usually is re-
quired to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to a judicial hearing.
Courts have begun to recognize, however, that for AIDS victims, the
procedural sequence specified in P.L. 94-142 must perforce be circum-
vented.90 Time is the most valuable commodity of children with AIDS,
and society must ensure that time is used to make their lives as normal
and comfortable as possible.
II. TEACHERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
A. The Right to Privacy
Like students, teachers9 ' and other school employees who may have
AIDS or who are concerned about infection have a right to privacy.
Their personnel records are protected by state statutes. 92 School em-
ployees' personnel records are provided additional protections in many
states by collective bargaining agreements between boards of education
and teachers' unions. Nevertheless, much of the information in a
teacher's personnel file is available to the public on request in states
where state law considers a public employee's personnel file a "public
record."'9 3 In these states the general public's right to know usually
prevails over a school employee's right of privacy.
94
Although untested, it seems clear that in Ohio, at least, a school
employee with AIDS could protect his or her records based on a three-
part balancing test analysis used in non-AIDS cases to resolve potential
conflicts between the privacy act and the public records statute. The test
requires the court to consider whether disclosure of the information
would result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how serious the invasion
would be; whether the public would be served by disclosure and whether
the information is available from other sources. 95 Doubt as to whether
disclosure is proper is resolved in favor of disclosure of "public
89. Id. at 1004.
90. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
91. In Ohio, the term "teacher" includes all persons certified to teach who are em-
ployed as instructors, principals, supervisors or superintendents, or in any other position
requiring certification. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.09(A) (Anderson 1990).
92. For example, in Ohio such protection is found in the Ohio Privacy Act, OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.09 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
93. In Ohio, virtually every record kept by a public entity, including school districts,
county divisions, state offices and administrative agencies, is a public record. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson 1990).
94. In Ohio, the statute unequivocally gives preference to public access. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1347.08(E)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
95. Wooster Republican Printing Co. v. City of Wooster, 383 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ohio
1978).
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records." '9 6 Although the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently reduced
the weight of an "invasion of privacy" in the balancing test,9 7 the gener-
ally heightened concern for the privacy of persons with AIDS should, on
balance, prevail.
Medical records are specifically excluded from the operation of the
Ohio public records law,9 8 but it is unclear whether it is the medical
record in the doctor's office or the medical record in the personnel file
that is exempt from disclosure. If it is the medical record given to the
employer by the AIDS patient's doctor, then that record would not have
to be released by a public agency under existing Ohio law. It is also
unclear what a school district should do when one of its employees tests
positive for AIDS. Should the information be placed in his or her file?
Should it be communicated? To whom?
The conditions under which a person with AIDS would prevail in a
tort action based on a privacy violation have not been specifically deter-
mined,9 9 though several cases have addressed students' privacy con-
cerns. 100 Unless it has a malicious intent, a statement is not actionable
when made within the context of a qualified or conditional privilege,
that is, where a commonality of interest exists between the publisher and
the recipient, and the communication is a kind reasonably calculated to
protect or further that interest.' 0 ' Frequently, in such cases, "there is a
legal, as well as a moral, obligation to speak."' 0 2 An actionable invasion
of the right of privacy is the
"unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personalty,
the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has
no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffer-
ing, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
96. Id. at 129-30.
97. State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 481 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ohio 1985) (the
public's right of access to a public employee's personnel file may not in any way be re-
stricted by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or be otherwise withheld from
the public or the news media).
98. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson 1990).
99. One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Comment d states that
"[wihen the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there
is no invasion of privacy."
100. See supra notes 34-36.
101. The essential elements of a conditionally privileged communication are good
faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion and proper publication to proper parties only. West v. People's Banking & Trust
Co., 236 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
102. Creps v. Waltz, 450 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Hahn v. Kot-
ten, 331 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ohio 1975)). In Hahn, the trial court was required to grant a
directed verdict for defendants if the statements at issue met the conditionally privileged
communication definition and if the record contained no evidence of actual malice on




The Ohio Court of Appeals has held that a medical examiner may
not disclose information about a patient to anyone without first seeking
the patient's permission.' 0 4 Only certain aspects of the doctor/patient
relationship are protected, however. For example, a secretary working
at a medical center wrongfully divulged confidential information about a
patient during her lunch hour, but the center was held not liable. The
court held that corporations are liable for injuries caused by the wrong-




Are teachers and other employees with AIDS afforded the same
protection against discrimination that students with AIDS enjoy? In
1988, the Ninth Circuit did extend protection to teachers, holding that a
school system may not discriminate against a teacher infected with
AIDS. 1
0 6
Chalk, a teacher of hearing-impaired students, was hospitalized with
pneumonia and diagnosed as having AIDS. After several months of
treatment and recuperation, he was declared able to return to work, but
his Orange County, California school district put him on administrative
leave for the remainder of that year and then offered him an administra-
tive job with the same salary and benefits that he would have received
teaching. Chalk rejected this offer, preferring to return to the class-
room. A federal district court refused to issue an injunction requiring
that Chalk be allowed to teach. The Ninth Circuit unanimously re-
versed, relying on School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 10 7 The court
concluded that Chalk was "otherwise qualified" to teach under § 504
despite having AIDS and a history of previous physical impairment from
AIDS. The "otherwise qualified" determination depended on whether a
reasonable accommodation would eliminate any risk that Chalk would
communicate an infectious disease to others in the workplace. The
103. Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956) (emphasis added)).
104. Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 374-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) ("The
discloser has no privilege unless he has reason to believe that the recipient has a real need
to know, not mere curiosity.").
105. Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Ctr., Inc., 470 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
106. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). In fact, a school
may face a wrongful discharge claim if it terminates an employee with AIDS merely be-
cause he or she is perceived to be a threat to co-workers. The 1985 Centers for Disease
Control guidelines regarding the transmission of AIDS in the workplace state that an in-
fected employee should not be restricted from working solely because he or she has AIDS.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYEES, cited in WEINER, supra note
2, at 148.
107. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (establishing that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to
public employees who are infected with a contagious disease, in Arline's case tuberculosis,
and who have a history of previous physical impairment from the disease, even if they do
not currently suffer from the impairment).
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court reviewed the four Arline factors 10 8 before deciding that Chalk's re-
turn to the classroom would not pose a significant risk that he would com-
municate an infectious disease to his students.10 9 Even though the
potential harm resulting from AIDS is catastrophic and the duration of
the risk of infection is indefinite (two of the Arline factors) the court
found "an overwhelming evidentiary consensus of medical and scientific
opinion regarding the nature and transmission of AIDS.""I 0
While the Ninth Circuit ruling was not unexpected after Arline, it
does mean that a school district should consider its decision carefully
before arbitrarily reassigning a teacher with AIDS. By the same token,
however, it must continue to monitor the condition of a teacher with
AIDS who is allowed to remain in the classroom. For example, it was
highly probable that Chalk's immune system would deteriorate over
time, making him very susceptible to opportunistic infections. While
these infections do not cause AIDS, they are contagious in a classroom
setting. Eventually, if Chalk did not voluntarily leave the classroom, his
school board would have to exercise its power to control, regulate and
protect.
Many states have enacted strict handicap provisions that would pro-
tect teachers. For example, the Ohio Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimi-
nation against the handicapped and is even more pervasive and
protective than the federal statutes.' Its provisions are enforced by
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC). 112 In cooperation with the
Department of Education, OCRC must prepare a comprehensive educa-
tion program for the public schools "to eliminate prejudice on the basis
of... handicap."' '3 State entities like OCRC can accept and investigate
charges alleging discrimination on the basis of AIDS. Such charges
would be analyzed under the commonly-accepted legal standards ap-
plied to other handicaps.
Finally, teachers do not have an option to leave when a person with
AIDS enters the school,' '4 but they may legitimately expect the school
108. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
109. Since Chalk had physical symptoms and a previous physical impairment from
AIDS, he was not asymptomatic, but fully met the Arline conditions. 480 U.S. at 288. The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, did not address the critical question of protection for a staff mem-
ber who is asymptomatic.
110. 840 F.2d at 706. Essentially, this is a finding that there is no known risk of trans-
mitting AIDS through the nonsexual, noninvasive, day-to-day interaction between teach-
ers and students in the classroom.
11. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112 (Anderson 1991).
112. Id. § 4112.04.
113. Id. § 4112.04(A)(9).
114. A difficult question is whether employees who object to working with an AIDS
victim-or someone whom they fear will expose them to the disease-are protected
against employer discipline for engaging in concerted activity, which is allowed under the
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). In an AIDS situation, such
activity could conceivably consist of teachers refusing to work because a coworker who had
AIDS was allowed to continue working in the school. This is a hypothetical situation; the
author knows of no such present case. The author believes, however, that such an action
would not be protected under the "concerted action" provisions of the NLRA. See 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
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district to provide adequate training to ensure that they understand
AIDS and know how to act to avoid unreasonable danger. Their fears
will diminish if they are taught to use the so-called "universal
precautions." 115
C. The 1973 Rehabilitation Act
Numerous state statutes prohibit employment discrimination
against the handicapped; some of these extend protection to persons
with AIDS. 1 6 Many of these statutes protect both public and private
employees. The federal government also has adopted laws intended to
integrate the handicapped into the social mainstream.' 1 7 To determine
coverage for the handicapped, therefore, persons with AIDS and schools
should examine both sets of laws.
The model statute on disability discrimination is the federal Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.118 It is the vehicle most often used to redress
claims of handicap discrimination in employment.' ' 9 It applies to fed-
eral employees and contractors and to all programs receiving federal
financial assistance. Its fundamental principle 120 is that an "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" may not be denied an opportunity to
participate in any federally funded program or activity. 12 1 Under the
federal definition, not only AIDS carriers but those who are victimized
because they are thought to have AIDS or who seem likely to get AIDS
could be protected.122 Although no specific case law protects people in
115. "Universal precautions" consist of treating every situation as if it were one in
which a person could, without proper precautions, become infected by someone with the
HIV virus. In the school setting, this would mean, for example, that a teacher wears rub-
ber gloves when helping any child who has suffered an injury that could cause an AIDS
infection. This protects the teacher regardless of whether the child is infected.
Doctors disagree as to the risk that the virus will be transmitted through contact with
blood during a fight or an injury that may occur at school. Studies have shown that to
infect another person would require a large amount of blood, containing a large quantity
of the virus particles, entering the other person's bloodstream. Furthermore, with the
type of injuries that occur on a school ground, the body immediately begins to heal the
open wound through the clotting process. This process, it has been argued, creates a
natural barrier that prevents commingling of the two individuals' blood and thus forms a
natural barrier to the virus. WEINER, supra note 3, at 190.
116. Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 681, 689-96 (1985).
117. See, e.g., id. at 689-90 n.35; see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796 (1991).
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1991).
119. Although much debate surrounds whether § 504 applies to AIDS, Congress could
not possibly have intended the Rehabilitation Act to cover AIDS because AIDS was not yet
diagnosed in 1973 when the Act was passed. In Arline, the Supreme Court reviewed the
scope of § 504 and specifically refrained from commenting on its applicability to AIDS.
This was a purposeful decision on the Court's part, based on "ripeness." In a 1986 mem-
orandum, however, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice ruled that
AIDS and disabling symptoms of ARC were "handicaps" under § 504. Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 122, at D-I (June 25, 1986).
120. As enunciated in § 504.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1991).
122. People who are infected by the virus but have not experienced debilitating symp-
toms appear to be covered by the final section of the Rehabilitation Act's definition, which
refers to people who "are regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
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the latter two categories, § 504 probably will be extended to them, be-
cause the Act unambiguously refers to physical impairments that sub-
stantially limit life activities.
12 3
In Arline, the school board argued that discrimination against a
handicapped person could be lawful if it is based on fears deriving from
the handicap's contagious nature.' 24 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument and held instead that a school teacher afflicted with the conta-
gious disease of tuberculosis is a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. This means that a federally-funded
state program may not discriminate against a person with tuberculosis
solely because of the tuberculosis. As to whether an employer may dis-
charge an individual who suffering from a contagious disease because of
"fear of contagion," when the disease is defined as a handicap, the
Court concluded that while school districts can protect an individual
with AIDS from the irrational fears of others, only medical professionals
can separate irrational fear from just cause. The school argued, unsuc-
cessfully, that Arline had been discharged not because of her diminished
physical capacity but because her tuberculosis posed a threat to the
health of others. The Court ruled that the Rehabilitation Act does not
consider conditions that could "impair the health of others" a
handicap. 1
25
The Arline Court did not determine whether the Rehabilitation Act
protects a person with the HIV antibody. Instead, the Court adopted a
four-part test recommended by the American Medical Association in its
amicus brief. In remanding the case to the district court to determine
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified," the Court required that the
trial court base its decision on:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments
given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of
the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the
risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the
risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause vary-
ing degrees of harm. 1
2 6
The Arline decision protects individuals against irrational fear or
prejudice on the part of employees or fellow workers, but it does not
require an employer to hire someone who has a contagious disease. The
Court said only that individuals who are both handicapped and other-
wise qualified are eligible for relief under § 504. Later, in Chalk, the
Ninth Circuit held that a teacher with AIDS was handicapped and other-
wise qualified for employment under § 504.127
In fact, members of high risk groups who are not infected (or not known to be infected),
but who are treated adversely in employment because they are perceived as threatening to
infect others with AIDS, could be protected by the "regarded as" category.
123. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 22-31.
124. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282.
125. Id. at 284-85.
126. Id. at 288.
127. 840 F.2d at 711.
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Arline provided the commonly-used rationale for expressly rejecting
the application of a standard of law based on the communicability of
AIDS as opposed to the impairment itself. This is the legal crux of the
AIDS issue, because a person with AIDS may not be impaired at all. If, in the
specific case, medical opinion indicates that there is no likelihood or
probability of communicating the disease through casual social contact,
a person with AIDS probably will not be treated as handicapped. Thus,
an asymptomatic carrier would not be treated as handicapped because
of the low probability of communicating the disease through casual con-
tact. As the danger of contagion increases, however, as for example with
AIDS-Related Complex and certainly with full-blown AIDS, handi-
capped status will likely attach.
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is effective on July
26, 1992. The Act makes it unlawful for private employers, state and
local governments, employment agencies and labor unions to discrimi-
nate against qualified individuals with disabilities in the job application
process or in hiring, firing, promotion, training, compensation or other
terms and conditions of employment.
128
Coverage under the ADA is parallel to that under the 1973 Rehabil-
itation Act with regard to definitions of disability and qualified individu-
als. Both statutes allow the option of being "regarded as having such an
impairment." Although AIDS is not mentioned in the statute, it is clear
from the legislative history that Congress intended the Act to protect
persons with AIDS and those with HIV from discriminatory acts.
129
III. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF AIDS
Like everyone else, school employees and pupils have a duty to pre-
vent the spread of a contagious disease. Many states have laws requiring
that a person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that he is
suffering from a dangerous and contagious disease must take reasonable
measures to prevent exposing others to the disease.' 30 Thus, in states
that have enacted this type of law, a person with AIDS who knowingly
fails to take such reasonable measures could be found guilty of a crimi-
nal offense and could be subject to selective isolation. Many believe that
a person with AIDS who has knowingly infected others 13 1 should be iso-
lated. Selective isolation not only would prevent offenders from in-
fecting more people, but also would highlight public concern about the
spread of AIDS and might even deter potential offenders.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1991).
129. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1991).
130. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.81 (Anderson 1988). A violation of this
statute is a second degree misdemeanor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.99 (Anderson
1988).
131. Gaetan Dugas, a Canadian airline steward, is a well-known example. See RANDY
SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 78-79, 438-39 (1987).
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Some acts by AIDS carriers are regularly prosecuted as violations of
existing criminal laws. For example, several persons have been charged
with assault, attempted assault and reckless endangerment for allegedly
biting or spitting at police or prison officers who tried to restrain them
while they were in custody.13 2 Simply exposing someone other than
one's spouse to HIV infection through sexual activity constitutes a crimi-
nal offense in some states.' 3 3 One court has indicated that a sex act by
an AIDS carrier constitutes assault with a dangerous weapon or at-
tempted murder.134 In 1987, a West German court convicted an Ameri-
can serviceman with AIDS of causing bodily harm with "dangerous
treatment" because he had had intercourse with several partners.l 
3 5
In addition to invoking existing criminal laws in the new context of
AIDS, some states have passed new legislation specific to AIDS trans-
mission. Some forms of AIDS transmission, such as donating blood and
having sexual intercourse without informing the partner, have already
been criminalized.13 6 Future state action criminalizing various forms of
AIDS transmission might include making it a felony to engage in acts of
prostitution while knowing one was infected with HIV, aggravating pun-
ishment for rape committed by someone who knows he is infected with
HIV, and criminalizing sexual intercourse by a knowing AIDS carrier or
the knowing commission of any act a person knows is likely to transmit
AIDS to another.
In the wake of the AIDS epidemic, calls for mandatory testing and
quarantine have mounted. The federal government now tests immi-
grants, federal prisoners, military personnel and federal employees in
the Peace Corps, Job Corps and State Department Foreign Service. The
testing of foreign service personnel was upheld, although the Job Corps'
AIDS testing policy has been challenged.' 3 7 The key question is
whether mandatory testing violates an employee's Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Case law remains un-
clear, though one state case appears to limit the right to require
testing. 138
In addition, numerous states have passed laws that require testing
of prisoners and convicted prostitutes, sex offenders and IV drug
132. Robert 0. Boorstin, Criminal and Civil Litigation on Spread of AIDS Appears, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1987, at Al.
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (1990); LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 14:43.5 (1987).
134. Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1989). In this Herpes transmission case,
the court specifically stated that the transmission of AIDS would also be construed as
battery.
135. Serge Schmemann, Bavarian Court Convicts American in AIDS Case, N.Y. TIMES, No-
vember 17, 1987, at A5.
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. 384.24 (West Supp. 1986) prohibits a person infected with HIV
from having sexual intercourse without informing his or her partner of the infection;
IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1986) prohibits a person with AIDS or an AIDS carrier from know-
ingly or willfully exposing another to AIDS, ARC or HIV; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-32-104
(1986) prohibits AIDS carriers from donating blood.
137. Doreen Weisenhaus, The Shaping of AIDS Law, NAT'L L.J., August 1, 1988, at 1.
138. Guardianship of Anthony, 524 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1988) (a sexually active re-
tarded man who exhibited no symptoms of AIDS could not be tested for the disease).
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users. 139 Illinois and Louisiana enacted mandatory testing for marriage-
license applicants, but only four of the first 12,000 applicants tested pos-
itive for HIV, while the number of applicants for marriage licenses was
significantly reduced. 1
4 0
Quarantine of persons with AIDS has also been suggested. A 1986
Newsweek poll indicated that fifty-four percent of those surveyed fa-
vored quarantining people with AIDS. 14 1 Proposals for quarantine,
however, represent an outdated medical practice. Quarantine is highly
discretionary and relatively unconstrained by strict norms of notice, fair
warning and due process. Nevertheless, many state health laws enacted
during earlier epidemics were routinely upheld as an appropriate exer-
cise of the state's police power. These laws have been largely unused,
however, because antibiotics have proved more effective than quaran-
tine in stopping most epidemics.
Several states have amended their public health laws to authorize
some form of isolation for some AIDS carriers.14 2 Other possible state
actions might include permitting quarantine of any seropositive HIV
carrier who knowingly exposes another person to the virus and authoriz-
ing quarantine of persons with AIDS and persons suspected of being
infected with HIV pending testing. State lawmakers are likely to allow
public health authorities to quarantine or isolate persons designated as
diseased upon a showing that their conduct exposes others to the dis-
ease and that confinement is necessary to prevent its spread.
The substantive constitutional constraints that apply to criminal
sanctions have not been applied to processes of quarantine, commit-
ment and preventive detention.' 43 Civil commitment, however, may in-
volve greater deprivation of liberty than criminal punishment, 144 and
quarantine of AIDS patients or carriers may violate their right to due
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. Because of this experience, several states have instituted premarital education
programs in lieu of testing.
141. Growing Concern, Greater Precaution, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 32. In 1986, Cali-
fornia voters defeated a notorious pro-quarantine initiative that would have added AIDS
and exposure to the HIV virus to the list of diseases reportable to the state health authori-
ties. The authorities, in turn, would have been authorized to quarantine persons with
AIDS or AIDS carriers. People living with or visiting AIDS patients or carriers would have
been subject to criminal penalties if they failed to report this contact to public health
authorities.
142. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-1406(2)(c) (Supp. 1991) authorizes public health officials
to order persons infected with HIV whose behavior endangers others to cease and desist,
and in the event that they violate such orders, to apply restrictions necessary to stop them;
IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1986) adds AIDS, ARC and other manifestations of HIV infection
to the list of diseases subject to quarantine; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.410 (Baldwin 1991)
classifies AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease subject to quarantine or isolation.
143. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (civil commitment is not sub-
ject to the constraints of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment). To invoke criminal sanctions would entail a more serious deprivation of
individual liberties than civil sanctions such as quarantine, commitment and preventive
detention.
144. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (from an alcoholic's point of view,
compulsory commitment for alcoholism "can hardly be considered a less severe penalty"
than jail).
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process and equal protection. In any event, quarantine of persons with
AIDS is unreasonable because the AIDS virus is not easily communi-
cated. 14 5 Quarantine, like isolation and placarding, is an extreme mea-
sure that should be implemented only when no less restrictive
alternative is available to control transmission.1
4 6
A state board of health may have the responsibility to inspect
schools and may close any school for health reasons. 14 7 When a danger-
ous communicable disease is unusually prevalent, as would be the case if
AIDS were to become an epidemic, or a school or community is
threatened with epidemic conditions, an Ohio statute permits the state
board of health to close any school and even prohibit public gatherings
for such time as is necessary. While medical knowledge about AIDS
suggests that this action would be inappropriate, state law neverthess
provides the authority for it in Ohio.'
4 8
IV. THE ROLE OF SCHOOL BOARDS
School board members are vested with management and control of
all the public schools in their district.' 49 Although a school board re-
ceives its power from the state, local boards are given broad authority in
the conduct and management of their schools. 150 Absent gross abuse, a
court has no authority to control the discretion vested in the board or to
substitute its judgment for that of the board.
15 1
A school board should develop policies before an AIDS crisis devel-
145. For a more extensive discussion of the quarantine issue see John A. Gleason,
Quarantine: An Unreasonable Solution to the AIDS Dilemma, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 217 (1986);
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 53 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the
State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988).
146. Case law has allowed such restraint of prisoners. For example, a New York court
dismissed an attempt by prisoners who suffered from AIDS to enjoin their segregation
from the general prison population. The court held that segregation of prisoners with
AIDS from the general prison population bore a rational relation to prison officials' objec-
tive of protecting both AIDS sufferers and other prisoners from tension and harm that
could result from other prisoners' fears. Further, the segregation did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment, deny prisoners with AIDS due process or violate their rights to pri-
vacy, free expression and free association. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
When an inmate with AIDS was denied conjugal visits through the New York Prison
Family Reunion Program, the inmate and his wife brought a mandamus proceeding to
review the ruling and obtain declaratory relief. The court found that an inmate retains
only those rights not inconsistent with the institution and his status. The inmate claimed
that denying him visitation invaded an area of personal decision making. But the court
held that the denial was appropriate as long as prison officials had a rational basis for it. In
this case, prison regulations set forth 15 guidelines for consideration and balancing. The
court noted that the guidelines, many of which were subjective, did not create an entitle-
ment to the conjugal visits, and found, inter alia, that the inmate's AIDS was an appropri-
ate reason for prison officials to deny his conjugal visits. Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.26 (Anderson 1988).
148. Id. Such action may create rather than reduce the mass hysteria and fear of conta-
gion that accompanies AIDS.
149. See, e.g., Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.47 (Anderson 1990).
150. Greco v. Roper, 61 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 1945).
151. State ex rel. Evans v. Fry, 230 N.E.2d 363 (1967).
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ops. As elected officials, board members are under immediate political
pressure when it becomes public knowledge that a person or child with
AIDS is in school. There is simply no time for rational action once AIDS
hysteria begins. Responsible school board planning in advance is partic-
ularly important because a school board may only take official actions in
concert during an official session. 15 2 An individual board member has
no authority to act on behalf of the entire board.
In developing policies to deal with AIDS, board members should
review state and federal law regarding the treatment of persons with
handicaps or infectious diseases. Although education is not a federal
constitutional right,' 53 it is a right under many state constitutions.
Ohio, for example, provides public education as a right for citizens be-
tween the ages of five and twenty-one; 154 students cannot be deprived of
this right without due process.155 Without these statutory protections,
students with AIDS would have no recourse if a school district excluded
them in the misguided belief that its action is necessary to protect
others.
Financial assistance in meeting the educational needs of handi-
capped children is available to states under P.L. 94-142, the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act. 15 6 Federal assistance also is avail-
able for early childhood education under P.L. 99-457 .157 Some states
have gone beyond the federal statute in providing assistance and protec-
tion for handicapped children. For example, the Ohio Administrative
Code was revised in 1976 to establish an elaborate system of regulations
and statutes regarding the handicapped.
15 8
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142) es-
tablished handicapped children's right to be educated in the same class-
room as nonhandicapped children, when this is feasible. School boards
should consider this "mainstreaming" concept 59 in determining how to
educate children with AIDS, ARC or the HIV antibody. The first issue
to be resolved is whether AIDS would qualify as a handicapping condi-
tion under a provision regarding children who are "health impaired or
who have specific learning disabilities requiring special education.'
160
If a student with AIDS is covered by special education provisions,
the school district is required to provide for all the costs of that stu-
dent's individualized educational plan. In Ohio, this includes "required
related services and instruction specifically designed to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, home in-
struction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 16 ' The concept
152. 68 AM. JuR. 2D Schools § 53 (1973).
153. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Anderson 1990).
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.661 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
156. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1990).
157. Early Education for Handicapped Children, 20 U.S.C. § 1423.
158. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3301-51-01 to -30 (1990).
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B).
160. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(A) (Anderson 1987).
161. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
of an individualized education program is eminently useful for a child
with AIDS.
Superintendents typically have a statutory right and duty to assign
children. 16 2 Because of this responsibility, the superintendent must
make the difficult decisions regarding the assignment of a student with
AIDS. Each case should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and each child
should receive adequate substantive and procedural due process.
Before excluding a child with AIDS, a school district should notify the
child and institute a hearing of some kind, based on written board pro-
cedure or policy.
Substantive due process requires that a school district do more than
merely review the facts. It requires the district to listen to the best medi-
cal and legal advice available and then make the best decision possible.
Many school districts have established AIDS panels. Ideally, theses
panels include at least one infectious disease specialist, a county health
official, a medical doctor, a physician for the child with AIDS and an
educator from the school district. 163 With four medical people on such
a panel, the decision on an AIDS case would be likely to reflect the med-
ical community's determination that the risk of AIDS transmission
through casual contact in a school setting is minimal. A disturbing prac-
tice developing in some school districts, however, is to increase the
number of non-medical school district personnel on these panels. Such
panels are likely to favor the school, giving the school district greater
leverage than the child when a sensitive AIDS decision must be made.
This practice could create potential legal problems. If educators base
their decisions solely on educational, rather than informed medical
grounds, ignoring medical experts' testimony, their decisions may not
hold up in the lawsuits to which they are likely to give rise.
The future regarding AIDS and the schools is far from bright. Most
persons with AIDS, children included, will face discrimination and ill-
treatment. Children will continue to face legal battles to stay in school,
and teachers and staff will continue to lose their jobs. Discriminatory
practices will increase as the fear and trauma of potential infection from
AIDS is amplified and inflamed by the news media and imaginary fears.
School systems must be at the forefront of concern and change, if for no
other reason than the length of AIDS incubation. With a seven-to-ten
year dormancy period (some studies indicate that it might be fifteen
years or more), 164 many of those unknowingly infected with the virus
will have children. Many of these children born with AIDS will enter
schools in the mid-1990s.
A fundamental underpinning of our federal system is the belief that
162. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.01 (Anderson 1990).
163. The author discussed the proposed procedure with dozens of school superintend-
ents at the 1991 American Association of School Administrators conference in New Orle-
ans, La., March 2, 1991 during an open forum session. The consensus was that a medical
panel recommendation was the best tactic, and in fact, the superintendents' school attor-
neys had recommended it.
164. Health Benefits, supra note 9.
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the federal government should help with problems that are too big for
local government to handle. This philosophy has resulted in federal ini-
tiatives in areas of defense, commerce and civil rights. At present, how-
ever, no federal law deals with AIDS and no federal plan addresses the
AIDS crisis, despite the fact that a report by the Presidential Commis-
sion on AIDS called for sweeping measures, including voluntary testing
and anti-discrimination laws.1 6 5 Courts are still struggling with the ap-
propriate application of the Rehabilitation Act to persons with AIDS,
and while an explosion of litigation has occurred in state courts, federal
courts have provided little guidance.
Present state and federal laws may protect people with AIDS who
hold public sector positions, but in far too many states, individuals in
private sector jobs have only limited protection. At first glance, protec-
tive legislation for people with AIDS may not seem as important as
assistance in fighting the disease itself. Unfortunately, this is a short-
sighted view. Persons with AIDS and their families-who also are not
assured that they are secure in their jobs and apartments and safe from
quarantine-will not come forward for testing and treatment. Because
the threat of discrimination makes it unrealistic for a person to volunteer
to be tested for AIDS before having children, many asymptomatic carri-
ers will continue to have children who are born with the virus. Thus, the
number of infected people will continue to grow, and the number of
children with AIDS will continue to increase.
In the fifties, the dangers of drugs were featured in federal reports,
journal articles and local publicity, yet we did nothing because vested
interests were not affected. Drugs, it was said, were a black ghetto prob-
lem that did not concern the "good" kids. The result of this avoidance
is that we now have a drug problem that is beyond the ability of any city,
state or even the federal government to resolve. Similarly, the much
needed, far-reaching federal AIDS initiative will not occur as long as
people believe that AIDS is only a disease of homosexuals and drug
abusers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations regarding AIDS policies, practices
and procedures are intended for school boards, administrators, teachers
and staff to use as they develop local practices. The recommended poli-
cies and procedures may help school officials avoid serious legal and
community problems without jeopardizing the rights of people with
AIDS.
AIDS policies must be in place in advance of a potentially critical
situation. A school district has no time to develop a well-reasoned series
of actions after an AIDS emergency develops, and community pressure
and concern may lead to incorrect and possibly illegal actions. An AIDS
advisory team composed predominately of medical experts should be in
165. See Weisenhaus, supra note 137, at I.
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place to recommend actions to the superintendent and school board.
Expert medical advice is critical in protecting and insulating the school
district, as well as in protecting the rights of a person with AIDS. An
AIDS advisory team should include the child's or employee's doctor as
well as county and district medical officials and a district educational
representative.
A school district should communicate its AIDS policies and the un-
derlying rationale to the public before a crisis occurs. For example, the
public may be informed that medical evidence has ruled out transmis-
sion of AIDS by casual social contact and that there is no evidence of
virus transmission within the classroom situation. This practice serves
as a community education program and provides a basis for avoiding
panic reactions if a crisis occurs.
As a general rule, discrimination against a person with AIDS in a
school setting is irrational, unreasonable and probably unlawful as long
as medical research continues to demonstrate that AIDS cannot be con-
tracted through casual social contact. A school board should not trans-
fer or fire a seropositive student or employee, or one with ARC or AIDS,
merely because of that person's medical status. The medical team's rec-
ommendations should be the controlling factor in a decision regarding
transfer or termination. Recent court action 16 6 indicates that transfer
should only occur after a medical team decision based on the communi-
cability and risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. Rarely, if ever,
should a student be turned away or a school employee be fired because
of medical status.
A school district should always explore the options of home instruc-
tion for a student and assignment to a nonteaching position for an em-
ployee. Student and staff may actually prefer an alternative in which
they are not involved with the public and thereby avoid exposure to op-
portunistic infections. If the parents of the student with AIDS accept
home instruction, or if an employee is willing to accept an assignment to
a nonteaching position, the district is relieved of responsibility and
liability.
Even when parents opt for home instruction, a school district must
allow a child with AIDS to attend school. A child has a right to be edu-
cated among his or her peers. An exception should be made only when
the child is a danger to others, as in the case of a young child with AIDS
who has a history of biting others.
A school district may not exclude an employee because of the
"fear" that he or she will spread the AIDS virus. Arline settled this ques-
tion. 16 7 An employer may not discriminate simply because of an un-
founded fear of transmission. Only when there is convincing evidence
that a person with AIDS is a threat to others may an employer take pro-
166. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes
65-78 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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tective action. Fear of contagion, alone, is not enough to justify
discrimination.
An employer may not terminate an employee with AIDS without
convincing evidence of a threat of contagion, but the same employer
must take care in acting against people who object to continued employ-
ment with a person with AIDS. Workers engaged in "concerted activ-
ity" are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 16 8
whether or not they are members of a collective bargaining unit. There-
fore, a school district may not arbitrarily terminate employees who com-
plain about the perceived safety hazard of working with a person with
AIDS. Of course, the employees must be reasonable in their beliefs and
act in good faith. Since the medical facts at this time indicate that the
disease is transmissible only through intimate physical contact, which
would not occur in the performance of an employee's job, a court proba-
bly would find that fear of AIDS in this situation is not reasonable. Fur-
thermore, the NLRA probably would not protect a "concerted activity"
where the person with AIDS had previously been defined as handi-
capped, since a handicapped person is protected from discrimination
under state and federal law.
Treating individuals with AIDS or ARC differently from those who
are seropositive is an equal protection violation. It would be unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory for a school board to terminate an employee or
exclude a student with a given AIDS-linked condition while treating
those in another category differently. Excluding all categories of AIDS
victims also would fail. While education is not a "fundamental right,"
states that choose to provide a public education must make equal serv-
ices available to all. Again, the behavior and physical condition of the
person with AIDS must be the determining factor.
School district and employee insurance policies should be ex-
amined to determine the extent of coverage and protection. In most
cases, insurance plans exclude or limit benefits for a pre-existing injury
or sickness. Thus, an insurance company must continue to provide cov-
erage for an individual who contracts AIDS during his or her employ-
ment, with no prior knowledge, as it does for a person who contracts
cancer while employed. Some insurance companies have used a positive
antibody test to justify denying coverage. This practice appears to be a
departure from traditional group underwriting practices and therefore
may trigger a charge of employment discrimination.
An AIDS condition should be kept confidential whenever a question
arises as to whether information should be released. Confidentiality is
implicated when an AIDS test is required, when an employee notifies the
district of a positive test result and when a child with AIDS enters the
school system. These results must not be released without consent, nor
should they be used to determine insurability or suitability for employ-
ment. State laws vary, but revealing medical information could be a
168. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
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clear invasion of the privacy of a student or employee. The general pol-
icy should be that if there is no need to fear AIDS, there is no rational
reason to intrude on the right to privacy of a person with AIDS.
A school district must make a reasonable effort to accommodate an
employee with AIDS. Because persons with advanced AIDS are likely to
be considered handicapped, employers must make reasonable accom-
modations for their physical or mental limitations, unless those accom-
modations would impose an undue hardship-not merely an
inconvenience-on the employer's business. Since AIDS is not spread
by casual social contact, a school district would find it difficult to argue
undue hardship.
A school district should take immediate action to eliminate or cur-
tail students' drug activity, since the fastest growing cause of AIDS infec-
tion is intravenous drug use, and to initiate and sustain AIDS-prevention
education programs. Teenagers are a high-risk group for AIDS because
they tend to experiment with sex and drugs. Their impulsive behavior
and lack of knowledge about long-term consequences make them espe-
cially vulnerable. A comprehensive program of AIDS education, which
enhances personal awareness and instructs students on protective be-
havior, may reduce the number of students who acquire the disease.
Since the incidence of AIDS among Hispanics and Blacks is far higher
than in the general population, 169 education programs should include
specialized AIDS instruction for minority children, geared to their cul-
tural values.
Staff development programs focusing on AIDS education should be
instituted at the same time as AIDS-prevention education programs for
students. Many teachers are unaware of many facts about AIDS and
many also are unable to deal with the complexity of students' concern
and questions about AIDS prevention. Most adults are simply not com-
fortable talking about such AIDS concerns as anal intercourse, safe sex,
and condom use. Only through proper in-service training, followed by
on-going staff development based on open communication, will teachers
develop the knowledge and ability to share critical AIDS information
with students. Teachers and all staff who communicate with students
should receive this training.
CONCLUSION
The present attitude of many people regarding AIDS is similar to
the prevalent attitude in the 1950s regarding drugs. Religious funda-
mentalists are not the only ones who believe that AIDS may be a punish-
ment for the sexual behavior of homosexuals or for the excesses of
intravenous drug abusers. Medical science has established, however,
that AIDS attacks everyone, not just homosexuals and drug addicts. Un-
fortunately, the "democratic" nature of the AIDS virus will so com-
pound the problem that even comprehensive federal legislation may
169. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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come too late to save most people who are infected by AIDS. The costs
will be astronomical. Our health providers may be unable to meet the
nationwide need. Likewise, our social systems-including public school
systems-are ill-prepared to meet the interpersonal needs of AIDS pa-
tients, their families, and a hysterical public. The national will seems
'inadequate to provide both a coordinated federal AIDS effort and a
stronger research effort; it may not even be strong enough to force
lawmakers to enact additional supportive legislation.
The only realistic solution is prevention, and prevention requires
education. Children are educated both at home and in school. With a
comprehensive awareness program, the spread of both diseases, AIDS
and AFRAIDS, can be slowed. Children will learn if they are taught ef-
fectively. Teaching about AIDS requires a sincere effort and a general
acceptance of the lessons to be learned.170 This is possible, but who will
teach the parents, teachers and administrators who teach the children?
Whither our future?
170. For additional information on schools and AIDS, see the following: Leah Ham-
mett, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion from School, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1373 (1986); Edward Knox Proctor, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1302 (1986); Frederick A. 0. SchwartzJr. & Frederick P. Schaffer, AIDS in the
Classroom, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163 (1985); Lisa J. Sotto, Undoing a Lesson of Fear in the
Classroom: The Legal Recourse of AIDS-Linked Children, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1986); Mat-
thewJ. Welker, The Impact of AIDS Upon Public Schools: A Problem forJurisprudence, 33 EDUC.
L. REP. 603 (1986).
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The statutory purpose of the Colorado Children's Code is to "serve
the welfare of children and the best interests of society."' Unfortu-
nately, this purpose often finds itself circumvented as the adversarial
process of the juvenile justice system takes over. In delinquency pro-
ceedings, the often polarized parties do not collectively think in terms of
the best interest of the child nor the best interest of the community.
While this is the nature of a juvenile justice system, professionals within
the Colorado system often ask some very important questions regarding
how the system affects the youths involved: Are juveniles treated fairly?
Are courts too lenient or to harsh on juvenile offenders? Do juveniles
receive the support and skills necessary to rehabilitate and steer them
away from future criminal activities? What are the roles of District At-
torney (DA), defense attorney, guardian ad litem and judge? How dedi-
cated are professionals who work within the system? Are the juvenile
justice system resources being used properly? Is the Colorado Chil-
dren's Code being properly construed to "serve the welfare of the chil-
dren and the best interests of society?"'2 These questions often beget
difficult and complex answers.
This Article examines some issues these questions pose-not from
an "ivory tower" perspective, but from the youths' perspective. We re-
port their thoughts and feelings about the juvenile justice system as ex-
pressed by the youths in a recently conducted survey. First, this Article
presents an overview of the Colorado juvenile justice system of which
the subject youths are a part. Next, this Article details the methodology
and reports the findings of the survey. Finally, this Article concludes
with the authors' impressions regarding the youths' responses in the
survey. Although not every youth within the juvenile court system (for
delinquency) was surveyed, and our research is a broad on-going pro-
ject, we believe it is important to report our findings to date with the
* Bonnie Saltzman is an attorney in the juvenile division of the Denver District
Attorney's office and holds aJ.D. and Master of Social Work from the University of Colo-
rado at Denver. Regina Huerter holds a Masters in Counseling and Personal Services
from the Univeristy of Denver and is counselor and program director for Denver, Partners,
Inc., a non-profit organization for youths. Kim Wagner was research assistant on the
youths' interviews.
i. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(2) (Supp. 1991).
2. Id.
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hope of educating and instigating further discussion amongst profes-
sionals in the juvenile court system. While we may not agree with the
surveyed youths' responses, we believe it is essential to listen and try to
learn from them in order to improve the system.
OVERVIEW OF THE COLORADO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SYSTEM
The Colorado Children's Code3 (Code), divided into seven sepa-
rate articles, outlines the law applicable to youth and family in a variety
of situations. 4 This section provides a brief overview of Article Two of
Title Nineteen-Delinquency. The Code's Delinquency provisions set
forth procedures and guidelines to be used in delinquency proceed-
ings. 5 These procedures range from arrest to parole. Juvenile court has
jurisdiction over youths between the ages of ten and seventeen and uses
the date of the offense as the guide for determining jurisdiction. 6 Gen-
erally, rights afforded to juveniles in delinquency cases align with rights
afforded in adult criminal cases, 7 with a few exceptions. The parents or
guardians are expected to take an active role in the delinquency pro-
ceedings and are named as respondents on the delinquency petition.
For example, a parent or guardian must be present when the juvenile is
being questioned by law enforcement personnel and must enter a waiver
of the Miranda rights with the juvenile.
8
At any stage in the proceedings, the court can appoint a Guardian
Ad Litem (GAL)9 for the juvenile. The GAL is a licensed attorney, who
acts in the place of a parent or guardian for the youths. Such an ap-
pointment is often necessary when there is no parents or guardians of
the youth to look after the best interests of the youth. At times, a GAL is
also requested when the victim in the delinquency petition is the parent
or guardian. Thus, the GAL represents the best interests of thejuvenile,
which may conflict with the youth's desires.
If a warrantless arrest is made and the juvenile is placed in deten-
tion, a probable cause determination must be made within forty-eight
3. The Colorado Children's Code is found in Title 19 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes.
4. The Code contains seven articles - General Provisions, Delinquency, Dependency
and Neglect, Colorado Children's Trust Fund, Uniform Parentage Act, Relinquishment
and Adoption, and Support Proceedings.
5. A delinquent is a juvenile convicted of a delinquent act. A delinquent act is a
violation of any statute or ordinance if committed by ajuvenile. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-
2-101 (4), (8) (Supp. 1991).
6. Id. § 19-2-102.
7. For example, in delinquency cases, a court appointed attorney is utilized as de-
fense counsel when the State Public Defender's Office has a legal conflict in the case. The
attorney is in private practice, but in such cases is paid by the State Judicial Department for
his or her appointment. See id. 19-1-103(14) (general definition of court appointed attor-
ney in juvenile proceedings).
8. Id. § 19-2-210.
9. In delinquency matters this is a court appointed attorney who takes the place of
the parent or guardian in delinquency matters. This usually occurs when the parents or
guardians are unavailable or there is a conflict between the interests of the parents and the
juvenile. See id. § 19-1-103(14) (definition of guardian ad litem) and id. § 19--Ill1 (con-
cerning appointment of a guardian ad litem).
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hours. Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Riverside
County v. McLaughlin,' 0 these probable cause determinations are based
on an affidavit from the arresting officer. This determination is made
within forty-eight hours, including holidays and weekends, by a juvenile
court magistrate or judge. This probable cause determination does not
include the setting of bail, it merely determines if the juvenile should
remain in detention.
If the magistrate orjudge decides the youth should remain in deten-
tion, a hearing must be held within forty-eight business hours after the
arrest to determine if the juvenile should be detained further and what
amount of bail, if any, should be set.1 ' Within seven days, if the juvenile
is detained because the family can not make bail or the juvenile is held
without bail, the DA must file a petition alleging that the juvenile is a
"delinquent child."' 12 If the juvenile is released or bonded-out from de-
tention, there are no statutory guidelines for when the petition must be
filed.
The decision to file a petition is solely at the discretion of the prose-
cutor. There are, however, alternatives available to the prosecutor to
avoid a formal juvenile adjudication. One alternative to filing a petition
is placing the youth in a diversion program, 13 a community-based alter-
native to the formal court system. Depending on the judicial district, the
program is associated with either the prosecutor's office or a commu-
nity-based organization. If the youth formally completes the program,
no petition is filed. Even if a petition is filed, the prosecutor may agree
to a second alternative, an informal adjustment, whereby the juvenile
completes certain conditions and the petition is dismissed.14 The fail-
ure to complete the conditions may result in a formal adjudication. A
third alternative to a formal adjudication is a deferred adjudication. 15
The youth either enters a guilty plea or is found guilty at trial, but the
prosecutor and judge agree to defer the formal adjudication for a cer-
tain period of time not to exceed one year. During this time, the youth
is required to complete certain conditions. If the conditions are met, the
petition is dismissed.
Once the petition has been filed and served upon the juvenile and
parent/guardian, the proceedings follow the same procedure as in adult
criminal cases. Felony cases are set for preliminary hearings, while mis-
demeanor cases are set for either trial or pre-trial conference. Prior to
cases being set for either proceeding, the parent/guardian has the op-
portunity to attain counsel for the juvenile. The Colorado State Public
10. 11I S. Ct. 1661 (1991). Before Riverside, the Court required a "prompt" judicial
determination of probable cause after a warrantless arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114 (1975).
1I. CoLo, REV. STAT. § 19-2-204 (Supp. 1991).
12. Id. § 19-2-204(3)(a)(V) and CoLo. R. Juv. P. Rule 3.1.
13. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-2-303 (Supp. 1991).
14. Id. § 19-2-302.
15. Id. § 19-2-702.
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Defender's Office accepts applications for representation in juvenile
cases.
In Colorado, juveniles have the right to a jury trial, with one excep-
tion. If the offense would be less than a class-one misdemeanor had an
adult committed the offense, there is no right to a jury trial. 16 In this
situation, if the DA waives seeking a commitment to the Department of
Institutions or a sentence to the county jail the trial is to the court. 17 In
ajuvenilejury trial, the jury generally consist of six members. However,
if the youth is also charged with being an "aggravated juvenile of-
fender,"' 8 a sentencing enhancement, the jury has twelve members.19
The most drastic deviation from the adult criminal court occurs in
the sentencing phase of the delinquency proceeding. One purpose of
the Colorado Children's Code is to "secure for each child . . .such care
and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare
and the best interests of society" and to "preserve and strengthen family
ties whenever possible .... -20 The sentencing guidelines attempt to
reflect this purpose. 2 ' At the sentencing hearing the judge may con-
sider any social, psychological and other relevant reports and evidence.
This assures that the "proper disposition best serve[s] the interests of
the juvenile and the public."'2 2 In addition, the victim has the right to
attend the hearing and express concerns about the alleged crime, the
juvenile, restitution and the sentencing orders.2
3
The Children's Code outlines a variety of sentencing options for the
court. In short, the options are: probation, probation and up to forty-
five days in detention (if the juvenile is over twelve years of age), proba-
tion with out-of-home placement in a residential child care facility or
with other relatives or a commitment to the Department of Institutions
(DOI)2 4 in Colorado (if the juvenile is over twelve years of age).2 5 The
standard terms and conditions that apply to every juvenile placed on
probation 26 include: no further violations of the law, no possession or
consumption of alcohol or controlled substances, no possession of
weapons, school attendance, restitution and reporting to the assigned
probation officer as required. In addition to these standard terms and
conditions, the court may also order the juvenile to complete commu-
16. An example of a class-one misdemeanor is third-degree assault. An example of a
class-two misdemeanor is second-degree motor vehicle theft.
17. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-501 (Supp. 1991).
18. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
19. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-2-501(1) (Supp. 1991) and id. § 19-2-804(4)(a).
20. Id. § 19-1-102(1)(a) & (b).
21. The sentencing guidelines for juvenile court in Colorado are outlined in COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-2-701 (Supp. 1991) and id. § 19-2-801.
22. Id. § 19-2-701.
23. Id. § 19-2-707.
24. The DOI is a Colorado government agency that administers the State treatment,
rehabilitation, and mental health agencies, including the juvenile secured facilities (e.g.,
Lookout Mountain School). Id. § 27-1-101 and § 24-1-118.
25. Id. § 19-2-703(i)(a)-(k).
26. Id. § 19-2-705.
[Vol. 69:3
WHAT DO "THEY" THINK?
nity service hours, mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment
and other conditions the court deems appropriate for the juvenile.
A commitment to DOI cannot be for longer than two years, unless
the juvenile has been adjudicated an "aggravated juvenile offender," or
DOI petitions the court to extend the period of commitment. 27 The
terms of commitment are for a determinant period of time unless a sen-
tencing enhancement applies, in which case the court can set a minimum
period of institutionalization.
2 8
There are four sentencing enhancers in juvenile court: mandatory
sentence, repeat felony, violent juvenile and aggravated juvenile. A
"mandatory sentence offender" is a juvenile who has been adjudicated
three times. A sentence for such a youth requires a minimum one year
out-of-home placement. It does not, however, require a commitment to
DOI. Thus, many youths sentenced under this designation are placed
on probation, but reside in a Residential Child Care Facility (RCCF)
2 9
or with another relative.30 A "repeat felony offender" 3' has at least two
adjudications-the latter for what would constitute a felony offense if
committed by an adult. This designation gives the court discretion to
commit the youth to DOI for a minimum term not to exceed two years.
A youth over thirteen years of age and adjudicated for a crime of vio-
lence (according to the Colorado Criminal Statutes)3 2 can be designated
a "violent juvenile offender," 3 3 with those fifteen years of age and over
being placed out-of-home for at least one year.34 A commitment to DOI
is not mandatory for a "violent juvenile offender."' 35 An "aggravated
juvenile offender" is a youth twelve years of age or older adjudicated for
a class-one felony,3 6 or a youth sixteen years of age or older with both a
prior felony and subsequent crime of violence adjudication. 3 7 The
judge has discretion to extend the commitment period from two to five
years for aggravated offenders. 3 8 In all cases, the judge also has discre-
tion to sentence juveniles who are eighteen years of age or older on the
day of sentencing to the county jail.3 9 A probation officer is assigned
to monitor the progress of a juvenile placed on probation. 40 If, on the
27. Id. § 19-2-704(3), (4) and § 19-2-804(6)(a).
28. Id. § 19-2-704(3).
29. An RCCF is a group home, not locked or secured, and is the least restrictive treat-
ment (outside the home) setting for youths.
30. Id. § 19-2-801.
31. Id. § 19-2-802.
32. For example, first-degree sexual assault, aggravated robbery and first and second-
degree assault are all crimes of violence.
33. Id. § 19-2-803.
34. Out-of-home placement is discretionary for those under 15 years old. Id. § 19-2-
803(2)(a).
35. Id. § 19-2-203.
36. Only first-degree murder is considered a class-one felony.
37. Id. § 19-2-804.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 19-2-703(l)(b) & (c).
40. A probation officer, assigned to work with a youth and family when placed on
probation, monitors progress in the community and makes recommendations to the court
about the youth's treatment program. Id. § 19-2-1002.
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other hand, a juvenile is committed to DOI, a client manager is assigned
to the youth. 4 1 The client manager monitors and coordinates the
youth's treatment and placement needs. A commitment to DOI often
leads to a period of parole. If parole is granted, a parole officer is as-
signed to the juvenile.4 2 The parole officer becomes the primary re-
source person for the youth; however, the client manager lends
assistance when necessary.
The Colorado juvenile delinquency process is adversarial in nature,
but with an orientation towards due process. Although judges have
some sentencing discretion, the decision-making process is limited by
statutes and the formal structure. The Colorado model ofjuvenile court
best fits the structure defined as Autonomous/Noninterventionist - Type
Four.43 Type Four courts restrict judicial decision-making to non-dis-
cretionary, offense criteria limited by rules and structure. Youth social
service agencies are separate and specialized. Therefore, the alleged
crime dominates the judicial process, not the condition of the youth,
except at the sentencing phase. At that point, the probation report sup-
plies mitigating or aggravating social information that the judge uses to
assess the type and severity of the sentence. The magnitude of the of-
fense is subordinated to the importance of the offender's characteristics
(e.g., family composition, education, mental health), which dominate at




Youths volunteered and responded to a structured questionnaire
containing twenty sections with a total of ninety-six questions. The
questions contained close-ended, fact finding items followed by open-
ended questions to further examine the thoughts, attitudes and feelings
of the interviewees. Each participant in this study was asked to respond
to the same questions. This report provides a glimpse of the findings
for thirteen of twenty sections.
45
41. A client manager, assigned to work with a youth committed to DOI, coordinates
treatment and the residential setting for the youth, but does not actually work in the
facility.
42. A parole officer monitors youths who are granted parole after a period of commit-
ment to DOI. Id. § 19-2-1205.
43. Jeanne Ito, Janice Hendryx and Vaughan Stapleton, Inside Metropolitan Juvenile
Courts: How Their Structure Affects the Outcome of Cases, STATE CT. J., Fall 1982, 16, 17-18
(research study analyzing various juvenile court jurisdictions, categorizing them and study-
ing how each category affects the treatment of offenders). Type One (or Integrative/In-
terventionist) courts control probation, intake, social services, detention and adjudication
and the prosecutor does not participate in filing the petition. Id. at 16. Type Two (or
Transitional) courts share control of authority and the prosecutor is involved in the deci-
sion to file a petition, but not in probation or administrative control of the court, as in
Type Four. Type Three (or Divergent) courts have little centralized control over the juve-
nile process.
44. Id. at 35.
45. The other seven survey sections deal mostly with the youths' family and educa-
tional histories, not the youths' opinions regarding the juvenile system. However, since
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The population represented a spectrum of Colorado counties as
well as a cross section of involvement and history with the juvenile jus-
tice system. Even though the number of youths in the study is relatively
small (twenty-four), they are reflective of youths involved in the system.
The three areas represented in this study are: (1) adjudicated youths on
probation who reside in an RCCF/unsecured facility; (2) adjudicated
youths sentenced to DOI who reside in an RCCF/unsecured facility;
46
and (3) adjudicated youths committed to DOI who reside in a secured/
locked juvenile facility. 4 7 Of the twenty-four youths, six were on proba-
tion, six were in unsecured facilities, eleven were in secured facilities,
and one was on parole and living at home. The parolee youth was previ-
ously placed in an unsecured facility.
The interviews occurred at the youths' respective residential facili-
ties. The youths were interviewed individually in a private setting. The
results of the interviews were not disclosed to placement/residential
staff or any other persons working with the youths because they were
assured of confidentiality prior to the interview. A research assistant, a
Master's candidate in social work at University of Denver, was employed
to conduct interviews with the youths on probation and in unsecured
facilities. Youths from secured facilities were interviewed by one of the
authors. In order to be sensitive to the youths and gain honest answers,
the author associated with the juvenile court was not involved in the
interview process. The interviews, averaging forty-five minutes each,
were conducted over a one-month period. The authors attempted to
keep any personal bias out of this Article by reflecting only the opinions
of the youths in all sections except the conclusion. Wherever possible,
the youths were directly quoted; however, vulgar language was edited.
Due to the qualitative design of this article, only basic statistics of
means, modes, and ranges are reported.
FINDINGS
Of the twenty-four youths interviewed, twenty-three were male and
one was female. The average age was 17.04 years old. The youths' eth-
nic breakdown is as follows: one Turkish, four African-American, one
Native American, four Caucasian, seven Hispanic, six multi-racial and
one unknown. 4 8 Six are currently on probation, six are in unsecured
facilities, eleven are in secured facilities and one is on parole. All the
youths, except the parolee, are currently placed out-of-home.
The offenses that resulted in their current placement represent a
wide variety of crimes. They include: theft by receiving, motor vehicle
theft, burglary, sexual assault, incest, aggravated robbery and murder.
this project is on-going, the authors hope to correlate the family and educational informa-
tion with the incidence of self-reported crime and publish those results in a future article.
46. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47. This is the most restrictive treatment setting for youths.
48. The youths were asked to identify their own ethnicity within the structure of open-
ended questions. The responses contained many different ethnic terms, such as such as
black, African-American, Spanish, Mexican, Hispanic, white, and Caucasion.
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The youths self-reported 4 9 a total of 5233 crimes, yet had only a total of
eighty adjudications. The mode number of crimes self-reported was 120
and the mode number of adjudications was three. Using these numbers,
each youth participated in an average of 218 crimes prior to his or her
current situation.
Out of the 5233 self-reported crimes, 50 1398 committed as a group
were gang related, 862 perpetrated as a group were non-gang related,
356 offenses committed alone were gang related and 2179 committed
alone were non-gang related. 5 ' Approximately thirty-four percent of
the self-reported offenses were gang related and fifty percent of the
youths claimed gang affiliation. The youths reported that 2548 of the
offenses were committed while they were intoxicated or under the influ-
ence of drugs and/or alcohol. The drug of choice was alcohol, and most
often the alcohol was combined with marijuana. Only five percent
stated that they were never under the influence of alcohol or drugs when
they perpetrated their crimes. On the average, the youths were 12.10
years old at the time of their first experience with drugs and/or
alcohol.
5 2
Although the number of self-reported crimes for this population
seems quite high, it correlates well with the research completed by the
Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS) 53 in 1986. That study found
that each juvenile committed to DOI reported "breaking into a building
or a vehicle an average of 27 times in the year before commitment."' 54 In
49. Self-reported offenses include both those crimes the youths reported which they
were not arrested for, along with those that resulted in arrest. A single incident may result
in several self-reported crimes (i.e. a burglary involving violence to a person, committed
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51. There was no standard definition for gang. Eachjuvenile defined the term for him
or herself.
52. The age range for this first experience was three to seventeen years old.
53. DYS, a branch of DOI, is responsible for coordinating services to juvenile delin-
quents committed to the DOI.
54. COLORADO DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES, A REPORT TO THE COLORADO ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE DIVISION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUG USE,
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addition, this same study reported a yearly average of thirty-nine felony
thefts and 101 acts of selling marijuana. 5 5 The study found that "com-
pared to a national sample of youths from the general population, the
involvement of the Division of Youth Services population was from
three to ten times greater for most offenses."1
56
We began our examination into the justice system by asking the
youths questions regarding the first juvenile justice professionals the
youths encountered, the police officers on the street. Unfortunately,
youths have a poor opinion of law enforcement. Fifty-eight percent of
the youths interviewed stated that they had negative and often abusive
experiences with the police. One youth reported that a police officer
told him: "Obviously the Judge hasn't taught you a lesson, so I will."
The most common experiences expressed by the youths were of harass-
ment and "alley rides"-when police officers hit the youths after arrest.
This certainly leaves a very impressionable youth with an incorrect im-
pression of the purpose of law enforcement and results in fear of the
police. The majority of the youths expressing negativity towards the po-
lice also recognized that their own behavior may have contributed to the
situation. Many stated that, in retrospect, if they had been respectful
upon arrest, the police may have been respectful in return. Several
youths expressed respect for the police. Thirty-four percent stated that
they understand that the police have a difficult job. Eight percent were
neutral on this issue.
Court is the next step for the juvenile. The court process, to those
inexperienced, is often confusing. What do the youths say? Fifty per-
cent reported that they understood what happened in court when they
attended. Those who did not understand had difficulty with the "long
words," the rules and procedures, people who spoke too fast and a pro-
cess that moved so quickly that no time was left for the youths' input.
Youths who did understand asked questions and/or had attorneys who
explained the process to them. In one case, a youth stated that he did
not understand because he did not pay attention. He expressed a lack of
control over his court situation as his reason for not paying attention.
There are many professionals in the courtroom during delinquency
hearings: the judge, the defense attorney, the probation officer, the DA
and often a GAL.5 7 Do the juveniles understand what role each plays in
the process? This query divulged an overwhelming amount of confu-
sion for the youths. Although eighty-three percent of our population
did not have a GAL, those who did (seventeen percent) reported that
they did not know what the GAL was supposed to do. Comments on
this issue of the GAL ranged from: "Don't know what they do" to
DELINQUENCY AND BEHAVIORAL ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS AMONG COMMITTED JUVENILE OF-
FENDERS 9 (1986) (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 28.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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"Didn't do anything." The youths were disappointed that the GAL
never met with them outside of court and never got to know them.
When asked about the DA, three participants, twelve percent of the
youths, did not know who the DA was or what he or she did. Twenty-
nine percent of the youths spoke to the DA and reported positive exper-
iences. One youth reported that the DA was a shrewd person, but that
he was just doing his job. Others reported that the DA dropped charges
and at times dismissed cases. Seventy-one percent stated that they did
not speak to the DA, but sixty-four percent of these youths stated that
they wanted to. If the sixty-four percent had spoken to the DA, they
would have told the DA about themselves, asked the DA what his or her
role is, asked what the DA's intentions were and would have asked the
DA for alternatives. One youth found the DA too accusatory and an-
other youth stated that the DA would not take the time to speak to him.
Most of the youths did have defense attorneys-only thirteen per-
cent were pro se. Of those with attorneys, thirty-four percent had posi-
tive experiences and fifty-three percent had negative experiences.
Fourteen percent remained neutral on this issue. Of those with attor-
neys, at least fifty-three percent had Public Defenders (PDs) (five youths
that had attorneys did not designate whether the attorney was court ap-
pointed, PD or private attorney). Those with positive experiences stated
that their attorneys presented the case well, did a good job and spoke
well for them. Comments from the youths who had negative exper-
iences with their attorneys included feelings that their attorneys gave up,
would not explain what was happening, would not tell the judge what
the youths wanted and was not on the youths' side. These youths had
never met their attorneys before their court appearances.
Fifty-eight percent of the youths wanted to talk to the judge at sen-
tencing. Of this fifty-eight percent, seventy-one percent actually did
speak at their sentencing. This left twenty-nine percent of the youths
silent who wanted to speak and forty-two percent who never wanted to
speak. The most common issues the youths desired to address with the
judge were to explain the circumstances of the offense and let the judge
know who they are. The primary reasons for not speaking in court were
intimidation, fright and a sense that the judge did not care anyway.
Some youths wanted to speak about how unfair a probation officer had
been, but they thought it would make the situation worse. Once again,
at times the hearing proceeded too quickly for the youths to have time to
formulate and express ideas.
When asked: "Do you think you were treated fairly or unfairly in
court?" the youths focused on their sentences as a measure of fairness.
Sixty-seven percent thought they were treated fairly, while twenty-nine
percent thought they were treated unfairly. Four percent remained neu-
tral on this issue. The youths' comments reflect that they understand
the adage: "Do the crime, do the time." Most said they were treated
fairly because they did the crime, the judge gave them a break, the judge
gave them multiple chances and that they got counseling. A few youths
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even commented on their sentence as "not much time." Those who
thought they were treated unfairly often did not understand the process,
felt no one listened to them and felt that there was not enough investiga-
tion into their case.
Seventy-five percent of the youths had some experience with proba-
tion. Of these, fifty-six percent had a helpful probation officer. The
most common positive comments made about probation officers were
that the officers were "too lenient," "cool," "nice," and "good." On the
flip side, the negative comments included that the officer did not care,
was on a power trip, was not too helpful and did not do any good. Sixty-
one percent reported no behavior changes while on probation; instead
they continued their pre-conviction behavior. Of those youths who did
report a behavior change, forty-one percent reported a negative
change-they "got worse." Thirty-nine percent of the youths on proba-
tion reported to the officer under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Most of these youths reported intoxicated more than once. Thirteen
percent of the youths also appeared in court intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs/alcohol.
The topic of client managers was discussed by all the Division of
Youth Services (DYS) clients-seventy-five percent of the population.
The range of time spent in DOI was three months to four years and five
months, and the mode was ten months. One youth reported being a
DYS client on and off for six years. Most comments about the client
managers were positive. "Nice," "polite," "cool," "good," "great guy,"
"helpful" and "concerned," are sample comments. A few youths ex-
kressed concern that their client manager did not take care of business,
was lazy, was inflexible and treated them as "a number".
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE YOUTHS
A majority of the youths, seventy-nine percent, agreed that
juveniles should be treated apart from adults. The advantages of a sepa-
rate juvenile system allowed them to get help, rehabilitate and avoid the
more violent adult prisons. Some youths thought that juveniles should
not be held as responsible as adults for their offenses because juveniles
are immature and curious. However, twenty-nine percent of the youths
thought that the more serious juvenile offenders should be placed in the
adult system. Twenty-one percent of the youths did not want separate
systems. Comments from youths who did not like the separation ranged
from "treatment is unnecessary" to "there are less hassles in the adult
lock-up facilities." One youth responded: "You make a decision as an
adult, so you should be treated as one."
The message was clear-the juveniles want to be treated separately
from adults, but they also want change in the current juvenile justice
system. They offered several simple suggestions to improve the system.
First, they want people to speak to them. This includes defense attor-
neys, GALs, judges, probation officers, and client managers. The
juveniles repeatedly said that they are much more than a piece of paper.
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The people handling their cases should make the time to meet with
them before court and get to know them as people. Second, they want
people to listen to them. They believe that they have valuable informa-
tion, which is often over-looked by the professionals. The youths re-
ported that "importance" is a subjective term, and what they view as
important should be treated as such. The youths viewed family dynam-
ics, their peers and their own fears of sharing information as important.
In addition, they want to be heard before the sentencing phase of the
proceedings. They would like the juvenile court system to be less of-
fense oriented and more "offender characteristic" (family, mental
health, education, etc.) oriented at all stages of the system. Such a
change, the youths feel, would make the court and professionals more
likely to listen and not simply pass judgment. Most youths believe they
know what is best for themselves, but this rarely gets expressed. Third,
the youths ask the professionals for patience. Juveniles have difficulty
processing all the information flowing around the courtroom. They ask
for time to formulate questions and comments. In addition, they ask for
patience to build trust. Many youths felt that they could not be honest
due to a lack of trust and the power structure of the system itself.
Fourth, thejuveniles ask to be educated about the juvenile system. They
want to know the role of each person in court and out of court. This
would facilitate communication, honesty and trust. They would know
who to ask questions of and what questions to ask.
All of the youths recognized that their own conduct led to the con-
sequences. They also recognized that they should have taken a more
active part in the court process. All of the youths expressed some regret
for not asking questions or for not speaking up in court. However, they
cited intimidation and a desire not to ruin their case as reasons for mini-
mal participation. Although the youths suggested making the process
less intimidating, the only specific suggestions regarding that ideal were
those listed above.
The youths gave several specific suggestions for the system. Most
asked for more restrictions on the behavior of police officers. They also
stated that the court, as well as the probation and client managers,
should be more consistent-enforce sanctions instead of just threaten.
One youth thought the law should allow more than three adjudications
before out-of-home placement is enforced. Another juvenile felt he
should have a choice of where to go if placed out-of-home.
Some suggestions involved complicated theories of law. For exam-
ple, one youth wanted a shorter statute of limitations. Suggestions to
make the civil rights law more positive were made along with reforma-
tion of the education system. The youths suggested making the educa-
tional system more flexible to meet student needs, possibly through
individualized instruction. The youths also suggested stricter laws for
police misconduct and getting rid of laws which "pick on youth" as ways
to improve the system. One suggestion was very simple: Change all the
private property signs that prohibit skate boarding.
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The overall theme for the youths' suggestions was respect. They do
not feel respected as people when they go through the court process.
This lack of respect causes many of them to close up and not
communicate.
Once a youth has become involved in the juvenile justice system,
the role of a parent becomes overshadowed by the court process. Par-
ents, like their children, are often intimidated by the court proceedings
due to a lack of understanding or fear of saying something that will make
the outcome worse. One youth reported that his parents are Spanish-
speaking and did not understanding what happened in court. Thus,
when his parents did speak, their comments were misunderstood.
All the youths discussed what they wished, in retrospect, they would
have done or said regarding their parents. Seventy-seven percent said
they should have respected and listened to their parents. (It is impor-
tant to mention that ninety-two percent of the youths specifically identi-
fied their mothers in this section.) They went on to say they would have
"trusted their mothers better," "explained that it wasn't their fault" and
apologized for the trouble they caused. They felt they could have tried
to talk to their parents, sharing their feelings and frustrations.
The youths also provided some great insight into what their parents
could have done. Sixty-three percent stated their parents should have
enforced punishments such as grounding and restrictions. These youths
reported needing more structure, less rescuing and getting away with
"things" without consequences. Although we did not ask if the youths
had been abused at home, twenty-five percent stated they were, and that
their parents should not have treated them in that way. Other input was
that parents should spend more time with their children, listen to them
and ask how they are doing. They felt that going places with their par-
ents would have helped structure time and left less time for negative
peers. Being given better values, not being taught to be prejudiced and
parents leaving the past alone were all cited as important. Only twenty-
five percent of the youths felt their parents did everything they could.
CONCLUSION: THE AUTHORS' IMPRESSIONS
It was surprising to discover that each youth, in his or her own way,
and to different degrees, accepted responsibility for his or her involve-
ment in the juvenile justice system. The findings and suggestions re-
ported above are the honest and sincere thoughts of the youths
interviewed. The youths took a risk in participating in this research and
they trusted the writers to accurately reflect their comments and feel-
ings. We have made every effort to do so.
The youths' reaction to the interview process was interesting. Some
youths shied away from volunteering because they did not think people
would listen. Others were enthusiastic about the opportunity to give
input into a system that they feel controls their lives. We thank each of
the youths for participating, for their candor, and for caring enough to
spend time completing the interview.
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One important issue this research did not touch upon is victimiza-
tion. The self-reported crimes among our population totaled 5,233.
This denotes 5,233 primary victims for only twenty-four juveniles. It is
not our intention to minimize victimization. We recognize, profession-
ally and personally, the tremendous impac these juveniles have had on
society. Yet, this project focused on the youths' perceptions of how they
"fit" into the juvenile justice system. Victim awareness is an issue that
deserves further research (e.g., how does the victim "fit" into the justice
system and how do the juveniles view their victims). The limited scope
of this Article prevented us from addressing such significant issues.
As mentioned above, each youth, in his or her own way, accepted
responsibility for his or her involvement in the juvenile justice system.
Prior to the interview, the youths did not understand how they could
actively participate in the system and play a responsible role in the court
process. They understood the connection between the offense and the
resulting sentence, but they did not understand the process of getting
from one point to the next.
It should be noted that a circumscribed group was involved in our
research-our sample is in out-of-home placement with treatment. This
might account for the youths' ability to accept responsibility for their
offenses and to be more insightful about themselves. Even though we
did not interview youths who were placed at home or not in treatment,
responses from the interviewed youths demonstrated the value of treat-
ment over probation.
It was obvious to us that communication gaps exist within the juve-
nile justice system. The questionnaires revealed the youths' frustration
with mixed messages. Often times, they were not treated consistently
and did not experience what they were told they would experience. As
professionals, we need to develop a method of communication among
ourselves and with the juveniles, which would allow us to have a more
positive impact upon youths without confusing them. Needs and expec-
tations must be clarified for youths, and follow-through must be com-
pleted. The youths in our survey view communication, information and
respect as important ingredients in the court process. Communication
among professionals and youths can only enhance the purpose of the
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We enjoin thee . .. that thou carry
This female bastard hence, and that thou bear it
To some remote and desert place, quite out
Of our dominions; and that there thou leave it
(Without more mercy) to its own protection
And favour of the climate.
- King Leontes'
INTRODUCTION
The problem of drug harmed babies stems from numerous aban-
donments. The most poignant abandonment is the pregnant mother re-
linquishing the safety of herself and her fetus to drugs and alcohol. This
abandonment2 is the culmination of a series of subtle and pernicious
abandonments by our legal, medical and political systems that harm
poor women in general and poor women of color in particular. From
the fetal perspective, our political failure to provide comprehensive per-
inatal care for poor mothers creates a greater risk of harm than all but
the most severe drug use by the mother. Within this context, a thor-
ough legal analysis of the problem is necessary but not sufficient. This
Article will endeavor to show that the problem of protecting the fetus
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER'S TALE act 2, sc. 4 (J.H.P. Pafford ed., The
Arden Edition, 4th ed., Harv. U. Press 1963) (1912).
2. Abandonment is here used in the sense of relinquishing any part of one's duty to
care for an infant.
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from maternal drug use can be neither understood nor remedied within
our present models of medical and legal practice. Our present concepts
of punishment, child protection, treatment and professionalism exacer-
bate this problem. An interdisciplinary analysis is necessary to begin to
understand the societal, political and professional abandonments that
contribute to the crippling of our children.3 The goal of this analysis is
not to simply critique the professions, but rather to combine their per-
spectives to produce a different medical standard that better diagnoses
the problem and a different medico-legal system that better prevents it.
4
The medical evidence herein will demonstrate that the effects of
poverty, homelessness, inadequate healthcare and racism are every bit
as damaging to the fetus and the child as are alcohol and drug exposure.
Malnutrition can cripple just as much as cocaine. If we wish to protect
our children, we must have a standard that diagnoses a child who is at
risk from preventable harm, whether that harm is heroin or homeless-
ness, lead paint or poverty. Neither our medical model nor our legal
model of causality adequately address the complexity of the problem.
The Article proposes an "ecologic" model of analysis, which attempts to
consider both the internal and the external environment of the mother.
5
From a fetal perspective, drugs are not needles, pills or smoke. Drugs
are a pollutant of the blood that nourishes the fetus and a pollutant of
the amniotic fluid it breathes. The fetus floats into life in a lake of am-
nion and feeds upon a river of blood. Both lake and river are very vul-
nerable to the "runoff" of toxins from malnutrition, stress, drugs and
infection upon the mother's body. Like any other lake, it must be re-
plenished with fresh water, and like any other river, one poisoned
stream pollutes the entire river. When a pregnant woman cannot or
does not feed herself adequately, the river weakens and no longer sus-
tains fetal growth. Chronic stress weakens the river as do illness, infec-
tion, living in poverty and depression. Like drugs, each of these harm
the fetal environment and, therefore, should be considered when look-
ing for a way to improve newborn health.
3. Since this Symposium on Children will have an interdisciplinary audience, this
Article covers medical aspects of the problem already familiar to medical practitioners and
covers legal aspects of the problem familiar to legal practitioners. Since part of this prob-
lem stems from a failure of each profession to appreciate and understand the efforts of the
other, a restatement seems advisable. Moreover, the lay reader (who is most affected by
but least involved in this analysis) may benefit from this meager attempt to summarize the
works of many disciplines. A review of the table of contents will allow the sophisticated
reader to skip areas with which he or she is familiar.
4. For the purposes of this Article, prevention has three tiers. Primary prevention
involves preventing maternal drug use or unplanned pregnancy. Secondary prevention
concerns preventing harm to a fetus whose mother is drug dependant (e.g. comprehensive
prenatal and drug treatment programs). Tertiary prevention involves limiting the harm
and enhancing the rehabilitation of the child's injuries from prenatal drug exposure (e.g.
postnatal nutrition, parenting classes and healthcare).
5. Here, the concept of ecology is rooted in the original Greek oikos (the home within
which one's family resides) logos (study or knowledge of). An ecologic analysis assesses the
strengths and shortcomings of the "home" environment as well as the internal "environ-
ment" of each family member. The first "environment" of the fetus is the womb and the
second is the home. Each home is despoiled when the mother, father, family, and the
medical, legal and political systems abandon their duty of care.
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The majority of drug-addicted women and children at risk live in
environments degraded by violence, poverty, illness, inadequate hous-
ing, unemployment or underemployment and the absence of adequate
medical and legal care. The majority of drug-addicted mothers sur-
veyed grew up in environments degraded by physical or sexual abuse in
their childhood, obesity and clinical levels of depression beginning in
their early teenage years and grossly inadequate health care, sex, parent-
ing and relational education as adolescents. The young mother's de-
graded personal environment contributes to a staggeringly low sense of
self-esteem that she may compensate for by forming highly dependent
relationships with males. In order to maintain this "life raft" relation-
ship, the woman will often agree to share both drugs and her body. The
resulting addiction and pregnancy is either unintentional or intended to
preserve the relationship. Young fathers (who have similarly degraded
personal environments) are often as likely to abandon their children as
the young mothers are to abandon themselves to the relationship.
Our historic penchant for abandoning poor single mothers of color
creates special needs commensurate to the degree of harm they and
their ancestors have endured. The ecologic analysis used herein in-
cludes the mother's community, culture and faith, recognizing that com-
munity support, cultural cohesion and a shared faith in some higher
power are keys to prevention of and recovery from drug abuse and other
risks of harm to the child. The present medico-legal standard of "drug
exposed infant" allows an abandonment of infants equally at risk from
other causes. It feeds historical prejudices against addicted, poor and
minority women that culminate in family shattering attempts to criminal-
ize and punish maternal drug use. This Article proposes a new standard
of the "challenged child," which better captures preventable harms to
the fetus, while discouraging the exercise of prejudice against the
mother.
Next, this Article outlines a new medico-legal system for the chal-
lenged child, which would be separate from (and parallel to) juvenile
court, dependency court and child protection services. The system is
designed to increase the availability and use of perinatal (pre and post
birth) care and to decrease the use of foster care and court intervention.
It recognizes that protecting the child involves protecting the child's re-
lationship with its nurturing parents and nurturing parental figures.
Central to this system is the creation of a new legal relationship, a "co-
parent." The co-parent is distinguishable from the foster parent and the
guardian ad litem by: (1) being agreed to by the mother, (2) being re-
lated to the mother or the mother's community and (3) having a lifelong
commitment and legal rights to the child. Co-parents work to enhance
the parenting of the biologic parents, to enhance family and community
support of parent and child, and to assist in the non-adversarial transi-
tion of parenting responsibilities from the mother in the event she is
completely unable to fulfill them.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief review of the history of child
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abandonment from Greek times to the present. It examines historical
views of maternal "abandonment" due to drug use. It then reviews,
from a medical perspective, maternal drug use and other threats of harm
to the fetus, and estimates the size of the problem.
Part II considers past "solutions" and begins with a review of our
historical attitudes towards drugs and alcohol and our attempts to deal
with or ignore their abuse. It reviews the effectiveness of drug criminal-
ization and drug treatment programs since the 1930s and concludes that
we lack any model of drug treatment that effectively addresses the needs
of women addicts in general and pregnant addicts in particular.
Part III summarizes the constitutional rights of the mother, fetus
and child and then considers the efficacy of state remedies of criminal-
ization, civil commitment, mandatory treatment, mandatory reporting
and reduction or termination of parental rights.
Part IV focuses on the abandonments of mothers and families by
our professions and our political institutions. It reviews certain ia-
trogenic (physician created) harms to highlight problems in the medical
concept of treatment, professionalism and the structure of our health-
care system, which function to inadvertently abandon those women and
children most in need of medical help. The term "legigenic" (law or
lawyer created) harm is coined and used to examine some of the harms
created by our present concept of justice, professionalism and the func-
tion of our criminal and dependency legal system. It highlights our
many political abandonments of minorities, the addicted, the poor and
their children to demonstrate that anti-discrimination laws are insuffi-
cient to remedy this problem.
Part V reviews the present medical/legal standards (e.g., "drug ex-
posed infant" and "failure to thrive") and uses an ecologic analysis to
redefine our concepts of the problem and of treatment. It explains the
more comprehensive standard of "challenged child" and applies it to
the cases of "Louise" and "Cecil."
Part VI explains the co-parent system as an alternative to court and
as the better vehicle for remedying or preventing the many abandon-
ments6 that create a challenged child. It reviews protocols for the selec-
tion, training and compensation of co-parents and proposes expanded
roles for family court services, churches and community centers. Imple-
menting such a system demands that certain challenges to our profes-
sions and communities be met.
Part VII reviews certain challenges to law, medicine and other pro-
6. Abandonment extends to our poorer elders in our failure to provide adequate
healthcare, housing and support. The crushing costs of maintaining an elder with
Alzheimer's drain many parents' capacities to care for their children and lead to desperate
acts of "granny dumping." See A Dumping Ground for Granny, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1991, at
64. While we act with outrage to both "drug babies" and "granny dumping," the reasons
they occur and pressures they create on the family are similar. The concept of "chal-
lenged" should be applied to these elders, and co-parents should be made available to
them. However, there are important differences in elder care and elder need that cannot
be adequately covered in this Article.
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fessions and recommends adoption of particular policies and pursuit of
specific studies. Finally, it suggests four methods of funding this system
(outside of legislative appropriation).
I. ABANDONMENT: PAST AND PRESENT
A. Historical Child Abandonment
Abandoned children suffuse our history. Moses, Oedipus, Romulus,
Remus and many more were saved by an ethic of care for strangers that is on the
wane today. 7 The responsibility to care for a child from classical Greece
and Rome into the Dark Ages was very different than today. In Rome,
for example, every free child born was ordinarily placed on the ground
before the father. Whether the child was born within or without wed-
lock was not as important as whether the father was willing to be respon-
sible for the child.8 If the father picked the child off the ground, the
baby would become part of the family. This act was known as "raising" 9
the child. Children not so "raised" were fostered with or given to other
families in need of children or abandoned at central sites (e.g., the town
square) in each locality. Children so abandoned rarely perished. They
were quickly adopted by other families. Twenty to forty percent of free
children in Rome were abandoned during the first three centuries of the
Christian era.' 0 Today, in contrast, fewer than 50,000 children, one and
a half percent of newborns, are placed up for adoption in the United
States annually. ' '
In ancient times, abandonment was neither criminally nor civilly
punished. It was viewed as a painful and practical solution to economic
difficulties, and since the places of abandonment were known and pub-
lic, the likelihood that the infant would be raised by another family was
very high. Some abandoned children became key members of wealthy
families. Abandonment was also not permanent. Laws supported par-
ents reclaiming their abandoned children if they properly paid the care-
takers for interim care. Nor was an abandoned child stigmatized by a
negative label. The Latin term "alumni" translates as "foster children."
Fostering was highly esteemed as a "voluntary" love. An "alumnus"
likewise indicated a relationship not founded in either blood or law.
The pace of abandonment continued throughout the Middle Ages and
7. Romulus and Remus, the founders of Rome were allegedly suckled by a she-wolf.
HOWARD H. SCULLARD, A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN WORLD FROM 753 TO 146 B.C. 26-27 (2d
ed. 1951). This well reflects the ethic that no creature was so wild as to not care for and
suckle a child.
8. This ethic of not penalizing the child for its mother's marital status continued
until Constantine's decree in 336 A.D. barring inheritance from an unmarried mother.
Constantine's decree reflected the emerging Christian ethic over the traditional Roman
ethic. JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN IN
WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE 72 (1988).
9. Tollere, the Latin word, means "to support, provide food, or sustenance for." Ox-
FORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1946 (Combined ed.) (1983 reprint).
10. BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 135.
11. Id. at 16.
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into the eighteenth century. 12
However, the care received and the attitudes toward abandoned
children began to decay rapidly from the twelfth century on. There
were no orphanages or foundling homes of record prior to the 1200s.
Families and the church took in the children. In the 1300s, the simulta-
neous rise of a church bureaucracy, detailed codes of law, the inquisi-
tion, church-based orphanages' 3 and a serious bout of vicious
discrimination against women, homosexuals and non-Christians oc-
curred. As society was systematized under detailed, church-based legal
codes, the traditional welfare functions of the parish community and the
monasteries were institutionalized. The abandoned, the ill and the sick
were housed in large structures and served by religious orders. Then, as
now, hospitals shrank from the responsibility of caring for abandoned
children. Then, as now, the mother came to be blamed for the
problem. 14
Then, as now, the population was fearfully responding to a chroni-
cally depressed economy after a long period of expansive affluence in
the 1200s. The 1300s brought a massive expansion of the church and
law and a massive contraction of charity and duty to one's larger com-
munity. Disease and disability, desire and difference became, in many
respects, subjects of inquisition. The ethic of blaming the parents flow-
ered in many forms. Leprosy, deformity and childhood disability were
blamed on parental promiscuity or sexual relations during the time a
woman was lactating or menstruating.' 5
In league with the ethic of parental blame rose the ethic of civic
indifference to the plight of the poor and their children. By the end of
the fourteenth century, children's "hospitals" received grudging sup-
port from civic authorities, with the result that infant mortality soared.16
Then, as now, the poor and the afflicted were viewed as deserving of
their plight. Their diseases were wrongly associated with immorality
much like AIDS is today. 17 The status of woman and the support of
12. For example, the rates of known abandoned children according to birth registries
were from 12-25% in Toulouse, 33% in Lyons and 20-30% in Paris in the last half of the
eighteenth century. In poor areas the rate was estimated at 40%. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 360.
14. For example, in 1300 the poet, Hugo von Trimberg, assailed "mothers of so little
devotion that they leave their children alone in front of hospitals or churches." Id. at 362-
63.
15. Id. at 403 n.15.
16. In Spain at San Gallo Hospital, 20% of the children died within a month of entry
and only 13% lived to age six. The foundling home mortality rate continued to climb
through the end of the eighteenth century, 91% among infants and 86.4 % among children
in Rouen and 77% in Paris (as opposed to 28% among children raised at home). Id. at
421-22.
17. In 1322, Charles IV ordered that all lepers in France be incarcerated forever to
assuage his worried subjects. JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND Ho-
MOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN
ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 272 n.4 (1980). The sentiments are not unlike those
favoring lifetime quarantine of people with AIDS. Medically speaking, moralizing about a
disease because of how it is transmitted is both misleading and dangerous. It is misleading
because diseases have no moral aspect, they simply infect until they are stopped. The
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motherhood also tumbled in the 1300s.
Women, who had been making in-roads into society and the church,
were strongly challenged. They were viewed as carrying the guilt of Eve,
not the grace of Mary. To consolidate its hegemony, the church chal-
lenged midwives, females in the clergy and the traditional female healers
and herbalists that had served the community since the time of ancient
Greece. Tens of thousands of these women were burned as witches.
Men's relations with other men were also challenged. The homosexual
love common in the clergy, royalty and aristocracy since classical Greece
was suddenly prosecuted as an abomination. 18
The persecution of many categories of parents created a great
number of new orphans. The church "took in" these orphans to be
properly raised under the watchful eye of God. Apparently from the
church's perspective, the only way to stamp out heresy was to eliminate
the parents and indoctrinate the children in institutionalized schools.' 9
Our AIDS epidemic is accomplishing another child diaspora wherein fif-
teen million children will be orphaned by the year 2000.20
In the United States, slavery placed the fate of the Black family in
the hands of the master. Children were taken and sold at any time, and
their mothers were forcibly bred. After slavery, states continued to re-
more hardy (contagious) diseases, like influenza, survive in (and pass easily through) the
air. Less contagious ones, like hepatitis, demand more warmth and moisture in the form
of touch or contact. AIDS is vastly less contagious than hepatitis due, in part, to its viral
density being 1/1000th of hepatitis and that it quickly dies without a constant source of
moisture and warmth. As a result, the AIDS virus can only survive if transmitted through
blood or other bodily fluids.
Venereal diseases are simply less hardy than other diseases. To impute immorality to
a disease (and the diseased) because of its method of transmission is no less absurd than
the fourteenth century burning of a non-Christian because of his method of worship. The
fires of heresy then now burn in the form of bias. Since we are more a commerce and work
based society, a few our heresies are: lacking money (poverty), lacking work (unemploy-
ment), lacking self-control (addiction) and lacking white heterosexual masculinity (not
professional material).
If we seriously wish to reduce the harm to children we must come to see both the
myriad harms of bias to their mothers and how that bias blinds us to their fate. Seen as a
virus, bias infects and impairs our capacity to act (our bias against IV drug users, gays and
the poor "infected" people with AIDS). Such children make up a significant percentage of
those at risk for fetal drug exposure.
18. There is no record of any prosecution for sodomy in either ancient Greece or
Rome. Id. Apropos to this, Boswell notes that, surveying the period from ancient Greece
to the present day, the periods of greatest discrimination against gays were the fourteenth
century in Europe and the first half of the twentieth century in the United States with all of
our strenuous efforts at prescribing particular sexual acts.
19. This policy, in a slightly milder form, was reflected in the United States Govern-
ment's attempt to "assimilate" Native Americans. Until 1967, Native American children
were shipped off to different regions to attend school nine months a year. The children
were punished for attempting to speak their native tongue or engage in any spiritual cere-
monies. There were often identified by number, and not name, in schools. Their parents
and grandparents were denigrated for being unsophisticated. Twelve years of this process
shattered the parent/child and grandparent/child bond in many Native American families.
Children subject to our forced boarding school ethic had no "home" to return to. The
high degree of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and other problems in native communities may, in
part, be due to our government's misguided efforts to "assimilate."




move Black children from their homes, terminate their parents' rights,
sterilize their mothers and prosecute them for maternal drug use at a
rate far greater than similarly situated Whites.
2 '
The theory of abandonment proposed herein suggests that those
subjected to the most systemic abandonment are most likely to be char-
acterized as unfit and uncaring parents. In the fourteenth century, Jews
were alleged to steal and eat children, and heretics in general were per-
ceived to neglect and abuse children. Such stereotypes continue today
in the form of "lazy welfare mothers" and "addict mothers," particularly
if they are women of color. 22 Abandonment theory asserts that drug use
by the most abandoned population will be subject to the greatest sanc-
tions. Thus, an image of dignity is lent to Betty Ford's prescription drug
and alcohol addiction, while an image of depravity is lent to any
mother's crack addiction. It is easier to convict those already aban-
doned. There have been many prosecutions for maternal crack and opi-
ate use. There have been no prosecutions for maternal alcohol use,
even though it poses a greater peril to the fetus.
B. Historical Maternal Drug Use. Our Alcoholic Heritage
The problem has been with us since Biblical times: "Behold, thou
shalt conceive, and bear a son; and now drink no strong wine or strong
drink .... -23; "[olne who drinks intoxicating liquor will have ungainly
children."
24
Perhaps only the severity of the problem is new. Alcoholism was
less common in Greece and Rome, since wine has only a fraction of the
alcohol content of distilled spirits. The rise of the distillation process
made it easier to give dangerous amounts of alcohol to the general pub-
lic, just like the discovery of the crack process made it easier to dis-
tribute dangerous amounts of cocaine to the general public. As crack
flooded New York in the late 1980s, cheap gin flooded London in the
mid- 1 700s.
The status of women in the slums of eighteenth century England
was, by any measure, harrowing and dismal. Once this inexpensive gin
was available at local grocery stores, many poor women drank them-
selves into a stupor and sold most of what they had to buy enough to
21. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equal-
ity, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1440-43 (1991). Professor Roberts
provides a cogent argument that the historic discrimination against blacks continues in the
prosecutions of mothers using drugs (which are aimed primarily at poor women of color).
Id. at 1420, 1421.
22. "Women of color" is an extremely inexact phrase referring to Black, Hispanic,
Asian and Native American women. Homosexuals are another example of this phenom-
ena in that they are presumed to be a sexual threat to children. This stereotype endures
despite the fact that the clear majority of convicted pedophiles are married heterosexuals.
Abandonment allows the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes.
23. Judges, 13:7.
24. MICHAEL DORRIs, THE BROKEN CORD: A FAMILY'S ONGOING STRUGGLE WITH FETAL
ALCOHOL SYNDROME 144 (1989) (quoting Babylonian Talmud (200-500 A.D., Kehuboth
32b)). This should not be understood as a scientific observation in our sense of the word.
It was likely an experiential admonition.
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continue using this new "hard" drug. As a result, hundreds of children
were miscarried, stillborn or born seriously retarded or deformed.
2 5
In America, the connection between alcoholism and sickly offspring
was not pursued. Colonial America had a reputation for very hard
drinking. Elections were often decided upon who "treated" or "whis-
kied" the best on election day. 26 Thomas Jefferson invented the Presi-
dential cocktail party, and President John Adams is reputed to have
drunk a tankard of hard cider at breakfast.
2 7
Although Jefferson, Andrew Jackson and Aaron Burr were famous
for their wine collections, ChiefJustice John Marshall was perhaps most
devoted to his Madeira. 28 When distilled spirits became available to the
general American public at affordable prices, consumption soared. In
the 1820s, the annual per capita consumption of grain alcohol exceeded
four gallons. This is equivalent to eighty gallons of beer (at five percent
alcohol) or forty-five fifths of whiskey (at eighty proof). Consumption in
the 1820s was almost three times the consumption today. Foreign visi-
tors to the new nation were astonished at American consumption. A
Swede, Carl D. Arfwedson, reported a "general addiction to hard
drinking. "29
The gracious host of the early nineteenth century considered it a
social duty to get all of his guests drunk. Drinking whiskey was consid-
ered a patriotic duty, since whiskey was key to the early American econ-
omy and was used as a cash substitute.
3 0
George Washington objected to alcohol abuse amongst workers.
He stated that distilled spirits were "the ruin of half the workmen in this
Country . .."31 In addition, alcohol was such an accepted part of Amer-
ican life that in 1829, the secretary of war estimated that three-quarters
25. "The gin epidemic produced the first observations since classical Greece of the
connection between hard-drinking mothers and sickly offspring. But in making this con-
nection, indifference to the mother's alcoholism was only exceeded by the blame heaped
on her for her children's afflictions." MARIAN SANDMAIER, THE INVISIBLE ALCOHOLICS:
WOMEN AND ALCOHOL ABUSE IN AMERICA 31 (1980).
26. George Washington lost an early attempt at election to the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses for failure to supply sufficient liquor to the electorate. He ran again in 1758 and
won with 307 votes after providing 144 gallons of rum and other spirits. His return was
slightly over two votes per gallon. W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMER-
ICAN TRADITION 152 (1979). After his retirement, Washington moved to Mount Vernon,
where he opened a major distillery in 1797. His distillery earned him 344 English Pounds
in 1798, a phenomenal sum. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 6.
28. In the 1790s, the members of the Supreme Court lived in a Boarding House that
allowed Madeira (approximately 20% alcohol) only in wet weather, for sake of "health."
Upon occasion, the chiefjustice would command Justice Story to check the win-
dow to see if it were raining. When informed that the sun shone brightly, Mar-
shall would observe, "All the better; for our jurisdiction extends over so large a
territory that the doctrine of chances makes it certain that it must be raining
somewhere." The chiefjustice, observed Story, had been "brought up upon Fed-
eralism and Madeira, and he [was] not the man to outgrow his early prejudices."
Id. at 106.
29. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
30. Whiskey was one of the "Spirits of Independence." Id. at 59.
31. Id. at 6 (citing 11 Washington WRITINGS 377 (W.C. Ford ed, 1891)).
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of the nation's laborers drank daily at least four ounces of distilled
spirits."1
3 2
The concern over alcohol extended elliptically to women, who con-
sumed an eighth to a quarter of the total. The subject of women with
alcohol problems was considered "too delicate" to receive public atten-
tion. Women were rarely allowed to drink in taverns or grocery stores
and were not allowed into the men's drinking clubs. Instead, they drank
around collective activities such as quilting, plucking seeds from cotton
or at social gatherings. 33 In the nineteenth century, women drank the
predecessors of Valium, Librium and Dalmane in the form of "cordials"
and "stomach elixirs" for their "health." Through the nineteenth cen-
tury, these elixirs became even more powerful, containing ever larger
doses of opium (as laudanum) and cocaine. Heroin and cocaine were, at
one time, popular patent medicines. The addictive propensities of pat-
ent medicines in the 1900s continue in some of the pharmaceuticals pre-
scribed today. Then, as now, the focus was on mood altering, elevating
substances. Then, as now, they were seriously over-prescribed and
over-promoted.
Today, women make up nearly thirty-five percent of the Alcoholics
Anonymous membership. The incidence of heavy drinking among
young women is declining more slowly than in young men.3 4 Women
frequently use other drugs in combination with alcohol, placing them-
selves at a higher risk for harming their fetuses.3 5 Nearly twenty-six per-
cent of girls in one study, age twelve to seventeen, abused an illicit drug,
compared to twenty-four percent of boys. In that same age group, an
estimated 100,000 girls and 88,000 boys tried crack cocaine. 36 The
medical community is not without responsibility, since physicians pre-
scribe two-thirds of all legal psychoactive drugs to women, and it is esti-
mated that more than one million women in the United States are
dependent on those drugs.
37
Allowing such an addiction rate is a partial abandonment of the
physician's Hippocratic Oath to "at least do no harm." Maternal drug
use is an intergenerational problem. To understand it, a review of the
effects of drugs on the fetus is necessary.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id. at 12.
34. In 1975 and 1989, heavy drinking (five drinks in a row) reported during the prior
two weeks declined more modestly among high school girls than among high school boys.
LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., USE OF LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS By AMERICA'S HIGH SCHOOL
STUDENTS, 1975 TO 1989, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (1991).
35. About 51% of women AA members in one study, as compared to 41% of male
members, reported addiction to another drug. STANTON PEELE, THE DISEASING OF
AMERICA (1989) (citing a 1989 Alcoholics Anonymous Survey).
36. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPENDENCE, NCADD FACT SHEET:
ALCOHOLISM, OTHER DRUG ADDICTIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS AMONG WOMEN (citing
NIDA, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES, 1988,
1989 at 17, 35).
37. Id. (citing M. Sandmaier, Alcohol, .Mood-Altering Drugs and Smoking, in BOSTON WO-
MEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (1984)).
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C. Drugs and the Fetus
The population of parents abusing alcohol, cocaine, opiates and
other drugs is unknown. Estimates vary widely. The National Commit-
tee for the Prevention of Child Abuse estimates that there are ten mil-
lion children being raised by "addicted parents," of which 675,000
children are abused.3 8 There are an estimated ten million adult al-
coholics, five million regular cocaine/crack users and 500,000 heroin ad-
dicts in the United States.3 9 Most female users are intheir childbearing
years. Other estimates project 300,000 infants exposed to crack co-
caine, 600,000 infants exposed to debilitating amounts of alcohol,
10,000 infants exposed to heroin and other opiates and an unknown
number of fetuses exposed to prescription drugs, amphetamines and
crystal.
Commonly, more than one drug is abused. One survey of drug de-
pendent mothers found that 30% of cocaine users, 45% of methadone
users and 66% of heroin users also used other drugs.40 Studies project
that up to 15% of all pregnant women in the United States abuse drugs
during their pregnancy. 4 1 The AMA estimates that up to 11% of preg-
nant women have used illegal drugs during pregnancy, 4 2 and of those,
75% have used cocaine.43 Women are now heavily targeted for market-
ing of alcoholic beverages. 44 They also have fewer physiological de-
fenses to alcohol.
4 5
38. Jan Bays, Substance Abuse and Child Abuse: The Impact of Addiction on the Child, 37
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 881, 881 (1990) (citing The Substance Abuse and Child Abuse Connec-
tion, in THE NCPCA MEMORANDUM. CHICAGO, NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION OF
CHILD ABUSE, October 1989).
39. Bays, supra note 38, at 881.
40. Bays, supra note 38, at 883.
41. See Rorie Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1; see
also Catherine Foster, Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct.
10, 1989, at 8.
42. American Medical Association Board of Trustees Report, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior
by Pregnant lW'omen, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990) (adopted as Report 00 by the House of
Delegates of the American Medical Association at the Annual Meeting, June 1990) [herein-
after AMA Trustees] (citing American Medical Association Board of Trustees Report.
Drug Abuse In The United States: The Next Generation. Interim 1989).
43. IraJ. Chasnoff, Drug Use In Women: Establishing a Standard of Care, 562 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCIENCES 208, 208 (1989).
44. Women are projected to spend $30 billion on alcohol products in 1994, compared
to $20 billion in 1984. Ed Fitch, Betty Briefcase Buys More Bottles, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 12,
1985, at 37.
45. If a man and a women of similar weight drink the same amount of alcohol, 30%
more alcohol will enter the women's blood stream, because women have less of a particu-
lar enzyme that digests alcohol. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPEN-
DENCE, supra note 34 (citing M. Frezza et al., High Blood Alcohol Levels in Women, 322 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 95 (1990)). Even with less alcohol consumption, women are more likely to
develop cirrhosis of the liver than men, and they have a much greater risk of dying of
cirrhosis. Id. (citing S. Hill, Vulnerability to the Biomedical Consequences of Alcoholism and Alcohol-
Related Problems, in ALCOHOL PROBLEMS IN WOMEN 126 (Sharon C. Wilsnack & Linda J.
Beckman eds., 1984). Alcoholic women are more frequently disabled for longer periods of
time than alcoholic men. Id. (citing P. Roman, Women and Alcohol Use: A Review of the Litera-
ture, ADAMHA 18 (1988)). This may result from a systematic failure to diagnose the prob-
lem before significant damage has occurred, from the lack of affordable health care or,
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The Dangerous Drugs. The fetus is at once more vulnerable to and
more adaptive to drug exposure. Since it lacks the mother's capacity to
metabolize many drugs, alcohol and other drugs remain in its system
much longer. 4 6 Since the fetal brain continues to form new structures
until thirty-six months after birth, it can recover from (or adapt to) some
prenatal injuries. The failure to support these infants after birth causes
this physiological "second chance" for recovery to be missed.
47
Alcohol. The primary problem of maternal alcohol use is that it is
not viewed as a problem by society at large. Despite clear medical evi-
dence that alcoholism is a severe addiction that is difficult to terminate,
alcohol use continues to be strongly promoted as an aid to self-esteem, a
magnifier of one's desirability and a necessary part of social occasions.
Pregnant women abusing alcohol 4 8 create severe risks that their
children will be born with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). FAS was first
identified as a physical syndrome in 1973. It is the primary preventable
cause of mental retardation in the United States and Canada. 49 The
physiological defects created by FAS are facial malformations such as
small head circumference, flattened midface, sunken nasal bridge, flat-
most importantly, from the mother's reluctance to use available health care for fear she
will be reported to authorities and possibly lose her child.
46. See The Fetal Recycling Effect, infra note 86 and accompanying text. For example,
with cocaine, the drug and its metabolites cease to function within thirty minutes. Cocaine
is normally eliminated from the mother's system by breaking it down into benzoylecgoine
through the cholinesterase system. A lesser amount is converted into norcocaine, a sub-
stance just as stressful as cocaine. Both the fetus and the newborn lack a developed cho-
linesterase system so the cocaine is converted into norcocaine. This norcocaine (which is
almost as stressful as cocaine) simply sits in the fetal blood until it is slowly filtered-out by
the newborn's immature renal system. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Perinatal Cerebral Infarction and
Maternal Cocaine Use, 108 J. PEDIATRICS 456, 458-59 (1986); Ira J. Chasnoff, Drug Use in
Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1403, 1405 (1988).
47. Properly cared for, newborns have a remarkable capacity to recover or simply
grow around some pre-birth traumas. Some damaged organs, brain tissue and nerves can
be regrown, replaced or "rerouted" through a variety of physiological redundancy sys-
tems. With comprehensive support and care significant recovery can occur within 12
months of birth. Controlled studies have demonstrated that pregnant women who enter
treatment programs early in pregnancy and succeed in ceasing or reducing cocaine use can
significantly reduce the harm to the child. IraJ. Chasnoffet al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine
Use in Pregnancy: Perinatal Outcome, 261 JAMA 1741, 1742-44 (1989).
Thus, the post birth environment is just as critical to the neonate's well being as the
uterine environment. The scant support provided poor, addicted, single mothers cripples
their capacity to maintain a home environment sufficient for the child to recover from pre-
birth drug exposure. Cocaine suppresses the appetite such that the mother may go for
long periods of time without proper nutrition, creating significant harm to the fetus. Hy-
pertension is quite common amongst cocaine addicts. The stress created by the financial
requirements of heavy addiction are ruinous regardless of the income status of the addict,
commonly forcing the individual to sell all assets, abandon all friends, and live on the
streets. Many cocaine addicts often resort to prostitution which could result in sexually
transmitted diseases which could be passed on to the fetus, infections that aren't properly
treated and, most importantly, exposure to the AIDS virus.
48. Women of childbearing age show the greatest increase in alcohol consumption:
The AMA, former Surgeon General Koop, and a number of other experts have concluded
that there is no safe level of alcohol consumption during pregnancy. AMA Trustees, supra
note 42, at 2667 (citing Council on Scientific Affairs. Fetal Effects Of Maternal Alcohol
Abuse. Chicago, Ill: American Medical Association; 1989)).
49. Spina Bifida and Downs Syndrome are the other two leading sources of mental
retardation.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
tened and elongated philtrum (the furrow under the nose), central ner-
vous system dysfunction, motor impairments, impaired judgment, heart
defects, eye anomalies, hearing disorders and malformations of various
internal organs.
As Michael Dorris described his son, an FAS child:
My son will forever travel through a moonless night with
only the roar of wind for company. Don't talk to him of moun-
tains, of tropical beaches. Don't ask him to swoon at sunrises
or marvel at the filter of light through leaves. He's never had
time for such things, and he does not believe in them. He may
pass by them close enough to touch on either side, but his
hands are stretched forward, grasping for balance instead of
pleasure.... A drowning man is not separated from the lust
for air by a bridge of thought-he is one with it-and my son,
conceived and grown in an ethanol bath, lives each day in the
act of drowning. For him there is no shore.
50
Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE) is a less severe version of FAS where
there are no obvious physical manifestations. However, there is a ten-
dency for low birth weight, subtle malformations and significant behav-
ioral and academic problems.
Fetuses are extremely sensitive to alcohol and other drugs in the
blood stream. 5 1 One episode of serious drinking during pregnancy is
sufficient to diminish a child's IQ by one order of magnitude (approxi-
mately seven points) and double the likelihood of developmental
disability.
52
Approximately one in every 600 children is born with FAS. FAE is
estimated to affect approximately 36,000 newborns each year in
America. 5 3 Assuming lifetime medical and social costs of $1.4 million
for each FAS child, a projected cost of $10 billion per year for FAS/FAE
may not be unreasonable.
The greatest fetal damage occurs during the early stages of preg-
nancy when the mother may be unaware of her pregnancy. One to two
drinks a day is sufficient to trigger FAS. FAE may be triggered by even
50. DORRIS, supra note 24, at 264.
51. Alcohol dehydrates so effectively that tissue can be preserved in it for years. Alco-
hol also dehydrates fetal brain tissue and, thereby, stunts its growth and development.
52. Ann P. Streissguth et al., Moderate Prenatal Alcohol Exposure: Effects On Child L Q And
Learning Problems At Age 7 1/2 Years, 14 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 662,
662 (1990).
53. HenrickJ. Harwood & Diane M. Napolitano, Economic Implications of the FetalAlcohol
Sndrome, ALCOHOL HEATH & RES. WORLD, Fall 1985 at 38, 42. "On Indian reservations in
the southwest United States, minimal prevalence rates range from one in 97 to one in 750
live births. The highest reported prevalence is one child in eight in a Canadian Indian
village, where all children and mothers were systematically evaluated." Ann Pytkowicz
Streissguth et al., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Adolescents and Adults, 265 JAMA 1961, 1966
(1991) (citing P.A. May et al., Epidemiology of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Among American Indians of
the Southwest, 30 Soc. BIOL. 374 (1983); G.C. Robinson et al., Clinical Profile and Prevalence of
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in an Isolated Community in British Columbia, 137 CANADIAN MED. Asso-
CIATION J. 203 (1987)).
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less alcohol. 54 There is no known safe dose of alcohol during preg-
nancy. Although 90% of the public appears aware that drinking during
pregnancy may damage the fetus, one study showed that one-third of
women interviewed believed that drinking no more than three drinks a
day during pregnancy was safe.5 5 The mothers most abandoned by our
political system (poor, single, minority and depressed) are least likely to
understand the harms of alcohol and least able to refuse its easy
availability. 56
Tobacco (Nicotine). The harm of smoking is well established. The
harm of breathing the smoke of others is becoming established.
5 7 "Cig-
arette smoking by pregnant woman results in higher rates of spontane-
ous abortion, premature birth, increased perinatal mortality, low birth
weight and negative effects on later growth and development in in-
fants." 5 8 In one study, "indirect or passive exposure to smoking by the
father" had 66% of the effect in reducing fetal birth weight as did expo-
sure to the mother's smoking.
5 9
Cigarette smoking is notoriously difficult to stop. Many poly-drug
addicts report that alcohol and opiates were less difficult to quit than
cigarettes. The spiraling cost of cigarettes drains the limited budgets of
single mothers and other poor families. Tobacco use remains high
amongst the young, particularly among the poor and the isolated. Ciga-
54. Ann Pytkowicz Streissguth & Robin A. LaDue, Psychological & Behavioral Effects in
Children Prenatally Exposed to Alcohol, ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, Fall 1985 at 6, 12.
55. Judith E. Funkhouser & Robert W. Denniston, Preventing Alcohol-Related Birth De-
fects: Suggestions for Action, ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, Fall 1985 at 54, 54.
56. Michael Dorris explains that among the Lakota, " '[tio refuse a drink is tanta-
mount to a slap in the face,' because it deprived the host of his or her right to be gener-
ous." DORRIS, supra note 24, at 89 (quoting Beatrice Medicine, An Ethnography of Drinking
and Sobriety Among the Lakota Sioux. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at
Madison, at 103) (emphasis in original).
57. "Sidestream smoke contains significantly more carbon monoxide, tar, nicotine, 3,4-
benzopyrene, and cadmium than mainstream smoke." Children of parents who smoke
have a significantly greater risk of bronchitis and pneumonia their first year of life, and a
greater risk of a variety of severe respiratory illnesses in their second year than children of
nonsmoking parents. WASHINGTON THORACIC SOCIETY, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, IN-
VOLUNTARY SMOKING 1-2 (1990) (citing Ira B. Tager et al., Effect of Parental Cigarette Smoking
on the Pulmonary Function of Children, 110 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 15 (1979); U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING,
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986)) (emphasis added).
Sidestream smoke releases more toxins, in part, because the tobacco is burning at a
lower temperature resulting in less complete combustion. Similarly, an open fireplace re-
leases more pollution into the air than an airtight fireplace that burns at a higher
temperature.
58. ABA Trustees, supra note 42, at 2666 (citingJ. Pritchard et al. eds., Williams Obstet-
rics. Norwalk, Conn: Appleton-Century-Crofts; 1985; B. P. Sachs, Sharing The Cigarette.
The Effects Of Smoking In Pregnancy, in Smoking and Reproductive Health 144 (M.J. Rosen-
berg ed., 1985); J.F. Murphy & R. Mulcahy, Cigarette Smoking and Spontaneous Abortion, BMJ
1978 (1988).).
Low birth weight is one of the clearest indicators of significant risk for fetal health.
M.B. Meyer, Effects of Maternal Smoking and Attitude on Birth Weight and Gestation, in THE Epi-
DEMIOLOGY OF MATURITY (M. Reid & F. Stanley, eds.); L.P. Finnegan, Smoking and Its Effect
on Pregnancy and a Newborn, in AT RISK INFANT: Psychosocial, Medical Aspects 127 (S. Harel &
N.J. Anastasiou eds. 1985).
59. David H. Rubin et al., Elffect of Passive Smoking on Birth- lleight, THE LANCET, Aug. 23,
1986, at 415, 415.
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rettes are used by some women to suppress appetites to maintain a level
of slenderness to match social expectations that can place the fetus at
risk for undernutrition. Promotion of tobacco use as a false means of
enhancing self-esteem, independence or desirability creates an unneces-
sary risk of harm to unborn children.
60
Cocaine and Crack. Cocaine use can cause serious fetal harm, chiefly
from the drug's capacity to choke off the normal oxygen and blood flow
to the fetus.6 ' Crack and cocaine use also cause premature birth, kidney
dysfunction, strokes (causing brain damage) and significant malforma-
tions of the central nervous system, the heart and the gastrointestinal
tract. 62 Cocaine-exposed infants are prone to strokes, which lead to fur-
ther brain damage.
63
Although cocaine may not have the teratogenic effect of alcohol,
some of the short-term effects on the fetus can be quite harrowing. Be-
cause cocaine acts as a tremendous stimulant and vasoconstrictor (con-
striction of blood vessels), the fetus is immediately deprived of a good
deal of its normal blood supply and oxygen for thirty to sixty minutes
while the drug is active. This can create near asphyxiation of the fetus
(hypoxia) and/or precipitous delivery of the child from the tremendous
uterine cramps which effect a premature tearing away of the placenta
from the uterine wall (abruptio placenta).
Cocaine was once viewed only as a psychological habit, because
there were no dramatic heroin-like withdrawal symptoms. 64 We now
60. An interesting discussion setting forth a basis for a tort claim for prenatal expo-
sure to sidestream smoke can be found in Julie E. Lippert, Prenatal Injuries From Passive
Tobacco Smoke, 78 Ky. L.J. 665 (1989-90).
61. Between 1979 and 1980, all categories of illicit drugs (e.g. opiates, amphetamines,
hallucinogens) except one, began to decline. This drug is cocaine, whose use soared
through the 1980s. Cocaine was originally secured by chewing the leaves of the coca plant
which produced a highly fat soluble substance and stimulation of the brain for a period of
many hours. In the United States market, this is broken down to a hydrochloride salt
which is usually inhaled through the nose. With the invention of crack, smoking cocaine
became possible. Attempting to smoke cocaine destroys the power of the drug. Smoking
is only possible after the cocaine is chemically converted into an alkaloid which burns eas-
ily at lower temperatures. This product is marketed as "free base" or "crack."
Cocaine is arguably the most addictive drug known. It produces intense craving and
intense drug taking behavior in all animal species studied, including man. Crack cocaine is
more rapidly and completely absorbed into the brain leading to a more intense and less
controllable high. Parallel to the rise of crack use has been a three to four fold increase in
reports of adverse medical problems from cocaine use.
62. For a good overview review of cocaine's effects see Janet R. Fink, Effects of Crack
and Cocaine Upon Infants: A Brief Review of the Literature, CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 2 (Fall
1989). More recent data on all relevant drugs is available though the National Resource
Center for the Prevention of Perinatal Abuse of Alcohol and Other Drugs, 1090 Vermont
Avenue, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005.
63. Like alcohol, most of the fetal damage occurs during the first trimester. Unlike
alcohol, cocaine does not cause the visible deformities found in an FAS child. Ceasing
cocaine use at any point can increase the baby's size, but does not remedy motor skill
deficits and other abnormalities. Until longitudinal studies indicate otherwise, it is reason-
able to assume the needs of crack exposed babies will be similar to those of FAS children.
64. Much remains to be known about precisely how cocaine functions. To clearly un-
derstand the method by which cocaine operates in the body, we must have an immensely
greater understanding of the neurochemistry and electrophysiology of the brain. Re-
search does document that the environment around the cocaine user and the user's behav-
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know that cocaine use may create serious and long term biochemical
alterations of the central nervous system, which further increase the
craving for more drugs. 65 Some pharmacological treatments may be
effective.
66
Methamphetamines and Crystal. Methamphetamines and "crystal," a
particularly concentrated methamphetamine, create harms similar to
crack at a significantly lesser cost.6 7 Withdrawal symptoms and neonatal
abstinence syndrome (NAS) are like cocaine or heroin. Some fullterm
newborns appear to be blind or deaf, are very sleepy, rarely cry, and
suck so poorly that force-feeding is necessary. 6 8 In one study, one-third
of fullterm methamphetamine-exposed newborns had brain hemor-
rhages and organ tissue death resulting from lack of adequate blood
floW.
6 9
Crystal is to methamphetamines what crack is to cocaine. Its impact
on the user is devastating, with upwards of seventy-two hours of fren-
zied activity during which food is commonly ignored, followed by some-
thing close to physical collapse for another twenty-four to thirty-six
hours.70
Marijuana. An estimated 6,000,000 women of childbearing age use
marijuana. 7 ' The majority of studies indicate that use by pregnant
mothers creates an elevated risk of prematurity, low birth weight and
undersized newborns. 72 One study found marijuana's effect on fetal
ioral characteristics have a great effect over the degree of drug use. Many potentially
useful therapeutic interventions have been suggested for out of control cocaine use, but
little proof exists for their effectiveness. Cocaine abuse creates significant stress on the
cardiovascular system and can create heart attacks. On the psychological level, it can cre-
ate or on a lesser level, profound irritability, misperceptions (often relating to an exagger-
ated sense of competence) and paranoid thinking.
65. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS & COM-
MITEE ON PROBLEMS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE: SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES ON COCAINE ABUSE
20, 25 (1987) (the document is a consensus of participants in "Scientific Perspectives on
Cocaine Abuse," held Jan. 12-13, 1987). For treatment of this condition, there are very
few experimental studies which indicate what works with what populations. Cocaine abus-
ers have a high incidence of psychopathology but we lack the diagnostic tools to determine
whether the psychiatric symptoms exhibited by cocaine abusers were created by the drug
use. Id.
66. Tricyclic anti-depressants such as desipramine and imipramine as well as
dopamine agonists such as bromocriptine and amantadine show promise but the lack of
knowledge of how cocaine works in the body and the pharmacology and physiology of
cocaine withdrawal makes it difficult to confirm that these particular drugs are effective in
the long term. Id.
67. Potential harms include premature birth, placenta previa, general growth, cardio-
vascular and neuromuscular impairment. Retarded brain development is evidenced by
significantly decreased head size.
68. Bays, supra note 38, at 884.
69. Id. (citing Suzanne D. Dixon, Effects of Transplacental Exposure to Cocaine and
Aethamphetamine on the Neonate, 150 WESTJ. MED. 436, 441 (1989)).
70. Psychotic episodes are not at all uncommon thereafter. The use of crystal is not
yet widespread and may not be due to the highly traumatic nature of the withdrawal. The
effects on fetuses remain to be discerned although spontaneous abortion should be a likely
result.
7 1. Bays, supra note 38 (citing Edgar H. Adams et al., Epidemiology of Substance Abuse
Including Alcohol and Cigarette Smoking, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sm. 14, 19 (1989)).
72. Id. at 884.
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growth was equivalent to smoking twenty cigarettes per day.7 3 Infants
whose mothers are frequent marijuana users experience a mild version
of heroin withdrawal.
Heroin and Other Opiates.74 Perhaps 10,000 fetuses are exposed to
significant opiates 7 5  resulting in intrauterine growth retardation
(IUGR), prematurity, fetal distress, septicemia, miscarriage, placenta
previa and increased need for Caesarean-section birth.
7 6
Opiates do not create the facial deformation found in FAS children,
but opiate-exposed infants do exhibit long term deficits in cognition,
motor function and concentration, have poor self-discipline, low self-
esteem and behavioral problems of hyperactivity, aggressiveness and
poor peer relations.
77
The harms to the fetus may have more to do with the semi-fugitive
lifestyle forced on intravenous drug users in the United States than the
drug itself. Our "War on Drugs" with its vast capacity to convict and its
limited capacity to treat, pressures addicts to hide from the very relatives
who might be best able to help them recover. The fetus is thereby
doubly abandoned. Chronic infection and other illnesses (AIDS and
Hepatitis B) are common due to unclean needles. Street heroin varies
widely in strength, causing premature withdrawal symptoms or
overdoses.
Comprehensive methadone maintenance programs have a benefi-
cial effect on the fetus, despite the fact that fetal withdrawal from metha-
done is sometimes more difficult. Narcotic-exposed fetuses 78 often
73. Id. (citing Elizabeth E. Hatch & Michael B. Bracken, Effect of Marjuana Use in Preg-
nancy on Fetal Growth, 124 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 986, 992 (1986)). On the other hand, an
exhaustive Canadian study found that maternal marijuana use created no significant in-
crease in miscarriage, fetal distress (meconium staining) or birth complications. Twelve to
fourteen months after birth, the earlier symptoms of growth retardation that had been
observed had disappeared and there were no other discernable effects of marijuana use on
the infant. This may be because the effects are subtle or confounded by other influences.
Bays, supra note 38 (citing Peter A. Fried, Postnatal Consequences of Maternal Marijuana Use in
Humans, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 123 (1989)).
In addition, one study found that children frequently exposed to marijuana in utero
were ten times more likely to contract a form of leukemia. The specific disease was acute
nonlymphoblastic leukemia. Bays, supra note 38 (citing Leslie L. Robison et al., Maternal
Drug Use and Risk of Childhood Nonlymphoblastic Leukemia Among Offspring, 63 CANCER 1904,
1906 (1989)).
74. Since 1984, heroin use has increased significantly. A purer and less expensive
form is now being smoked alone or with crack (called "speedballing"). In King County,
Washington, heroin use now exceeds speed use, and heroin was involved in close to half of
the overdose deaths. A Trend Toward Heroin, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 1992
at Al. The Senate Judiciary Committee found a 74% increase in heroin users in 1991.
Heroin Entering in Record Amounts at Bargain Prices, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992 at i.
75. The primary opiates referred to here are heroin, morphine (more commonly used
as the synthetic merpredine hydrochloride) and pentazocine.
76. Karol Kaltenbach & Loretta P. Finnegan, Perinatal and Developmental Outcome of In-
fants Exposed to Methadone In-Utero, 9 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 311 (1987).
77. Bays, supra note 38 (citing Geraldine S. Wilson, Clinical Studies of Infants and Chil-
dren Exposed Prenatally to Heroin, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 183, 191 (1989)).
78. The rapid increase in technology regarding care of premature children has al-
lowed many otherwise drug addicted babies to survive who would have previously died. In
1956, a comprehensive study indicated a 94% death rate amongst addicted infants who
were untreated and a 34% death rate among treated infants. MiltonJ. Goodfriend et al.,
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experience a much more gradual withdrawal extending to four to six
months after birth, with peak symptoms occurring around six weeks of
age.7 9 Some methadone programs have reduced abnormality at birth
and reduced or eliminated other abnormalities after birth.80
PCP (Phencyclidine). PCP is an inexpensive, mood-altering drug that
is sometimes associated with highly aggressive behaviors. Infants ex-
posed at birth suffer from milder withdrawal symptoms than infants ex-
posed to cocaine or opiates. 8 ' PCP is commonly taken with a variety of
other drugs such as cocaine and opiates. Perhaps its most important
effect is that, among poly-drug 8 2 users, those who use PCP are signifi-
cantly less likely to succeed in treatment than those who do not.
D. Examining the Drug of Alcoho1
8 3
From the perspective of the fetus, we must abandon the fiction that
alcohol, tobacco and tobacco smoke are not drugs. They should be
viewed as very harmful ones.8 4 Alcohol consumption creates the great-
est harm to the fetus in the month before the mother knows she is preg-
The Effects of Maternal Narcotic Addiction on the Newborn, 74 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
29 (1956).
79. Two-year follow-up on narcotic exposed infants who were well supported after
birth found that their development as measured on the Bailey Scales of Infant Develop-
ment was well within the normal range. Infants born to mothers on methadone, like other
narcotic exposed infants, are usually born smaller in weight and length and this difference
persists until 12 months of age when the infants usually catch up with the unexposed chil-
dren. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure: Effects on Neonatal and Infant Growth and
Development, 8 NEUROBEHAVIORAL TOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 357 (1986).
80. Kaltenbach & Finnegan, supra note 76; Sydney L. Hans, Developmental Consequences
of Prenatal Exposure To Methadone, 562 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 195, 195 (1989); see also
Wilson, supra note 79.
81. Infants are likely to be jittery, hyperactive, difficult to console, difficult to feed and
prone to coarse flapping of arms and wide-eyed non-specific stares. Bays, supra note 38, at
885.
82. Most drug taking and most drug abusing involves many drugs. The interactive
effects of commonly prescribed medications can be severe. Also the use of licit drugs such
as tobacco and alcohol is correlated with the later abuse of illicit drugs. Cocaine use per-
sists and increases well through the child rearing years of adulthood. This is also true of
alcohol. In contrast, the chance of initiating use of marijuana, LSD and other controlled
substances in adulthood falls to a very low level. Young adults with a history of higher
than average tobacco use, alcohol use and particularly marijuana use appear most vulnera-
ble to cocaine use. Studies show that marijuana use among youth is much more common
among youth with conduct problems in early elementary school. See, e.g., PEELE, supra note
35.
83. For the purpose of illustration, the focus will be on an alcohol harmed (FAS)
child. Sustained exposure to other drugs can create similar problems.
84. Alcohol, barbiturates, cocaine, valium, diazepam, heroin, marijuana (THC), meth-
adone, phenobarbital, nicotine, T's and blues (tripelennamine's and pentazocine) and PCP
(phencyclidine hydrochloride) share three key attributes:
I. Each stunts normal fetal development.
2. Each is addictive and is consumed by over 400,000 pregnant women annually who
find themselves unable to deal with their immediate physical circumstances.
3. Each easily passes the placental barrier (due to low molecular weight and other
factors) and enters into the bloodstream of the fetus.
Since there is more abuse of alcohol, cigarettes and legal drugs than illegal drugs, it
stands to reason that the greatest source of harm is from alcohol, tobacco and legal drugs.
Recent data suggests that during pregnancy, 50-60% of women use analgesics and 25%
use sedatives. Alcohol uses ranges wildly. Chasnoff, supra, note 46, at 1403.
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nant.8 5 Many women with substance abuse problems do not notice they
are pregnant until after the first trimester. Skipping menstrual cycles is
a common occurrence for female drug addicts. Drug use continues
without awareness of the child within. Once a fetus is implanted in the
uterine wall (about two weeks after conception), it is supplied blood
from the placenta. Alcohol and other drugs can then enter the fetus
directly.
The Fetal Recycling Effect (FRE). FRE causes the fetus to be exposed
to alcohol and other drugs longer than the mother. In the case of alco-
hol, the mother's liver can normally filter out approximately one ounce
an hour. If she drinks approximately four ounces of alcohol in the form
of four cocktails, the alcohol could clear her system entirely within four
hours. Her fetus, however, lacks the liver function to metabolize alcohol
until after birth. The alcohol simply recycles through the fetus and the
placenta with a very slow absorption rate. Fetal alcohol is filtered out
much more slowly through its semi-developed renal system. "Most
drugs that have been studied have a longer half-life in the fetus than in
the adult."
8 6
FAS and FAE are lifelong impairments. The effects of other drugs
are not quite as devastating, but are still very harmful. The harm to the
child can be significantly increased by being exposed to an impover-
ished, neglectful and/or abusive home environment. Infants are at risk
for central nervous system dysfunction, weak suck, feeding and sleeping
difficulties and failure to thrive. Among young children, the FAS child
stands out as significantly smaller, with a high need for attention. Intel-
lectual capacities range from IQs of sixteen to ninety, with multiple im-
pairments and behavioral problems. FAS children are initially quite
dependent and loving if given large amounts of attention and clear
structure. However, they are subject to significantly more psychopathol-
ogy including hyperactivity, difficulty with peers and chronic attention-
getting behaviors.
By adolescence, FAS children often engage in inappropriate behav-
iors leading to expulsion from school for males and premature sexual
activity for highly suggestible females. In school and at work, the chil-
dren harmed the most are those who are not recognized by the schools
as having FAS/FAE and other drug-related educational impairments.
85. See James W. Hanson et al., The Effects of Moderate Alcohol Consumption During Preg-
nancy on Fetal Growth and Morphogenesis, 92 J. PEDIATRICS 457, 460 (1978). During the first
trimester the fetus is developing key building block structures of its neurophysical and
digestive systems. Drug use by the mother can make the uterus a less than friendly envi-
ronment complicating the embryo's capacity to implant in the uterine wall. The placenta's
capacity to attach to the uterine wall is also compromised by drug and alcohol abuse. Al-
cohol consumption early in pregnancy is associated with FAS/FAE, while late pregnancy
consumption is associated with IUGR (intrauterine growth retardation). R.E. Little, Mod-
erate Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Decreases Infant Birthweight, 67 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1154
(1977). Binge drinking (five or more drinks) on occasion in addition to drinking an aver-
age of one and a half drinks per day dramatically increases the risk of harm to the fetus.
E.M. Ouellette et al., Adverse Effects of Offspring of Maternal Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy, 197
NEw ENG. J. MED. 528 (1977).
86. Chasnoff, supra note 46, at 1405.
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School personnel routinely judge these children as simply choosing to
act inappropriately instead of having significant organic impairments.
Proper management demands periodic testing of all children in school
and extra structure in their learning environment. As adolescents, these
children tend to be sexually curious, yet fail to have understanding of
socially appropriate sexual behavior. Thus, they are open to the risk of
sexual victimization as well as thoughtless sexual relations.
Most FAS children reach an academic plateau in early high school
and will be unable to hold a regularjob. They would benefit from voca-
tional training during high school, but most vocational and technical in-
stitutes offer training only beyond the high school level, frequently in a
curriculum that is too academically rigorous. Some FAS children appear
to have verbal skills near the level of their parents' skills, but on further
analysis, they have significant deficits in memory and understanding.
Arithmetic and logic skills are often more diminished than verbal skills.
FAS children try to make up for these deficits by charm, deference, affec-
tion and, failing at those, hostility. One dilemma faced by many foster
parents is that many FAS and FAE children are "too functional" to qual-
ify for state and federal funds, yet they are unable to live and work
independently.
As they mature, they are subject to hyperactivity, eating disorders,
stuttering, reduced clarity of speech, upper and lower limb clumsiness,
strabismus, head and body rocking, disturbed sleep, constant trepida-
tion, delayed language disorder and significant difficulties in developing
arithmetic skills. Self-management of finances in later life is rarely pos-
sible. 87 Most FAS patients require highly structured living situations
throughout their lives and more specialized services than are generally
available for retarded persons.8 8
Needs of the Parent. The caretaker of a drug-exposed (FAS/FAE)
child assumes a responsibility far beyond that normally associated with
parenting or foster parenting. The physical, intellectual and emotional
needs of such children are very demanding. These children require con-
stant supervision, an extraordinary amount of energy, love and, most of
all, a rigorous consistency. Both parents alone rarely can provide suffi-
cient support. Burnout from such parenting is common and is com-
monly attributed to the stress. It is equally reasonable to attribute the
burnout to our systemic abandonment of poor single mothers. Such
burnout among single mothers can result in child abuse, abandonment
or neglect, for which only the mothers are held responsible.8 9
87. It is not uncommon for the FAS adult to instantly befriend whomever shows them
kindness and invite them into their homes only to be robbed or sexually compromised.
For the many who are unable to make change, whether they pay a one or ten dollars for a
comic book is immaterial. See DORRIS, supra note 24.
88. A cogent discussion of the realities of such long term care can be found in James
Bopp, Jr. & Deborah Hall Gardner, AIDS Babies, Crack Babies: Challenges to the Law, 7 IssuEs
L. & MED. 3 (1991).
89. Abandonment theory suggests that the stress upon the mother of systemic aban-
donment would be ignored so that the state authority could more easily conclude the
mother was "overwhelmed" by her parental responsibilities or her drug addiction.
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E. Poverty, Homelessness and Other Abandonments
While the damage to a fetus from drugs is significant, it poses far
less threat to the welfare of the child than the personal, 90 environmen-
tal9 1 and societal circumstances that lead to the drug-taking behaviors.
From the medical perspective, the absence of prenatal care, adequate
food and adequate housing for the expectant mother (not to mention
adequate drug treatment) creates a greater threat of infant mortality or
morbidity than the drug use itself.
9 2
Poverty as Abandonment. Since the "War on Poverty" in the 1960s,
there has been a flattening of benefits to the poor, and since the 1980s,
there has been a dramatic decline in services in general. There has been
a significant lowering of the poverty level criteria in the 1980s such that
the population in poverty appeared to be reduced. Even with America's
artificially low level of poverty, children make up the largest population
of those in poverty. Forty percent of black children and almost 40% of
Hispanic children are poor. Children from families receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are four times more likely to
enter foster care, particularly if they come from a single parent
household.
93
Homelessness as Abandonment. If homelessness is considered a drug,
then the harms of this drug are appalling.9 4 One recent survey found
that 48% of homeless children had not yet secured appropriate immuni-
zation.9 5 They were twice as likely to have chronic illnesses as children
90. Street drugs vary in strength and thus create the threats of alternating withdrawals
and overdoses.
91. Needles that are unclean contribute to the likelihood of septicemia, hepatitis and
AIDS. A poorly monitored drug withdrawal program can create premature delivery of the
fetus by premature separation of the placenta from the uterine wall. Both over and under
doses of drugs can lead directly to loss of blood (hypovolemia) and loss of oxygen (hyp-
oxia) to the fetus.
92. Support for this contention comes from many sources; particularly the methadone
programs for pregnant women which have babies born with significantly fewer abnormali-
ties than babies born to non-addicted mothers who endure the abandonments of poverty,
homelessness and absence of prenatal care.
93. Edward L. Schor, Foster Care, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1241, 1243-45 (1988).
94. Mothers who fall into the homeless category are prone to the following:
1. An infant mortality rate of 24.9 per 1,000, ten times the norm. Garth Alperstein
& Ellis Arnstein, Homeless Children-A Challenge for Pediatricians, 35 PEDIATRIC CLIN-
ics N. AM. 1413, 1416 (1988).
2. An incidence of low birth weight (less than 2,500 grams) among 18% of the new-
born which is 200% greater than the housed poor and over 500% greater than
the norm. Id.
3. A reported rate of child abuse and neglect of 8.8 per 1000, over 300% greater
than the housed poor. Once born, children exposed to "homelessness" have a
higher likelihood of developing malnutrition or infectious diseases (pneumonia,
tuberculosis, measles, dysentery) as well as emotional disturbances and depres-
sion. Ellen L. Bassuk et al., Characteristics of Sheltered Homeless Families, 76 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1097, 1099 (1986).
In a survey of homeless families in Boston, nearly 50% of the children were found to
have significant developmental lags, clinical levels of anxiety, depression and/or learning
difficulties. Id.
95. This compares to 8% amongst poor but domiciled children. As a result, children
exposed to "homelessness" contracted measles at a rate 16 times higher than children in
New York City as a whole. Seventeen percent of children in one shelter were found to
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in poverty with homes. 9 6 Undernutrition was chronic, and its effect on
infants devastating.
9 7
Infant undernutrition not only impairs growth and near term
health, but also contributes to lifelong stunting of mental faculties,
growth impairments, behavior disorders and, perhaps most importantly,
the capacity to maintain meaningful relationships. 9 8 The compensatory
care needed for malnourished children is similar to that of drug-exposed
children.
Nutritional supplements and medical care are necessary to correct
growth deficits, but insufficient to compensate for developmental im-
pairments. Where malnourished infants were offered a variety of basic
social support services such as visiting nurses within a framework of
home-based assistance, there was a substantial increase in developmen-
tal scores for their age group. 99 Similarly, drug-exposed infants whose
families are provided treatment without substantial social services do
not recover nearly as much of their impaired capacities as do children
who are provided comprehensive social services support.
Violence as Abandonment. The homicide rate in the United States is
ten times greater than that of England and twenty-five times greater
than that of Spain. The rate is far higher in the ghettos where most
drug-exposed children must live. '0 0 Mothers forced to live in fear pass
have chronic medical problems requiring multi-disciplinary team of health workers to pro-
vide comprehensive care. Alperstein & Arnstein, supra note 94, at 1418.
96. Id. (citing D. WEBER-BURDIN &J.D. WRIGHT, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION
AND PEW MEMORIAL TRUST HEALTH CARE FOR THE HOMELESS PROGRAM, 5TH REPORT, FEB-
RUARY 1987). Of the estimated three million homeless people nationwide, 28% (840,000)
are families with children. This group comprises the most grievously harmed sub-group of
the 12 million children U.S. who are chronically undernourished according to the esti-
mates of the Physician's Task Force on Hunger in America. J. Larry Brown, Hunger in the
U.S., Sci. AM., Feb. 1987, 36, at 36.
97. Although malnutrition at any time in a child's life is stressful, it is particularly
harmful to the development of the child's brain between mid-pregnancy and the first 36
months of life. During this period, the brain grows very rapidly in its basis structure in
forming synapses, branching dendrites and creating additional neurons in the cerebellum
and hippocampus. During this "brain blossom" period, 60% of the infant's glucose utili-
zation is directed towards the rapid blossoming of the child's brain. At each point in this
"blossoming" appropriate nutrients must be available or the child's brain will remain
stunted in both structure and function for life. The brain has the capacity to divide its
neurons and form new synapses and dendrites only during the "brain blossom" period of
infancy. At this time a mere eight hours without food with the proper amino acid balance
creates a measurable decline in the infant's well-being.
No amount of compensatory feeding after the brain blossom period will correct the
situation. Additional nutrition will correct the child's weight and height deficiencies but
the child will remain with a clinically reduced head size and reduced cognitive functions.
Deborah A. Frank & Steven H. Zeisel, Failure To Thrive, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1187,
1187-93 (1988).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1199 (citing Sally Grantham-McGregor et al., Development of Severely lalnour-
ished Children Who Received Psychosocial Stimulation: Six-Year Follow-up, 79 PEDIATRICS 247,
247 (1987)).
100. Marvin E. Wolfgang, Homicide in Other Industrialized Countries, 62 BULL. N.Y. ACAD.
MED. 400, 400 (1986). Almost 60% of victims and assailants knew each other and 20% of
victims and assailants were members of the same family. Approximately one-half of all
homicide victims have elevated blood-alcohol levels. Howard Spivak et al., Dying is .Vo
Accident: Adolescents, Violence, and Intentional Injuiy, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1339
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIE IV
the stress on to their fetus. Drug use is one of the few ways to escape the
pervasive fear of some neighborhoods. Thus, the damage of drugs to
the fetus is aggravated by the environment into which it is born.' 0 '
Foster Care as Abandonment. Foster care could also be viewed as a
drug, when it is dispensed liberally at great expense for a variety of
problems it does not cure. 10 2 Like most drugs, it has a number of un-
pleasant side effects for those using it. 10 3 Children in foster care appear
to have an elevated risk of developmental delays and educational
problems.' 0 4 Foster care can create multiple abandonments with result-
ing traumas that are very difficult to overcome. 10 5 The increasing need
(1988). Homicides in 1980 were responsible for 1,500,000 hospital days and
$640,000,000.00 in health care costs. Non-fatal intentional injuries occur as must as 100
times more frequently than fatal injuries. Studies have shown that the report of assaults
and intentional injuries to police are approximately 25% of the assaults and injuries from
assault that are treated by medical facilities in the same locality. Jerome I. Barancik et al.,
Northeastern Ohio Trauma Study: L Magnitude of the Problem, 73 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 746
(1983).
101. The Violence Epidemiology Branch of the Center for Disease Control found that
80% of homicides occur between members of the same race. As blacks are over-repre-
sented in homicide statistics they are likewise over-represented in the ranks of families in
poverty. In a recent study in Atlanta, the measure of people per square foot in each hous-
ing unit was used as an indicator of socioeconomic status. When reviewing the incidence
of homicide among the poor, there was no significant difference between blacks and
whites. Brandon S. Centerwall, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Domestic Homicide, Atlanta,
1971-1972, 74 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 1813 (1984).
Comparing blacks and whites, low socioeconomic status was predicative of violence,
not race. The Northeast Ohio Trauma Study found that lower socioeconomic status and
residence in urban areas played a significant role in the likelihood of intentional injury.
Center for Disease Control studies showed that homicides most often occur in urban areas
with low socioeconomic status, high population density, poor housing and high unemploy-
ment. Spivak, supra note 100, at 1339 (citing Centers for Disease Control, Homicides Among
Young Black Males-United States, 1978-1982, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 629
(1985)).
A particular study in Dayton, Ohio demonstrated that a rise in unemployment would
lead to an increased incidence of homicide with a lag period of one to two years. Spivak,
supra note 100, at 1340-41 (citing Center for Disease Control, Homicide- United States, 31
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 599 (1982)).
102. This is not to say that foster care does not have some very beneficial uses. Like
any drug, harm results when it is over-prescribed.
103. For the child protection system, it allows the perception that "something" was
done even if that "something" created no measurable improvement in the welfare of the
child. For the child, a series of foster care placements can effect, on a psychological level,
much greater harm than fetal drug exposure. (Statement of a California State Psychologist
who directed a recovery center for drug exposed children previously placed in foster care.
The Health Quarterly (Corporation for Public Broadcasting television broadcast, Jan. 6,
1992)).
Chronic health care problems affect 40% - 76% of children in foster care. In one
study of 149 children in foster care, because of abuse or neglect, only 13% of the children
had normal physical examinations. Thirty-four percent has potentially serious medical
problems requiring one or more sub-specialty consultations. Spivak, supra note 100.
104. They have been found to have cognitive and academic functioning at the low end
of the average range which is very similar to low socioeconomic status children living with
their own families. DAVID FANSHEL & EUGENE B. SHINN, CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE: A
LONGITUDINAL INVESTIGATION (1978).
105. In 1980, Congress took a step to keep troubled families together when it passed
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (P.L. 96-272) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This law sought to: (1) prevent unnecessary foster care
placements by making sure that the child cannot be protected in the home before even
considering a placement; (2) return foster children to their families before considering
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for foster care is more reflective of the larger failure of our government
and social institutions to provide for the poor than of the increase of
insoluble family problems.
The Harms of the Father. It is certainly common knowledge that many
poor fathers abandon the mother and their child. A higher percentage
fail to adequately support their child. The greater harm may be that the
the father's alcohol and drug use may create fetal deformity.' 0 6 In this
circumstance, a child with drug use related deformities could be born to a mother
who has not used drugs. The possibility that the harm to the fetus did not
result from the mother's behavior challenges every effort to criminalize,
civilly commit or allege abuse or neglect on the mother's part.
II. PAST SOLUTIONS AND PRESENT PROBLEMS
Any review of the literature of neglected or harmed children reveals
considerable conflict over what the causes precisely are, as well as con-
siderable difficulty in assessing the efficacy of any given remedy. Differ-
ent definitions of the problem begot different remedies. Every
legislative remedy alters the family and the understanding of the prob-
lem such that over time the problem expands to include all the failed
remedies of the past. Thus the problem is eventually understood in
terms of the history of results of past remedies.
From the ecologic perspective, nature responds to forced interven-
tion. For example, insects that are sprayed with insecticide develop
adoption or any other permanent arrangement; and (3) promptly adopt out children if the
child's safety cannot be protected in the home.
Under this law state agencies are required to make reasonable efforts to look into all possi-
ble family supports, treatment programs and family assistance and counseling programs
for the family in the home. This includes the caseworker making a mandatory case plan
outlining all of the background, options and efforts. The effect of this well-intentioned law
is in doubt. Between the massive budget cuts in social services and the rise in drug ex-
posed infants, the mission appears to have been either compromised or lost. On the one
hand, caseworkers can only do so much without adequate resources. On the other hand, it
may be policy error to compel the caseworker in charge of placement (to protect the child
from immanent harm) to also be responsible for avoiding placement until all other options
are exhausted. This is a statutory oxymoron almost like having the probation officer serve
as the public defender.
A more pernicious aspect of foster care is racial bias. According to Professor Roberts,
black children in foster care receive less pleasant placements than whites, remain in the
system longer and are less likely to be either returned home or adopted. Roberts, supra
note 21, at 1440 n.109.
Malcolm X described his experience with foster care as follows:
AJudge... in Lansing had authority over me and all my brothers and sisters.
We were "state children," court wards; he had the full say-so over us. A white
man in charge of a black man's children! Nothing but legal, modern slavery-
however kindly intentioned....
I truly believe that if ever a state social agency destroyed a family, it de-
stroyed ours.
Id. (citing M. LITLE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 20-21 (1965)).
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human
Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991); Gladys Friedler, Effects on Future Generations of Paternal
Exposure to Alcohol and Other Drugs, ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, Winter 1987/88 at
126; Ruth E. Little & Charles F. Sing, Association of Father's Drinking and Infant's Birth IReight,
314 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1644-45 (1986). Thanks to the Seattle King County Task Force for
Chemically Dependent Women for alerting me to the above.
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resistance to it. Similarly, families that are repeatedly "helped" by state
authority often develop a high resistance (skepticism) to any state inter-
vention. Our endeavors to criminalize and otherwise punish substance
abuse over the past sixty years and our decisions to exclude women from
many treatment programs significantly changed the nature of the prob-
lem. Methodologically, we are faced with a situation akin to a dog chas-
ing its tail. The problem, most narrowly defined, is that of a mother,
drugs (including alcohol and nicotine) and her fetus. In the classical
analysis, the mother is either ignorant of the effect of drugs or so mor-
ally lax or uncaring that she fails to protect her fetus. The fetus is an
innocent victim of her myriad failings and deserves the protection of the
state. This patriarchal, moral laxity model has been with us for millenni-
ums. Roman law provided for a death sentence for women who were
drunk. 1
0 7
A. From Fallen and Afflicted to Treatable and Addicted
As mothers were penalized for their drug use, they were also penal-
ized for their poverty, race and sexual activity. In America, from colo-
nial times through the end of the eighteenth century, the churches and
local communities worked together to address and ignore the needs of
the poor. Indigence was a basis for removing children from their family,
since poverty was prima facie evidence of neglect. Early on, children
were commonly indentured or apprenticed to "such religious families
where both body and soul may be taken good care of."' 10 8 The late
nineteenth century brought significant effort by the state to institutional-
ize these children until they were adopted or put in foster homes in the
country to protect them from "the perils of want and the contamination
of example."' 10 9 The "example" to be avoided was that of an unwed or
deserted mother without means to provide for herself. During the first
half of the nineteenth century, it was quite common for Black slave chil-
dren to be sold, for poor White children of single mothers to be "re-
moved" and for children of Native Americans to be "relocated."
The twentieth century brought institutional welfare efforts from
city, state and federal governments. Jane Addams's Hull House was a
model for benefit programs for the poor, such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). However, the double standard towards
women endured in the AFDC eligibility criteria. For example, single
mothers found engaging in sexual activity were precluded from received
AFDC benefits. In fact, extra-marital sexual activity was a common
107. Norma Finkelstein, Treatment Issues: lVomen and Substance Abuse, prepared for the
National Coalition on Alcohol and Drug Dependent Women and Their Children, Sept.
1990, at 1.
108. Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 483, 484 (1990) (quoting M. ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SO-
CIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 92 (1988)).
109. Id. at 484 (quoting M. ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 165 (1988)).
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ground for removing the child from its mother. I°
The "example" set by the unmarried woman (including a widow)
was sufficient to justify terminating her parenthood."I' The standards
of family normalcy and propriety derived by mostly White professionals
worked a double hardship on women of color, resulting in a dispropor-
tionate level of intervention into their families and their capacity to have
families.' 12
Addiction: Disease or Depravity? In the 1800s, alongside the heavy
drinking Americans, determined temperance workers argued that liquor
(the "Good Creature" of Benjamin Franklin's day)"11 was the root of all
evil, and its users were demonized as "fallen" reprobates. "Demon
rum" was alleged to have claimed many a soul."1
4
Interestingly, whiskey was not so demonized, which well reflects the
immense power of whiskey in the nineteenth century. When drug addic-
tions reached well into the middle and upper classes, the federal govern-
ment moved against those with the least political clout. In 1914, the
Harrison Narcotics Act launched a controversy that continues to this day
as to whether addiction is a disease (a medical problem subject to treat-
ment) or a depravity (a moral/legal problem to be deterred by criminal
sanction). In the early 1900s, the depravity label won, and physicians
were, with the cooperation of the medical community, prosecuted for
prescribing opiates to addicts, even those trying to break their habit.' 15
110. Id. at 484 (citing LINDA GORDON, HEROS OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE - BOSTON, 1880-1960 (1988); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD
A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE, NEW YORK
(1971)).
111. There is no evidence of widowers with children having their parental rights (or
AFDC benefits) terminated for extramarital sexual activity.
112. Federal support for sterilization continues, but it seems to be applied to mostly
poor women (who are mostly women of color). As recent as the 1970s, some doctors
made sterilization a condition of agreeing to perform births or abortions. Sterilization
agreements were also secured by threatening to revoke welfare benefits. Roberts, supra
note 21, at 1443.
113. RORABAUGH, supra note 26, at 22.
114. See, e.g., the Reverend Huntington Lyman's battle cry in 1830: "The devil had an
efficient hand in establishing, perfecting, and sustaining the present system of making
drunkards." RORABAUGH, supra note 26, at 185. The temperance tactics towards children
of the 1830s were very like the "Scared Straight" anti-drug tactics of today. " 'If you must
some times scare them,' pleaded William Hines, 'in the room of telling them that bears will
catch them, that hobgoblins or ghosts will catch them, tell them that Rum will catch
them ... ' " Id. at 198 (emphasis in original). As crack addicts ruin communities now,
drunkards ruined communities then. "'The drunkard . . .cleaves . . . like a gangrenous
excrescence, poisoning and eating away the life of the community.' " Id. (quoting HENRY
WARE, A SERMON DELIVERED AT DORCHESTER 4 (1820)).
Amongst the poor women of child bearing age, the temperance movement, like the
present war on drugs, functioned to make drug use more furtive and shameful thereby
cutting off mothers from the family supports that could help them recover. The success
rate of the Temperance/Prohibition movement appears not unlike that of the War on
Drugs.
The abstinence ethic of the 1830s continues today in Alcoholic's Anonymous, Nar-
cotic's Anonymous and related movements. The "demon" is gone but God remains. See
alSo JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEM-
PERANCE MOVEMENT (1963).
115. Chavkin, supra note 108, at 484.
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In 1925, the Supreme Court in Linder v. United States found in favor of
the medical model when it stated that addicts "are diseased and proper
subjects for such [medical] treatment .... 116
In the 1950s, the American Medical Association adopted a policy
declaring such addiction a disease that should be addressed through
medical treatment combined with social support. Drug addiction was
acknowledged in the psychiatric community's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders as a "psychoactive substance dependency
disorder." In 1962, the Supreme Court held firmly in favor of the medi-
cal model, declaring narcotic addiction to be a disease and thus not sub-
ject to criminal penalty." 
7
As medicine claimed the responsibility for dealing with drug addic-
tion within its realm, it also claimed the responsibility for dealing with
child abuse and neglect. The method of claiming involved discovering
an identifiable syndrome that covered the problem. The first discovery
was the "battered child syndrome," which was followed a few years later
by the "battered wife syndrome" and still later by the "fetal alcohol
syndrome."
We must recognize that female drug addiction is very different from
male drug addiction. While male drug addiction is primarily to the sub-
stance, female drug addiction is often to the relationship in which the
drug is shared. Prior abandonments fuel the need to remain in a highly
dependent relationship, and the fear of future abandonment undercuts
the capacity to say "no" to a lover's request to get high. The primary
addiction of many of these women is to a destructive relationship from
which alcohol and drug abuse results. The societal failure to educate
and support parents, combined with historic discrimination against wo-
men, yields a besieged generation of young mothers who are highly vul-
nerable to substance abuse.'"I Substance abuse provides the additional
threat to the fetus of diseases transmitted by substance abuse. Until re-
cently, over 80% of women with AIDS were those who shared needles
with other addicts or were the sexual partners of addicts.' 19
116. 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
117. The Court stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make
it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to afflicted with a
venereal disease. . . . [I]n the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law
which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas added,"the prosecution is aimed at penalizing an
illness, rather than providing medical care for it. We would forget the teachings of the Eighth
Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and permitted sick people to be
punished for being sick." Id. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
118. Although the causes of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) remain largely un-
known, its incidence among drug exposed infants is two to twenty times higher. The risk
may be partly environmental where, for example, the drunken or "high" parent inadver-
tently smothers the infant. See, e.g., Bays, supra note 38, at 901.
119. Chasnoff et al., supra note 79.
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B. The Circular Reforms of Dependency
Our legal model has travelled in a rather large circle, beginning 125
years ago with a mission of "rescuing" the child from the family, and
finally returning to "protecting" the child from the family. 120 Some-
where in the 1970s and early 1980s, the larger mission of protecting the
child in the family was lost.
Approximately thirty years ago, the concept of the "battered child
syndrome" was presented to the American Academy of Pediatrics. In
1960, the problem was estimated to affect 447 children. 12 1 As of 1986,
2.3 million reports of suspected abuse and neglect were reported annu-
ally, and there were 2,000 to 5,000 deaths annually.
In response to this new phenomenon, all states, by 1967, passed
laws requiring professionals who suspected abuse or neglect to report
their cases to the local social service agencies. These agencies were in
turn required to investigate and, if cause was found, to provide child
welfare and mental health services to the family. For the family that was
unwilling to cooperate, the pressure of juvenile court was used with a
threat of dependency and/or termination of parental rights. When case
loads were relatively low in 1970, the programs were successful. 12 2 Law
enforcement in the criminal sense was not present in the field during the
1960s and early 1970s. Criminal charges were filed only in the rare in-
stance of clear evidence of injury or homicide. Part of the reason for the
few prosecutions was that there were rarely witnesses to serious abuse,
and physicians were not able or willing to diagnose a "non-accidental
injury" "with reasonable medical certainty." Medical text books of that
era suggested that one-half of subdural hematomas (e.g., significant
head injury) of infants were spontaneous.12
3
The late 1970s witnessed the rise of the battered woman syndrome,
and with it the increased public awareness of sexual abuse, incest and a
quickly developing support structure for battered women shelters and
rape crisis centers. Society moved quickly in the direction of attempting
to support victims of sexual assault, regardless of age, and soon found
themselves dealing with young children.1
24
As case loads exploded, funding imploded. The Reagan adminis-
120. As mentioned previously, the original mission of many welfare societies founded
to protect children after the civil war was one of rescue. Children were commonly "res-
cued" from urban ghettos and placed in the countryside. The often extremely stressful
impact of being removed from their families was not initially perceived. With the rise of
Hull House, Social Work and the Populist movement in the 1900s, there was a major effort
to break away from rescuing the individual child to attempting to protect both child and
their family. Paul G. Anderson, The Origin, Emergence, and Professional Recognition of Child
Protection, 63 Soc. SERVICE REV. 222 (1989).
121. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962); Richard
D. Krugman, Future Role of the Pediatrician in Child Abuse and Neglect, 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 1003, 1004-11 (1990).
122. In Denver in the 1970s, 80% of children removed from their homes returned
within a year and were not re-abused. Krugman, supra note 121.
123. Id. at 1004.
124. It is important to note that this "epidemic" of physical and sexual abuse has ex-
isted for many decades but, until then, had remained largely unreported.
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tration deeply cut many basic support programs for families. In 1988,
the Congressional Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families
reported that although child protective cases increased 55% from 1981
to 1986, funding rose only 4%. Many agencies that normally provided
services to families who were not abusive or neglectful were statutorily
compelled to direct almost all their resources to treat abused children
and their families. Thus, in some areas, there was a complete dearth of
child welfare services for those who needed help, but were not abusive.
Some families "admitted" to child neglect to get needed services, even
though they were not neglectful.
12 5
While funding for protection was cut, public health nursing was also
cut. What was previously a comprehensive preventative health care sys-
tem for mothers and infants in the 1970s evolved, by 1990, to a fee-for-
service home health care industry whose employees visited only the in-
sured. Cuts in school funding compelled many school districts to re-
duce or share their nurses. Another major resource that families had
turned to with their children was thus put beyond their reach.
Another pressure against families with children was created in 1979
when Congress "de-institutionalized" the chronically mentally ill. The
ill overwhelmed the community mental health centers and displaced
many families who were in need. Treatment previously available to abu-
sive families was cut. By the late 1980s, Child Protection Services (CPS),
the agency charged with protecting both the child and the family, was
reduced from being an advocate to merely being an investigator.
126
Similarly, physicians involved in child protection actions were used
as agents of diagnosis for purposes of prosecution and rarely used as
agents of treatment. Many pediatricians have become increasingly re-
luctant to report suspected abuse because of their honest fear that the
system will possibly create greater harm for the child than their informal
efforts. Both criminal sexual abuse hearings and civil hearings regard-
ing abuse have become increasingly more adversarial, even though the
initial assumption was to have a more informal congenial atmosphere.
Physical findings regarding abuse and neglect are increasingly chal-
lenged and increasingly in doubt. 127 During the past decade, a number
of physical phenomena believed to be indicia of abuse were discovered
in populations of non-abused children. 12 8 The net result of new knowl-
edge regarding diagnosis of abuse was a net increase in the uncertainly
125. Krugman, supra note 121, at 1004.
126. The primary role of CPS is to collaborate with law enforcement to meet the mini-
mums of statutory mandate. As treatment services within CPS declined, many of the
clinical social workers left such that by 1990, most CPS workers were baccalaureate gradu-
ates with scant prior experience in entry level positions. The prior position of an advocate
clinical social worker was now replaced by a "case manager" and the CPS worker was put
in the position much like the probation parole officer.
127. J.A. Adams et al., Anogenital Findings and Hymenal Diameter in Children Referredfor
Sexual Abuse Examination, I ADOLESCENT PEDIATRIC GYNECOLOGY 123 (1988).
128. Krugman, supra note 121, at 1007 n.21 (citingJohn McCann et al., Perianal Findings




as to diagnosing abuse "with reasonable medical certainty." 129
The mother witnessing paternal abuse or neglect became more and
more reluctant to seek medical or therapeutic help in a crumbling fam-
ily. If the mother sought help for an abusive spouse, she risked having
him ordered from the home while having no guarantee that he would
complete an adequate anger management program. Reporting the
abuse of a child in the absence of effective and available treatment
forced the mother to choose between losing the family breadwinner and
thereby plunging herself and all the children closer to poverty or "pro-
tecting" one child. Double standards rose again as her failure to report
was used as a basis for neglect charges against her. Thus, the mother
risked a penalty for something she could not remedy.
Although the mother was abandoned by the treatment, welfare and
medical systems, she alone was often blamed for the situation. The
theme of maternal blame so clearly stated in the London Gin Epidemic
(i la Dan Quayle) continues to infect our attempts to assist abused,
abandoned single mothers. On top of these concerns was the nagging
certainty that the vast majority of abuse cases did not rise to the level of
being predicted "with reasonable medical certainty." Thus, many abus-
ing parents were found innocent, even though they could have been
found guilty under a lesser standard of proof. To address this, Con-
gress, in 1989, founded the United States of America Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect. The results are not yet in.
The medical community has become increasingly aware of the ef-
fects of failing to treat much of the harm detected. While a substantial
literature documents the propensity of the untreated victim for becom-
ing a victimizer it is a sad fact that vastly more public resources are spent
incarcerating offenders than treating either victim or victimizer to pre-
vent future abuse.1
30
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND STATE REMEDIES
A woman who chooses to carry her pregnancy to term has a moral
responsibility to make reasonable efforts towards preserving fetal
health. Moral responsibility does not create a legal duty to accept medi-
cal procedures or treatments in order to benefit the fetus. The distinc-
tion between moral and legal responsibility is an important one. Our
society places great moral value on assisting those in need or in danger.
There is no legal duty that anyone risk his or her well-being to provide
help, or for any person to donate tissue to another even if the risk is
minimal and the donation would save the other person's life. The duty
of a pregnant woman to her fetus is greater than this, but less that the
129. Id. at 1007 (citing Richard D. Krugman, The More We Learn, the Less lWe Know "With
Reasonable Clarity", 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 165 (1989)).
130. While 22% of Colorado inmates and 33% of Alaska inmates are sex offenders,
less than three percent of known child sexual abuse victims are receiving treatment. Krug-
man, supra note 121, at 1009 (citing Gail Ryan, Victim to Victimizer: Rethinking Victim Treat-
ment, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 325 (1989)).
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obligation of a parent to his or her child. Parents have a legal duty to
provide reasonable support and health care for their children. How-
ever, they cannot be compelled to risk their life or health to protect their
children's health.
If medical measures are necessary to protect the viability of a fetus,
the mother faces a risk to her life and health in order to undergo treat-
ment. Legally compelling a pregnant woman to undergo medical proce-
dures for her fetus creates a penalty on pregnancy, a violation of her
constitutional right to privacy and her constitutional right to decide to
be a parent. Logically, there is no basis to assert that a pregnant wo-
man's moral responsibility to her fetus exceeds a mother's legal duty to
her child.
The medical and legal communities have asserted a broad range of
suggested solutions. The power to implement these solutions that is
provided by the United States Constitution is also limited by the Constitu-
tion. Thus, constitutional law provides a framework limiting the
method, manner and means by which the state exercises power to pro-
tect the fetus. What follows is an overview of constitutional concerns
1 3 1
of which the state must be aware and options the state may use in efforts
to protect the child.
A. The Rights of Mother, Fetus and Child
The Right to be Spared Cruel and Unusual Punishment. Punishment for
drug and/or alcohol abuse, broadly recognized as a disease, is inappro-
priate under the Eighth Amendment.13 2 Moreover, abuse of alcohol can
and does in many cases pose a greater threat to fetuses than does abuse
of illicit drugs. Similarly, use of tobacco creates a demonstrable threat
to the well-being of the fetus in the form of premature births and low
birth weight. Any criminal statute the legislature contemplates must
consider criminalizing pregnant women's consumption of alcohol and
tobacco.
The Right to Equal Protection. In a statute, the legislature must first
face the challenge that a woman is being penalized for behavior that
would not be actionable if the same drugs or alcohol were consumed by
a male. Although objections to a statute on this ground would not likely
be subject to strict scrutiny, the statute could likely further discrimina-
tion against abandoned minority mothers.' 3 3 A 1986 review of court-
131. There are myriad works addressing constitutional issues in great detail. This arti-
cle does not, therefore re-plow this well-turned field. A few of the more helpful articles
are: Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Alison B. Marshall, Drug Addiction, Pregnancy, and Childbirth:
Legal Issues for the Medical and Social Service Communities, 18 CLINICS PERINATOLOGY 147
(1991); James M. Wilton, Compelled Hospitalization and Treatment During Pregnancy: Mental
Health Statutes as M'odels for Legislation to Protect Children from Prenatal Drug and Alcohol Exposure,
25 FAM. L. Q. 149 (1991); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
133. The Supreme Court has not applied the strict scrutiny analysis for sex-based equal
protection claims, apparently because sex, in and of itself, is not a suspect classification.
See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Reid v. Reid, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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ordered Caesarean sections found that all were public clinic patients,
81% were minority women, of whom 24% did not speak English as their
primary language. 1
34
The Privacy Right to Reproduce.' 3 5 Griswold v. Connecticut 136 anchors a
line of cases empowering women to make decisions regarding parentage
without state intervention. The Griswold Court held invalid a Connecti-
cut law which attempted to prohibit married couples from using contra-
ceptive devices. The Court argued that enforcement of the law would
require the state to invade "the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms."' 3 7 The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade '3 8 held inva-
lid the Texas statute prohibiting abortion. In Carey v. Population Services
International,m3 9 the Supreme Court found the right of privacy for deci-
sions regarding the creation of a family, including contraception,
childbearing and child care.
The Privacy Right to Confidentiality. In Whalen v. Roe, 1 40 the Court
found an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters." There is, perhaps, nothing more crucial for the fetus than a
mother's confidential relationship with her physician. For physicians
and nurses to secure urine toxicologies without the mother's consent
and to provide results to state authorities shatters the physician-client
relationship and does not necessarily protect the fetus. A single incident
of drug use caught by a toxicology screen does not create nearly the
harm to a fetus as a mother's lifetime fear of seeking medical attention
for herself and her children.
The Right to Bodily Integrity. In addition to the above-cited privacy
rights, the Fourth Amendment also provides mothers the right "to be
secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures
.... 141 Under the Fourth Amendment, serious questions can be raised
as to whether courts can force mothers to undergo Caesarean sections
or life sustaining medical treatment such as the treatment in In re Quin-
lan. 1 4 2 A drug urinalysis of the mother is not remotely as invasive as a
Caesarian section.
In the last decade, there has been a significant expansion of the
right to compel drug testing, even though drug testing is a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab,14 3 the Court held that the United States Customs Depart-
134. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEw. ENG.J.
MED. 1192, 1193 (1987).
135. These privacy rights are disputed by conservative jurists and strongly defended by
others. Privacy rights are argued to be emanations from the penumbras of the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. For further argument see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 1302-1435 (2d ed. 1988).
136. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137. Id. at 485.
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
140. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
141. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
142. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
143. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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ment could require any employee applying for a particular position to
be subject to drug testing even though there was no suspicion that indi-
vidual had any history of prior drug use. Under Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executive Ass'n, 144 the Court allowed complete toxicological tests of all
workers on a train that was involved in an accident. Neither of the above
cases required proof or even suspicion of individual use. Testing the
child after birth involves no invasion of the mother's bodily integrity and
would likely be permitted.
A Woman's Right to Govern Her Body. In 1973, the Fourteenth
Amendment was construed to protect a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.14 5 This right was inferred, in part, from the
above rights to privacy, confidentiality and the Griswold right to procre-
ate. 14 6 The state's interest in protecting a woman's health and in pro-
tecting potential human life was balanced to allow no state intervention
for a decision to abort during the first trimester.
t4 7
The Roe right to abortion and the privacy rights emanating from
Griswold may not apply to the case of a mother who is harming her fetus
through the use of drugs and alcohol, whereas the woman's right to re-
productive choice is arguably compelling in the case of abortion. The
state should have an equally compelling right to protect the fetus from
harm once the mother decides to keep it. The likelihood that the Roe
privacy protections will be extended to maternal drug abuse is undercut
by the Court's ruling in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. 1
4 8
There, the Court rejected the opportunity to extend Roe's privacy rights
beyond the context of abortion.
The Rights of the Fetus and Child. The rights of the unborn come from
a patchwork of legal principals. 149 Neither Roe nor Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services 150 require states to protect fetuses. If born alive, the
fetus has a right to inherit and to sue others for pre-birth damages to it.
Some states even allow a child to claim for damages by his or her
144. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
147. Roe was recently modified by the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), where the court upheld a statute requiring viability tests to
be performed for any pregnancy of twenty weeks or more. The trimester standard was
changed such that the state could regulate abortion at the point that potential life became
"viable." The Roe Court considered viability to begin at the third trimester. The Roe
Court also recognizes a state interest in protecting a woman's life and health over that of
the fetus. Thus, the state has no right to prohibit abortion at any time if the woman's life
or health is in peril. The Supreme Court recently affirmed Roe, but eroded womens' free-
dom to first trimester abortions. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
148. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Here, the Court sustained the right of the comatose pa-
tient to stop the use of life supporting equipment and did so under the right of bodily
integrity and the Fourteenth Amendment.
149. The most common method of asserting the rights of a fetus against its mother is
extending the fetus's rights against third party injury to rights against its mother. Barbara
Shelley ably argues this for Pennsylvania. Barbara Shelley, Comment, Maternal Substance
Abuse: The 'ext Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights?, 92 DicK L. REv. 691 (1988).
150. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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mother.' 5 1 Roe found clearly "that the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn,"' 52 whereas the
Webster plurality decision did not address this issue. The Webster plurality
abandoned the Roe trimester framework as unduly rigid. 153 Under Roe,
the state's interest in protecting the child becomes compelling in the
third trimester. 154
Further support for the notion that fetal health is distinguishable
from the right to an abortion is found in the case In re A. C., where the
court held, "the right of a woman to an abortion is different and distinct
from her obligations to the fetus once she has decided not to timely
terminate her pregnancy."155
B. Punishing the Abandoned. Concerns about Criminalization
Professor Roberts notes an interesting ancestor of present day
criminal prosecutions:
Slaveowners forced women to lie face down in a depression in
the ground while they were whipped. This procedure allowed
the masters to protect the fetus while abusing the mother. It
serves as a powerful metaphor for the evils of a fetal protection
policy that denies the humanity of the mother.'
56
This denial of humanity is the maintenance of societal abandon-
ment. As of November 1991, there were over 110 reported cases of wo-
men subject to criminal prosecution based on prenatal drug use.
1 5 7
Approximately 75% were poor women of color. Half of the White wo-
men prosecuted were identified as poor. 15 8 Only three cases involved
alcohol abuse.159 Seventy percent of the women prosecuted were Black
and most were crack addicts.160 Not one of the prosecutions was based
on a statute that was designed or intended to govern the conduct of a
pregnant mother towards her fetus.'61 The conviction ofJenniferJohn-
151. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
152. 410 U.S. at 158.
153. 492 U.S. at 517-18.
154. 410 U.S. at 113, 158, 162-164.
155. 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. App. 1987). However, this case concerned a pregnant,
terminally ill mother who was under such severe medication that an informed consent to a
Caesarean section was not possible to secure. This is quite distinct from a mother who
objects to mandatory treatment even if she is addicted to drugs or alcohol.
156. Roberts, supra note 21, at 1438 (footnote omitted).
157. Draft Memorandum, "State by State Case Summary of Criminal Prosecutions
Against Pregnant Women," from Lynn Paltrow to ACLU Affiliates and Interested Parties
(November 22, 1991) (on file with author). Ms. Paltrow stressed that these are only the
reported cases from ACLU affiliates. The total number of prosecutions and convictions is
likely much higher. Also, some cases did not report the mother's race and many did not
report her income level. Only three women were specifically reported as being middle
class. Telephone Interview with Lynn Paltrow, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project,
New York (March 24, 1991).
158. Id. at 2-24.
159. Id.
160. Roberts, supra note 21.
161. Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at 177. To date, no state has passed a stat-
ute authorizing criminal prosecution of substance abusing mothers. An early draft of Flor-
ida's child abuse statute authorized criminalization but its provision was reversed prior to
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son for "delivery" of cocaine to a minor (her newborns) was handed
down without any evidence of harm to the children from the drug expo-
sure. 162 In this instance, delivery was via the umbilical cord for the few
seconds after the child was born, until the cord was severed.
Societal abandonment can be maintained by criminalizing behaviors
that are largely unique to the abandoned.' 6 3 One of the rationales for
conviction is that incarceration will protect the fetus. Regrettably, the
evidence suggests that incarceration today affords no more protection
for the fetus than the hospitals of eighteenth century France.
164
Incarceration: A Greater Harm Than Drugs. Prisons and jails (like their
"hospital" predecessors) are rarely provided budgets sufficient for ade-
quate health care. 165 Prison health experts warn that prisons are shock-
passage indicating "that no parent of [a drug dependent) newborn infant shall be subject
to criminal investigation solely on the basis of such infant's drug dependency." Id. at 175
& n.104 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503 (7)(a)).
162. Ms. Johnson sought hospitalization a month prior to birth when she was worried
that her crack use would harm her unborn child. The state learned of her drug problem
only after she confided her concerns to her obstetrician. Most courts would be hard
pressed to find that an addict has the criminal intent to abuse her child. Ms. Johnson was
prosecuted under the statute of having the criminal intent to deliver controlled substances
to the a third party. The state found criminal intent by arguing that her attempts to get
help demonstrated that she knew that her drug use was harmful. Roberts. supra note 21, at
n. 156 (citing Brief of American Public Health Association and Other Concerned Organi-
zations as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 2, Johnson v. State, No. 89-1765 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1989) and Trial Transcript at 144, State v.Johnson, No. E89-890-
CFA, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), aff'd, No. 89-1765, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3585
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1989)).
This was her third "cocaine child" and Johnson received a sentence of 14 years proba-
tion and one year of rehabilitation programs conditioned upon receiving treatment. John-
son sought the treatment, but the outpatient programs refused to treat her because they
feared liability should her fetus fail to survive withdrawal. It appears that the tens of
thousands of dollars spent on Jennifer Johnson's trial and conviction had little effect on
the welfare of her child or the likelihood that this will not occur again. Ms. Johnson's trial
is a clear example of retributive criminalization. The metaphor of whipping the slave
endures.
163. The most recent law review article favoring criminalization is by James Denison,
The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1103 (1991). Mr. Denison ably reviews many arguments against criminalizing and
then advances a statutory formula designed to pass constitutional muster. Shona B. Glink
proposes a very limited use of criminal sanction for prevention, not punishment of mater-
nal substance abuse. Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the
Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533. On the other hand, George P. Smith, II goes far be-
yond criminalizing to suggest damage suits and sterilization. George P. Smith, II, Fetal
Abuse: Culpable Behavior by Pregnant Women or Parental Immunity?, 3J.L. & HEALTH 223 (1988-
89). Perhaps the greatest value of this article is its clear explication of how to intellectually
abandon the humanity of a drug addicted mother. The author asserts that certain sub-
stance abusing mothers are no longer "moral mothers," only "biological mothers" and
therefore not deserving maternal rights. The means by which the author prunes the limbs
of the mothers' humanity clearly portrays the process of abandonment. Two other articles
providing "kinder and gentler" analyses favoring criminal sanctions are: Jeffrey A. Par-
ness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1985); Catherine A. Kyres, Note, A "Cracked" Image of My Mother!
Myself? The Need for a Legislative Directive Proscribing Maternal Drug Abuse, 25 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 1325 (1991).
164. See supra note 16.
165. The institutions of the abandoned are sometimes funded like the services for the
abandoned. Society's scant faith in the rehabilitative potential of abandoned individuals
extends to its scant faith in the rehabilitative potential of its institutions for the abandoned.
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ingly deficient in attending to the health care needs of pregnant
women.16 6 The result has been widespread deficiencies in prenatal diet,
nutrition, exercise and seriously inadequate, if any, prenatal care. A re-
cent American Medical Association (AMA) report found that pregnant
women in jail are routinely subject to conditions that are hazardous to
fetal health, such as gross over-crowding, twenty-four hour lock-ups
with no access to exercise or fresh air, exposure to tuberculosis, measles,
hepatitis and a generally filthy and unsanitary environment. Addition-
ally, it is unclear if incarceration would prevent drug use by pregnant
women, because drugs are readily available in prison. 167 Recent Cali-
fornia cases well document the AMA findings,' 68 and one of the few
166. Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARVARD WOMEN'S L. J. 189 (1989).
167. See AMA Trustees, supra note 42.
168. Ellen M. Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced: Debunking the Myths of Medical Treat-
ment in Prison, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Winter 1991, at 23, 23 (citing Jones v. Dyer, No. H-
114544-0, Alameda County Superior Court, California)). Doris M. was sentenced to six
months in the county jail for a minor probation violation when Doris was seven months
pregnant. This unusually long sentence was apparently intended by the sentencing judge
to protect her child from exposure to heroin during the remainder of her pregnancy. Do-
ris was a heroin addict and had sought methadone treatment unsuccessfully prior to her
sentencing. Once incarcerated, she was given no methadone and forced to withdraw "cold
turkey" from heroin which resulted in severe vomiting, headaches, abdominal pain, diar-
rhea and other significant traumas.
[Doris] was not examined by an obstetrician for almost six weeks and received no
follow-up appointment or medical treatment. When she was approximately
eight-and-one-half months pregnant, she had severe uterine pain and felt no fetal
movement. Three days later, her stillborn daughter was removed by cesarean
section.
Barry, supra, at 23.
Esperanza C. was denied access to an obstetrician during the entire course of her
pregnancy and her fetus died in utero after eight and one-half months. Id. at 26 (citing
Harris v. McCarthy, No. 85-6002-JGD); a copy of this state-wide class action complaint and
settlement agreement can be obtained by writing to Legal Services for Prisoners with Chil-
dren, 1535 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94103, telephone (415) 255-7036.
Linda H., one of the plaintiffs in Harris, was transported on the eve of the birth of her
child to an outside hospital. Her mode of transport was in shackles, seated upright in a
van. Her child was born severely distressed. It spent thirty-one days in intensive care and
has permanent disabilities. Barry, supra, at 25-26.
Brenda J., another plaintiff in Harris, received inadequate treatment for placenta
previa (breakthrough bleeding). She had a miscarriage at eight and one half months and
had to undergo an emergency hysterectomy. Id. at 25.
Annette Harris, the lead plaintiff in Harris, suffered from vaginal bleeding for over
three weeks without securing the attention of any physician. She was given a drug that was
inappropriate for pregnant women because of the risk of inducing labor. As a result, she
went into premature labor, and her newborn died shortly thereafter. Id.
Jessie V. was sentenced to six months at Kern County Jail for misdemeanor assault.
Jessie was six months pregnant at the sentencing and addicted to heroin. She requested to
be placed on methadone maintenance and for one week was given a very low dose of
methadone, insufficient to prevent withdrawal. After that week she was denied methadone
and forced to go through withdrawal unaided, suffering nausea, chills, shakes and vomit-
ing. As a result, she was unable to eat or keep down any food. The only assistance pro-
vided by medical staff was Tylenol. Jessie had to sleep on the floor of the jail on an inch-
thick mattress resulting in severe back pain and difficulty standing or walking. Although
Jessie had a very high-risk pregnancy, she was not visited by any obstetrician until one
occasion after she had secured the assistance of outside legal counsel. Id. at 23 (citing
Yeager v. Smith, No. CV-F-87-493-REC (E.D. Cal.)).
Although sweeping victories have been secured in the above cases, demanding sub-
stantial change in the prisons, the reality remains that prenatal care is poor. The Califor-
nia Institute for Women involved in the Harris litigation is close to 300% over designed
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comprehensive studies of pregnancy care in correctional settings docu-
mented severely inadequate medical care in two California state prisons
and one large urban county jail.
169
Jail does not limit access to drugs and alcohol.170 Recent testimony
before the California legislature indicates that drugs and alcohol are
supplied to prisoners by outside visitors and correctional staff. Correc-
tional staff may play a significant role in distributing illegal substances
inside of the jail.' 7 1 Jail may increase the likelihood of the abuse of
drugs and alcohol. It does not provide better prenatal and obstetric
care than the mothers would receive "on the streets" and often forces
"cold turkey" drug withdrawals creating greater risk of harm to the fetus
than continuing drug use. Jails are not equipped to accomplish the con-
stant medical monitoring necessary to safely detoxify a pregnant wo-
man. Overcrowding and the opportunistic infections common in jail
populations create a significant and unnecessary risk of harm to the
fetus.
The Wide Meshed Net of Drug Testing. Any state that passes legislation
attempting to criminalize maternal substance abuse will face strict scru-
tiny. Hopefully, the purpose of the statute is not to punish the mother
for being addicted, but to protect her fetus from harm. The statutory
goal of protection rests on the assumptions that the course of drug use
while pregnant can be detected and that the detected drug use is shown to
be harmful to the fetus. These assumptions are often invalid. Testing at
birth detects only recent use, 1 7 2 says very little about the amount used
and nothing about the frequency or duration of use. 1 7 3 In other words,
testing detects only recent use not harm. Some younger pregnant
mothers can consume tremendous amounts of alcohol without trigger-
ing FAS or FAE. Others can consume illegal drugs without creating de-
capacity. County jails are similarly overcrowded with inmates routinely forced to sleep on
the floor for weeks at a time. Id. at 26. The Doris M. case settlement created a treatment
program for pregnant drug-dependent women in Alameda County. Id. at 23. In Kern
County (Yeager), however, the promised program has yet to be provided because the
county lacks resources in the general community for drug and alcohol treatment. Thus,
there is some likelihood that less affluent county jails and state prisons in rural areas would
lack funds and support necessary to provide adequate treatment for their pregnant
inmates.
169. Barry, supra note 168, at 25 (citing C. McCall et al., Pregnancy in Prison: A Needs
Assessment Of Perinatal Outcome In Three California Penal Institutions, California Department of
Health Services, Maternal And Child Health Branch, 1985).
170. Elsa Walsh, Drug Use At Lortan "Disturbing", Increased Demand By Inmates Feared,
WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 1989, at BI.
171. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 168 (excellent examination of the pitfalls of and alterna-
tives to criminalization; demonstrates the efficacy of voluntary residential treatment).
172. Heroin, cocaine and its metabolites, methadone, benzodiazapines and amphet-
amines are usually undetectable 48 hours after ingestion. Marijuana can endure for up to
20 days, PCP for up to eight days and phenobarbital for two to three weeks. Alcohol
endures in the system for perhaps two to three days. Sheila Ronkin et al., Protecting 1other
and Fetus from Narcotic Abuse, CONTEMPORARY OB/GYN, March 1988, at 178.
173. Thus the physician is left to guess whether the infant's poor condition resulted
from street drugs, prescription drugs, maternal malnutrition, maternal stress or a host of
other factors. Even if cocaine was found at birth, testing cannot provide the crucial infor-
mation concerning what drugs were taken during the prior nine months.
[Vol. 69:3
ABANDONING OUR CHILDREN
monstrable harm to their fetus. Thus, if drug use is the criteria for
criminalization, then it is a crime based on a potential preventable harm
to the fetus. Any effort to criminalize preventable harm to a fetus must
address the fact that testing cannot prove preventable harm. Moreover,
mandatory testing causes mothers to hide the precise data needed to
detect risk of harm (drugs used, amounts, duration and other medical
difficulties) from the doctor in order to avoid being prosecuted. Thus,
the fact of criminalization functions to reduce the critical medical data
available to the physician to assist the high-risk pregnancy.
If the statute is based on the harm to the infant from the mother's
disease (addiction), it must answer to the fact that there are many other
diseases that create a greater risk of harm. 1 74 If a mother's disease or
impairment cannot be criminalized, the crime must be based on her decision to
have a child. While this raises some equal protection problems, the fact
that only diseases found mostly among "abandoned" women are
criminalized raises profound equal protection problems. Criminal stat-
utes would have to include the use or abuse of alcohol and cigarettes by
pregnant mothers.
Alcohol creates more fetal harm than any other drug. States have
significantly less authority to prevent fetal harm from alcohol, tobacco
and licit drugs than from illicit drugs. Alcohol and cigarette use is legal
and is heavily promoted in this society. It is unlikely that tobacco and
alcohol use by pregnant women will be criminalized.
The threat of testing is an additional trauma to the pregnant
mother, particularly when the test could cause the loss of her job and
cancellation of health coverage. Even if the mother is drug free, she
faces the nagging possibility of false positive test results. Prescription
drugs can trigger false positives and false negatives on urine sampled
enzyme-monitored immunoassays can be produced by diluting the urine
sample or altering its pH. 1 75 If testing is limited to cases in which the
baby exhibits Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS), many mothers will
be long gone from the hospital before symptoms occur. NAS may not
occur for up to fourteen days after delivery. Thus, an addicted mother
who has only cursory access to health care during her pregnancy and
who leaves the hospital a few days after delivery could successfully elude
detection of her condition.1
76
174. Tay-Sachs disease is carried by the mother and causes death of approximately
40% of her offspring before they reach age six. Women with Tay-Sachs tend to be of
Jewish Eastern European ancestry. The infant fatality rate for mothers with AIDS is not
greater than that for Tay-Sachs.
175. For example, some over-the-counter cold remedies or diet pills can appear as am-
phetamines, non-steroid inflammatories can appear as marijuana and some antibiotics ap-
pear as a positive cocaine test. Codeine, which is metabolized into morphine, will yield a
positive opiate test. Urinary tract infections may cause multiple false positive reactions
giving the misimpression of poly drug abuse. Ronkin et al., supra note 172, at 178.
176. Cocaine has a short half life in the body of 30 minutes to a few hours before it is
metabolized and converted into metabolites ecogoine methyl ester which continue in the
body for only two to four days. The body fluid tests can confirm the use of cocaine as well
as hair samples.
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Deterrence, Rehabilitation and Retribution. Traditionally, criminal liabil-
ity is imposed for purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.
The goal of deterrence is not met. The state lacks the authority to make
drug addiction or alcoholism criminal conduct. 177 There is no evidence
that addiction is a moral weakness that could be cured by jail time, nor is
there evidence that a woman's knowledge of the threat of incarceration
cause her to stop abusing herself and her fetus. Ironically, the only cer-
tain result of criminal deterrence is an incentive to abort her fetus in
order to destroy the evidence.'
78
If the goal is immediate rehabilitation of the mother to prevent fur-
ther harm to the fetus, then the criminal process takes a dangerously
long time. Irreversible fetal damage can occur before an arrest can be
made and irreversible harm could occur in order to avoid arrest. Jail is
no place to avoid drugs, and states are under no duty to provide jail
inmates addiction treatment that is available to normal citizens.1
79
The only goal met by criminalizing pregnant women's substance abuse is that
of retribution. Such retribution is a ratification of abandonment theory
and a reaffirmation of popular prejudice. While some pro-criminaliza-
tion commentators argue that no "moral" mother would expose her
child to harm from drugs, 180 they fail to address the morality of more
privileged mothers with deadly diseases or the morality of a society that
exposes millions of its children to poverty and denies health care and
drug treatment to their parents. This failure to address the larger moral
issues reflects a cognitive myopia that results from societal
abandonment.
Many legislators continue to labor under the illusion that to
criminalize a behavior is to cure it. However, in the case of maternal
drug use, criminalization serves the more important function of legiti-
mizing our abandonment of and popular prejudice against "welfare
mothers on drugs." As Willie Horton was effectively used to personify
the threat to womanhood, "crack mothers" personify the threat to child-
hood. This threat to childhood flows through our history on a river of
abandonment. As impoverished "gin mothers" were punished in eight-
177. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
178. Cases brought in Florida, California and Ohio have been dismissed on grounds
that the statute was not intended to apply to fetuses or to prenatal conduct or more impor-
tantly that the interpretation would make a fetus equivalent to a "child" in the statutes
thus making pregnant women open to abuse or neglect charges for all aspects of prenatal
care including the voluntary decision to have an abortion early in the pregnancy.
179. State of Ohio v. Tammy Gray concerned a child endangerment charge brought
against a woman who had used cocaine during her pregnancy. The court dismissed the
charge saying that to interpret the statute as sought by the state would be creating a duty
of prenatal conduct and would, therefore, be interpreting the word "child" in the statute
to include "fetus." Connolly & Marshall, supra note 133, at 176 & n.109 (citing State of
Ohio v Tammy Gray, Slip op. No. CR88-7406, Court of Common Pleas, Lucas County,
July 13, 1989).
180. See e.g., Smith, supra note 163. The author distinguishes between a biological and
a moral mother arguing that only a "moral" mother should be allowed to have children.
He supports criminalization and sterilization as options. His argument most effectively
supports abandonment theory in his sincere, eloquent and utter detachment from the hu-
manity of addicted mothers.
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eenth century London, "crack mothers" are punished in twentieth cen-
tury Miami.
Roe v. Wade. If Roe v. Wade is overruled, a state's authority to
criminalize will be expanded. The pro-criminalization forces argue that
if injury to a child can be criminalized, injury to a fetus can be as well.
One result of extending rights to a fetus is that the adversarial relation-
ship between mother and doctor is extended to mother and fetus.' 8 ' In
this circumstance, the mother must seriously consider aborting her pos-
sibly healthy fetus to avoid the possibility she will be convicted and sepa-
rated from her existing children. Any criminal statute must demonstrate
that the harm of maternal drug use is a greater threat to the infant than
the harm created by the state's attempt to prosecute the mother. From
this perspective, it is difficult to understand how any statute's protection
could exceed its harm. 18 2 The metaphor of whipping the Black slave
mother as she lies over a hole endures.
C. Civil Commitment: Pros and Cons
The Uniform Alcohol and Intoxication Treatment Act' 8 3 provides
an interesting basis for civil commitment' 8 4 of mothers with substance
abuse problems. The Act could be amended to allow involuntary com-
mitment of pregnant women abusing drugs (including alcohol and
tobacco).
Arguments in Favor of Civil Commitment. Civil commitment is prefera-
ble to criminal punishment on a number of grounds. First, it is quicker
than criminal punishment. Although civil commitment does have con-
siderable procedure and safeguards, the time between detection and
commitment is usually much less than in criminal cases between appre-
hension and conviction. Second, it is focused. Criminalization could be
employed against casual users and as a vehicle for social retribution.
181. California State Senator Edward R. Royce proposed amending section 273a of
California's Penal Code to define "child" as "a person under the age of 18 years or a
fetus." Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at 176.
182. The harm to the existing family network and the mother's future capacity to se-
cure employment at a reasonable wage would be immense as a result of prosecution.
Since most pregnant women abusing drugs have been abandoned by the fathers, the chil-
dren of such women would suffer from the economic discrimination against their mother
every time she had to admit her criminal conviction on a job application.
183. UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT, 9(l) U.L.A. 79 (1988). A
thoughtful article exploring this and favoring the feasibility of civil commitment is Kristen
Rachelle Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for A Thoughtful Legislative Response,
65 WASH. L. REV. 377 (1990). A more detailed exploration of the Uniform Act can be
found in Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitu-
tional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1990). James M. Wilton provides a
careful analysis which may be used for commitment and compelled treatment. Wilton,
supra note 132.
For a more comprehensive consideration of the policy, intent and procedures of civil
commitment, see Sandra A. Garcia & Ingo Reilitz, Involuntary Civil Commitment of Drug-De-
pendent Persons with Special Reference to Pregnant WVomen, 15 MENTAL & PHYS. DISAB. L. RPvR.
418(20) (1990).
184. Civil commitment is here defined as court ordered temporary non-criminal place-
ment of individuals in an institution for purposes of protecting them from harm to them-
selves or others.
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However, the Commitment Act demands a case-by-case examination
whereby the pregnant substance abuser must first fit the definition of an
alcoholic, drug addict, etc. Whereas a criminal act could be construed to
penalize pregnant women for any behavior that would harm the fetus,
the Civil Commitment Act addresses only substance abuse.'
8 5
Third, civil commitment provides more protection of the mother
and child. Civil commitment statutes protect fetal health by treating the
mother's addiction. The state's interest should be in protecting the
health of the fetus and the child thereafter. Criminal jail time may tem-
porarily prevent substance abuse, but at a high cost to the fetus. Civil
commitment recognizes the value of the mother as a separate person
instead of a mere breeder for a more valuable fetus. Treatment, more
than punishment, lessens the likelihood of drug abuse during future
pregnancies.
Fourth, civil commitment allows for flexibility in treatment. Civil
commitment law allows individual planning to address the unique needs
and circumstances of each mother. Criminal sanctions fix the period of
jail time. Civil commitment allows the addict to be retained in custody
until she is no longer a threat to her fetus. If the danger persists, the
abuser can be recommitted. The proposed Uniform Act requires a phy-
sician's certification to limit mis-commitment.
Finally, the social stigma of civil commitment is less than that of
criminal conviction. Any criminal conviction is a significant blow to fu-
ture employability. The only certain result of criminalizing pregnant
women's substance abuse is undercutting their earning capacity and
thereby their capacity to protect and defend the future livelihood of
their children. In contrast, civil commitment proceedings are often not
open to the public and the files are sealed.
Arguments Against Civil Commitment. Most states have civil commit-
ment statues that contain carefully drawn due process protections, in-
cluding mandatory reviews after short periods of commitment.
Unfortunately, many civil commitment programs for addicts are far from
civil. Civil commitment hearings are often held in prison-like facilities.
Both the New York and California programs group civil and criminal
addicts together.' 86 In Massachusetts, many women addicts who were
civilly committed ultimately went to prison. Massachusetts had earlier
mandated additional treatment programs for female addicts, but the de-
mand so exceeded the space available that women were sent to prison
treatment programs. 1
87
In addition, the question of whether civil commitment is effective
remains unanswered. There have been no significant efforts to evaluate
185. For example, it would not be productive to attempt to prosecute or commit a
woman for pursuing a rigorously vegetarian lifestyle during pregnancy which barred con-
sumption of milk, although this could create a risk of harm to the fetus.





civil commitment programs.' 8 8 Although the 1967 Presidential Com-
mittee on Law Enforcement mandated that mandatory treatment be
"substantive and distinguishable from imprisonment," most civil com-
mitment procedures fall far short. Only fourteen states require evidence
before commitment that appropriate treatment is "available," and only
five states require a demonstration that the available treatment will be
"beneficial."1 8 9 Thus, addicted women are likely to be committed with-
out any certainty that they will receive treatment and even less certainty
that the treatment will be tailored to their needs.' 90 It is particularly so
regarding the care needs of the addicted woman's children.
Civil commitment and child abuse and neglect laws all founder on
the status of the fetus. A mother who is abusing drugs is not necessarily
a danger to herself, thus the only basis for commitment is that she is a
"danger" to "others." Civil commitment has not been used on severely
addicted (non-pregnant) women, even when they have AIDS, because
there is no demonstrated danger to "others."''
None of the drafted civil commitment statutes contemplate a fetus
as an "other," and only Minnesota provides for involuntary commitment
of pregnant, drug-abusing women. 19 2 To civilly commit pregnant, drug
abusing women raises the question of Roe and Webster anew and extends
the adversarial relationship between mother and fetus from criminal to
civil law. Child abuse and neglect laws face the same difficulty if they
state that the fetus is a "person."
In addition, there is medical opposition to civilly committing preg-
nant, drug-abusing women. Forcing pregnant women into a penalty
model is no small constitutional problem and is clearly at odds with the
physician's hippocratic oath to "at least do no harm." The American
Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gy-
necologists have adopted policies strongly opposing involuntary com-
mitment for substance abuse or other mandatory treatment based solely
on the pregnant mother's abuse of drugs. 193 In addition to the medical
community's opposition, a formidable body of case law and constitu-
tional concerns hamper the forced treatment model.
Another concern is that of inflated treatment costs. There are treat-
ment and incarceration costs with civil commitment and criminalization.
188. Id.
189. See id,
190. Id. at 1557.
191. See id. at 1558 (citing Barry S. Brown, Civil Commitment-An International Perspective,
18J. DRUG IssuEs 663, 666 (1988) and Michael P. Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Involun-
ta. Civil Commitment of Opiate Addicts 18 J. DRUG ISSUES 641 (1988)).
192. Minnesota appears to be the only state that authorizes involuntary commitment of
pregnant drug users under MINN. STATr ANN. §§ 626.5561(2)(West 1992). Unfortunately,
the statute ignores alcohol and nicotine abuse, which likely harm more children than drug
abuse.
193. Chavkin, supra note 186, at 1558 (citing American Medical Association Board of
Trustees Report, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and
Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behaviour by Pregnant Wl1omen, 264 JAMA 2663 (1990) and
A. Allen, An Affirmation of American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee Opinion,
WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES, Fall 1990, at 37)).
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There is no doubt that civil commitment will cost more. Mothers whose
only offense is drug use should be separated from criminals. Such sepa-
ration creates vast institutional costs that could be better spent on the
mothers' habilitation. Most of the mothers needing such treatment are
near or below the poverty line and unable to pay for treatment. The
Social Security Act as presently constituted only provides Medicaid ben-
efits for methadone treatment. 1 94 Who will pay for another 250,000 po-
tential civil commitments per year? Only 1% of our vast federal
appropriation for the War on Drugs is budgeted for the treatment of
women, and only a fraction of that for the treatment of pregnant wo-
men. 19 5 It is manifestly unreasonable to commit a pregnant mother
without providing her with a reasonable certainty of appropriate treat-
ment for herself and appropriate assistance for her other children and
dependents. It is unlikely the government can afford treatment pro-
grams in jail when it cannot afford substantially less-expensive programs
outside of jail.
Commitment would likely create harm to the existing children of
the mother due to the absence of day care and appropriate residential
care for the children while the mother is away. In addition, as noted
above, there is no certainty that jail impairs the woman's access to drugs.
In the present War on Drugs atmosphere, admitting to drug use could
end the mother's custody of the child, terminate low-income housing
and shred the fabric of family and social ties. 196 Civil commitment for
substance abuse by pregnant women does not deter them from sub-
stance abuse as much as it deters them from seeking prenatal care or
help for their addiction. Particularly where the woman has other depen-
dent children, the threat exists that an unfavorable physician's report
could result in a jail sentence.
Another problem with criminal or civil commitment statutes is that
they would compel doctors to play the role of policemen, not healers.
Addicted mothers could secure medical assistance only at the risk of
legal peril. Addicted mothers would be more likely to not go to the
hospital until it was time to deliver the child, after making strenuous
efforts to rid themselves of drugs. This process creates manifestly
greater harm to the infant than civil commitment could allay.'
9 7
194. Senate Bill 29 and House Resolution 1189, admitted in the first session of the
102d Congress, include the "Medicaid Drug Treatment For Families Act of 199 1,"- which
provides for Medicaid coverage of alcoholism and drug dependency residential treatment
of pregnant women. This legislation is not yet passed but would likely better tend to
defend the interests of the unborn from harm than any well-intentioned state statute di-
rected at criminalization. S. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1189, 102d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1991).
195. Health Quarterly (Public Broadcasting Corporation television broadcast, Jan. 6,
1992).
196. One example is that of a pregnant woman who was battered severely by her hus-
band and sought medical treatment from a local hospital. Tests administered during her
treatment indicated that she had been drinking. On her release she was arrested and
charged with criminal child abuse for consuming alcohol during her pregnancy. AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS UPDATE, Feb. 3, 1990, at 2.
197. First, the absence of prenatal care creates a much greater risk of morbidity and
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Civil commitment of pregnant, drug abusing women create the
probability of expanded maternal duty to the fetus. Any civil commit-
ment statute must, by necessity, create a duty of the mother towards her
fetus. Once this duty is created, it could easily extend beyond the abuse
of illicit drugs to any activity by the mother which creates a demonstra-
ble risk of harm to the child.' 98
The probability of increased state liability also exists. Civil commit-
ment (and criminalization) could substantially increase the cost of drug
treatment for pregnant mothers. Such mothers are extremely high-risk
obstetric patients and treatment centers reasonably fear legal liability to
the subsequently born child since such a child is likely to be born with
some injury resulting from prenatal drug use. The drug treatment
center staff is faced with significant medical uncertainty as to appropri-
ate drug treatment of the mother until delivery. They have no clear data
as to the mother's prior drug use, and they likely have a scant medical
history of her. Efforts by the treatment staff to shift the mother to meth-
adone could backfire if the dose is inappropriate and creates premature
labor.
Many addicted mothers use more than one drug. Polydrug abuse
can create very difficult initial diagnostic problems. To avoid premature
withdrawal that will harm the fetus, some form of drug use must con-
tinue. An addicted mother going into premature withdrawal can create
a level of stress and tachycardia that directly limits both the blood and
oxygen supplied to the fetus. The threat of criminalization is likely to
influence the mother to under-report drug or alcohol consumption.
This is particularly true if the mother believes that disclosure will result
in an additional prosecution. The welfare of the child will more likely be
protected if the mother can work with her established neonatal physician
in conjunction with the hospital-associated confidential treatment pro-
gram in which there is no statutory duty to report.
Conclusions Regarding Civil Commitment During Pregnancy. The funda-
mental problem of civil commitment is that it begs the question of sys-
temic abandonment. Both civil commitment and incarceration function
to punish the drug-using mother for deciding to keep her child.19 9 Be-
mortality among children than drug use by a mother. Second, a mother's attempt to cease
use of drugs or alcohol could create, as indicated elsewhere, significant unnecessary
trauma to the child due to premature withdrawal symptoms. Third, the absence of prena-
tal care and stresses of drug related life are likely to result in the premature delivery of an
underweight infant creating a great likelihood of ancillary medical costs. Fourth, the
mother's fear of the hospital would cause her to be less likely to pay attention to her
medical needs, thus increasing the likelihood that she would sustain aggravated medical
conditions that would impair her capacity to care for her child after delivery. All of these
combine to impair the hospital's capacity to provide comprehensive prenatal education
and postnatal education to enhance or assess the mother's parenting capacities.
198. Fetal rights created by criminal or civil commitment statutes are subject to the
same slippery slope of ever expanding harms subject to state sanction. An excellent dis-
cussion of this issue can be found in Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1990).
199. Within the systemic abandonment theory, civil and criminal commitment would
be preferred because they perpetuate the image that "something is being done" while
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cause of fear of detection, both function to discourage the mother from
seeking prenatal care. The cognitive myopia that fuels disparate prose-
cution of the abandoned would fuel disparate civil commitment. For
example, consider a typical mother subject to commitment who is a
poor, pregnant, addicted woman of color and has two other children,
one of whom has been placed in foster care. This is contrasted to a
typical mother with Tay-Sachs disease who is White, married, middle
class and has two prior children, one of whom died at age four from the
disease after a painful debilitating struggle. Each mother awaits the
birth of her third child. The civilly committed mother waits in a jail-like
setting, struggling with drug withdrawal and worrying about the safety
of her child whom she is rarely able to see. Her fetus may or may not
have suffered harm from her addiction, but the harm is very unlikely to
be fatal. Efforts are made to convince the woman to agree to free fed-
eral sterilization in order that no more children will be harmed. In con-
trast, the Tay-Sachs mother awaits birth with her family at Mt. Sinai
Hospital. After the death of her last child, she, with the support of her
family and psychiatrist, was encouraged to try again. Her decision to
become pregnant is seen as courageous. Her fetus has a 50% chance of
getting the disease and the disease is 100% fatal.
D. The Efficacy of Mandatory Treatment and Reporting
Criminal prosecution, civil commitment and, to a lesser extent, de-
pendency proceedings assume that involuntary treatment and report-
ing 20 0 have a positive effect. A similar faith is placed in the efficacy of
testing. If these assumptions cannot be sustained, the problem of mater-
nal drug use may need to be faced in an entirely different way.
Any comprehensive review of mandatory drug treatment programs
in the United States yields little clear evidence of success. On the other
hand, such review yields clear evidence of historic abandonment, in that
the programs failed to meet the needs of woman addicts in general and
pregnant woman addicts in particular. Most of the major programs
studied were concerned mostly with males. The rate of success with fe-
males in such male-oriented programs was significantly lower.
In the 1930s, the United States Public Health Service established
treatment programs for felons in Fort Worth, Texas and Lexington,
Kentucky. After decades of effort, the evaluation found no clear evi-
dence that such mandatory treatment was more effective than voluntary
avoiding consideration of our societal abandonments which contribute to the mother's
plight.
One such abandonment is our War On Drugs which, according to one commentator,
functions to impede the addicted mother's access to healthcare and sever her access to
comprehensive rehabilitation. Larry Gostin, An Alternative Public Health I ision For A National
Drug Strategy: "Treatment Works", 28 Hous. L. REV. 285 (1991).
200. A thorough analysis of many unanticipated shortcomings of mandatory reporting
in Florida can be found in Brian C. Spitzer, Comment, A Response to "Cocaine Babies"-
Amendment of Florida 's Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants Born Drug Dependent, 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865 (1987).
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treatment.2 0 ' In the 1960s, California reached out beyond the felon
community in its very ambitious California Civil Addict Program. One
evaluator claimed success. 20 2 However, another author found treat-
ment to be neither consistently effective nor consistently available.
20 3
In 1966, programs were developed under the Federal Narcotic Addic-
tion Rehabilitation Program Act and the New York Narcotic Addiction
Central Commission. The New York program provided no clear evi-
dence of success.
20 4
Under the 1972 Federal Alternatives To Street Crime, there was a
concerted effort to move compulsory treatment from penal settings to
community settings. One positive result was an increase in the length of
stay of treatment. 20 5 However, there was no evidence that mandatory
treatment reduced future criminality any more than voluntary programs.
Later programs, including carefully structured treatment programs,
small group size, the addition of ex-addicts to staff and significant secon-
dary support, reported some success for males.
20 6
As of late 1991, approximately 65,000 women in California were
seeking comprehensive treatment for substance abuse. California had a
total of 2,000 treatment "beds" available. 20 7 Many treatment centers do
not accept women on welfare, and those who do give priority only to
pregnant women. This ignores the likelihood that drug or alcohol use
may simply be a side dependency for the primary dependency the wo-
man have on a relationship with a male drug or alcohol abuser. The
emphasis of treatment being available only to pregnant women may
cause them to infer that they are important to the social system only
201. See Chavkin, supra, note 186, at 1556-57.
202. Id. at 1556 (citing M. Douglas Anglin, The Efficacy of Civil Commitment in Treating
Narcotic Addiction,in NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF
DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 8 (C.G. Leukefeld & F.M. Tims eds.,
1988)).
203. See Chavkin, supra note 186, at 1556-57 (citing E. Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 198 (1989)).
204. Factors contributing to failure included "overreliance on criminal justice facilities
and personnel, a shortage of experienced clinicians, large caseloads, high abscondence
rates, and spurious evaluation efforts." Id. at 1557 nn.8-9 (citingJ.A. Inciardi, Some Consid-
erations on the Clinical Efficacy of Compulsory treatment: Reviewing the New York Experience in NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 126 (C.G. Leukefeld & F.M. Tims eds., 1988) and C. Winick, Some
Policy implications of the NVew York Civil Commitment Program, 19J. DRUG ISSUES 5 61 (1988)).
205. An increasing length of stay was directly related to the likelihood of reduction of
future criminality.
206. Sadly, one of the few multisite studies of compulsory treatment of female addicts
found that "female addicts who entered drug treatment under legal pressure . .. were less
likely to remain in treatment than women who entered voluntarily." Chavkin, supra note
186, at 1557 (citing R. Moise et al., Women in Drug Abuse Treatment Programs: Factors that
Influence Retention at Very Early and Later Stages in Two Treatment Modalities: A Summary, 16
INT'LJ. ADDICT 1295 (1981)).
207. Health Quarterly (Corporation for Public Broadcasting television broadcast, Jan. 6,
1992).
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when they are pregnant.
20 8
Mandatory reporting presents problems as well. Any time a physi-
cian is compelled to report confidential information secured from his
pregnant client or from her newly born child, the delicate relationship
between health care provider and patient can be shattered. From a legal
perspective, it is certainly preferable to limit reporting to whether the
newborn has evidence of maternal drug or alcohol abuse (e.g., neonatal
abstinence syndrome or fetal alcohol syndrome). This neonate-based
reporting avoids creating rights in the fetus that compete with the rights
of the mother.
The next risk of reporting is the not infrequent failure to keep
records in a confidential manner. One positive (or false positive) test
result could render the mother difficult to insure or uninsurable. 20 9
Small employers who self-insure would be unable to hire her. The re-
quirement to report places heavy demands upon physicians to ade-
quately diagnose drug and alcohol exposure at birth. Physicians face the
further problem of securing the informed consent of their clients for
drug screening while trying to maintain a relationship of trust. 2 10 This
will likely cause the mother to fail to completely express all of her drug
and alcohol problems and thus limit the physician's capacity to address
them.
208. The special health needs and social problems of women demand more specialized
treatment. For example:
-Women alcoholics have death rates from 50 to 100 percent higher than those of male
alcoholics, according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services....
-Three out of four chemically dependent women have been victimized by sexual
assault.
-Half have an eating disorder.
-Twenty percent have attempted suicide, and as many as 65 percent of female al-
coholics have a psychiatric disorder such as depression.
Cecelia Goodnow, Falling Through the Cracks: Getting Proper Drug Treatment is a Major Chal-
lenge for Women, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCE, Sept. 21, 1990, at CI, C3. Further, according
to a recent study in King County, Washington, removing a drug problem is only part of the
solution. Most women on federally funded treatment programs have less than a high
school education, and even after treatment, 72% remain jobless. Id.
209. Insurance companies are active in their abandonment of particular populations.
During 1990 and 1991, medical insurance companies raised their coverage for males in
particular professions (interior design, waiting, florists etc) to levels far beyond the risk.
The increase was apparently due to the inference that males in such work were more likely
than not to be gay, that if they were gay they were more likely than not to be promiscuous
and that if they were promiscuous they were more likely then not to acquire AIDS. While
these presumptions are sustained by popular prejudice, they are denied by medical evi-
dence. The incidence of new AIDS cases in the gay community went into a steep decline
in 1988 and continues to fall. Faced with proof that their premiums were raised while risk
was falling, some companies countered that the cost of AIDS deaths demanded higher
premiums. However, recent studies have documented that the medical costs of a death by
AIDS are far less than a death by heart attack, stroke or coronary artery disease.
210. This places healthcare workers in a Catch-22 where they are liable if they fail to
report and they are liable if they misreport. This dilemma is exacerbated by their lack of
authority to fully investigate the matter and their concern that any report would do more
harm than good because of the manifest lack of comprehensive treatment for the mother.
A cogent discussion of these and other mandatory reporting issues can be found in Sandra
Bolton, Comment, Maternal Drug Abuse as Child Abuse: Potential Liability for Health Care Profes-
sionals, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 281 (1987).
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When comprehensive treatment is unlikely to be available, the phy-
sician is acutely aware that a report could harm much more than help the
child, mother and family. To get enough data to treat the mother, the
physician needs her trust. As the physician loses her trust, he loses the
capacity to address the medical needs of the rest of the family. Doctors
become the practical equivalent of Bureau of Indian Affairs officers for
the abandoned tribes of addicted mothers. They must betray those
whom they are paid to serve. Their capacity to prevent fetal harm by
educating future mothers about contraception, drugs and prenatal care
is severely compromised. By removing the option to report from the phy-
sician, we remove one of the most important tools to convince the
mother to enter into appropriate treatment.
Within the theory of abandonment proposed herein, the physician
would be most likely to report the subgroup of drug using mothers with
which he or she has the least relation or affinity. Within the population
of all mothers testing positive for drugs, physicians are more likely to
report those traditionally abandoned by medical practice; namely,
mothers who are poor and nonwhite. This precise result occurred in a
careful study of mothers in Pinellas County, Florida. 2 1 1 Of the mothers
testing positive, Black mothers were reported 9.6 times more frequently
than White mothers. This reporting bias continued regardless of in-
come and of whether the mother was in a public hospital or a private
obstetric office.
Voluntary reporting to a confidential registry is a much better op-
tion than mandatory reporting. Taking the legal, constitutional, medical
and epidemiological data into account, it appears that the fetus is likely
to receive the most protection if the mother has maximum access to pre-
211. Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and
Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202
(1990). In March of 1987, Florida adopted a policy mandating reporting of births to wo-
men who use drugs or alcohol during their pregnancy even if there was no evidence of
drug or alcohol use at the time of birth. The Florida child abuse statute, 415.503(9)(a)(2)
(West 1992), defines "harm" to include "physical dependency" of a newborn infant upon
almost any (controlled) drug. The county surveyed was Pinellas County which contains St.
Petersburg. The population pool was approximately 860,000. Nine percent of the county
residents were minorities. Twenty-seven percent of the residents were over age 65. Fifty-
five percent were between the ages of 18 and 64, and in late 1988, approximately 6,256
families were receiving AFDC benefits. The National Association for Perinatal Addiction
Research and Education conducted a study in which, during a one-month period, urine
samples were taken from 390 women entering five public health clinics and 335 women
entering private obstetrical care. 14.8% of all the women had positive toxicologic results
for alcohol, marijuana, cocaine and opiates.
For the white women, 15.4% of the urine samples were positive. For the black women,
14.1% were positive. During the following six months, only 1.1 7 of the white women were reported,
while 10. 7r of the black women were reported. Black women were 9.6 times more likely to be reported
to authorities. The black women had a somewhat higher incidence of alcohol and cocaine
use than white women. The white women were alone in opiate use and used more mari-
juana and slightly less alcohol and cocaine.
This reporting bias prevailed regardless of income. In private obstetricians' offices,
although black women made up less than 10% of the patient population, they represented
55% of those reported for substance abuse during pregnancy. Likewise, at public health
care clinics, black women made up 44% of the patient population but they represented
67% of those reported for substance abuse. Id.
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natal, obstetric and follow-up care to address any deficit she has in
parenting, job and interpersonal skills. Such comprehensive healing
programs are only effective where there has been full and complete dis-
closure of prior personal, interpersonal and substance abuse problems.
Such disclosure will not occur where the physician is required to report
evidence of substance abuse. Making the requirement to report volun-
tary maximizes the pediatrician's capacity to advocate for the mother,
address her substance abuse problems and substantially increase the
likelihood that her fetus will not be subject to further harm.
Under this standard, the physician would have the option to report
the mother if, in his or her estimation, the mother willfully refuses to
participate in treatment and rehabilitative programs designed to benefit
her and her child. Nationally, physicians should be protected from lia-
bility for such reports in order that they would be able to fully provide
all the information needed by the courts when legal action on behalf of a
child is under consideration.
E. Child Abuse, Neglect and the Minnesota Model
Between 1963 and 1965, all fifty states and Washington, D.C. en-
acted child abuse reporting laws. 2 12 Thus far, only six states have de-
fined specific sanctions for maternal substance abuse. Illinois, Florida
and Oklahoma require reporting of children exposed to drugs during
pregnancy or born addicted to illegal drugs.2 13 Massachusetts requires
filing a child abuse report for any child "determined to by physically
dependent upon an addictive drug at birth."'2 14 Massachusetts did not
include fetal alcohol syndrome as did Indiana, whose child abuse and
neglect statute includes any child born with fetal alcohol syndrome or
addicted to a controlled substance.
2 1 5
New Jersey passed the most comprehensive statute allowing state
212. Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at 155 (citing Civil Liability for Failing to Report
Child Abuse, I DET. C.L. REv. 135, 135-36 (1977)).
213. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)(as amended by
P.A. 86-274 § I and P.A. 86-659 § 1, which included in the definition of "neglected child,"
newborns whose blood or urine contains controlled substances or metabolites thereof.)
and ch. 37 para. 802-3(l)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2)(West
Supp. 1991). The statute covers "physical dependency of a newborn infant upon any
drug." The statute goes on to say "no parent of such a newborn infant shall be subject to
criminal investigation solely on the basis of such infant's drug dependency;" OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West 1989) only applying to a child "who appears to be born in a
condition of dependence on a controlled dangerous substance." § 846(A). This totally
ignores the more serious threat of alcohol in favor of the more politically acceptable scape-
goating of "controlled dangerous substances."
214. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119 § 51A (Law Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1991).
215. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (Burns Supp. 1991). Addiction in a newborn is pre-
sumably determined by the observation of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS) in the
newborn. However, NAS can take up to 14 days to appear, and by then most women are
far from the hospital. One effect of the statutory scheme in Florida, Indiana, Illinois,
Oklahoma and Massachusetts is to push the mother into a medically unsupervised with-
drawal before she appears in the hospital. The trauma to the fetus from such withdrawal is
immensely greater than a medically supervised attenuation of drug use. The result can be
an infant harmed more by the state's attempt to protect it than by the harm itself.
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intervention wherever the "welfare" of the child "will be endangered"
and expressly including "an application on behalf of an unborn
child." 2 16 The breadth of this statute opens the door to take action
against the mother for any activity that would cause harm to the child.
This could include the mother's physical activity, the degree of hazard in
the work place or pre-existing medical conditions. It appears to create
constitutional legal rights for an unborn child and includes other
problems suggesting that it is unlikely to pass constitutional muster if
challenged.
In contrast, California, the state with perhaps the most experience
in attempting to treat substance abuse, has passed a narrowly tailored
statute giving physicians the option to report drug-dependent children
to state authorities. Contrarily, California creates a parental duty to pro-
vide food and medical care to an unborn child under its child support
statute.21 7 Thus, California's child support statute has sanctions regard-
ing neonatal support that do not exist in the child abuse and neglect
statute.
A Legacy of Frustration: Neglect Proceedings for Maternal Addiction.
Ohio 2 18 and New York2 19 courts made strenuous efforts to contain and
control seriously addicted mothers. A finding of neglect could be based
on actual impairment (NAS) or imminent danger of impairment. 22 0 In
1985, the New York Family Court in In re Danielle Smith,jumped over the
216. N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4C-I1 (West 1981).
217. This is a criminal penalty found in the California Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 270 (West 1988).
218. In Cox v. Court of C.P., Franklin County, 537 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio App. 1988), the
court focused upon a pregnant mother of four who abused cocaine and heroin and had
failed no less than 23 drug screenings during her pregnancy. The father was also an addict
and had been hospitalized recently for a drug overdose. The couple's four children were
under state care pending placement with other families. The juvenile court ordered the
mother to cease using illegal drugs that would endanger the fetus and further, that she
submit to a medical examination to determine the health of her baby. The mother failed
to do either, and the court filed a motion for contempt. The Ohio Court of Appeals found
that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the mother and, therefore, lacked jurisdic-
tion to compel her to take any action on behalf of her unborn child. Id. at 724-25.
219. New York has repeatedly found that maternal drug use constitutes neglect. In In
re Vanessa F, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sur. Ct. 1974), the court found that "[a] newborn baby
having withdrawal symptoms is prima facie a neglected baby under the Family Court Act,
Article 10, and custody of such a child can be withheld from the parents responsible until
after court hearings and other safeguards." Id. at 340. The state of New York is, like many
other states, notably short of treatment facilities for women, particularly pregnant women.
This case does not clearly address whether the mother and father were capable of caring
for the child, who was undergoing withdrawal from drug exposure. If the mother and
father were capable, then the court action was basically punishment for the mother's prior
drug use.
220. In another case where the mother was addicted to alcohol, barbiturates and co-
caine and refused to enroll in either alcohol or drug treatment program, neglect was found
after the child was born prematurely and suffered from mild withdrawal symptoms. In re
"Male" R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Fain. Ct. 1979), the court could find neglect either upon the
finding of actual impairment of physical condition or imminent danger of impairment. In
this case there was a finding of imminent danger but not actual impairment. Although the
child was certainly born with some impairments, the court focused on past conduct of drug
use and the refusal to accept treatment as evidence of the mother's present incapacity to
provide adequate care for the child.
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Fourteenth Amendment to find that an unborn child is a "person" enti-
tled to protection under the Family Court Act, Article 10.22, In In re
Sharon Fletcher, the Family Court rejected Smith and came in line with the
position advocated by the pediatric community for decades, which was
that prenatal drug abuse alone does not establish neglect.
222
The Fletcher case in New York22 3 parallels California's In re Steven
S. ,224 where the court found that a fetus is not a person under the Cali-
fornia Welfare and Institutions Code. This led the California Attorney
General to conclude that "[aicts or omissions by a pregnant woman or
others which adversely affect the well-being of a fetus do not constitute
child abuse .... 225 The frustration of the judges in these cases is al-
most palpable, and each case points inescapably to our legal system as
part of the problem of protecting children. The National Council ofJu-
venile Court Judges recently finished an impressive set of protocols ad-
dressing these issues and concluded, in part, that juvenile court was not
the proper forum for addressing these issues.
22 6
Such child neglect and child abuse law are the principle tools our
legal system uses to protect children. 2 27 Harm resulting to infants from
maternal drug abuse, poverty and hopelessness is not likely to be judged
child abuse, because child abuse standards usually hinge on a finding of
221. 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fain. Ct. 1985). The court found that the pregnant mother's
abuse of alcohol created an imminent threat of impairment of the child. This finding was
made with little evidence of actual impairment, only the "possibility that the child might
have fetal alcohol syndrome." Id. at 333; see also Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at
166. The Smith case well demonstrates the fearful potential for family-shattering state in-
tervention when there is no clear harm to the child.
222. 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fain. Ct. 1988). The court held that maternal prenatal drug
abuse alone cannot form a basis for a finding of neglect. Prenatal drug abuse alone does
not establish a mother's inability to parent any more than drug use after pregnancy estab-
lishes a parent as unfit to parent. The court concluded that the state statute did not intend
to regulate a pregnant woman's body or to control her diet, medication, exercise or smok-
ing habits on behalf of a fetus.
223. It is reported that New York City also no longer takes legal action against preg-
nant women for actions which could endanger their fetuses. Connally & Marshall, supra,
note 131, at 171.
224. 126 Cal. App.3d 23 (1981).
225. Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at 171 n.92 (quoting Attorney General, In-
formal Opinion, Child Abuse Reporting Law, Dec. 11, 1986).
226. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges noted:
In many cases involving substance abuse, social service agencies often unnecessa-
rily take custody of a baby shortly after birth while the baby is still in the hospital.
Judges are then asked to detain the baby based solely upon the results of a posi-
tive toxicology screen .... A positive toxicology screen and confirmatory test are
not sufficient basis for removal of a child.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OFJUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, DRAFT PROTOCOL FOR MAKING
REASONABLE EFFORTS IN DRUG-RELATED DEPENDENCY CASES 20 (Sept. 1991).
Testing only indicates one exposure to drugs but no evidence of drug dependency.
Dependency can be determined only by waiting and observing the child for signs of NAS
(neonatal abstinence syndrome). The risk of serious trauma and harm to the child and the
child's mother from over-reacting to a positive toxicology screen cannot be overstated.
The National Council notes that "U]uvenile and family court proceedings are not neces-
sary, and probably not desirable in most situations involving substance-exposed infants."
Id.
227. Sam S. Balisy, Note, MIaternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for
the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1987). This is one of the best early articles argu-
ing for the state to act in a preventive fashion in behalf of the child.
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some sort of willful mistreatment. While abuse focuses on a willful act,
neglect focuses on a failure to act. The first problem with this standard
is that there is no consensus as to the definition of what "act" means.
2 28
Whereas a physician might see neglect as malnutrition, dehydration,
frost-bite or chronic illness, a case worker in the home may look to ade-
quacy of food, furniture and safety. Teachers may report lack of cleanli-
ness, slurred speech, body odor and inadequate clothing, while lawyers
will attempt to demonstrate the cause and effect linkage between the act
and the harm complained of.
The second difficulty with neglect is that it demands proving that
something did not happen. Physicians are increasingly reluctant to tes-
tify that a parent's failure to do "x" resulted in neglect "y.", 2 2 9 For ex-
ample, a child clearly showing signs of malnutrition may reflect a failure
of our educational system more than a failure of the mother.
2 30
Similarly, when a teacher reports significant language and mathe-
matic deficits, is the mother to blame if she is a member of our rapidly
increasing population of illiterate parents? What responsibility does our
school system have for the mother's illiteracy and the resulting difficul-
ties faced by her child? 231 This highlights one of the central flaws inher-
228. For an excellent review of neglect from a medical, political and somewhat legal
perspective see Ray E. Heifer, The Neglect Of Our Children 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 923
(1990).
229. See id. at 932.
230. For example, one physician reported as follows, regarding a six-week old baby
that had lost weight since birth, an undeniable sign of poor nutrition:
Multiple visits to the clinic were made, and various laboratory tests done. The
baby was malnourished and the mother genuinely concerned. She insisted she
had been following all the directions given by the resident physician, particularly
those relating to feeding the infant. When the baby was fed in the clinic he ate
well and no evidence of serious illness, other than the malnutrition, was ascer-
tained. Finally, the child was placed in the hospital, and during a 3-day period the
infant began to gain a significant amount of weight. On the 5th day, I sat down
with the mother to explain the outcome, which she had already ascertained. Her
baby had done well in the hospital. On the one hand, the mother was happy,
conversely, she was upset. The latter placed a certain degree of guilt in her mind.
I asked the mother to show me exactly how she fed the baby, from the very begin-
ning (something I should have done days or weeks earlier). She demonstrated
how she mixed the formula, filled the bottle to the brim, placed the nipple on the
bottle, held the baby, and fed the baby-all done correctly. When the milk
reached the "6 mark" on the bottle, she stopped feeding. I asked her why she
stopped, because the baby had only taken 2 ounces. She indicated that the doctor
had told her to give her baby 6 ounces. When I realized that the milk level had
moved from 8 to 7 to 6, it was only then that I tumbled to the fact that the mother
had a serious cognitive problem, which was masked by her excellent social inter-
actional skills. When I pointed out she should feed the baby until the milk
reached the 2 mark, she said "If he wanted me to give him 2 ounces, why didn't
the doctor tell me?"
Id. at 927.
231. Hot water burns on children are another source of neglect. The temperature of
hot water from hot water heaters may vary from 120 to 170 degrees Fahrenheit. In con-
gregate housing, the tenants have no control over the temperature of the hot water. It has
been clearly demonstrated medically that a young child spending less than five seconds in
130 degree F water can receive third degree burns. Water out of the tap at 170 degrees F
could produce severe burns in a much shorter period of time. Id. at 929 (citing K. Feld-
man, ChildAbuse by Burning in THE BATrERED CHILD (C. Henry Kempe & Ray E. Helfer eds.,
1980)).
Should the parent be held responsible if the landlord maintains the water at a very high temperature
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ent in our child protection laws: while every party present is represented, every
responsible party is not present. Child protective services have no capacity to
act against landlords who fail to provide habitable premises, to act
against public health authorities who are unable to provide minimal nec-
essary daycare or to act against federal and state authorities who provide
food stamps and other supplements that are not sufficient to meet basic
nutritional needs. 2 32 While the medical community often sees neglect
as a problem involving the responsibility of many institutions, the legal
system, through child protective services, sanctions only the parents.
For more well-to-do parents, allegations of abuse and neglect are
increasingly used in acrimonious divorces, often resulting in harm to the
children that is much greater than they allegedly received. The differ-
ence in standards of proof, variances in investigation and the conflict
between different bodies of law in divorce court and "abuse/neglect"
court creates vastly more heat than light and often a significant dissipa-
tion of limited state resources.
23
Racial and Economic Bias in the Diagnosis of Abuse. In a carefully con-
trolled study, physicians and nurses were presented with medical histo-
ries for children with a variety of injuries. These histories were
consistent except for variations in race, socioeconomic status and the
degree of injury. The clinicians and case workers were asked to diag-
nose whether they felt this child's injury was an "abuse" or an "acci-
dent." The study results show that the diagnosis of abuse was
significantly more likely in families identified as the poor or minority.2 3 4
in order to reduce his overall heating costs? Are parents to be held fully responsible for risk of
hot water burns that they were not fully aware of? For a discussion of "[r]ights,
[r]esponsibility, and [p]revention" see Heifer, supra note 228 at 930-31.
232. See, for example, the president's decision in 1981 to classify ketchup and relish as
vegetable for the purpose of meeting minimum health standards for children's school
lunches. Condiment Capers, FORTUNE, June 25, 1984, at 125. The regulation was rescinded
in September 1981. Id. at 126.
233. As one physician recalled:
Not long ago I testified in a case of two children whose parents were both
professionals. They were in the process of getting a divorce, and a nasty custody
battle was unfolding. They accused each other from time to time of inappropriate
care of the children when they were under their respective supervision. The chil-
dren were seen in the pediatric clinic with certain manifestations, both physical
and psychological, that resulted from inappropriate care over a rather long pe-
riod. In compliance with the child abuse and neglect reporting law a report was
made to Protective Services. They, in turn, felt that the court should be involved
with the ultimate decision regarding the outcome. A petition was filed detailing
the problems. Because the divorce and custody hearings where the responsibility
of the circuit court, the case was heard in this court. On my arrival in court to
testify I found that the lawyers for the parents who handled the divorce were not
sufficiently comfortable with issues of neglect and had little experience in this
area. Consequently, each parent had two lawyers, one for the divorce and the
other for the neglect charges, the children had their lawyer, and the Department
of Social Services had their lawyer. As their testimony unfolded and the cross-
examination by all six lawyers occurred nothing short of chaos developed. Every-
one was upset and angry at everyone else. Those who were hurt the most were
the children. The legal system was completely paralyzed.
Heifer, supra note 228, at 933.
234. Richard O'Toole et al., Theories, Professional Knowledge, and Diagnosis of Child Abuse in
THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 349, 353 (David
Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
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The same bias towards the most abandoned is found in both physi-
cian reporting and physician diagnosis. To the insult of bias is added
the injury of the child abuse rescue mentality. The rescue mentality de-
voted to severely abused children sometimes spills over into the swift
and summary removal of babies who have been drug-exposed with no
other evidence of harm.23 5 On the other hand, some commentators be-
lieve that the threat of a dependency action after birth may encourage
the mother to seek prenatal care and treatment to address her drug and
alcohol abuse.
23 6
Although there are certain constitutional difficulties for findings of
neglect based on behavior during pregnancy, the practical difficulties
loom even larger. Imagine a state agency charged with protecting a fe-
tus pending delivery. How can this agency insure that that fetus is ade-
quately cared for without the cooperation of the mother? Further, if the
mother refuses to cooperate, how then would the agency protect the
fetus, particularly if the mother's experience of the state agency's inter-
vention creates additional stress and harm for the fetus? Either way, in
the event of an uncooperative mother, the state faces tremendous liabil-
ity problems not to mention the significant possibility of creating further
harm in its well-intentioned attempts to help.
The Model of Minnesota. The state with the most exhaustive statutory
provisions and best availability of treatment is Minnesota. 23 7 Minnesota
allows intervention by the state during pregnancy to prevent harmful
drug use 238 and defines child neglect to include the actual use of con-
trolled substance where a health care professional has reason to believe
a pregnant woman used to take a controlled substance during preg-
nancy. Every health care practitioner is required by law to file a neglect
report with the local welfare agency if he or she knows or has reason to
believe that a pregnant woman has used "a controlled substance for a
235. See Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131, at 175-76 n.105 (citing Reyes v. Superior
Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (1977)), which concerned a mother addicted to heroin who was
warned by public health nurses. Ms. Reyes continued to use heroin through the end of her
pregnancy and her twin boys were born addicted and subject to neonatal abstinence syn-
drome. Charges against Ms. Reyes were dismissed by the court on the grounds that the
statute was not designed to apply to either a fetus or the conduct of a pregnant woman.
Approximately nine years later, charges were brought against Pamela Ray Stewart for will-
fully failing to furnish proper medical care for her baby by ceasing her use of controlled
substances. Charges were dismissed on the grounds that the legislature did not intend the
law to be used as a mechanism to regulate the conduct of a pregnant woman.
236. See Connolly & Marshall, supra note 131.
237. Minnesota is also alone in the nation in having a reported surplus of treatment
beds. Authorities in the state represent that Minnesota has solved the indigent treatment
funding issue by having the treatment dollar follow the client to whichever treatment is
recommended. In other words, a pregnant mother could be placed in any treatment pro-
gram in the state. Under the state reimbursement policy, the state pays 85% of the cost
and the county of the woman's residence pays 15% of the cost. To date, Minnesota is the
only state with a statute that was passed to specifically protect fetuses from prenatal drug
exposure.
238. For a careful rationale for prenatal intervention under Minnesota and Illinois law,
see Kevin Drendel, Comment, Il'hen Self 4buse Becomes Child Abuse: The Need for Coercive Prena-
tal Government Action in Response to the Cocaine Baby Problem I I N. ILL. L. REv. 73 (1990).
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non-medical purpose during the pregnancy. '23 9
Physicians caring for pregnant women have a duty to test for drugs
if a woman's medical condition could possibly be due to use of con-
trolled substances. The results of such tests, whether positive or nega-
tive, must be reported to the agency.2 40 Also, any individual, although
he or she is not a health care professional, may report maternal drug
use. Neglect extends past the point of birth. The duty to report extends
to any toxicology tests performed on the fetus or the mother at birth,
the child's postnatal behavior (such as NAS) evidencing withdrawal
symptoms at birth and developmental delays during the first year of
life. 2 4 !
Under the statutory framework, multidisciplinary teams are sup-
posed to determine the least restrictive option for care for the mother
and her fetus. Expert testimony must present actual findings in behav-
ioral terms rather than clinical conclusions, and the findings must be
supported by specific witnessed events. There is a clear set of client
rights regarding visitation, communication, access to records, access to
advocates and access to care. Also, the statute requires after care plan-
ning between social service agencies and a treatment facility if the indi-
vidual mother is committed. Those committed are sent to licensed care
treatment facilities that imply that certain minimum standards have been
met. Child welfare agencies require referral to treatment and prenatal
care for the mother if appropriate, and civil commitment is required if
the mother fails to follow the treatment plan.
2 4 2
The primary shortcoming of the Minnesota statute is that it focuses
only on the harms of the historically abandoned. The greater harm of
alcohol and prescription drugs is not addressed. Secondly, the statute
deters a mother's use of health services, prenatal care and parental edu-
cation classes. Mothers will attempt to cease all drug use before going
to the hospital, even though this could endanger the fetus. The Minne-
sota statute may be subject to significant circumvention or non-coopera-
tion by the pediatric community. The single change that would most
impact the health of mother and child would be to take the Minnesota
services out of the context of dependency or juvenile court.
Minnesota, the state most endowed with treatment facilities, has
only sixty slots for women with children. According to Mr. Wayne
Raske, Alcoholism Specialist for the State of Minnesota, treatment
would be vastly more effective if reporting was not mandatory. The goal
should be to find and assist the troubled mother, not report her to
authorities.
243
In sum, our present legal model for child protection is relatively
239. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(1) (West Supp. 1992).
240. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5662(1) (West Supp. 1992).
241. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992).
242. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562(2) (West Supp. 1992).
243. Telephone Interview with Wayne Raske, Alcoholism Specialist, Chemical Depen-




well-equipped to deal with parents who willfully injure their children.
However, it is poorly equipped to prevent harm to the much larger pop-
ulation of children who are exposed to the abandonment (or neglect) of
poverty, malnutrition, inadequate medical care, parental educational
deficits, unemployment and the often resulting overuse of drugs. Thus,
what is needed is both a new standard and a new forum in which that
standard should be exercised. The present form of court is too adver-
sarial, too costly and too parochial. 2 44 One step in this direction can be
found in the Dependency Mediation Projects being tried in Los Ange-
les24 5 and Connecticut.
24 6
IV. ABANDONMENTS BY PROFESSIONALISM, MEDICINE AND LAw
Within the realm of the professional intellect, abandonment is
rarely intentional or malicious. Since it is historical, it appears benign.
It is maintained by intellectual neglect: the continuing avoidance of ex-
amining certain questions and assumptions. One such question is: How
does a country with the greatest number of doctors and lawyers per cap-
ita, and the most sophisticated justice and healthcare system, manage to
not address the fact that 20% of our families lack basic health care, legal
representation and personal safety? Regarding our assumptions, we
should ask, "What abandonment of compassion has occurred to create
an 'intellect' that does not perceive or a 'reason' that is not compelled to
address such a problem?"
The legal and physical apartheid in South Africa is sustained by an
emotional apartheid within many white Afrikaaners. A similar but more
subtle emotional apartheid suffuses our professions and their schools.
For example, looking to headings by which legal knowledge is organized
yields evidence of lingering bias. A search within LEGALTRAC by one
commentator under the topic of "sexual preference" contained a "see
also" to "sexual deviation," which, in turn led to "sexual perversion"
and "sexual masochism." ' 24 7 Within "civil rights" there is a heading for
"sex discrimination" and "race discrimination," but no heading combin-
ing the two to capture the common experience of many women of
color.2 48 The abandonment of women has been highlighted by feminist
scholars who convincingly contend that threads of patriarchal domi-
nance suffuse the fabric of law. 24 9 The abandonments of motherhood,
244. In that only the parental level of responsibility is considered, thus failing to pre-
vent the conditions that contributed to the neglect.
245. See Charlene Saunders et al., Mediation in the Los Angeles County Superior CourtJuvenile
Dependency Court: An Approach to Designing a Program That Meets the Interests and Concerns of All
Parties, 29 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 259 (1991).
246. See Margaret Shaw & W. Patrick Phear, Innovation in Dispute Resolution: Case Status
Conferences for Child Protection and Placement Proceedings in the State of Connecticut, 29 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 270 (1991).
247. Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, ll'iy Do Wl'e Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform,
Critical Librarianship, and The Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 213 n.42 (1989).
248. Id. at 219.
249. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculation on A lWomen 's Law'y-
eiing Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) and the more wide ranging work of CATH-
ARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
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race, economic circumstance and addiction have not been fully ad-
dressed. Another level of empathic abandonment is found in the re-
markable de-legitimation of emotion and intuition in professional
education. Using law school as an example, great emphasis is placed on
cultivating the capacity to consider horrid cases without any display of
emotion. Cultivating the capacity of analytic detachment is part of
learning how to "think like a lawyer." There is no curriculum for learn-
ing how to "feel like a lawyer" in the terms of increasing one's empathy
for and capacity to represent the abandoned. In many law school
classes, it is close to taboo to respond to a question with the words "I
feel .... -250 A class devoted to sharing one's inner hopes for and fears
about professional practice would be a cornerstone of all law school cur-
ricula if the goal was to help lawyers to work together to lessen injustice.
The ethic of intellectual solipsism that pervades law schools continues to
make such classes un-needed and unlikely. The sad result is that law
school demands an abandonment of empathic capacity.
2 5 '
Many law schools demand an abandonment of well-being. Whereas
3 to 9% of individuals in industrial nations suffer from depression (and
pre-law students fall within this normal range), depression among law
students quickly increases within six months of entry and throughout
law school. 25 2 Depression is joined by abnormally high levels of hostil-
ity, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, somatization and psychoti-
cism. 2 53 Compared to medical students, the psychopathology of law
students is greater on every measure except somatization and phobic
anxiety. 2 54 This constellation of psychological attitudes is not unlike
that found in battered women.2 5 5 The abandonment felt by many stu-
dents from their teachers is stunning. One survey of law students found
84% feeling that no professor was taking a special interest in their aca-
demic progress, 71% had no professor they could turn to for advice on
personal matters and 72% felt that no professor took a personal interest
250. As Professor Meltsner notes:
While only an extreme anti-intellectual would disregard the importance of objec-
tive thought, rational deduction and empirical proof to the practice of law, a
method of training lawyers which ignores the intuitive, the emotive, and the per-
sonal belongs not to the history of science but to the history of pseudoscience.
Michael Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33J. LEGAL EDuC. 624, 633 (1983). The concept of
"feminist reason" also touches on this issue. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It
and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47 (1988). Professor Minow wisely notes that feminist
reason does not cover the needs of all women but is a start in a healing direction.
251. The baseless arrogance of some (but not all) law professors results in needless
savaging of first year students. There are few forums for confronting the professor with
the harm of his or her arrogance or for defending a fellow classmate battered by needlessly
derisive questioning.
252. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological
Distress Among Lau? Students and Lawyers 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 247.
253. Id. at 247.
254. Id.
255. The emotional distance found in many battered women may correlate with their
high frequency of battering their children. Law students assuming the parental role of
professor who were harmed as students would be more likely to pass on the harm to their
students and be less likely to be aware of the emotional abuse they were inflicting.
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in helping them get a job after law school. 2 56 A similar frequency of
paternal abandonment is found among poor addicted mothers. Stu-
dent-faculty relations in law school are worse than in any other graduate
school. 2 5 7 Law school workloads and environment needlessly impair
the student's capacity to create and maintain family or other primary
relationships. 2 58 As one commentator noted:
For years professional education was America's pride and
joy.... That era is now over. Today even top-ranked schools
face increasing criticism. . . . In large measure they have
brought it on themselves. Moreover, the culprits are members
of their faculties, who have turned the schools into vehicles for
their personal pursuits .... [T]he schools care surprisingly lit-
tle about the needs of their own students, of those of the larger
society our professions supposedly serve.
259
The high incidence of depression in law school continues into legal
practice and is joined by alcohol abuse.2 60 It is difficult to expect law-
yers to empathize with alcohol addiction among the poor if they cannot
address it among their peers. The needless stress of law school contin-
ues into law practice with staggering demands for billable hours by
many large firms. This leaves little time or opportunity to address the
legigenic harms of law and legal practice.
Even if time were available, the narrow view of "case and contro-
versy" under Article III of the constitution limits access to the court.
26 '
Physicians wishing to intervene as a party26 2 in a suit by addicted
mothers for adequate drug treatment programs would have difficulty es-
tablishing their "significantly protectable interest."' 26 3 Doctors suing on
behalf of their impoverished clients for decent housing and healthcare
would likely fail to meet the Article III standard under Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee to Stop the War, which held that " 'abstract injury is not
enough.' "264 The doctrine of standing creates a further hurdle for the
256. Benjamin et al., supra note 252, at 249.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 244.
259. Id. at 250 (citing Andrew Hacker, The Shame of Professional Schools 32J. LEGAL EDUC.
278, 278 (1982)).
260. A two state survey found 33% of practicing lawyers suffering from clinical depres-
sion, alcoholism or cocaine abuse. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depres-
sion, AlcoholAbuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawvers, 13 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY
233, 242 (1990). A 1988 ABA survey found that 27% of the professional discipline cases
involved alcohol abuse. Id. at 243.
261. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
262. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
263. See e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978).
264. 418 U.S. 208, 219 (1974) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974).
Schlesinger concerned a challenge by citizen taxpayers to members of Congress who were
also members of the Reserves. Plaintiffs contended this violated the incompatibility clause
of the constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. Their claim was ruled nonjusticiable
because, in part, they lacked a concrete injury. Doctors suing for the poor could be dis-
qualified for lacking a concrete injury.
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altruistic professional.2 65
Through the lens of history, many common medical and legal prac-
tices of the eighteenth and nineteenth century appear, at best, mis-
guided and, at worst, barbaric. Our present day efforts regarding
maternal drug abuse may, in time, share a similar fate. Every new drug
and medical technique, like every new law and legal doctrine, creates
unintended side effects, impairing society's capacity to heal itself. Simi-
larly, making the practice of law and medicine a profession, while intended
to protect the public, had the "side effect" of severely limiting public
access to medical and legal knowledge and practice. Much as the early
Catholic church interposed the clergy between laity and their access to
God, faith in professionalism interposed doctors and lawyers between
lay people and their access to health and justice. Each profession must
be aware of the harms created by its professionalism. Medicine has
progressed more in this regard than law. 2 6 6 In 1924, the term iatrogenic
(physician created) was coined to describe the harms caused by the doc-
tor, not the disease. 2 67 latrogenic medicine is the study of such harms
and the effort to limit them. 26 8 As there is no legal equivalent to ia-
trogenic, "legigenic" will be coined 2 69 to describe the harms created by
lawyers and our legal system. Here, the focus is upon harms to the
"abandoned," specifically, the drug exposed child and his or her
mother.
Professional abandonment occurs on three levels. Primary aban-
donment occurs when the problem is not recognized at all. Secondary
abandonment occurs when the problem is recognized and placed
outside of one's professional responsibility. Tertiary abandonment oc-
curs when responsibility is accepted but adequate resources are not pro-
vided to remedy it. To explore the above, three questions will be
addressed: How does our concept of professionalism abandon? How
265. To have standing to sue one must allege actual injury, caused by the defendant
and redressable by court. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). W1Varth held against "generalized grievance[s]" and in favor of
"some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action .... 422
U.S. at 499 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
266. Part of the Hippocratic Oath is "never do harm to anyone." Lawyers, in contrast,
are pledged to not advance any cause not reasonably founded in law and fact. This is a
much looser standard, which tolerates an immense amount of nuisance or questionable
litigation. The practice of such litigation is a bit like the practice of medicine in the eight-
eenth century where leeches were applied to bleed the client of his infirmity. Although the
client did not always fare well, the leeches usually did.
267. "Caused by medical treatment: said esp. of symptoms, ailments or disorders
caused by drugs or surgery." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 595 (1988).
268. latrogenic injury is part of the larger category of adverse events that includes all
injuries caused by medical intervention rather than disease. Adverse events include injury
from substandard hospital conditions, failure to medicate etc. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan
et al., Hospital Characteristics Associated with Adverse Events and Substandard Care, 265 JAMA
3265 (1991).
269. This term is rooted in the Latin, lex, legis, a noun for "law" and the adverb legitime,
meaning "lawfully." It is preferred over the Latin, iurisconsul/us, for "lawyer" because the




does the profession of medicine abandon? How does the profession of
law abandon?
A. Professional Abandonment
Professions are normally distinguished from other jobs by having a
duty to provide care regardless of compensation. The International
Code of the World Medical Organization declares, "a doctor must prac-
tice his [sic] profession uninfluenced by motives of profit." The AMA's
Principles of Medical Ethics assert that "the principle objective of the
medical profession is to render service to humanity" and that "a physi-
cian should limit the source of his [sic] professional income to medical
services actually rendered by him [sic] or under his [sic] supervision, to
his [sic] patients."'2 70 The desire for "profit" within "profession" is in-
creasingly criticized 2 7 1 as a cause for the decline of professionalism.
2 72
However, the linguistic reality is that both our concepts of "profit" and
"profession" have abandoned much of their original meaning.2 73
270. Arnold S. Relman, What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1992, at 99.
271. Id. Dr. Relman, a former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, has force-
fully argued that market values and the force of technology are ruining medicine and
harming society.
272. The sentiment is not recent, as the oath of Hippocrates declares that physicians
should serve only "for the benefit of the sick." In the twelfth century the physician Moses
Maimonides reportedly created a prayer asking God to prevent the "thirst for profit" or
"ambition for renown" from interfering with medical practice. Id. at 99.
The devotion of Dr. Maimonides was likely influenced by the Knights Hospitallers, a
monastic order founded by Gerard in 1099. Gerard's revelation was to expand the con-
cept of hospice from caring for travellers to healing the sick regardless of their wealth and
giving dignity to the death of the mortally ill. The result was a "hospital" devoted to
providing rest for the weary, healing for the ill and opening to all who served and were
served. For the professionals who flocked to this order, one goal was to feel that each
knock on the door of the hospital was also a knock on the "inner door" of their hearts.
The "knights" attempted to heal both the illness of the body and the illnesses created by
the values of the marketplace. As the equivalent of today's best medical professionals,
they served the abandoned before all others. See, e.g. Albert R. Jonsen, Our Lords, the Sick,
Address at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the American Osler Society (Apr. 12, 1986)
(citing EDGAR HUME, THE MEDICAL WORK OF THE KNIGHTS HOSPITALLERS OF SAINTJOHN OF
JERUSALEM (1940)). Today, their spirit no longer flows in the mainstream of medicine.
Instead it flows through Mother Teresa, Physicians Without Borders, Physicians for Social
Responsibility and a number of others.
273. The Latin term profiteor means the act of professing to art, science or law as well as
making a public promise, pledge or declaration. CASSELL'S LATIN ENGLISH DICTIONARY
180 (1987). This definition is very similar to the definition of "profess" found in WEB-
STER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 939. The Ancient Greek term, prophetes meant
"speaks for" and was a root of our modern concept of"prophecy." Original prophecy was
not just "foretelling" by divine inspiration. It was also a very lawyerly "forthtelling" where
the Word or Law was applied to a specific circumstance. EERDMANS BIBLE DICTIONARY
851, 853 (1987). Forthtelling involved a careful projection into the future of a particular
application of the scriptural law. As law became secular, appellate law assumed the func-
tion of secular "forthtelling."
Our modem concepts of "profit" "prophet" and "profession" may be rooted in the
concept of service to a higher cause. As one's word was one's bond (prophets and profes-
sionals vow not to misspeak fact or law) one's promise was one's profit. From this perspec-
tive, profit and profession have suffered a divorce from the concept of a higher ethical
duty. As profit has deflated into mere "material gain," professionalism has declined into
entrepreneurialism. Thus, as professions lose their relation with their higher calling, it
becomes easier to sidestep their duty to the poor they vow to serve.
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It is unfair to lay the problems of the drug-exposed child solely at
the door of law or medicine. Both professions have a small percentage
of practitioners working very hard for the poor for scant wages, and a
larger percentage doing occasional work for no pay. The knotty
problems of maternal drug use also involve failures by the professions of
politics, economics, social work, public administration, business and the
clergy. No single profession can be held to blame for our shameful lack
of universal healthcare, appropriate drug treatment for mothers, afford-
able housing for the poor, adequate schooling and realistic sex education
and family planning. 2 74 Precious resources that should be devoted to
treatment are diverted to investigation, sanction and punishment. The
act of turning the skills families need into esoteric "professional"
fiefdoms exacerbates the problem. Each profession defines and handles
the family differently. Professionals are united in their inscrutability and
divided in their loyalty. Returning to the metaphor of drugs,
"polydrug" abusers are the most difficult to diagnose and treat because
of the exceedingly complex interactive effect of the drugs. Similarly,
problems involving the participation of more than one profession
("polyprofessional") are most difficult to diagnose and treat. This is not
because the needs of poor families have changed. Their needs for ade-
quate food, shelter and social support have been with us for many mil-
lennia. What has not been with us until recently is the concept of a
profession that places its maintenance and intellectual autonomy ahead
of the maintenance of the human family.
The Duality of Denial. Another way to address the polyprofessional
problem is to address how each profession ignores pressing social
problems. Again, the metaphor of drugs is apt.
Drug addiction treatment literature is rife with descriptions of al-
coholics and others who deny that the drug is the problem. In the pro-
fessional community, there is the denial that one's profession is part of
the problem and the denial that one's profession is responsible for acting
on the problem. A few points of denial follow.
First, there is a denial that our concepts of health and justice con-
tribute to the abandonment of our children. 2 75 Second, there is a denial
that our unreasoned bias towards (or perhaps fear of) the addicted, the
poor, minorities and gays allows us to ignore our continuing harm to
their families. Third, there is a denial that our War on Drugs is waged
only on controlled substances, ignoring the vast market forces promot-
ing the greater harm of cigarettes, alcohol and prescription drugs and
274. However, the AMA has yet to endorse a universal comprehensive healthcare pro-
gram and the ABA and the insurance industry have yet to endorse a universal legal care
program.
275. For example, the rising tide of reluctance within the pediatric community to re-
port impaired mothers because of lack of certainty that the outcome for the child will be
positive. A recent National Incidence Study show that physicians reported only two-thirds
of the cases for which they suspect maltreatment. Howard Dubowitz, Pediatrician s Role in
Preventing Child Maltreatment, 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 989 (1990). For the family in
need, CPS has become more a source of stigma than a source of service. Id. at 991.
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failing to provide comprehensive prenatal care, daycare, health care and
support for struggling families. Fourth, there is a denial that our social,
political and economic policies since the 1980s increasingly harm many
of our children. Less than 1% of the funds spent on the War on Drugs
is devoted to treatment of mothers. 2 76 Funding for the War on
Drugs 27 7 has taken precious funds away from treatment programs and
other programs designed to reintegrate the addicted mother back into
society. The first casualties of the War on Drugs are the abandoned.
Since this "war" excludes the most damaging drug, alcohol,2 78 and fails
to provide adequate and affordable treatment, it actually functions as a
war on the abandoned.2 79 While the United States is the only country
claiming the right to invade other countries to catch drug traffickers, it is
the largest consumer of cocaine, a major supplier of chemicals to manu-
facture cocaine and weapons to arm the cartels. The greatest profit
from cocaine is made in the United States, not by cartels abroad.2 80 Our
historic anti-drug policy is fueled by the fantasy that the threat comes
276. The Council ofJuvenile and Family Court Judges notes, "'[the paucity of effective
services for women and children still constitutes a national emergency." NATIONAL COUN-
CIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 226, at 38.
277. After spending $25 billion on drug interdiction and drug related incarceration in
this "war" there has been no significant reduction in drug availability, drug cost, drug use
or the healthcare costs related to drug use. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOL AND DRUG
DEPENDENCE, THE WAR ON DRUGS: FALIURE AND FANTASY: WHAT HAS THE $35 BILLION
INVESTMENT BOUGHT?, 2, 3, 4 (March 1992) [hereinafter NCADD]. While our "war" has
reduced casual drug use, it has failed to reduce addiction or drug related crime. Id. at 1.
We have doubled our prison population since 1980 (an increase of one million which are
mostly drug related). An estimated 75% of those incarcerated, on probation or parole
need comprehensive treatment and aftercare yet such services are available to only 1% of
federal inmates, 10% of jail inmates and 20% of state inmates. Id. at 2. Today, up to 3
million people need, but cannot get, assistance for drug problems. The failure to provide
care creates immense costs. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
estimates that the social costs of alcohol and drug abuse were $140 billion for 1985. Id. at
I (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL
AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESSES: 1985 27 (1990)).
278. While over 100,000 die from alcohol abuse per year (liver cirrhosis, alcohol
poisoning, and other alcohol injuries) NCADD, supra note 277, at 4., the total number of
deaths from drug abuse in 1988 and 1989 was 14,016. CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
THE DEFENSE MONITOR, Vol XXI, No. 1, at 5 (1992).
279. We are waging a war, by and large, only on those we have abandoned: the politi-
cally poor and powerless here and abroad. Clausewitz defines "war" as the total commit-
ment of a nation. CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 278, at 2. Our "war"
targets selectively without the United States as it does within. The Medellin Cartel of
Columbia was allowed to use "our" Contra supply channels to smuggle cocaine into the
United States. Id. at 3. The United States support of Afghan guerrillas in 1979 also sup-
ported opium growers that resulted in a "flood of heroin" to this country. Id. at 2. Nor-
mally, using the military is the last resort. Now it is the first. In 1981, our Posse
Commitatus Act of 1878 (which precluded the use of military for domestic law enforce-
ment without specific consent of Congress) was amended to allow military support of anti-
drug efforts. Id. at 3. This led to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which allowed direct
military aid to the precise foreign police that have been terrorizing Central and South
American democracy movements. The 1988 act waived the 1974 ban on such aid. Thus,
our military aid is often channelled away from drugs and towards those anti-democratic
militias not approved by our government. Taking Columbia as an example, only 16% of
the aid was channelled to the National Police yet they were responsible for over 80% of all
drug seizures. The rest of our "anti-drug" aid was used by the Army for its own ends. Id.
at 7.
280. Id. at 2, 3.
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from "foreign" producers, 28 ' which leads us to spending billions to re-
duce the drug supply and doing little to reduce demand. The policy of the
United Nations International Narcotics Control Board is precisely oppo-
site of ours:
A critical and intractable component of the drug problem is the
reduction of illicit demand. Unless progress toward this end
can be made, sustained successes in other dimensions of the
drug equation can only be temporary since otherwise one
source of supply or one particular drug will inevitably be
promptly substituted for another. Accordingly, the Board reit-
erates that Governments should redouble their efforts to en-
able accelerated progress to be made in reducing drug
abuse.
28 2
Fifth is the denial that our vast investment in institutionalized sys-
tems of law and health care has eroded the cohesion of our communi-
ties, our families, and our resulting capacity to heal ourselves. The sixth
denial is the denial of the greatest rate of child poverty on statistical
record in the United States. In 1974, 14.4% of children were born in
poverty. That figure has now shot up to 20%. In contrast, 25% of our
elderly were in poverty in 1970 and 12.6% in 1985. Thus, the poverty
rate for our elderly has decreased approximately 50%, while the poverty
rate of our children has increased approximately 40%.283 For total gov-
ernment spending on the elderly relative to spending on children, the
ratio remained approximately three-to-one in favor of the elderly from
1960 through 1979.284 After 1975, AFDC benefits available to children
were reduced along with medicaid benefits. By 1988, the total government
expenditure ratio between our elderly and our children was ten-to-one in favor of the
elderly. 28 5 While benefits to the elderly have remained relatively con-
stant, benefits to children have slid precipitously, creating the greatest
harm to those most in need.
The final denial is a denial of a 300% increase in the number of
female heads-of-household between 1959 and 1985.286 The literature
contains much about the "feminization of poverty." While this argu-
ment is certainly warranted, it is a misconception to conclude that all
children are in poverty because of abandonment by fathers. Over 7075 of
the increase in the number of poor children in poverty occurred in families where the
father was present.2 8 7 While poverty certainly plagues single mothers, it
281. In his recent testimony before Congress, Professor Donald Mabry of Mississippi
State University stated: "For almost a century American antidrug policy has blamed for-
eigners for the American drug disease, thus preserving the myth that Americans are natu-
rally good but corrupted by evil foreigners." Id. at 2.
282. Id. at 7 (quoting REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR
1991, UNITED NATIONS (1991)).
283. Paul H. Wise & Alan Meyers, Poverty and Child Health 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM.
1169 (1988).
284. Id. at 1171.
285. Id.; see also Samuel H. Preston, Children and the Elderly: Divergent Paths for America's
Dependents, 21 DEMOGRAPHY 435, 436-37 (1984).




extends to many two parent families. Approximately 25% of the fami-
lies with married parents would be poor if they depended on their fa-
ther's income alone. Two parents working minimum wage jobs are
frequently unable to meet legitimate health care and other needs of
their children.
Doctors vs. Lawyers: The Malpractice Debacle. Some members of the
medical community have long argued that frivolous "the sky's the limit"
insurance costs and medical malpractice lawsuits have forced the in-
crease in medical costs. According to Jury Verdict Research, the median
malpractice award has decreased 13% since 1985.288 Since 1986, health-
care costs have increased by 65%. Less than 1% of the current health-
care costs of $817 billion are due to malpractice costs. Families USA, a
Washington, D.C. group, found that the increase in malpractice premi-
ums accounted for only .1% of the increase in healthcare costs.
28 9
While the insurance industry is certainly to blame for unreasonable pre-
mium increases in the past, much of the problem now centers on the
increasingly troubled relations between doctors, patients and lawyers.
Lawyers step in when the physician-patient relationship fails, and failure
is more likely when general distrust of doctors increases. 2 90 In To-
morrow's Doctors: the Path to Successful Practice in the 1990s, Dr. Benjamin
Natelson suggests that the problem of malpractice is a medical not a legal
problem. He relates one case concerning a forty-year-old female dia-
betic who complained of leg pain. Her internist endocrinologist (spe-
cializing in diabetes) referred her to an orthopedist to no avail. As her
pain increased, her internist sent her again to the orthopedist and then
to a neurologist. Her pain increased and she lost partial use of her leg.
Despite X-rays and bevies of tests, the stress fracture in her leg was not
discovered. Natelson concluded, "[in hindsight, .... the problem was a
simple one. Each doctor was focusing on the area in which he was an
expert. . . . Everyone was wearing the superspecialist's blinders.
' '29i
Natelson feels this case is a "major indictment of our methods of teach-
ing medicine" and warned new doctors:
You must take off the blinders that the medical school has put
on; more importantly, you must analyze the patient's problem
in the context of the patient as a whole. Had this been the case,
288. Colman McCarthy, Bungling Doctors Shouldn't Blame Lawyers, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb.
14, 1992, at 6.
289. Id. Some malpractice insurance companies continue to charge high premiums
then return part of them to subscribers as "dividends" and "credits." For example, physi-
cians' insurance, covering 60% (4300) of the private physicians in the state of Washington,
has had no increase in malpractice premiums since 1988, and voted to return $1 million as
dividends and $4 million as Loss Experience Credits to their policy holders. The insurer
reports returns to subscribers of $14 million since 1989. WASH. ST. MED. Ass'N REP., Dec.
1991, at 7.
290. The distrust of doctors stems not just from their individual practice. It also stems
from the failures, frustrations and skyrocketing expense of healthcare. Lawyers are simi-
larly blamed for the failings of the legal system. The writer takes no position regarding
whether lawyers or doctors are "at fault" for medical malpractice litigation. However,
lawyers and doctors are at fault for the increasing tension and distrust between the two
professions. As each profession demeans the other, the client is the first to suffer.
291. McCarthy, supra note 288.
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and if this woman had not been viewed as someone with a sick
'leg,' 'nerve' or 'pancreas,' perhaps no malpractice 2 92 would
ever have transpired.
29 3
Similar problems occur in law, even though specialization is not as
well developed. Specialization usually pays better and requires less
work to stay current with the literature. However, poor mothers and
families need general practice doctors and lawyers to address the broad
range of their needs. Unfortunately, the general practitioner is an in-
creasingly endangered species in both professions. From the perspec-
tive of the fetus at risk, the net result of specialization is a loss of
knowledge and service. We must accept a simple gestalt: The whole of
the problem is greater than the sum of the specialists.
A Double Standard for Professionals. Substance abusing doctors and
lawyers who have neglected their clients have more procedural safe-
guards and rehabilitation treatment opportunities to avoid losing their
right to practice than substance abusing parents have to avoid losing
their right to parent. Although dependency statutes in all states have
broad declarations of concern for the well-being of children, practically
speaking, these concerns are not adequately supported. Defense coun-
sel for dependency hearings have staggering case loads, scant staff sup-
port and an almost punitive level of compensation. States lack the funds
to provide comprehensive treatment or care for addicted women, so the
state often finds itself intervening on behalf of the child against a parent,
and demanding significant change by that parent while being unable to
provide significant resources to effect that change.
A mother or father who has lost a child to foster care frequently
cannot afford the legal cost of fighting for the child's return. In most
states, the state provides counsel for the child's removal, but not for his
or her return. Return of the child from long-term foster care is the rare
exception. In contrast, the return of the impaired2 94 doctor and lawyer
to practice is the norm, not the exception. 29 5 The clearest example of
292. The failure of the medical and legal community to self-police its ranks is a major
contribution to malpractice. One ABA study of New York and California found 50 - 70%
of disciplinary cases involved alcohol abuse. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., Comprehensive
Lawyer Assistance Programs: justification and Model, L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 9 (forthcoming 1992)
(citing STANDING COMMITrEE ON BAR ACTIVrIES AND SERVICES, ABA MAP PROGRAM: AL-
COHOL AND DRUG ABUSE PROGRAMS FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, Tab I Introduction/ Over-
view, 1 (1980)). Alcoholism amongst attorneys is twice the norm of adults in the United
States. Benjamin et al., supra at 3 (citing NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR ALCOHOL AND
DRUG INFORMATION, ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE AFFECTS THE LIVES OF MILLIONS OF
AMERICANS, THE FACT IS . . . (Oct. 1988)). Substance abuse amongst doctors is more
difficult to detect because doctors have immense access to controlled substances.
293. McCarthy, supra note 288 (quoting BENJAMIN NATELSON, TOMORROW'S DOCTORS:
THE PATH TO SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE IN THE 1990s).
294. When professional persons are hooked on drugs or alcohol, they are rarely called
"addicts." They are "impaired professionals" and are sheltered within a much larger
group of professionals whose impairment results from disease, age or injury. Mothers of
drug exposed infants are not afforded this comfort. By the same mechanism which the
professionals are protected, the abandoned are shamed.
295. Benjamin et al., supra note 292; EmilJ. Menk et al., Success of Reent, into .4Anesthesiol-
ogy Training Programs by Residents lith a History of Substance Abuse, 263 JAMA 3060 (1990).
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this is in the field of anesthesiology, where the doctor has a constant
access to drugs. Until 1980, a history of drug abuse precluded entry
into an anesthesiology specialty.2 96 In 1983, the American Society of
Anesthesiologists' Committee on Occupational Health of Operating
Room Personnel concluded that addicted doctors should be "en-
couraged and supported" to return to anesthesiology after successful
treatment, followup and receipt of a positive prognosis for long-term
recovery. 29 7 This laudable position was taken in the face of a relapse
rate of over 60% by opiate-abusing anesthesiologists.2 9 8 In contrast, a
comprehensive community based program for "impaired" (addicted)
mothers reports that 80% of the babies are born drug free.2 99 Unlike
professional drug rehab programs for professionals, future funding for
the poor mothers' programs is uncertain at best.
That some pregnant mothers addicted to opiates, cocaine or other
substances return to these drugs after a month or two of in-patient treat-
ment is often used to rationalize the judgment that these mothers "do
not care" for their children and that they are "hopelessly" addicted. A
review of lawyer and physician abuse of alcohol indicates that these pro-
fessions require far more medical attention before they successfully con-
trolled their addiction to alcohol, a substance that is far less addictive
than cocaine.30 0 In one study physicians averaged 4.7 months of in-pa-
tient alcohol and drug related care before achieving sobriety. Perhaps
national policymakers should be more patient with addicted single
296. Menk et al., supra note 295, at 3060.
297. Id. at 3060.
298. Id. at 3061.
299. Interview with Dr. Suzanne Dixon, Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Cal-
ifornia at San Diego (May, 1992), regarding the results after one year of a pilot program in
San Diego, California.
300. According to Dr. LeClair Bissel, in his pioneering study, "[a]lcoholism is the most
common, serious illness likely to affect a professional in the first fifteen years after com-
pleting graduate education." LECLAIR BISSEL & PAUL W. HABERMAN, ALCOHOLISM IN THE
PROFESSIONS vii (1984).
Bissel and Haberman studied 407 professionals who admitted being alcoholics and
who had been abstinent for at least a year such that their recollection and their prior alco-
hol history was more clear. The group consisted of 97 physicians, 55 attorneys, 100
nurses, 49 dentists, 56 college women and 50 social workers. They were extensively inter-
viewed, and 97% were interviewed four years later. Most were in their late 40s, and 20%
were Phi Beta Kappa and honor students and 60% graduated in the top third of their class.
Most drank regularly from their late teens and became drunk regularly by age 26. The
lawyers and doctors admitted that alcohol interfered with their lives and their practices at
least four years following their graduation. Nevertheless, it took them approximately ten
more years to definitively act on their alcoholism.
Forty percent of the lawyers and doctors received extensive psychiatric treatment
before achieving sobriety. Sixty-eight percent of the men and 58% of the women were
institutionalized at least once for alcoholism. Physicians were admitted for in-patient
treatment for drug and alcohol care an average of 6.3 times and spent an average of 4.7
months in hospital treatment for their drug problems. Id. at 72. The sample of 407 professionals
reported over 1,500 in-patient hospital admissions before achieving sobriety.
Twelve percent of the doctors and 17% of the nurses reported addiction to hard nar-
cotics procured through pharmaceutical sources. Twenty-seven percent of the male attor-
neys were addicted to other drugs and 43% of the male physicians were addicted to other
drugs. Eighty-four percent of that population used soft narcotics or "mood altering
drugs," and 97% of the population reported using alcohol and mood altering drugs.
Thirty-five percent of the sample had at least one alcoholic parent and approximately 30%
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mothers who often have diminished IQs, scant job experience, limited
education, limited literacy and who suffer from a history of domestic vio-
lence and sexual abuse.
B. Medical Abandonment: Iatrogenic Harm
Primary medical abandonment is medical ignorance. For example,
it was medical doctrine until the 1940s that Blacks did not suffer heart
attacks. 30 ' This misconception has been remedied for males but not for
females. "Primary care professionals don't think women get heart dis-
ease," states Joanne Howes of the Society for the Advancement of Wo-
men's Health Research. 30 2 Medical ignorance is acute regarding the
impact of drugs on women in general and on pregnant women and fe-
tuses in particular. Major heart disease studies, such as the United
States Physicians Study that examined the effects of an aspirin a day, did
not include women. Government mandated Phase I clinical trials of new
drugs rarely include women of childbearing years.30 3 Thus, in the United
States, drugs are approved for public use without testing their effects on pregnant
mothers and their fetuses. Doctors prescribing new drugs do so on a prayer.
"Women have more fatal drug reactions than do men, and they seem to
be greatest during the reproductive years," states Dr. Susan J. Blumen-
thal, chief of the behavioral medicine program of the National Institute
of Mental Health.3 0 4 Here, abandonment takes the form of gender es-
reported having an alcoholic sibling. Twelve percent reported having a child who is alco-
holic.
Ninety-one percent of the sample reported loss of control and professional judgment
while under the influence of alcohol. Sixty-two percent drank during work hours. Eighty-
eight percent reported experiencing blackouts, which were defined as periods where they
made legal or medical decisions and had no recollection of their actions. Eighty-six per-
cent of the sample reported making errors in professional judgment. Thirty-nine percent
had auditory hallucinations, and 33% had visual hallucinations while on the job Id at 75.
Given this degree of impairment over an average of a decade, it is interesting to note that
only 23% of the doctors and only 33% of the lawyers were ever warned about their drink-
ing by either their employer or their professional society. Only seven percent of the doc-
tors and none of the lawyers lost their license to practice. Id. at 76.
On re-interview four years later, 80% reported drinking again on one or more occa-
sions and 48% of the men and 50% of the women reported using drugs other than alco-
hol. While this study does not document the incidence of alcohol abuse amongst the
professions, it starkly illustrates the tremendous difficulty a sample of our professional
peers have in dealing with drug problems.
Doctors and lawyers are on the front lines of the war on drugs. They are the best
educated individuals in our society regarding the dangers of addiction and the many pun-
ishments that can result from drug and alcohol abuse. Many of them reported driving
drunk and being pulled over but not being arrested because of their status as physicians,
lawyers and judges. Id. at 69. Only 12% of the sample lost their license. See also Thomas
J. Crowley, Doctors Drug Abuse Reduced During Contingency Contracting Treatment, 6 ALCOHOL &
DRUG REs. 299 (1985-86); Michael A. Bloom & Carol L. Wallinger, Lawyers and Alcoholism:
It is Time for a New Approach, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 1409 (1988).
301. Marguerite Holloway & Phillip Yam, Reflecting Tiferences: Health Care Begins to Ad-
dress the Needs of Women and Minorities, 226 Sci. AM., March 1992, at 13-16.
302. Id. at 13.
303. Id. at 13. Part of the rationale is the untested presumption that effects on mostly
white males will generalize to women. Another concern is for liability if the drug harms a
fetus. Thus, the drugs are tested unknowingly by women and fetuses. The situation is
analogous to breast implants.
304. Id. at 13. Drug companies may use the question of fetal damage to avoid the cost
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sentialism. 30 5 A similar abandonment led to the public release of
thalidomide in the 1960s.
One study found that hospitals with more than 80% minority pa-
tients had the highest rate of iatrogenic injury. 306 Although this harm is
immense, it is insignificant compared to the harm suffered by those un-
able to (or too fearful to) secure heath care. 30 7 Many public hospitals
and emergency rooms are no longer able to provide the safety net for
the uninsured or underinsured mother. Waits of over six hours for peo-
ple in need of immediate medical attention are common.30 8 At one ma-
jor California hospital, patients waited an average of 6.4 hours before
leaving. Fifty three percent left because they were too sick to continue
waiting.30 9 Any mother with other children could not likely wait six
hours for care due to day care or job demands. Any drug-addicted preg-
nant mother would likely get too sick to sit for six hours to check on the
health of her fetus. The gridlock of our public highways now extends to
of testing drugs on women of child bearing age, but Dr. Florence Haseltine, physician and
director of the center for population research at the National institutes of Health notes,
"What's wrong with giving an abortion to a woman who gets pregnant during treatment?"
Id. at 16. Apparently, the expense of such clinical trials is too great, greater than the risk
of harming thousands in the public. Proving a new drug to be harmful in the general
population is much more difficult than in clinical trials.
305. "Gender essentialism" refers to the assumption that the masculine body is repre-
sentative ofall bodies for the purpose of testing drugs. Gender essentialism also occurs in
medical diagnosis. For example, thousands of women died from AIDS without being diag-
nosed as having it. These women were diagnosed as having acute PIDS (pelvic inflam-
matory disease) and other maladies. Whereas a diagnosis for males with AIDS was well
formulated by 1984, the symptoms for females were not ascertained until 1989. The harm
of this delay is greater for women (and their children) since according to Dr. Blumenthal,
"AIDS appears to have a more virulent course in women; they die sooner after being diag-
nosed." Id. at 16.
Another example is breast cancer, which causes one of nine female deaths each year.
Black women have a poorer survival rate than whites. Despite vast investment in and pro-
gress towards curing other cancers and heart disease, a recent GAO report found that
since 1971 "there has been no progress in preventing the [breast cancer] disease." Id.
Scant progress has been made in diseases like lupus, which afflicts mostly Black women,
and depression, which afflicts twice as many women as men. Id.
306. Brennan et al., supra note 268.
307. The experience of one Haitian mother trying to secure prenatal care is instructive:
My friend say go to doctor and get checked .... My friend be on the phone
much time before they make appointment. They no have space for 30 days.
When I go to hospital, it confusing.... I go early, and see doctor late in the
afternoon.... I wait on many long lines and take lots of tests. I no understand
why so many test every time. No one explain nothing. No one talk my language.
I be tired,feel sick from hospital. I go three times, but no more. Too much trouble
for nothing.
Roberts, supra note 21, at n.144 (quoting F. CARO ET AL., BARRIERS TO PRENATAL CARE 75-
76 (1988))(emphasis added).
308. David W. Baker et al., Patients Who Leave a Public Hospital Emergency Department ll'ith-
out Being Seen by a Physician, 266JAMA 1085 (1991); Andrew B. Bindman et al., Consequences
of Queingfor Care at a Public Hospital Emergency Department, 266 JAMA 1091 (1991).
309. Baker et al., supra note 308, at 1088. All patients leaving without seeing a doctor
were screened by the researchers. They found that 46% of those leaving were "in need of
immediate medical attention," id. at 1085, and 71% of those "in need of immediate medi-
cal attention" left because "they felt too ill to wait longer." Id. at 1088. Contrary to ear-
lier studies, the patients who left had medical needs just as serious as those who stayed.
Eleven percent of those who left were hospitalized during the next week, and 49% did not
see a physician during the week after they left.
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our public hospitals. As a recent Journal of the American Medical Association
editorial concluded, "[t]he system itself has become 'too sick to
wait.' "310 The writer also noted, "[elfforts to foster health care compe-
tition worsened the problem by encouraging private hospitals to convert
medical and surgical beds to more lucrative pursuits (such as drug- and
alcohol-treatment units)."'3 11 Overcrowded hospitals, like overcrowded
courts, are an important form of institutional abandonment (that often
inflicts the greatest neglect upon those most in need of help).
Losing Control of Drugs and Knowledge. Any review of the immense
drug treatment literature yields many views and scant consensus. As the
health care field becomes more of a business and less of a profession,
particular treatment programs and drugs are often propelled into popu-
larity through promotion by the pharmaceutical industry. Over the past
three decades, the medical community has lost significant control over
the objective knowledge about many pharmaceutical and treatment mo-
dalities. 3 12 The Federal Drug Administration evaluates only the safety
and suitability of the drug to be marketed. It has no oversight to prevent
or limit over-marketing once the drug is approved for public use. The
remaining reference for drugs, the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), is
published not by a consortium of university medical schools or the
AMA. It is compiled and written by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association (PMA). The integrity of medicine is undercut when it loses control
over the objective evaluation of medications.313 New drugs for use in drug
treatment programs receive more publicity in journals than treatment
programs that do not involve drugs. This is likely due to companies who
are anxious to promote their new version of products.
3 14
310. Arthur L Kellermann, Too Sick to Wait, 266JAMA, 1123, 1124 (1991) (Editorial).
A 1989 poll by the American College of Emergency Physicians found "serious overcrowd-
ing" in 41 states and the District of Columbia. A poll by the Emergency Nurses Associa-
tion found overcrowding problems in all 50 states. Id. at 1123. A 1990 survey of 277
public and private hospitals found that 40% of hospitals diverted ambulances away be-
cause of overcrowding. Thirty-eight percent reported that overcrowding sometimes
caused admitted patients to wait 24 hours or more in the emergency room until beds could
be found in the appropriate ward. Id.
311. Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
312. The Journal of the American Medical Association ceased its program of evaluating all
new drugs in 1976. With it went the last comprehensive, publicly controlled evaluation of
drugs.
313. The promotion of special interest medication is not unlike the promotion of spe-
cial interest legislation. Each, in its own way, undercuts the integrity of the medical and
the political community. Unfortunately, neither physicians nor the public has the right to
elect officers within the pharmaceutical industry.
314. For example, ifa given drug company discovers a new version ofa benzodiazipene
(e.g. valium), the drug company is quite likely to commission objective, university-based
research to evaluate the efficacy of the drug in the market area sought by a manufacturer.
Initially, many medical journals refused to publish such self-serving research even though
it was done in a careful and scientific fashion by respected physicians. However, the tenu-
ous economic reality of many medical journals forced them to occasionally publish these
articles. The reward for publication came in the form of indirect compensation. If a given
journal X published an article reporting favorable results for a new drug, the manufacturer
could, with complete legitimacy, request 250,000 reprints to be mass mailed to target phy-
sicians, disseminated at conferences and provided by the company's drug sales force.
The legitimate profit realized from such an immense reprint request insured eco-
nomic survival for many journals for years to come. UnlikeJA.AL, many professional jour-
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Conflict of Interest: Entrepreneurialism as Professionalism. The abandon-
ment of professionalism for entrepreneurialism occurs in all professions
and is most advanced in medicine, where physicians own an increasing
percentage of health care facilities through which they can channel pa-
tients and profit from their referrals. The temptation to use one's lab
for testing and one's treatment center for treatment is immense. Law-
yers are precluded from such associations within the legal system.
A 1991 study by the Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board
found that 40% of the physicians had invested in joint ventures (diag-
nostic imaging centers, radiation therapy clinics, ambulatory surgical
centers, clinical labs and physical therapy centers) to which they referred
patients. 3 15 These joint ventures were originally promoted on the idea
that costs could be saved, services could be improved and physicians
would pool their funds to invest in labs in "medically underserved" ar-
eas. The study found that "none of the joint venture facilities are lo-
cated in medically underserved areas" and that "joint ventures do not
increase access to rural or underserved indigent patients." The study
found that the joint venture clinical labs, diagnostic imaging centers,
physical therapy centers and rehabilitation centers charged more, per-
formed significantly more tests or services per patient, employed less-
skilled staff and provided only limited access to the poor. Doctor-owned
clinical labs performed an average of 3.3 diagnostic tests at the average
cost of $43 per patient. Non-physician owned labs performed an aver-
age of 1.7 tests (94% less) at a cost of $20. In other terms, the doctor-
owned labs performed 94% more tests per patient at a cost of 115%
more per patient than labs not owned by doctors. Since almost all the
diagnostic imaging centers in Florida were physician-owned, the study
compared labs in Miami and Baltimore, where few were doctor owned.
Both cities have similar socioeconomic profiles. Miami's rate for multi-
nals did not feel comfortable taking advertisements. Without such revenue it was difficult
to survive.
Another example of abandonment is the AMA proposal to sell the use of the AMA
logo for " 'special reports' . . . including 'live' or 'paper' symposia generated for medical
meetings and press conferences sponsored by drug companies." Dennis L. Breo, Sidney
1o/fe, AID-Healing the System or Just Raising Hell?, 266JAMA 1131 (1991). Sidney Wolfe,
Director of Public Citizen Health Research Group responded to this proposal:
The AMA is blurring the line between education and advertising. The AMA is
acting as a prostitute for the drug industry by wrapping its logo-its stamp of
approval-around scientific studies that are otherwise unacceptable. This project
is worse than sleazy. The AMA is putting crass commercialism and its desire to
make money ahead of the interests of doctors and patients.
Id. at 1131. The AMA has since decided to drop the "special report" but to pursue being
paid by the drug industry to distribute drug studies (largely sponsored by the drug indus-
try) that appeared in AMA journals. Id. Thus some AMA journals are doubly funded by
pharmaceutical companies: first by their advertising and second by republication of indus-
try sponsored articles favorable to their products. The Fellowship Pledge of the American
College of Surgeons states, in part, "[mloreover, I pledge myself, so far as I am able. ... to
shun unwarranted publicity, dishonest money-seeking and commercialism as disgraceful
to our profession ...." (quoted in Albert R. Jonsen, Asklepios as American Surgeon, AM. C.
SURGEONS BULL., May 1989, 10, at 12).
315. Referral Profits Line Doctors' Pockets, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
HEALTH LETrER, Oct. 1991, at 1, 2-3.
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pie resonant imaging was 67% higher and Miami's computerized axial
tomography (CAT scan) rate was 29% higher than Baltimore's non-doc-
tor owned labs.3 16 While Florida may have the highest percentage of
such joint ventures, a seven state survey by the Health and Human Serv-
ices' Office of Inspector General found that 25% of the clinical labs and
27% of the diagnostic labs were wholly or partly physician-owned.
3 1 7
The Compromise of HMOs. Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) began as a healthy alternative to traditional "fee-for-service"
hospitals where the focus was on illness treatment with few services for
prevention. HMOs emphasized prevention by keeping a cap on premi-
ums. 3 18 HMO physicians were thus paid more for keeping patients
healthy than for providing treatment.
The 1980s, however, brought a steep rise in for-profit HMOs, whose
services are very similar to the insurance fund plans they were created to
reform. HMOs were 50% corporate by 1986 and 66% corporate by
1989, an increase of 33%.319 According to the Group Health Associa-
tion of America's 1990 HMO Industry Profile, 63% now require mem-
bers to pay out-of-pocket for primary care visits (in addition to their
ceiling premiums). 320 For example, in mid 1987, two for-profit HMOs
in Champaign County, Illinois dramatically increased premiums and be-
gan charging patients an additional $10 for each physician visit. The
reasons cited were: that consumers were overusing physicians "like a
revolving door;" that many "young healthies" had left, leaving the
HMOs with the older, sicker patients; and that prior losses demanded a
rate increase in order to remain fiscally sound.
32 1
The Champaign County Health Care Consumers did a careful study
of the two HMOs from 1984 through 1987 and found that the average
number of physician and other walk-in visits declined 38.8% from 1984 to
1987.322 The average number of physician encounters at the HMOs was
"comparable to the U.S. population as a whole."' 32 3 The study also
found that the percentage of patients over sixty-five years of age was less
than the national average and did not increase from 1984-1988.324 Fi-
nally, the study found that the average length of stay at the HMOs de-
clined between 1984 and 1987, and was less than the Illinois and
national averages. 3
2 5
The above statistics suggest that none of the reasons cited for the
increase were based in fact. Further study revealed that physician pay-
ment per office visit rose 106% during the period where office visits per
316. Id. at 2.
317. Id. at 3.
318. For Profit H.Os: Unmanaged Costs, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
HEALTH LETTER, Oct. 1991, at 6.
319. Id. at 6.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. The visits declined from 7.66% to 4.69%. Id.





patient declined 38.8%.326 From 1984 through 1989, thirty of the forty-
five Board Members of the HMOs had a direct conflict of interest where
they benefitted from service contracts with the HMOs.3 27 "Incentive
payments" were made to doctors and hospitals as a reward for reducing
the services provided to members. Normally, the savings from lower
doctor use would be passed on to patients in the form of lower premi-
ums. Had the HMOs not paid these bonuses, they would have posted
healthy profits instead of declaring "losses" which, in turn, created the
premium increase and patient out-of-pocket payments.
3 28
In sum, the HMOs original mission of "maintaining" health where
physicians were paid a flat salary for caring for their clients, was lost.
The new mission was "managing" health care where the physician acted
as a gatekeeper. According to one presiding judge, "[tihe result was
that the fewer referrals a doctor made and the fewer hospitalizations he
ordered for his patients, the more money he made." 3 2 9
Gifts, Perks and Marketing Diseases. According to testimony before the
Senate Labor Committee, in 1988 the pharmaceutical industry spent
over $163 million on gifts to doctors, buffets, banquets and other sup-
port of national medical specialty meetings.3 3 0 In 1991, the AMA and
the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME)
issued guidelines discouraging acceptance of gifts and industry sponsor-
ship of continuing medical education seminars.3 3 ' This has chilled pro-
motional practices by some doctors. Others seem to ignore the
guidelines. For example, Abbott Laboratories used a sweepstakes to
send physicians to a convention. The Collagen Corporation offered an
eight-day cruise to the South Pacific to fifty-five dermatologists who had
purchased their injectable collagen. Warner Lambert sent its best physi-
cian customers on a "Texas style" vacation.
3 3 2
Allowing "disease" to be defined only by medical doctors allows
less scrupulous doctors to profit from their diagnosis. "Between 1978
and 1984, the number of for-profit residential treatment centers in-
creased by 350 percent and their caseloads by 400 percent. s3 3 3 At the
same time, physicians are increasingly ambivalent about diagnosing and
treating alcoholism in their patients. One study noted, "[i]ndeed, with
the general population, 71% of physicians fell either incompetent or
ambivalent about treating alcoholism, and only 21% recognize alcohol-




329. Id. at 8.
330. Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts Influence Medical Care, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RE-
SEARCH GROUP, HEALTH LETrER, Oct. 1991, at 9, 9.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. PEELE, supra note 35, at 49 (citing C. M. Weisner, & R. Room, Financing and Ideology
in Alcohol Treatment, 32 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 167-84 (1984)).
334. Benjamin et al., supra note 292, at 4 (citingJ.L. Coulehan et al., Recognition of Alco-
holism and Substance Abuse in Primary Care Patients, 147 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 349 (1987)).
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cosmetic surgery "business," wherein the medical model seeks to trans-
form physical difference into a surgically repairable deformity. 3 35 As
Dr. Albert Jonsen, a distinguished medical ethicist, noted:
Competition as the spirit of medical and surgical care er-
odes the compassion that has always been medicine and sur-
gery's highest virtue. . . . [C]ompetition will lead to greater
exclusion of those persons who will not be profitable patients
and to greater solicitation of those who can be induced into
being patients. The first will be deprived of needed surgery;
the latter will be the victims of fashionable surgery.
33 6
The Troubles of Treatment. Many of the iatrogenic ills of medicine find
expression in treatment programs. Our over-reliance on narrow forms
of treatment has some of its roots in our investment in penitentiaries in
the late eighteenth century. One of the institutions that Alexis De Toc-
queville, author of Democracy In America, found most intriguing was our
penitentiaries. They were designed on the assumption that criminality
could be diagnosed and, with proper treatment and opportunity for
"penitence" (the root motive of "penitentiary"), dealt with. 33 7 A similar
ethic inspired the "abstinence" movement. Both relied on the wedding
of sudden conversion with institutional removal. Criminals, drunks and
children had to be "removed" from their environments in order to be
"saved." Comparing America to our European neighbors, we institu-
tionalize (incarcerate) a greater percentage of our criminals for a longer
period, and we "treat" a greater percentage of our addicts for a longer
period. Also, we provide in-patient hospital procedures for a greater
percentage of birthing mothers than Holland, yet, even correcting for
differences in race and class, the United States has a higher incidence of
infant mortality than our European counterparts.
3 3 8
If drug addiction were only a medical disease, it would be distrib-
uted through our society regardless of social class. People who are better
off are less likely to become addicted.3 39 Addiction is more likely in a hostile environ-
335. Nicholas Regush, Toxic Breasts, MOTHER JONEs, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 24, 26 (quoting
Memorandum from American Society of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. to the
FDA). The most telling recent case of iatrogenic disease is the epidemic of breast implants
that have occurred in over two million women in the past twenty years. For example, in a
memorandum sent to the FDA, the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Sur-
geons stated, " '[t]here is a substantial and enlarging body of medical information and
opinion to the effect that these deformities [small breasts] are really a disease.' " Id.
336. Jonsen, supra note 314, at 15.
337. DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
338. For example, comparing Holland to the United States, 5% of the births in Hol-
land and 24% of the births in the United States were by Caesarean section. In Holland,
36% of the babies are born at home. Most deliveries on hospital premises are in non-
medical settings in which the mothers are not attended by physicians and usually leave
within 36 hours. Europe as a whole and Holland in particular have a significantly lower
rate of infant mortality even though 70% of the births are accomplished by midwives.
PEELE, supra note 35, at 245 (citing C.A. MILLER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CLINICAL INFANT
PROGRAMS, MATERNAL HEALTH AND INFANT SURVIVAL (1987); M. Wagner, testimony before
the U.S. Commission to Prevent Infant Mortality (International Comparisons Section),
United Nations, New York, Feb. 1, 1988)).
339. PEELE, supra note 35, at 160.
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ment and recovery is more likely in a comfortable environment.34 0 The medical
model of disease-like the legal model of crime-fails to address this
painful fact and, thereby, functions to perpetuate it. Drugs are more
powerful for those accustomed to being powerless. 3 4 1 The narrow med-
ical model of disease may simply shift the mother from dependence on a
substance to dependence on a program. Within the model, addiction is
not "cured," it is only overcome temporarily through the exercise of
"self-control." This concept of addiction is quite similar to our classical
concept of "possession" where one must be eternally vigilant to protect
against the ever present threat of Satan. "Demon drug" thus replaces
"Demon rum." The experience of addiction in our Vietnam veterans
suggests that this model is inadequate.
America has developed, over the past thirty years, a vast investment
in treatment programs that have become a major source of profit in the
health care industry. In-patient "treatment" programs of five weeks
range in cost from seven to thirty-five thousand dollars. In contrast to
this model is the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) model, where the alco-
holic proclaims he or she is "powerless" over the addiction and will "al-
ways" be addicted.3 4 2 Both of the above systems presume that the
person is diseased. In AA, the disease is assumed to be incurable and
will, like cancer, return unless the afflicted is eternally vigilant. Gradu-
ates of the AA school assert that they are only one drink/hit/injection
away from complete personal disarray. While such a "disease" model
may serve to reduce social stigma for the "impaired" (but not "ad-
dicted") professional, it may be the last straw for a mother in poverty
whose self-esteem is already dangerously low.
340. Our Vietnam experience demonstrated that much drug use is situational. A large
number of our soldiers in Vietnam used narcotics. In one major study of Vietnam addicts,
it was found that 73% of those who use narcotics five or more times become addicted.
However, the majority of those addicted in the hostile environment of Vietnam got over
their addictions simply by leaving Vietnam. More surprisingly, half of the addicted men
who returned used heroin in the United States, yet only 12% became re-addicted. The
rest stopped short of re-addiction without any form of treatment. Among the group that
used heroin extensively (more than once a week for a considerable amount of time) only
50% became re-addicted. PEELE, supra note 35, at 167-68 (citing L.N. Robins et al., Viet-
nam Veterans Three Years After Vietnam: How Our Study Changed Our View Of Heroin, in 2 THE
YEARBOOK OF SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE (L. Brill & C. Winick eds., 1980)). Given that the
incidence of homicide in the urban United States is approximately 10 times that of our
European counterparts, the situation in some ghettos is, perhaps, not unlike Vietnam.
Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome is a response to drive by shootings and chronic gang
violence. The soldier of Vietnam faced constant fear, discomfort, isolation, lack of social
supports, a lack of security and a lack of enduring relationships. This is almost the same
inventory typical of single mothers in poverty. See e.g., ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No
CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF Two Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991)
(Kotlowitz movingly documents the loss of childhood, loss of feeling and loss of hope in
two young boys growing up in a Chicago Housing Project).
341. Although the cocaine epidemic raged in the middle class in the 1980s, there is
clear evidence that, by 1987, it had peaked among members of the middle class and above.
With the advent of an affordable type of cheaper cocaine-crack--cocaine addiction be-
came a major problem among the poor.
342. The AA model that began with alcohol has been extended by others to cocaine,
narcotics, victims of sexual crimes, victims of physical abuse, children of alcoholics and to
the highly amorphous but burgeoning "co-dependents" movement. See, e.g., PEELE, supra
note 35.
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Our medical system has invested so deeply in a limited variety of
treatment programs that. it becomes financially rewarding to expand the
population needing "treatment" by expanding the population that is di-
agnosed as being "diseased."' 34 3 Insurance companies pay millions of
dollars for individuals to enter substance abuse programs, the effect of
which are questionable. 34 4 A parallel structure of impropriety emerges
from the professions of law and medicine. Within the law, overzealous
prosecutors and legislators realize political profit by criminalizing ma-
ternal drug use. Within the medical community, overzealous elements
of the "medical-industrial complex" compete to cash in on the possibil-
ity of vast state subsidized treatment programs.3 4 5
Dubious Results for Poor Women. What a few prosecutors and the treat-
ment pushers have in common is that none of their methods is demon-
strably effective in deterring or preventing drug and alcohol abuse
among poor pregnant women. There is no controlled study docu-
menting significant rates of long term recovery from any established al-
cohol treatment program, including Alcoholics Anonymous.3 46 This
may be because most of the established treatment programs have a dis-
tinct bias toward the middle class and toward males, wherein the focus is
on the substance and the addict and not on the relationships that may
influence the addiction. This method of treatment is rarely successful
with poor single mothers. It fails to recognize that the mother and her
relationships with herself, her family and her community must be the
focus of treatment, and notjust the mother as an individual. Contrary to
common opinion, the typical female alcoholic is not the furtive middle-
343. Between 1977 and 1987, AA membership doubled even though the per capita
alcohol consumption in the United States declined. According to John Noble, deputy di-
rector of biometry and epidemiology at the Nation Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism, "[d]espite moderating per capita alcohol consumption nationwide, the treatment
of alcoholism and other chemical dependencies will remain a growth industry well into the
foreseeable future." PEELE, supra note 35, at 234 (citing M. Korcok, Alcohol Treatment Indus-
try to Grow as Risk Group Matures, U.S.J. DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE, Mar. 1987, at 1,
quoting John Noble)).
344. See PEELE, supra note 35.
345. A sad example of the health care treatment industry taking advantage of public
concerns about drug use is found in the recent experience of Ontario. When the province
of Ontario decided to act on behalf of its residents who were addicted to drugs, they found
themselves, like most U.S. states, without sufficient treatment facilities. They were ap-
proached by a variety of U.S. treatment programs, and the province decided to reimburse
U.S. health care programs for 75% of the cost of treatment. Many U.S. "specialty hospi-
tals" not only set up recruitment centers but, according to Canadian health officials, also
paid local "patient brokers" to infiltrate Ontario Alcoholics Anonymous groups in search
of likely customers. Thus, when a U.S. hospital got a referral, it would pay the broker a
commission of $1,500 to $3,000, fly the patient south for a month of counselling and
treatment and send the bill to the Ontario health program for $25,000 to $30,000. Some
150 U.S. hospitals were in on the recruiting bonanza. During the 1991 fiscal year, the cost
to Ontario for those treatment programs was an estimated $100 million. This is 250 times
the province's investment in U.S. treatment in 1980. The efficacy of this effort remains
unclear. Geoffrey Cowley et al., Money Madness: Are Private Psychiatric Hospitals Resorting to
Kidnapping in Their Quest for Paying Patients?, NEWSWEEK, November 4, 1991, at 50, 52.
346. PEELE, supra note 35, at 57 (citing F. Baekeland et al., Methods for the Treatment of
Chronic Alcoholism: A Critical Appraisal, in 2 RESEARCH ADVANCES IN ALCOHOL AND DRUG
PROBLEMS, 306 (R.J. Gibbons et al., eds. 1975)).
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aged suburban housewife. 34 7 Given our penchant for judging women
according to the form of their bodies, it may be no accident that poverty,
obesity and abuse team together to dramatically reduce the self-esteem
of poor female adolescents and dramatically increase the likelihood they
will seek the false solace of a relationship where their boyfriend encour-
ages drug use and sexuality. Treatment programs for the poor demand
addressing a different world with different social circumstances. 348
The federal government may be the only force powerful enough to
contain the expanding medical industrial complex. Were we to adopt a
federalized program like the Canadian program, there could be an im-
mediate reduction of cost by approximately 25%, the estimated cost for
administering our many separate reimbursement programs. 3 49 Sec-
ondly, consolidation of health care benefits would force down drug
prices, stemming the tide of production of copycat designer drugs and
increasing the use of generics. Instead of investing significant marketing
sums in trying to demonstrate that look alike drugs have a differential
effect, drug companies would be compelled to compete to produce the
best quality versions of effective drugs at the lowest possible price. The
more money that can be saved on pharmaceuticals, the more that can be
spent on efforts to prevent drug abuse and to cure addiction.
If our goal is to have healthy babies, then no combination and treat-
ment and prenatal care is enough. According to Marsden Wagner, a
pediatrician and epidemiologist with the World Health Organization,
prenatal care may help the birth outcome to a certain point, but the
most critical factors are the community supports for the pregnant mother
that our health care, welfare and political system increasingly fail to
provide.
350
347. Poverty and unsupported parenthood are significant vectors of female alcoholism
and obesity. One study found a 900% greater incidence of obesity among poor young
women than well-to-do young women at age six. At age 18 this difference was lower; there
was a 300% greater incidence of obesity among poor women than well-to-do women at
age 18. Albert Stunkard et. al., Influence of Social Class on Obesity and Thinness in Children, 221
JAMA 579, 580-81 (1972).
348. According to David Musto, a Yale psychiatrist, "[wie are dealing with two different
worlds here. The question we must be asking now is not why people take drugs, but why
do people stop. In the inner city, the factors that counterbalance drug use-family, em-
ployment, status within the community-often are not there." PEELE, supra note 35, at 162
(citing P. Kerr, Rich vs. Poor. Drug Patterns are Diverging N.Y. TIMES, August 30, 1987, at 1,
28).
349. The Canadian health care program has one standardized patient intake form that
can be used anywhere in Canada. At present, the competition of 1500 health insurance
programs in the United States creates thousands of different reimbursement forms. The
General Accounting Office has estimated that 25 cents of each health care dollar is spent
on administration. For 1991, the savings created by adopting the Canadian plan could
save an estimated $136 billion or $3,919 for each American insured in 1990. The actual
cost of health care was approximately $3,011 per person. The Administrative Cost of Health
Insurance, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, HEALTH LETrER, June 1991, at 1.
350. PEELE, supra note 35, at 242 (citing M. Wagner, Testimony Before the U. S. Commission
to Prevent Infant Mortality (International Comparisons Section), United Nations, New York,
Feb. 1, 1988).
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C. Legal Abandonment: Legigenic Harm
Like iatrogenic harm, primary legigenic harm is the failure to see
the harm. Secondary harm occurs when the harm is seen but not viewed
as a legal problem. Tertiary legigenic harm is the failure to provide suf-
ficient legal resources to understand and remedy the problem.
One primary harm is our heritage of exclusion. Women, Blacks,
natives and White men of modest means were not included in our con-
stitutional process or allowed to vote. 3 5 ' When Abigail Adams asked
her husband, John Adams, to consider the women in the constitution he
replied, "We know better than to repeal our Masculine systems."
'35 2
Such "masculine systems" continue to thrive in the hyper-competitive
atmosphere of law school, which selects in favor of tough, competitive
students and against equally bright, but sensitive and compassionate
students. The neglect of collegiality in law school reduces the value of
collegiality in practice. Loss of collegiality begets a loss of compassion.3 5 3 The
needless curriculum overload of law school leaves little time for any-
thing other than what must be done to survive. The same pace contin-
ues in many large law firms. The net result is a strong set of forces that
support the legal gladiator and neglect the legal healer. Legal healers
3 5 4
are precisely what is needed to address the issues of abandonment.
Healing demands the faculty of compassion to fully feel and understand
what has been abandoned. Without compassion, there is room only for
intellectual understanding. Zora Neal Hurston captures this loss of
compassion while listening to jazz with a White friend:
My pulse is throbbing like a war drum. I want to slaughter
something-give pain, give death to what, I do not know. But
the piece ends. The men of the orchestra wipe their lips and
rest their fingers. I creep back slowly to the veneer we call civi-
lization with the last tone and find the white friend sitting mo-
tionless in his seat, smoking calmly.
"Good music they have here," he remarks, drumming the
table with his fingertips.
Music. The great globs of purple and red emotion have not
touched him. He has only heard what I felt. He is far away and
I see him but dimly across the ocean and the continent that
have fallen between us. He is so pale with his whiteness and I
am so colored. 3 5 5
351. See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 64-66
(1933).
352. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law 100 YALE L. REV.
1281, 1281 (1991) (quoting I ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370, 382 (I. Butterfield ed.
1963) (original manuscript dated 1776)).
353. Compassion in the literal sense of experiencing or suffering with (passion "from
passus the past participle of patior meaning to suffer, undergo or experience," and corn from
cunr meaning "with"). CASSELL'S LATIN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 160 (1977).
354. In the sense discussed infra note 411 of making the person "whole." Here, whole-
ness is the person being wholly known, understood and represented within the law. Un-
derstanding here is not primarily intellectual, it is experiential in the original sense of sense
of understanding which was "standing under."
355. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theo,, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
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Explaining the experiences of being a poor mother of color to the
average law professor might be even more difficult than explaining jazz.
What cannot be explained is what is felt. Similarly, it is difficult for the
compassionate law professor to truly teach the many abandonments of
the law without appearing political, partisan or otherwise non-profes-
sional. Law school thus promotes the inversion of professionalism
where personal belief (what one professes) is hidden and only intellec-
tual analysis is shared. This zealous faith in a transcendent reason (with-
out compassion) has been with us since Socrates. 3 56 This ethic of
"objectivity," "fairness" and "autonomy" so cherished in the law ig-
nores the reality that mother's lives are not autonomous, they are rela-
tional.3 5 7 Autonomy is also less valued than relation in many minority
families. Law continues to promote a state composed of rational, auton-
omous individuals where self knowledge is vastly more important than
knowledge of another.3 58 Law cannot represent what lawyers cannot feel.
It is not enough to let the abandoned into law school if their lives are
not reflected in the curriculum. Without transcultural compassion,
abandonment will continue.
Secondary legigenic harm can be found in the law's failure to affirm-
atively protect children from the ravages of poverty, homelessness, inad-
equate healthcare and undernutrition. A child has no constitutional right to
a safe and nurturant environment. In Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services, the Supreme Court held, "[T]he Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even when
such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty or property interests of
which the government itself may not deprive the individual."' 35 9
This essentially negative interpretation has the Constitution func-
tioning to insure only that the laws apply equally to people in very une-
qual circumstances. 360 In this interpretation, doctrines that protect
610 (1990) (emphasis in original) (quoting Zora Neale Hurston, How It Feels to Be Colored
Me, in I LOVE MYSELF WHEN I AM LAUGHING ... AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING
MEAN AND IMPRESSIVE 152 (A. Walker ed. 1979)).
356. "In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge
when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not
surfeited with the bodily nature .... [H]aving got rid of the foolishness of the body we
shall be pure .. " Plato, Phaedo, in 7 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 225 (1952).
The abandoned in our society are mostly perceived as those who have not "got rid of the
foolishness of the body." Women, gays and many minorities have been found wanting for
being "too emotional," "lacking impulse control," etc.
357. For an excellent article exploring this in more depth, see Robin West, The Differ-
ence in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory 3 Wis. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 811 (1987). The high failure rate of mothers in drug programs designed for
white males can be seen, in part, to the programs failure to understand and address the
mother's relations.
358. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
359. 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
360. One is reminded of Anatole France's observation, "[tihe law, in its majestic equal-
ity, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE ch. 7 (1894) (quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FA-
MILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (15th & 125th Anniversary ed.)). For capable rebuttals and chal-
lenges to this limited role of the constitution, see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: .4
Critique, 88 MICH L. REV. 2271 (1989-90); MACKINNON, supra note 249.
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some women harm abandoned women. The right of privacy is con-
strued only to protect a woman's right to choose abortion but not the
right to be provided an abortion if she lacks the funds. Similarly, the preg-
nant addicted mother may choose residential treatment, but she has no
right to it. In a custody battle, the state has a very passive role of decid-
ing between parents when the mother is well-to-do. When the mother is
abandoned, on the other hand, the state may play the adversarial role of
trying to take her children from the family.3 6 l A poor mother's right of
freedom of association does not extend to living with her husband if she
receives Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), unless she
wishes to lose her benefits.3 6 2 On the one hand, the child has no consti-
tutional right to be protected by the state from an abusive parent.3 6 3
On the other, the child removed from home has no constitutional right
to be protected from an abusivefoster parent.3 64 Placing the child in jail
provides the child more safety rights than placing the child in foster
care. 3 65 Ironically, the child is afforded more constitutional protections
when the parent fights the state than when the parent agrees to treat-
ment and foster care.3 6 6 Even when a right to safe foster care is ac-
knowledged, binding state workers to exercise "professional
judgement," the workers can avoid liability for foster care neglect by
claiming that they lacked the funds to do proper placement. 36 7 Poor
361. See e.g., Roberts, supra note 21, at 1471.
362. See, e.g., KOTLowrrz, supra note 340.
363. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
"[The State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua against his father's violence
.... " Id. at 202. Joshua Deshaney had been repeatedly beaten by his father. The state
had previously taken Joshua out of the home for prior abuse and had issued a steady
stream of warnings to the father to remove the child again as third party reports of harm
continued. Finally, the abuse became so severe that youngJoshua was literally beaten into
idiocy (lifelong brain damage). Although the Supreme Court denounced the failures by
the state, it found that Joshua had no Fourteenth Amendment right to protection. "The
most that can be said of state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did noth-
ing .. " Id. at 203. HadJoshua tested positive to a minute amount of cocaine at birth, he
might have had a different fate.
364. See, e.g., Daniel L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?-Time for the
Supreme Court to Pay Its LO.U., 18 PEPP. L. REV. 353 (1991). Skoler provides an excellent
review of the immunities afforded state workers and provides a number of grounds for
asserting a right to safe foster care.
365. In Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F. 2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1118
(1990), the child was sexually abused in foster care and the State workers were given com-
plete immunity. In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services, 871
F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 148 (1989), the child was seriously abused by
foster parents and the state failed to remove the child after receiving reports of probable
harm. The court found the state had no due process responsibility since the foster parents
were not state actors, and since the natural parents voluntarily placed the child in foster
care. Id. at 476.
366. See Skoler, supra note 364.
367. In K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990), the court found a constitutional
right to a safe environment but excused the state from liability for placement in foster
where there was a known risk of abuse. In this case, the child was taken by the state and
placed in nine different foster homes over three and a half years during which she was
beaten and sexually assaulted. State workers were not held liable because they lacked the
funds to monitor and oversee placements. For an excellent discussion of this and related
cases, see Skoler, supra note 364, at 369-75.
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mothers cannot defeat claims of neglect by claiming that they lacked the
funds to do proper parenting.
While secondary legigenic harms focus on the absence of legal re-
sponsibility, tertiary harms focus on the maldistribution and misuse of
legal authority. One such harm is the assumption that concentrating all
of society's power to deal with fetal drug exposure in the court system
will protect the fetus. By way of summary, the prior data suggests the
following:
1. Criminalization does more harm than good.
2. Civil commitment, particularly where there are no adequate re-
sources for treatment, support and child care, does more harm
than good.
3. Child abuse and dependency laws, although well intentioned,
lack the capacity to prevent or to support the mother in dealing
with her problems and thus must resort to threats of
removal.
36 8
4. Each of the above threats cause the mother to be likely to avoid
prenatal medical care when it is available and to avoid other
involvement with the welfare system, substantially increasing
the risk of harm to her fetus. The stigma3 69 and trauma of test-
ing 3 70 and court proceedings could drive an already desperate
mother deeper into depression, thereby jeopardizing her capac-
ity to care for her other children.
Another chronic tertiary harm is creating an institutional remedy
and later failing to fully fund it. Foundling homes in the 1300s were a
major "reform" during which new religious orders were established to
serve abandoned children. Once institutionalized, the problem was no
longer seen by the community on a daily basis. As the problem faded,
the political willingness to pay for it lapsed, resulting in staggering
foundling home infant mortality rates.3 7 1 Child protection services and
foster care programs were established with similarly high standards,
which most states are no longer able (or willing) to fund. Now, we have
368. Only parents are held to be responsible parties. A better model of causality would
be epidemiological or ecological: considering the contributions made by the federal gov-
ernment, state government, local community and the parents' prior history. Our legal
system is not now inclined (and cannot afford?) to pursue such an inquiry and is, therefore,
unable to help many of the children who need help. Under an ecologic model, the closest
legal equivalent is the concept of comparative negligence, whereby each party's contribu-
tion to the harm is determined. It is unlikely that the juvenile courts would pursue such a
line of inquiry.
369. The stigma our legal system places on drug use causes the mother to move further
away from her family and other supports who would normally be key factors in her recov-
ery and caretakers of her children if she entered into in-patient treatment.
370. In 1989, one of the most respected groups of physicians on the front lines of
dealing with children's needs, the American Academy of Pediatrics, found it to be medi-
cally unethical to do drug testing for the primary purpose of detecting drug use. Chavkin,
supra note 108, at 486 (citing Committee on Adolescence, Committee on Bioethics, and
Provisional Committee on Substance Abuse, Screening for Drugs of Abuse in Children and Ado-
lescents, 84 PEDIATRICS 396 (1989)).
371. See supra note 16.
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programs for children harmed by the experience of normal foster
care3 72 and a medical community increasingly reluctant to report sus-
pected abuse because it will probaly not help the child. A mother's fail-
ure to be "cured" by (or reluctance to enter) a narrow treatment
program designed for males without dependent children can be evi-
dence of her lack of care or unfitness.37 3 The child is rarely helped
when the law focuses on the act of substance abuse and not the myriad
circumstances that drive the mother to substance abuse.
3 7 4
The addicted mother is not alone in abandoning her child. The
profession of law, now nearing 1 million lawyers, fails to meet the mani-
fest needs of many single mothers and most lower income families. The
few lawyers serving the poor are poorly compensated and face profes-
372. The primary harm to the infant is a result of the normal function of the foster
system where the infant is placed in a series of foster homes until adopted or, in rare
circumstances, returned to the mother. Such multiple placement creates substantial harm
to the infant's ability to attach or bond to a parental figure, which is critical to the child's
later capacity to maintain relationships.
One state program in California attempts to remedy the harm of multiple foster place-
ments by providing stable group care over a longer period of time. Many children enter
the program with clear evidence of retardation and developmental delay. With proper
remedial care, the children can return to a normal level of functioning. Without such care,
they would likely remain retarded for life. The cost per child is approximately $48,000.00
per year. Health Quarterly (Corporation for Public Broadcasting television broadcast, Jan.
6, 1992).
373. The AMA has stated:
"[Ilit is clear that addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual
willpower." Substance abuse is caused by complex hereditary, environmental,
and social factors....
Punishing a person for substance abuse is generally ineffective because it ig-
nores the impaired capacity of substance-abusing individuals to make decisions
for themselves. In all but a few cases, taking a harmful substance such as cocaine is not
meant to harm the fetus but to satisfy an acute psychological and physical need for that particu-
lar substance.
AMA Trustees, supra note 42, at 2667 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
374. An AMA Board of Trustees Report found that pregnant substance abusers faced
much more family dysfunction than non-abusers. They recorded high levels of depres-
sion, anxiety and powerlessness with low levels of self confidence and self esteem. The
report states as follows:
A study done by a center that treats female substance abusers found that 70% of
them were sexually abused as children, as compared with 15% of nonsubstance
abusers. Eighty-three percent had a chemically dependent parent, as opposed to
35% of the nonabusers. Seventy percent of female substance abusers report be-
ing beaten. Ten percent of female substance abusers in one study were homeless,
while 50% had occasional housing problems.
Id. at 2668 (citations omitted).
The California Medical Association has concluded as follows:
While unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring criminal charges against
a pregnant woman for activities which may be harmful to her fetus is inappropri-
ate. Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may dis-
courage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from providing
accurate information to health care providers out of fear of self-incrimination.
This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her
health could increase the risks to herself and her baby.
Id. at 2669 (citation omitted).
In regard to the above, the AMA Board of Trustees recommended, in part, that
"[c]riminal sanctions or civil liability for harmful behavior by the pregnant woman towards
her fetus are inappropriate," and that "[piregnant substance abusers should be provided
with rehabilitative treatment appropriate to their specific physiological and psychological
needs." Id. at 2670.
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sional responsibilities almost as daunting as that of single parents. Since
the early 1980s, Legal Services attorneys have had their three most ef-
fective tools for helping the poor (class action suits, administrative advo-
cacy and legislative advocacy) largely removed by restrictive regulations.
For example, prior to 1981, Legal Services attorneys could represent a
group lobbying for prenatal care for poor mothers. The regulation al-
lowed representation of a group if its "principle purpose" was to "bene-
fit low-income people." As counsel, they could help draft model
legislation, testify at hearings and lobby like any other legitimate polit-
ical interest. After 1981, the regulation was changed requiring the
group directors to be "primarily composed of low income people." A
group suing for universal prenatal care would likely have doctors,
nurses, educators, citizen activists and clergy on its board disqualifying
it from representation. 1981 also brought severe budget cutbacks, halv-
ing the number of attorneys on staff. This substantially reduced their
capacity to assist families in conflict. A divorce action with full represen-
tation often brings to light many substance abuse and abuse related
problems in their early stages. Once alerted, the family court could or-
der one or both parents into parenting, anger management or substance
abuse programs. Legal Services rarely represents any family whose in-
come is over 125% of the poverty line (for a family of four this is
$106,750). An immense number of lower and lower middle class families
who cannot afford counsel are left without representation. Canada, in
contrast, provides counsel to all parents in divorce who cannot afford it.
Another legigenic harm is the unnecessary trauma of divorce and
the related failure to pay child support.3 75 Approximately 24% of the
support awards from divorce remain unpaid. The national unpaid sup-
port debt currently exceeds $10 billion. Although divorce may resolve
some conflicts, it invariably creates considerable stress for children as
the parents spend spare assets attempting to resolve their conflicts. The
nature of divorce law awarding custody to one spouse and visitation to
another in most states creates an unnecessary sense of peril and an often
unnecessary investment of funds in the legal conflict. The unfortunate
psychological sequel of one parent "gaining custody" is that the other
feels a loss of custody and a reluctance to pay support. Behaviorally, the
custodial parent often has to become increasingly restrictive while the
non-custodial parent becomes permissive in order to compensate for the
perceived loss of parenthood. Of all age groups, preschool children ap-
pear to be the most easily harmed, with strong feelings of abandonment,
grief, depressed play patterns, nightmares, sleep and eating problems
and difficulties in toilet training which later manifest with a significant
decline in school performance. 3 76 Literature demonstrates that the
375. Between 1955 and 1988, the dissolutions granted tripled from 400,000 to 1.2 mil-
lion and from 1960 to 1984, the number of children involved in divorce increased from
460,000 to 1.1 million. Howard Dubowitz et al., The Changing American Family., 35 PEDIAT-
RIC CLINICS N. AM. 1291 (1988).
376. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHIL-
DREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980);Joan B. Kelly &Judith S. Wallerstein, The
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harm children experience as a result of divorce can be significantly di-
minished if they are allowed to maintain a positive relationship with
both parents, provided both parents are fit.
3 7 7
The Structure of Family Law Deters Treatment of Substance Abuse. Many
state statutes consider drug or alcohol abuse as grounds for reduction of
parental rights. For many women who are economically dependent, a
change of custody is catastrophic, since it will also result in a termination
of state benefits, the loss of low income housing and loss of family ties
where the relation of family is the only enduring relation. Frequently,
such women have much less job experience than their ex-husbands and
are much less able to earn sufficient income for their surviving children.
The result is the breakup of the remainder of the family, forcing the
children away from their mother into a series of foster homes, and in-
creasing the likelihood of a repetition of harm to the children. This in
turn increases the likelihood of drug and alcohol dependency as the chil-
dren reach adulthood. In sum, it is fundamental legigenic harm to stig-
matize and penalize the behavior of any mother when we fail to provide
the comprehensive resources necessary for her healing.
V. TOWARDS A NEW ANALYSIS AND A NEW STANDARD
A. Problems with Causality
The failure of the "neglect and abuse" model detailed above stems,
in part, from the contribution of the medical community in the late
1960s, which suggested a causilinear relationship between single
traumas and lifelong impairments. 378 This approach, the "main effect"
model, hypothesized a "continuum of reproductive causality," whereby
harms during or near birth were assumed to create significant mental
retardation and learning disorders for the remainder of life.3 79 This
confident medical assertion, that particular acts of abuse or neglect
would lead to lifelong damage, fueled the legislative drive to sanction
and punish these specific behaviors. However, in 1977, Emmy Werner
and Ruth Smith published an exhaustive longitudinal study covering
eighteen years of 88% of all 698 children born in 1955 on the island of
Kauai. The effect of socioeconomic status (SES) was stunning, with high
socioeconomic status erasing early trauma and low socioeconomic status
creating trauma over time. 38 0 By the mid to late 70s, the "main effect"
Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY
20 (1976).
377. Lawrence A. Kurdek & Berthold Berg, Correlates of Children's Adjustment to Their Par-
ents' Divorces, in CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 47, 58 (Lawrence A. Kurdek, ed. 1983). This is
particularly true of the need for maintaining each parent's relationship with the same sex
child. Id.
378. General reference for this section is: Steven Parker et al., Double Jeopardy: The
Impact of Poverty on Early Child Development, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1227 (1988).
379. Id. at 1228 (citing Benjamin Pasamanick & Hilda Knobloch, Retrospective Studies on
the Epidemiology of Reproductive Causality: Old and New, 12 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 7, 7-8 (1966)).
380. At age two, children with significant perinatal damage in a high standard of living
had IQs five to seven points below their peers, whereas children with similar perinatal
damage in a low standard of living had IQreduction of 19 to 37 points. Over the course of
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model that was used to rationalize much child neglect legislation was
seen as a poor predictor of a child's developmental outcome. 3 8 1 The
medical community began to look to the social environment as the pri-
mary source of major risk factors for the ultimate development and well-
being of children.3 82 The new model of child development replacing
the "main effect" model was the "transactional" model of child develop-
ment, which asserted that a child's outcome could only be predicted by consider-
ing the relationship between the content of the child's behaviors and the context with
which they are manifested.38 3 Loosely rephrased, it is the relation or trans-
action between nature (internal environment) and nurture (external en-
vironment), provided that nurture is defined to extend to the entirety of
the child's extended family and social and economic environment.
In essence, the model is ecological with each factor modifying and
potentiating the next. The following hypothetical case demonstrates
this analysis.
B. Applying an Ecological Analysis: The Case of Louise
Louise was a fifteen-year-old single mother on welfare who received
minimal prenatal care because of inadequate access to hospitals, her de-
pression about being pregnant and the recent disappearance of her boy-
friend. Louise had not expected to be pregnant. She had made love
with her boyfriend, Cecil, mostly to please him, just as she had used
drugs because of the intimacy he felt when they were "high together."
Louise's family strongly disapproved of her boyfriend, so she moved to
Miami to be with him. His drug of choice was cocaine. Louise had been
having irregular menstrual periods as long as she had used cocaine and
did not suspect she was pregnant until well into her second trimester.
The guilt of knowing she may have exposed her baby to drugs was im-
mense. Louise desperately tried to stop all drug use "cold turkey," cre-
ating further distress to her fetus in the form of impaired oxygen supply,
impaired blood supply and placenta previa.
On her first prenatal appointment at five months, Louise was or-
the study, the high SES children with severe perinatal complications and injuries had IQs
similar to the low SES children with no perinatal complications or injuries. At age 18, only
10% of the children found to have poor behavioral and developmental outcomes had been
exposed to significant perinatal stress or injury. The remaining 90% were babies whose
only injury was being born into poverty. Id. at 1228 & n.90 (citing EMMY E. WERNER &
RUTH S. SMITH, KAUAI'S CHILDREN COME OF AGE (1977)).
381. One landmark study of 26,760 infants enrolled in the National Collaborative Per-
inatal Project carefully traced 158 biomedical and II sociobehavioral independent vari-
ables and studied the relation between illness and injury at or before birth and intellectual
performance at the age of four. Low SES and low maternal education were most predic-
tive of poor performance, high SES and high maternal education were most predictive of
positive intellectual performance. Parker et al., supra note 378, at 1228.
382. One study found a number of risk factors predictive of IQ at age four which are
often related to socioeconomic status: e.g., maternal mental health problems, maternal
anxiety, impaired mother-child bonding, low maternal education, unemployment, inade-
quate social support, and stressful life events. Id. at 1228 & n.67 (citing ArnoldJ. Sameroff
et al., Intelligence Quotient Scores of 4-year-old Children: Social-Environmental Risk Factors, 79 PE-
DIATRICS 343 (1987)).
383. Parker et al., supra note 378, at 1229.
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dered to be hospitalized and lie flat on her back. Louise's child was born
three weeks premature. The child, Andy, was hospitalized in the inten-
sive care unit for three weeks. On release, he was quite lethargic, dis-
tracted and was showing clear signs of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
(NAS). Louise was overwhelmed with guilt and depression and lacked
any source of emotional support. Andy's lethargy and reluctance to feed
redoubled her feelings of maternal failure and deepened her depres-
sion, so that positive interactions with him became increasingly rare.
Andy, in turn, did not look to his environment for stimulation. He with-
drew and rarely vocalized, which further heightened Louise's feelings of
despair. By age two, Andy was clearly developmentally delayed.
In the above circumstances, what is the cause of this child's devel-
opmental delay? Under Florida or Minnesota law, this child would al-
ready have been reported to the authorities and Louise given mandatory
treatment for drug abuse when she had already quit. Louise's already
teetering self-esteem might topple at the prospect of being publicly
found to be "neglectful." Within the ecologic model, Louise's depres-
sion, Andy's temperamental passivity, inadequate social support and en-
vironmental stimulation, and low socioeconomic status would be factors
deserving of equal if not greater attention than Andy's exposure to co-
caine in utero. An ecological analysis of Louise's circumstances would
consider key factors in the internal "environment" and the external "en-
vironment." An example of such analysis is given below.
Internal Environment.
Genetic Endowment. This is the most powerful predictor of a child's
cognitive outcome. Studies estimate that genotype contributes to 40-
60% of the child's eventual IQ 3 8 4 This is based in part on studies com-
paring identical twins raised together or apart. One study comparing
twins at age thirty-six found that the correlation for IQ for twins living
apart was .58 compared with .66 for identical twins raised together. In
contrast, a summary of 111 studies found the average IQ correlation for
adoptive children raised in the same family from different biological par-
ents to be .30.385 Within the ecological theory, Andy's genetic endow-
ment affects his responsiveness and his capacity to take advantage of his
immediate environment. This genetic influence helps explain why chil-
dren raised in the same environment develop different intellectual ca-
pacities, whereas identical twins raised in different environments exhibit
startling similarities in personality and intelligence.
Temperament. Temperament refers to the "how" of behavior, moti-
vation to the "why" of behavior and ability to the "what" of behavior. 3
8 6
384. Id. at 1230.
385. Id. (citing ThomasJ. Bouchard,Jr. & Matthew McGue, Familial Studies of Intelligence:
.4 Review, 212 SCIENCE 1055 (1981)).
386. Id. (citing ALEXANDER THOMAS & STELLA CHESS, TEMPERAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
(1977)). Thomas and Chess refer to nine temperamental dimensions: activity level, regu-
larity of biologic functions, approach/avoidance tendencies, adaptability, responsiveness
to stimuli, intensity of reactions, quality of mood, distractibility and persistence. These
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Children with "difficult" temperaments were more likely to have behav-
ioral problems in the first five years of life but, by early adulthood, this
relationship had disappeared.3 8 7 The best predictor of outcome was the
"goodness of fit" between the child's temperament and his or her envi-
ronment. In higher socioeconomic status families, more resources and
time were devoted to the child's shyness, moodiness or chronic illnesses,
such that the child's difficult temperament would not hinder its future.
In low socioeconomic status families, a child with the same "difficult"
temperament is yet another source of stress to an already stressed sys-
tem. Children of difficult temperaments in poor (or otherwise stressed)
households are more likely to be physically abused than children of simi-
lar temperament in more affluent families.3 88 In practical terms, many
poor children are penalized for the same difficult temperament from
which many affluent children are protected.3 89 For example, Andy's with-
drawn and listless temperament was perceived as rejection by Louise.
Louise was provided next to no support3 90 to face being abandoned by
Cecil, the father, and being rejected by Andy.
Biologic Insults. Children like Andy are exposed to double damage
from their immediate biologic environment, first by being subjected to a
higher rate of infection and second by suffering greater harm from the
infection. For example, low socioeconomic status increases the risk of
contracting cytomegalovirus (CMV) infection. For middle and upper
class infants with CMV, there was little effect on their IQs or school fail-
ures. However, infants with CMV from poor families had demonstrably
lower IQs and 2.7 times greater school failure than their CMV middle
and upper class counterparts.3 9 1 Like Andy, infants of poor women are
more likely to be harmed by maternal drug use, malnutrition, inter-uter-
ine infections and a host of other diseases. The incidence of low birth
weight (below 2,500 grams) babies (like Andy) is two to three times
higher and significant developmental harm is greater in low socioeco-
authors followed 133 middle class children from birth to adulthood and found 40% with
an easy temperament characterized by high adaptability to change, positive approach to
new stimuli and a predominantly good mood and 10% with a "difficult" temperament
characterized by irregular biologic functions, discomfort with new stimuli and extensive
expressions of mood.
387. Id. (citing Alexander Thomas & Stella Chess, Genesis and Evolution of the Behavioral
Disorders From Infancy to Early Adult Life, 141 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 (1984)).
388. Id. (citing P. Vietze et al., Transactional Approach to Prediction of Child Aaltreatment, 1
INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 248 (1980)).
389. Affluence, in the familial context, should not be understood as merely monetary.
A warm extended family of modest means may be able to supply many of the supports that
an affluent family could purchase. An affluent mother would have access to prompt emer-
gency healthcare for her child, whereas the poor mother (with a shift job) would have to
enlist three other relatives to help her wait seven hours in the emergency room so her
child could be seen. Without a viable extended family, the mother would have to choose
between keeping her job and her child's health.
390. Louise abandons herself and her duties as a mother only after being abandoned
by many others. Providing Louise respite care, training in parenting, cooperative daycare
tied to job skills training and group support for dealing with her sense of depression and
loss could break her cycle of increasing depression and despair.
391. Parker et al., supra note 378 (citing James B. Hanshaw et al., School Failure and
Deafness After "Silent" Congenital Cytomegalovirus Infection, 295 N. ENG. J. MED. 468 (1976)).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
nomic status groups. In reviewing biologic impacts on children's devel-
opment, Jack Shonkoff concludes that children in poverty "carry a
disproportionate burden of biologic vulnerability that is largely related
to the increased health risks of poverty .... -392 Under this ecological
model, Andy's biologic vulnerability is significantly influenced by his en-
vironment after birth. Key environmental factors are discussed below.
External Environment.
Stress.39 3 This concept was adopted by Hans Selye in 1950 to ex-
plain a variety of physical disorders that were caused by hypersecretion
of the adrenal glands. 394 Similar levels of stress engender more clinical
depression among women from lower socioeconomic status than from
higher socioeconomic status. Similarly, there is clear data that high
stress impairs the mother's or other parent's capacity to form a stable
relationship with his or her child. High stress environments are corre-
lated with poor performance on developmental tests at eight months,
lower IQ scores at four years and increased school problems and emo-
tional problems at school age. High socioeconomic status families ap-
parently have environmental resources to buffer the effects of high
stress. Children of high socioeconomic status families had few school
problems and little difficulty with emotional adjustment compared to
their low socioeconomic status counterparts.
One factor that may explain this is that high socioeconomic status
families are more likely to have parental substitutes who will provide
stable role models for children whose parents are chronically stressed.
Toddlers exposed to high stress appear to be less secure in their attach-
ment to their mothers regardless of their mother's social class.
3 9 5
Inadequate Social Support.396 There is a clear relation between low
392. Id. at 1231 (quoting Jack P. Shonkoff, Biologic and Social Factors Contributing to Mild
Mental Retardation, in PLACING CHILDREN IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: A STRATEGY FOR EQurrY
133, 171 (Kirby A. Heller et al. eds., 1982).
393. Major stressors include financial shortfalls, death of a relative or friend, divorce,
housing problems, unemployment, and school difficulties. Low SES families are exposed
to two to four times greater stress than those with significantly more financial resources.
The stress is greatest for poor women with children under six years of age. Id. at 1232
(citing George W. Brown et al., Social Class and Psychiatric Disturbance Among Women in an
Urban Population, 9 Soc. 225 (1975)). Lower income families also find themselves subject
to the stress multiplier effect. As a chronic stress, poverty functions to increase the stress of
childhood illness, drug use or divorce.
394. Id. at 1231.
395. Id. (citing Ross A. Thompson et al., Stability of Infant-Mother Attachment and Its Rela-
tionship to Changing Life Circumstances in an Unselected Middle-Class Sample, 53 CHILD DEV. 144
(1982)).
396. Shonkoff defines social support as "the availability of meaningful and enduring
relationships that provide nurturance, security and a sense of interpersonal commitment."
Id. at 1232 (quoting Shonkoff, supra note 392). Further:
The benefits of social support fall into three categories: material supports (e.g.,
day care, nutritional supplements, availability of emergency help), emotional sup-
ports (e.g., friendships, counseling), and information/referral services (e.g., com-
munity resource availability, child-rearing techniques). Social support may derive
from formal networks (e.g., health care providers, educational services, or peer
groups) or informal networks (e.g., family, friends, or the media).
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socioeconomic status and low social support (which is associated with
decreased cognitive abilities at eight months, lower IQ and lower lan-
guage skills at four years and greater behavior problems among five to
eight year olds). Single parents are particularly susceptible to isolation,
thus limiting their children's capacity to spend time with stable adults
with positive parenting skills.3 9 7 In contrast, mothers with high social
support appear more satisfied with their lives in general and feel better
about their roles as mothers.5 98 High social support also results in re-
duced incidence of maternal depression,3 99 anxiety and other psychiat-
ric problems.
Mothers of children exposed to drugs particularly need a high de-
gree of social support as a reserve for the patience and confidence nec-
essary to deal with their challenging infants. Mothers who feel a high
degree of support often use less punishment and are more responsive to
their infants. These mothers are better able to form positive relation-
ships and secure attachments with irritable infants. 40 0 Social support is
an extremely powerful factor since it is associated with a more organized
physical environment, the provision of appropriate play materials and a
wider range of stimulation for the child. Regardless of stress levels,
mothers who reported more social support are likely to provide more
and better stimulation to their infant children. 4 0 1 Numerous studies
have shown the stability and quality of the home environment to be one
of the most powerful predictors of positive developmental outcome. In
other words, the environment provided by Louise after birth will have a
greater effect on Andy's well-being than his cocaine exposure.
Maternal Depression. Depression is defined as a mood characterized
by sadness, helplessness, gloom, loss of interest, emotional emptiness
and a feeling of flatness. Inadequate financial resources, low educa-
tional attainment, recent immigrant status, race, poor housing, stressful
life events and inadequate social support all increase the incidence of
maternal depression. Given the correlation of the above with low socio-
economic status, it is not surprising to find 500% more depressed low
socioeconomic status women than middle-class women. 40 2  The
younger the mother is at the time of her first child and the greater
Id. at 1232 (citing D. Unger & D. Powell, Supporting Families Under Stress: The Role of Social
Networks, 29 FAM. REL. 566 (1980)).
397. Id. at 1232 (citing Marsha Weinraub & Barbara M. Wolf, Effects of Stress and Social
Supports on Mother-Child Interactions in Single- and Two-Parent Families, 54 CHILD DEV. 1297,
1307 (1983)).
398. Id. (citing Virginia D. Abernathy, Social Network and Response to the Maternal Role, 3
INT'LJ. SOCIOLOGY FAM. 86 (1973)).
399. Id. (citing Suezanne Tangerose Orr & Sherman James, Maternal Depression in an
Urban Pediatric Practice: Implications for Health Care Delivery, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 363
(1984)).
400. Id. (citing Susan B. Crockenberg, Infant Irritability, Mother Responsiveness, and Social
Support Influences on the Security of Infant-Mother Attachment, 52 CHILD DEV. 857 (1981)).
401. Id. (citing John M. Pascoe et al., The Association Between lothers' Social Support and
Provision of Stimulation to Their Children, 2 J. DEV. BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 15 (1981)).
402. Id. (citing George W. Brown et al., Social Class and PsYchiatric Disturbance Among IWo-
men in ot Urban Population, 9 Soc. 225 (1975)).
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number of young children she has, the greater the risk for depression.
Maternal depression is associated with many children's problems such as
sleep problems, depression, attention deficit disorder, socially isolating
behaviors at school age and withdrawn and defiant behavior during ado-
lescence. 40 3 Even three-month-old infants will respond negatively when
their mothers simulate a depressed mood.
40 4
The synergistic effect of these factors is disturbing. An increase in
stress causes greater depression, which impairs the mother's capacity to
secure adequate social support. This, in turn, causes more stress, stimu-
lating yet a more dangerous degree of maternal depression. Through
the home environment and the parent-child relationship, these risks are
passed on to the child. Examining the above factors in an ecological
context, it is small wonder that two-thirds of all children who test as
mildly retarded have grown up in poverty.40 5 The greater tragedy is
that 75% of this retardation was likely caused by preventable socioeco-
nomic related factors, including reduction in maternal alcohol use. One
good relationship with a parent (or parent figure) has been shown to
significantly reduce psychiatric risk for children.
40 6
C. Redefining Treatment: Healing, Culture and Community
As a term, treatment focuses much more upon the process than the
product or the entity being treated. Treatment can be applied equally
well to cargo, chemicals, the ill and the addicted. 40 7 The human rela-
tions inherent in some of these treatment programs appear to be ig-
nored. Like chemotherapy, a method of cancer treatment, drug
403. Id. at 1233 (citing Myrna M. Weissman et al., Depressed Parents and Their Children:
General Health, Social, and Psychiatric Problems, 140 AM.J. DISEASES OF CHILDREN 801, 803-04
(1986)).
404. Id. (citing Jeffrey F. Cohn & Edward Z. Tronick, Three-Month-Old Infants' Reaction to
Simulated Maternal Depression, 54 CHILD DEV. 185, 192 (1983)).
405. Id. (citing Shonkoff, supra, note 392 at 171).
406. Id. (citing Michael Rutter, Early Sources of Security and Competence, in HUMAN GROWTH
AND DEVELOPMENT: WOLFSON COLLEGE LECTURES, 1976 (Jerome S. Bruner & Alison Gar-
ton eds., 1978)); Michael Rutter, Special Report: Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mecha-
nisms, 57 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 316, 321 (1987). Dire circumstances do not always
dictate dire outcomes. There is a small population of high risk, highly vulnerable children
who excel in relationships, school and life. To study these children, Garmezy has sug-
gested three categories of protective factors: (i) the personality characteristics of the child.
(High self-esteem in the sense of self-mastery); (ii) a supportive, stable and cohesive fam-
ily unit; and (iii) positive community support systems and relationships. Id. at 1234 (citing
N. Garmezy, Stress, Competence and Development: Continuities in the Study of Schizophrenic Adults,
Children Vulnerable to Psychopathology, and the Search for the Stress-Resistant Child, 57 AM. J. OR-
THOPSYCHIATRY 159 (1987)). The protective factors of family and community are perhaps
the most effective deterrent of maternal drug use and the most ignored and underfunded
in our war on drugs.
407. The term "treatment" does not come from the family of words associated with
healing or relationships. One root word for the term "treatment" is tractare (latin) for "to
handle" or "to deal with." Thus, metal can be treated with an acid to produce a desired
effect. Medically speaking, treatment is a prescribed manner of handling something or a
process for handling something. In recent decades, treatment refers to waste (e.g., sewage
treatment, radioactive waste treatment, emissions treatment, etc.). In this sense, "drug




treatment concerns itself more with the completion of a process upon
the individual than with the ultimate goal. The term healing40 8 recog-
nizes that the individual is not "whole" and that every person's "whole-
ness" is different. Healing is incompatible with punishment.
Punishment derives from the root term "pain" which in turn, derives
from older terms concerning the need "to pay for injury." Healing
forces us to look more deeply into the individual subject. Healing as-
sumes each case is unique, whereas treatment is a process that prefers
mass application. The healer should always be mindful that the laws as
written are always less than the laws of life. Healing, unlike treatment,
begins with a voluntary act by the diseased. Healing cannot be com-
pelled as treatment can. In epidemiologic terms, treatment can be a vec-
tor for punishment. One is given "the treatment" if one misbehaves.
Treatment is thus often "infected" with punishment.
Under the healing model, we apply the ecological analysis with the
assumption that the mother is abusing alcohol because she, her family
and her community are not properly functioning. Thus, the mother is
not "whole," and the purpose of healing is to make her "whole." The
healing process endeavors to provide opportunities to replace the miss-
ing parts of home, family environment, safety, self-esteem, community,
employability and job skills that are lacking in her life.
This healing model also applies to the treatment of child abuse
which, under the disease model, is commonly assumed to be "in-
tergenerational." The term "intergenerational" is an aphorism for the
term "disease." However, a national sample of child abuse found that
there was only "an 18 percent rate of transmission from parent to
child."'4 0 9 When focusing on predominately single mothers living in
poverty with high stress and few social supports, the intergenerational
rate of transfer almost tripled.4 10 By focusing on what prevents the per-
petuation of abuse, instead of what causes it, research found that pre-
ventive factors include extensive social and community supports,
improved parenting skills, parental self-confidence, parents' ability to
deal openly with their experience of abuse as children and the creation
of a stable relationship "with another adult-'a relative, teacher, minis-
ter, [or] friend-who is emotionally nurturing.' ",411 The ecological
analysis presumes that any form of treatment that fails to integrate train-
ing and problem solving, job skills, behavioral family therapy, social
skills training and building relations within the community is unlikely to
succeed. The Community Reinforcement Approach, which involves
many of the above processes, has shown a much higher level of success
408. "Healing" refers to the goal, and is derived from the old English, hal, meaning
"whole" or "healthy" in the sense of complete in one's body, mind and spirit. MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1043 (1962).
409. PEELE, supra note 35, at 280 (citing M. Straus, Family Patterns and Child Abuse in a
Aationally Representative Sample, 3 IN'LJ. CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 213 (1979)).
410. Joan Kaufman & Edward Zigler, Do Abused Children Become Abusive Parents?, 57 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 186 (1987).
411. PEELE, supra note 35, at 280 (quoting D. Goleman, Sad Legacy ofAbuse: The Search
for Remedies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at Cl, C6).
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than any of the established methods of alcohol treatment in which the
treatment industry has deeply invested.4 12
Culture as Healing. Among some Canadian tribes with very high rates
of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, entire villages rallied together, reasserting
norms of their traditional culture to support pregnant mothers to not
drink during their pregnancy.41 3  Hispanic and Black women have a
higher abstinence rate than White women so long as their underlying
culture remains strong. When the Hispanic community becomes accul-
tured (or decultured) to White norms, the abstinence rate among His-
panic women drops significantly. 4 14 However, substantial penalties can
accrue to those trying to maintain their cultures or even those with ac-
cents.4 15 Loss of traditional culture can be related to loss of resistance
to drugs. Culture is very difficult to define and certainly not limited to
minorities. However, culture in whatever form is part of the web of so-
cial supports crucial for mothers. Parenting programs for minorities,
which are based on white family norms, show about as much success as
drug treatment programs for women designed for men. However, when
parenting programs are adapted (or transculturated) to Hispanic and
Black family values, parenting education is more effective. 41 6 The likeli-
hood of securing prenatal care would be significantly increased by the
existence of community medical clinics sensitive to the mother's culture
(or cultures). By trusting in the clinic, she would also be honoring her
culture. The resulting doctor-patient trust level is likely to be much
412. Id. at 262 (citing W.R. Miller & R.K. Hester, The Effectiveness Of Alcoholism Treatment:
What Research Reveals, in TREATING ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS: PROCESSES OF CHANGE (W.R.
Miller & N.K. Heather eds., 1986)).
413. ANN PYTKOWICZ STREISSGUTH ET AL., DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES, THE CHILD DEVELOPMENT-MENTAL RETARDATION CENTER, AND THE ALCOHOLISM
& DRUG ABUSE INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, A MANUAL ON ADOLESCENTS AND
ADULTS WITH FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AMERICAN INDIANS
(2nd ed. Oct. 1, 1988).
414. Abandonment occurs on a cultural level where particular cultures are devalued or
even denigrated as being backward or dysfunctional. When, for example, a native ameri-
can culture does not share the values of the dominant culture, this culture is denigrated as
a barrier to progress (assimilation). For example, although everyone speaks with an ac-
cent, only certain people are recognized as having an "accent." Some accents (high brit-
ish) are valued and others (Filipino, Hispanic, Black) are often devalued. For an excellent
study of such linguistic and cultural discrimination, see Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:
Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and the Jurisprudence of the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329, 1330, 1336-39 (1991).
415. A. M. Alcocer, Alcohol Use and Abuse Among the Hispanic American Population, SPECIAL
POPULATION ISSUES, ALCOHOL & HEALTH REP., 4 NIAAA 361 (1990). In San Diego there
was a fivefold increase in the number of Hispanic women whose newborns tested positive
for speedball (heroin and amphetamines). The loss of traditional cultural values may be a
significant factor in this increase. Conversation with Dr. Suzanne Dixon, Professor of Pe-
diatrics, San Diego State University (Mar. 20, 1992).
416. The Center for the Improvement of Child Caring in Studio City, California has
developed and evaluated the Effective Black Parenting Program and the Los Ninos Bien
Educados Prevention Program. Each has shown significant success in reaching and teach-
ing inner city black and hispanic mothers (and a few fathers) important parenting skills.
HECTOR F. MYERS ET AL., CENTER FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF CHILD CARING, THE EFFECTIVE
BLACK PARENTING PROGRAM: A CONTROLLED RESEARCH STUDY WITH INNER CITY BLACK
FAMILIES 26-33 (Oct. 1990). Amado M. Padilla & Lily Alvarez, Evaluation Report of the Los
Ninos Bien Educados Prevention Program, prepared for the Santa Clara County Bureau of Drug
Abuse Services I (Sept. 30, 1991).
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higher than of an anonymous resident in a teaching hospital on the
other side of town.
Community as Healing. The medical evidence suggests that no thera-
peutic technique, no medical treatment and no legal intervention can
help these children as much as a viable community that meets the child's
basic human needs. Majority culture psychology may focus too narrowly
on the individual ego or the individual relationship as the unit of care.
Community psychology would rekindle the healing aspects of neighbor-
hoods. Instead of having groups of individuals who meet to explore
their shared problem of alcohol or other substance abuse, a community
psychology would encourage the meeting and affiliation of families, par-
ticularly families that consist of single mothers and their parents. Com-
munity psychology increases the degree of responsibility held by
community members for the condition of community members. The
Berkeley Alcohol Research Group found that less developed nations
maintained a high level of responsibility within the local community for
dealing with alcohol and alcohol related problems, whereas more indus-
trialized countries delegated these problems to centralized agencies and
professionals. 4 17 The ecological model proposes that alcohol and drug
abuse is something for which all members of the community have some
degree of responsibility. Community psychology also recognizes the
healing effect of helping those who are less fortunate. The differences
between actual community and therapeutic community are signifi-
cant. 4 18 In sum, the ecological analysis assumes that the context of healing is just
as important as the content. Healing that fails to honor the community is
unlikely to be of significant use in preventing maternal alcohol and sub-
stance abuse.
4 19
417. The group found:
Studying the period since 1950 in seven industrialized countries [including Cali-
fornia in the U.S.] . . . we were struck by the concomitant growth of treatment
provisions in all of these countries. The provision of treatment, we felt, became a
societal alibi for dismantling the long-standing structures of control of drinking
behavior ....
PEELE, supra note 35, at 269 (quoting R. Room, "Closing Statement" Evaluating Recovery
Outcomes, 43 (Proceedings of conference published by Program on Alcohol Issues, Univer-
sity Extension, University of California, San Diego (1988)).
Dr. Peele bluntly concludes: "The institution of modem medical and social services
systems for dealing with problems like alcoholism coincides exactly with the removal of the
forces most effective in curtailing these problems in the first place." PEELE, supra note 35,
at 269.
418. For example, much of corporate America has been involved in a variety of "team-
building" exercises where managers and line employees get together and attempt to relate
on a variety of trust building exercises, such as falling backwards into the arms of their
colleagues. The "feelings of community" that are created tend not to endure. In contrast,
General Electric gave 500 of its employees the day off to construct a major shelter for St.
Vincent De Paul. In one day, the group accomplished what would have taken months
under the planned construction schedule with workers and managers sweating shoulder to
shoulder.
The entire effort was devoid of the therapeutic rhetoric of team-building and created
longer lasting team spirit and teamwork than any prior endeavor for the same period. The
shared experience of having a "chance to do good" was the most powerful aspect of the
experience. Id. at 272 (citing CNN television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1989).
419. The ecological model recognizes that our immune system is not simply biological.
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D. Redefining Prevention: Intervening in Adolescence
The problem of mothers is part of the larger problem of drug use
among adolescents. Childhood mortality was in decline from the early
1900s to the 1970s. Since the 1980s, we have witnessed a striking in-
crease in adolescent death. 4 20 This peril is shared mostly by abandoned
adolescents. One large study found that over 50% of teens completed
adolescence without significant trauma to their functioning performance
and relationships, 33% had minor intermittent problems and 12% had
adolescence characterized by difficulty, disruption and harm. Fifty per-
cent of this group had significant psychiatric problems.4 2 1 High-risk be-
havior, disturbed relationships, school problems and challenges to
parental authority are frequently associated with teenage drug abuse.
4 2 2
Until the 19 80s, much adolescent drug use was attributed to "acting
out." Since then, a strong correlation between adolescent depression
and drug use has been found. 423 The overall rate of depression is
higher in adolescents than adults and higher among female adolescents
than males.4 24 Adolescents in poverty have significantly higher rates of
depression than their more privileged peers.
4 2 5
Female adolescence, like childbirth, is a difficult transition. The eti-
ology of female adolescent depression is similar to maternal depression.
A number of studies have demonstrated an association between depres-
sion and drug use.42 6 Adolescence, like motherhood, can be a severe
On a physical level it involves infection, malnutrition and undernutrition. On a psycholog-
ical level it involves self esteem, dealing with the wounds of the past and the depression of
the present. On the familial level, it concerns communication skills, relational skills, ne-
gotiation skills and parenting skills. On the communal level it concerns the persons sense
of "belonging," the strength of church's, community centers, family to family relations,
meeting minimum support needs, treatment, education, cultural support and identity. On
a societal level it concerns ensuring that all children are provided decent housing, educa-
tion, health care, safety, and self esteem regardless of the station of their birth or the status
of their parents.
420. Neela P. Joshi & Marcia Scott, Drug Use, Depression, and Adolescents, 35 PEDIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 1349 (1988).
42 1. Daniel Offer & Anne C. Petersen, Child Psychiatry Perspectives: Adolescent Psychiatry,
21 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 86 (1982).
422. Drug abuse, therefore, is often seen as the primary cause of morbidity and
mortality in adolescents. It has become the symbol of "what is wrong" with ado-
lescence. In fact, however, drug use is usually a symptom of pervasive developmental
disruption....
• .. Physicians can best interpret drug-using behaviors if they conceptualize them
as deviate attempts at coping and remember that the drugs . . . interfere with
social and emotional functioning and with interpersonal relationships, thereby
threatening normal development .... Whereas many children and adolescents
handle environmental stressors and developmental challenges well, others are
more vulnerable. Their development and functioning are characterized by frus-
trations and helplessness that make them especially susceptible to continuing or
intense drug use, deviant behavior, and developmental arrest.
Joshi & Scott, supra note 420, at 1349 (emphasis added).
423. Id. at 1350; E. Poznanski, Childhood Depression: The Outcome, 46 ACTA PAEDOP-
SYCHIATRICA 297 (1980-81).
424. Denise B. Kandel & Mark Davies, Epidemiology Depressive Mood in Adolescents - An
Empirical Study, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1205 (1982).
425. Stuart L. Kaplan et al., Epidemiology of Depressive Symptomatology in Adolescents, 23 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 91 (1984).
426. Joshi & Scott, supra note 420, at 1352.
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stress for the female with few social supports, low intelligence and low
self-esteem. 4 27 Adolescents flourish in the same environment in which
children flourish. Children reared in poorly structured, highly stressful
or chaotic environments will likely be less well-equipped to negotiate
challenges in their lives. They are at greater risk of encountering signifi-
cant depression when dealing with painful feelings and personal con-
flicts or social stigma. 428 Researchers find, that depression correlates
strongly with almost all aspects of low self-esteem. Long term low self-
esteem predicted initiation into drug use in a longitudinal study of jun-
ior and senior high school adolescents. 42 9 In keeping with the ecologi-
cal model, lack of mastery of social and intellectual skills, feelings of
powerlessness or inadequacy and lack of significant stable parental rela-
tionships have been associated with increased alcohol and drug use in
females.430
E. Sex and Contraception: Expanded Roles for Physicians and Nurses
The factors that fuel teen drug use also fuel teen sexuality. Women
of low socioeconomic status backgrounds report initiating drug use and
sex not for their own needs as much as to meet the needs of their male
friend. Children from higher income, higher support families are more
likely to delay sexual activity. If they do engage in sex, they are more
likely to use contraception than children from lower socioeconomic sta-
tus backgrounds and more challenging family situations.4 3 1 The same
high self-esteem that deters drug abuse also defers sex or unprotected
sex. Many girls with low self-esteem are more likely to remedy their self-
427. The challenge of coming of age and becoming a mother may be overwhelming.
Adolescent depression may reflect a difficult family heritage. Children of parents with
major mood disorders show significantly higher rates of mood disorders in comparison
with children of controls. Twin studies indicates there is some basis for arguing for a
genetic vulnerability (but not a certainty) for alcohol and drug abuse. Helen Orvaschel et
al., Assessing the Psychopathology of Children of Psychiatrically Disturbed Parents: A Pilot Study, 20J.
AMER. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 112 (1981).
428. Depression results when the stress to the adolescent becomes unbearable and
they are unable to secure sufficient social support to deal with their problems. Drug de-
pendence may stimulate further withdrawal from the social networks necessary to meet
their needs. This is not to say that all youngsters who use drugs are depressed or dysfunc-
tional. Many adolescents simply use drugs during brief periods of acute crises. SeeJoshi &
Scott, supra note 420.
429. Donna L. Yanish &James Battle, Relationship Between Self-Esteem, Depression and Alco-
hol Consumption Among Adolescents, 57 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 331 (1985); Howard B. Kaplan,
Antecedents of Deviant Responses: Predictingfrom a General Theory of Deviant Behavior, 6J. YOUTH
ADOLESC. 89 (1977);Joshi & Scott, supra note 420, at 1355.
430. LindaJ. Beckman, Self-Esteem of Women Alcoholics, 39J. STUD. ALCOHOL 491 (1978);
LindaJ. Beckman, Perceived Antecedents and Effects of Alcohol Consumption in Women, 41 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 518 (1980); Gene M. Smith & Charles P. Fogg, Psychological Predictors of Early Use,
Late Use and Von-Use of larihuana Among Teen-age Students, in LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON
DRUG USE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 101 (Denise B. Kandel ed.,
1978); Gene M. Smith & Charles P. Fogg, Psychological Antecedents of Teenage Drug Use, in I
RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH: AN ANNUAL COMPILATION OF RESEARCH 87
(Roberta G. Simmons ed., 1979).
431. Linda M. Grant & Efstratios Demetriou, Adolescent Sexuality, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS
N. AM. 1271 (1988); Edward Herold et al., Self-Esteem, Locus of Control and Adolescent Contra-
ception, 101 J. PSYCHOL. 83 (1979).
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doubt by over-investing in early intimate relationships. 43 2 The same
young women are more likely to rely on their boyfriends for sexual deci-
sion making. 4 33 A parallel structure emerges of teenage women engag-
ing in unprotected sex to enhance their relationship followed later by
engagement in drug use to enhance their relationship followed still later
by becoming pregnant to enhance their relationship. Males, in contrast,
tend to engage in sex, like drug use, for the enjoyment of the act. If the
unit of decision-making for engaging in unprotected sex and dangerous
drug use is the couple, then we must develop programs addressing and
supporting the relationship the young woman desires to preserve, pro-
vided that it becomes less harmful. Our preferred theories of psychol-
ogy define healthy self-hood as an intact individual self-sufficient ego.
We need a different psychology that does not assume the self alone is
health, rather that the self in relation is health.
4 34
Seen this way, part of the problem of fetal harm is the problem of
contraception. Comprehensive sex education and family planning could
prevent 313,000 teen pregnancies each year. 4 35 Surveys indicate that
less than 10% of the sex education programs cover the necessary spec-
trum of sexual issues.4 36  In 1985, the total AFDC benefits to women
who had their first child as teenagers was $16.65 billion.4 3 7 These costs
are largely preventable if there is a willingness within society to implement
comprehensive sex education and family planning practices. 4 38 The in-
cidence of fifteen to nineteen year old adolescent girls engaging in sex
rose from 28% in 1971 to 46% in 1979. 43 9 The fact that "[a]dolescent
birth rates remain considerably higher in the United States than in most
other developed countries" 440 may be related to the fact that "[t]he use
of contraceptives by adolescents in the United States is relatively low
and inconsistent.', 4 4 1 Knowledge and availability of contraception does
432. A large percentage of low SES, low self-esteem girls report engaging in sex to
please their boyfriends even though they do no derive any direct enjoyment from it. Grant
& Demetriou, supra note 431, at 1278 (citing C.S. CHILMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN A CHANGING AMERICAN SOCIETY: SO-
CIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, publication No. (NIH) 79-1426 (1978)).
433. Id. (citing G. Cvetkovich & B. Grote, Psychosocial Development and the Social Problems
with Teenage Illegitimacy, in U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADOLESCENT PREG-
NANCY AND CHILDBEARING: FINDINGS FROM RESEARCH 15-41 (C.S. Chilman ed. 1980) pub-
lication No. (NIH) 81-2077).
434. See, e.g., JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976);
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOP-
MENT (1982).
435. Grant & Demetriou, supra note 431, at 1273 (citing ALAN GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE,
TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY (1981)); see also Joshi &
Scott, supra note 420.
436. 1 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY AND
CHILDBEARING, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEAR-
ING (Cheryl D. Hayes ed., 1986).
437. Grant & Demetriou, supra note 431, at 1275 (citing M.R. Burt, Estimating the Public
Costs of Teenage Childbearing, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 221 (1986)).
438. Id. at 1273.
439. Id. at 1272 (citing M. Zelnik & J.F. Kantner, Sexual Activity, Contraceptive Use and
Pregnancy Among Aletropolitan-Area Teenagers. 1971-1979, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 230 (1980)).
440. Id. at 1274-75 (citing GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 435.
441. Id. at 1273.
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not guarantee proper use. Teenage girls delay seeking contraceptive
services an average of 16.6 months from their first intercourse and
younger teenage girls wait even longer.4 4 2 One-half of all premarital
pregnancies occur during the first six months of sexual activity and more
than 20% occur in the first month of sexual activity.
4 4 3
Another factor contributing to the failure to use contraception is
the developmental level of the young woman. Piaget found that one-
third of the adults he worked with never fully matured to the level of
formal operational thinking. 44 4 It is likely that many young women vul-
nerable to teenage sex and drug abuse are capable of little or no "for-
mal" operational thinking. Our efforts at deterring drug use and
unprotected sex should be revised to reach this audience. 44 5 Teenage
pregnancy could be significantly reduced if pediatricians and public
health nurses modelled appropriate sex education in schools and com-
munity clinics. 4 46 Contraception use is likely to be increased within a
stable and trusting relationship with a pediatrician. 44 7 The breadth of
the ecologic analysis demands a new standard that better captures in-
fants harmed by drugs, their environment and other sources.
442. Laurie Schwab Zabin & Samuel D. Clark, Jr., Why They Delay: A Study of Teenage
Family Planning Clinic Patients, 13 FAM. P.AN. PERSP. 205, 212 (1981).
443. Laurie Schwab Zabin et al., The Risk of Adolescent Pregnancy in the First Months of
Intercourse, 11 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 215, 215 (1979).
444. J. Piaget, Intellectual Evolution From Adolescence to Adulthood, 15 HUMAN DEV. 1 (1972).
These adolescents move from the state of "concrete" operational thinking to "formal"
operation thinking. Concrete operational thinking is based in the present time and, with
the help of hormones, often infuses a sense of being special that provides many adoles-
cents a perceived immunity from mishaps and an enhanced sense of infallibility (small
wonder why crack is so attractive). The following stage, formal operational thinking, re-
flects the increased capacity to think further into the future and to specifically engage in
extensive abstract thinking where the fantasy of sex can be distinguished from the reality.
445. The American Academy of Pediatricians has developed sample curriculum and
reading lists regarding such "concrete" sex education. Grant & Demetriou, supra note
431, at 1283.
446. Ciaran S. Phibbs et al., The Neonatal Costs of Maternal Cocaine Use, at 3JAMA (forth-
coming) (citations omitted). A conservative and detailed study in a large inner city public
hospital comparing cocaine exposed birth costs to a random sample of births without fetal
drug exposure indicates significantly longer hospital stays and costs of $5,000 - 11,000
more than non-exposed infants. This increase in cost does not include the added cost of
border babies or the costs of physicians, because the hospital involved was a teaching hospi-
tal. This estimate included only the costs incurred until medical discharge from the hospi-
tal. The lifelong special needs of cocaine exposed children and the particular pressures on
their mothers reduces the mother's employability and the reduced productivity of the co-
caine exposed child throughout their life are not factored in.
These staggering costs could be significantly reduced by the availability of appropriate
programs for preventing drug use among adolescents, for preventing pregnancy among
substance abusers, for comprehensive treatment programs for cocaine users with appro-
priate neo-natal and post delivery services. There is significant evidence that the harm
created by cocaine use during the first trimester can be significantly reduced if not elimi-
nated where the women enter treatment programs and cease using cocaine for the remain-
der of their pregnancy. Those mothers with prenatal care had average hospital costs
$4,300 to $5,000 less than those without prenatal care. Id. at 9-10. Even a conservative
analysis of the data suggests that comprehensive programs of drug use prevention, drug
use treatment, pregnancy prevention, and prenatal care would be cost effective immedi-
ately. An investment in prenatal care saves over $500 million in direct hospital expenses
and even more in post hospital rehabilitation expenses. Id. at 13.
447. Grant & Demetriou, supra note 431, at 1283.
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F. Toward a New Standard. The Challenged Parent and the Challenged Child
The new standard should have the following attributes:
It should be neutral. The new standard should not label the parent
as being "dysfunctional," "impaired" or otherwise guilty. Most poor
mothers who abuse drugs already suffer from significant depression and
low self-esteem. It makes no sense to further undermine their confi-
dence with a charge of neglect.
4 48
It should be non-pejorative. The standard should not discriminate
against the abandoned (minorities, the poor, the homeless, single
mothers, gays, addicts or people with AIDS). Our children can ill afford
the price of unreasoned prejudice.
It should be inclusive of all levels of responsibility. The ecological
approach suggested above includes responsibility on the level of the in-
dividual, the family, the community and society.
It should be epidemiological and thereby preventive. The focus
should be on the medical harm to the fetus, not the harm to our com-
monly held values. In other words, a poor Black pregnant woman using
drugs intravenously should be viewed with no less disfavor than a
wealthy pregnant woman abusing barbiturates and alcohol in the privacy
of her estate. The epidemiologic model understands that the interven-
tion must be tailored to each situation. While the wealthy mother and
her estate may benefit from rehabilitation through a private hospital, the
poor IV drug using woman likely needs habilitative services focusing on
securing adequate food, decent housing, education for parenting skills
and counseling to deal with the strong likelihood that she was subject to
sexual or physical abuse and has experienced long periods of low self-
esteem and depression.
It should not deter parents from fully utilizing the health care sys-
tem. A physician cannot maintain a "healing" confidential relationship
if he or she must also play "cop." Thus, while it is certainly reasonable
to require physician reporting of physical and sexual abuse, it is equally
important not to require the reporting of drug use and neglect. This
gives the treating physician the option to report only when he or she
believes that all other options have been exhausted.
It should be administered in a fashion that would enhance and em-
power the parents, their family and the community within which they
reside. As indicated above, social supports, home environment and
community resources are key factors in a child's capacity to fulfill his or
her potential and a parent's capacity to overcome a traumatic childhood,
learn parenting skills and to cease drug abusing behaviors.
Presently, there is no standard that encompasses abandoned fe-
tuses, newborns and young children. Within the medical community,
the most common measure is anthropometric (the infants size and
weight). Fetuses who are traumatized by their external environment
448. Unless and until a thorough exploration of all ahernatives is done and reveals that
such a conclusion would be appropriate.
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(i.e., drugs, stress disease or undernutrition) or their internal function
(i.e., some congenital deformities or genetic conditions) are usually
born early and small. For the fetus, the diagnosis is intrauterine growth
retardation (IUGR)44 9 and for the newborn it is failure to thrive
(FTT).4 50 The rate of FTT infants amongst the abandoned (poor or
uninsured) is estimated to be 500% greater than amongst the in-
sured. 4 5 1 Fetal exposure to nicotine, many prescription drugs and con-
trolled substances results in retarded growth. Maternal stress,
malnutrition,45 2 maternal depression and chronic maternal illness or in-
fection from use of IV drugs can also result in FTT. 4 53 While the FTT
standard is much more appropriate than "drug-exposed child," it is not
adequate.4 5 4 Many infants with FAE, significant heroin exposure or
other traumas can rapidly gain weight after birth and be normally sized
by twelve to eighteen months. While they are no longer FTT, they may
likely have lifelong impairments in judgment and cognitive skills. FT'
measures only physical "thriving," not intellectual, emotional or rela-
tional "thriving," which are equally important to the child. 45 5 To mea-
sure emotional and relational thriving demands an inquiry into the
relationship between parents (who may have been FTT), home environ-
ment and child. FIT may not capture this. Thus, FTT is necessary, but
an insufficient standard.
A better standard can be derived from the concept of abandonment.
If every abandonment the child suffers challenges the child's capacity to
thrive, then the concept of a "challenged child" should be more inclu-
sive. Challenges to the child include IUGR, FTT, FAS, FAE,4 5 6 NAS,
449. Birth weight less than tenth percentile for gestational age. Frank & Zeisel, supra
note 97, at 1192.
450. Id. at 1187. "In broadest terms, failure to thrive refers to infants and children
whose growth deviates from the norms for their age and sex." Id.
451. FIT has been diagnosed in 3-5% of infants in academic pediatric hospitals and
15-30% of admissions to inner city emergency departments. Id. at 1187 (citations
omitted).
452. Malnutrition is the primary source of failure to thrive. Id. at 1187 (citations omit-
ted); Robert Listernick et al., Severe Primary Malnutrition in U.S. Children, 139 AM. J. DIs-
EASED CHILDREN 1157, 1160 (1985).
453. This standard depends upon an accurate determination of the fetus's age, usually
through ultrasound methods as well as a careful record of the child's birthweight, bir-
thlength, head circumference and gestational age. A child born premature for reasons
unrelated to failure to thrive could be mistakenly diagnosed.
454. It is over-inclusive since, as a strictly anthropometric measure, it includes congeni-
tally impaired infants of very well to do parents who have not been abandoned in any
sense of the word. Such infants rarely need the environmental and nutritional supports so
vital to abandoned FTT infants.
455. A broader standard that is being tracked in some states is High Priority Infant
Tracking (H-PIT). H-PIT tracks infants meeting one or more of nineteen eligibility crite-
ria (e.g., neonatal seizures, APGAR score of less than three at five minutes, low birth
weight, mother is fifteen years or under). Unfortunately, funding often is available only to
track but not to help these high risk infants. Telephone Interview with Donna White,
Director of H-PIT Program, Washington State Department of Health (Mar. 30, 1992); see
also THE HIGH PRIORITY INFANT TRACKING PROGRAM, DIVISION OF PARENT-CHILD HEALTH
SERVICES, HIGH PRIORITY INFANT TRACKING PROGRAM, WASHINGTON STATE FACT SHEET
(1991).
456. Along with the use of FAS/FAE, the term Alcohol Related Birth Defects (ARBD)
is commonly used. ARBD overlaps both FAS and FAE. FAS and FAE are used herein
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undernutrition, poor environment, lack of perinatal care, disease and
congenital problems unrelated to the child's economic circumstances.
Many "challenged" children have challenged parents whose childhood
traumas, poor education and continuing lack of social support limit their
capacity to parent and provide. The standard of a "challenged parent"
is preferable to an "impaired parent" because it is less stigmatizing and
more accurate. 4 57 "Challenges" can be met and sometimes overcome,
whereas "impairments" are more often actual damage that cannot be
reversed and can only be accommodated. 458 Children of pioneer wo-
men who lost their husbands in the perilous trek west over the great
plains faced an environment just as hostile as a typical inner city housing
project. Yet the pioneer mothers are viewed as heroines and the project
mothers as "impaired" or as "lazy welfare mothers.' 45 9 The concept of
"challenged" recognizes all environments that are hostile without pass-
ing judgment on the parents. The standard is neutral and non-pejora-
tive. It includes all responsible agents and is epidemiologically sound.
It well reflects the ecological model of causality since the characteristics
of the child, the mother and the environment are all considered when
making the diagnosis. It captures those infants suffering from drug ex-
posure and those suffering from malnutrition and poverty. After birth,
the standard can be used with equal ease since it captures the effects of
malnutrition, stress, chronic infection and exposures to environmental
threats such as lead.
4 60
because they are more precise. However, the symptoms of FAS can occur in the absence
of alcohol exposure. To remedy this ambiguity, Dr. Sterling Clarren proposes to use
"Smith Syndrome" (Dr. David Smith was the first to recognize FAS) instead of "Fetal Al-
cohol Syndrome." Telephone interview with Dr. Sterling Clarren, Pediatrician and Dys-
morphologist at the Children's Orthopedic Hospital, Seattle Washington (Mar. 30, 1992).
457. The mother is no longer diagnosed as "dysfunctional." Rather, she is viewed as
having her capacity to parent challenged by her experience of physical and sexual abuse,
adolescent trauma and lack of education and social supports. The experience of growing
up in poverty, having low self-esteem, failing to become successfully literate, being de-
pressed and having inadequate social supports would all be considered challenges that limit
the mother's inherent capacity to parent. Similarly, her child would be challenged by ex-
posure to drugs, stressful uterine environment, chaotic and unstable environment at birth,
malnutrition and lack of comprehensive perinatal medical care.
458. There are many parents who manage to parent adequately despite having horrible
childhoods. These parents are challenged (and deserve help to deal with long deferred
traumas, educational deficits and a hostile environment) but they are not "impaired" since
they manage to conceal the harms they have suffered. Whereas the non-challenged parent
might spend 50% of his or her daily energy parenting, the challenged parent might re-
quire 80%. The result is a parent who needs help but rarely asks for it for fear the result
could be a loss of the child to the state. In this sense, many challenged parents are under
the perpetual threat of losing their children to the state or the streets.
459. See, e.g., BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 164-70 (Gerda Lerner, ed. 1973);Jew-
ell Handy Gresham, The Politics of Family in America, THE NATION, July 24/31, 1989, at 116.
Abandonment occurs here in our assumptions that the high fatality rate among Whites in
Conestogas was due to the hostile environment, while the high fatality among Blacks in some
housing projects is due to the Moynihanesque "disintegration" of black families. Both
groups exposeed their children to a perilous environment, yet only those historically aban-
doned are deemed neglectful. As Daniel Moynihan noted: "At the heart of the deteriora-
tion of the fabric of the Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family." Roberts,
supra note 21, at 1442 (citing OFFICE OF PLANNING & POLICY RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5 (1965)).
460. The Second National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey indicated that
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This standard recognizes the special challenges of parenting a chal-
lenged child. Alcohol-exposed or malnourished children are likely to be
chronically ill and may overwhelm a parent who would be capable of
parenting a healthy child. Pediatricians recognize that such parents
need both enhanced parenting skills and a respite from the demands of
care if their children are to grow. This standard recognizes the myriad
abandonments suffered by their parents. 46 1 These "ghosts in the nurs-
ery" challenge the parents' capacity to appropriately respond to their
child's needs and further erodes the quality of the parent/child interac-
tion. The apathy and irritability of the malnourished child is perceived
as rejection by many mothers, which further enhances the mother's al-
ready sizable doubt that she can meet her child's needs.
46 2
G. A System for Challenged Children
Many mothers of challenged children view the child protective ser-
vice (CPS) and juvenile court as "the enemy." CPS threatens to take
their children in a procedure that is bewilderingly complex, public and
stigmatizing. While our present system of juvenile courts linked to fos-
ter care and dependency proceedings should remain in place for the
many cases of physical and sexual abuse, the needs of the challenged
child would be best met by developing a non-punitive parallel system. A
few attributes of such a system are as follows:
Confidentiality. Alcohol or drug using mothers are likely to avoid any
form of the prenatal care so necessary for their fetuses unless they can
be assured of confidentiality. The pediatrician and the mother need to
work together, not play "cops and abusers." The importance of a full
and open confidential relationship between mother and doctor cannot
be understated.4 63 Doctors are adamant that they cannot adequately
treat their pregnant clients unless they have won their trust sufficiently
to fully disclose their medical history. The earlier the physician is able
to detect IUGR, the easier it is to detect and reduce the harm. It is much
easier to reverse the effects of fetal malnutrition and stress than fetal
drug exposure. 4 64 With 20% of American children under the age of five
in poverty, the risk is immense. However, malnutrition extends far be-
yond those who are in poverty to parents who are temporarily unem-
small increases in blood lead levels correlated strongly with impaired growth. Frank &
Zeisel, supra note 97, at 1193 (citing Joel Schwartz et al., Relationship Between Childhood Blood
Levels and Stature, 77 PEDIATRICS 281 (1986)).
461. Parents of challenged children were often deprived or abused as children, subjected
to chronic illness, depression, intellectual impairment, marital conflict and, perhaps most
importantly, isolation from relatives and the surrounding community. Id. at 1195 (citations
omitted).
462. Id. at 1188 (citations omitted).
463. Only by knowing the mother's entire history of possibly inappropriate behaviors
can the physician begin to ascertain the appropriate support systems that should be made
available to her to minimize the future harm to her fetus. There are a variety of question-
naires that can be integrated into such interviews that would allow the physician to detect
with reasonable certainty that the mother might be abusing drugs without the risk of di-
rectly asking her.
464. Frank & Zeisel, supra note 97, at 1192.
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ployed or parents employed at or near minimum wage. 46 5 The federal
government's decision to largely abandon poor children in the 1980s
resulted in a vast increase in families who do not qualify for AFDC. For
those lucky enough to qualify, the benefits rarely compensate for prior
malnutrition.
4 6 6
The medical community has developed protocols for maintaining
confidentiality in treating AIDS patients. Persons with AIDS are sub-
jected to an immense and unfair degree of discrimination that is parallel
to our historic discrimination against poor women, particularly poor wo-
men who use drugs. By maintaining confidential registries of people
with AIDS, physicians are able to deliver comprehensive medical treat-
ment without ever providing notice to any public authority that an indi-
vidual has AIDS. The same could be done for mothers with challenged
children.
4 6 7
The system must minimize or remove stigma from all aspects of its
function. For example, there should be no more diagnoses that a belea-
guered mother's family is "dysfunctional." The term dysfunctional is
ambiguous, needlessly negative and acts more like a badge of abandon-
ment than an assessment of parental skills. Every family has some de-
gree of function, so at best the term is an oxymoron, somewhat like the
phrase "unrelated relationship." "Dysfunctional" implies complete fail-
ure, giving the mother a sense of hopelessness and an excuse to no
longer try to improve her difficult situation. Terms like the "impaired
parent" or the "disturbed" or "retarded" or "developmentally delayed"
child are similarly objectionable. Instead of negatively labelling the
mother's relationship with her child as "impaired attachment" or the
more simplistic concept of "maternal deprivation," her relationship with
her child could be viewed as a "challenged attachment." For diagnostic
purposes, the pediatrician would make an inventory of the challenges
facing the mother, the child, the father and the relations between them.
The "challenge inventory" would include biological, psychological, eco-
nomic and social factors.
465. Id. at 1194 (citations omitted); see generally H. Peter Chase & Harold P. Martin,
Undernutrition and Child Development, 282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 933, 938-39 (1970); Listernick,
et al., supra note 452.
466. The WIC program reaches less than half of eligible families with pregnant women
and young children. Of those it reaches, parents report difficulty paying for infant formula
once the child's needs outstrip the 26 ounces per day provided by the program. Frank &
Zeisel, supra note 97, at 1194 (citingJ.E. McJunkin et al., Errors in Formula Concentration In
An Outpatient Population, 1 IJ. PEDIATRICS 848 (1987)).
Food stamps allow approximately $.49 per meal per person. Id. (citingJ.L. BROWN &
H.F. PIZER, LIVING HUNGRY IN AMERICA (1987)). In addition, food stamps create signifi-
cant stress to the mother due to the stigma of using them in public and the refusal of many
shop keepers and store owners to accept them.
467. Many of the mothers of challenged children are at great risk of contracting AIDS
through use of unsterilized needles and through sexual relations with males who carry the
virus. The gay community succeeded in radically reducing the incidence of new AIDS
cases within its ranks by instituting a systematic and comprehensive delivery of medical
services and prevention education to its community. Could we not make a similar effort




Continuous medical oversight. Juvenile courts provide oversight so
long as the child is "at risk." Under the challenged child system, the
pediatrician and school nurses could stay with the child through adoles-
cence into young adulthood. The relationship should begin with com-
prehensive prenatal care extending to perinatal follow-up through the
brain blossom period ending at age three or four. The provider's role
should continue as the child enters Head Start and any remedial pro-
grams into grade school with the pediatrician helping the child to be
comfortable with his or her body and the challenges that must be faced.
In junior high school, the provider would ensure that the child was posi-
tively and thoroughly explained the nature of sexuality and have a com-
fortable perception of his or her body leading to a thorough grounding
in contraception and family planning. Once the child develops intimate
relationships, the provider could also be consulted regarding decisions
about sexuality, childbirth, contraception and abortion. Particularly in
the case of significantly challenged mothers, the provider becomes a
pseudo-parental figure who may play a key role in the child's capacity to
overcome the biological and environmental insults experienced earlier
in life.
Community Support. The ecological model is community based and
reflects positive community cultural values. For the abandoned mother,
social supports in the form of extended family and community services
are critical to her capacity to recover and meet the needs of her child.
Many mothers are simply unable to travel long distances to hospitals to
secure medical care for lack of funds and inability to secure day care
while they are gone. The ecological model recognizes that a mother's
likelihood of recovering depends upon the strength and accessibility of
the community around her. Community based services would extend to
using public schools in the evening for classes on parenting, nutrition,
job skills, incest and physical abuse survivors groups and housing advo-
cacy groups. Churches in the community would be encouraged to make
their facilities available for the support of the families within the area of
their congregation.
Many challenged mothers of challenged children need habilitation
rather more than rehabilitation. The "healing" model is more appropri-
ate than treatment in that the mothers are not yet "whole" in regard to
the basic skills necessary for parenting and survival. Habilitative sup-
port involves basic parenting, education, nutrition, self care, contracep-
tion, counseling for dealing with prior traumas of incest, abuse and
neglect, couple counseling for dispute settlement and fair fighting, re-
medial education, literacy, basic financial planning and job skills. Gen-
erally speaking, rehabilitation is not appropriate until significant
progress has been made in habilitation. Rehabilitation would involve
addressing the challenges of drug use, relational conflicts and self-es-
teem deficits, which would include family counseling with fathers or hus-
bands, children, parents and relatives. Assertiveness training might also
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be appropriate. The most important rehiabilitation may be the legal
reclamation of the extended family.
VI. EXPANDING THE FAMILY TO PROTECT: THE CONCEPT OF Co-
PARENT
Where the mother is severely challenged, the extended family
should be encouraged to assist. Unfortunately, the present legal struc-
ture places concerned grandparents and relatives of the embattled
mother in an adversarial relationship with her. In order for relatives to
have authority to play an active role in her child's life, the mother must
"lose" some or all of her custodial rights. The cost and trauma of such
confrontational proceedings drain precious resources from families.
The scars resulting from such proceedings make many relatives reluc-
tant to try to protect the next child born to the challenged mother.
Among Native American communities and other cultures, it is not unu-
sual for other relatives to become more involved in parenting and caring
for the child without intervention by state authorities. Our system must
develop a less harmful way of involving another parental figure actively
in the life of the challenged child to assist the child and the mother.
This individual could be called a "co-parent."
A. Roles and Powers of the Co-Parent
Unlike foster parents, a co-parent would work regularly with the
parents. The co-parent would be a respected member of the local com-
munity who garners community support and sponsorship for the diffi-
cult challenges to be faced by the mother and her child. The co-parent
would initially have no authority to override the parent. The co-parent
would assist the parent to face her challenges and would assist her child
directly. The co-parent would assist the parents to secure the resources
and information they need to habilitate themselves as parents. Likewise,
the co-parent would assist in securing rehabilitative resources and have
full access to the child's pediatrician, teacher and public health nurse to
coordinate the care of the child and to ensure that the ongoing needs of
the child are being met. The co-parent would assist preschool and
school teachers to ensure that the educational needs of the child are
being addressed. The co-parent might assist lawyers to gather data for
class action litigation to insure the provision of necessary services to the
community, the parents and the child, such as health care, food supple-
ments and housing.
The co-parent could attend classes with the parents on parenting,
educational skills, job skills and dealing with childhood abuse and ne-
glect. The co-parent could assist the biological parents to network with
similarly situated biological parents for peer group support in the diffi-
culties of raising a challenged child.
The co-parent would assist the biological parents to be more aware
of the positive attributes of their ethnic heritage. He or she would assist
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the mother to better understand and deal with how she may be discrimi-
nated against because of her gender, her culture and her economic sta-
tus. The co-parent would assist in finding day care and other support
for the mother if she decides to enter any in-patient treatment program.
The co-parent would assist the pediatrician in updating the file on the
challenges faced by the parent and the child. Most importantly, the co-
parent would be an agent for the education of the mother, the child and
the community at' large. By working closely with the physician and the
community coordinator, the co-parent could challenge existing commu-
nity biases complicating the challenges faced by the mother. The co-
parent could be an agent of change in the community to move aside the
many curtains of fear and prejudice that often cloak the challenged
child.
B. Selection, Training and Subsidy of the Co-Parent
The co-parent should be a relative or neighbor of the mother and
one who is respected within the community. To qualify, the co-parent
would need to undertake basic training regarding the needs of a chal-
lenged child and the structure and function of the system devoted to
meeting the needs of that child. The co-parent would apply to the
county family court services department and be investigated somewhat
like adoptive parents. Upon the completion of satisfactory investigation
and training, the co-parent would be ratified by the family court as a
"co-parent," which would entitle her or him to all medical and academic
records of the child and to serve as an advocate of the relationship be-
tween the mother and the child.46 8 In the event that the mother became
unable to care for the child, the co-parent could assume increasingly
greater responsibility, which would culminate in the open adoption of
the child by the co-parent or some other individual agreed upon by the
co-parent, biological parent and the adoption authority. By having an
open adoption, the child and mother could still maintain a relationship
which may be critical to both, and the child would have the advantage of
more stable parental support. If the mother was unable to take advan-
tage of habilitative and rehabilitative services, such adoption would be
vastly less stigmatizing than the trauma of a termination proceeding and
the placement of the child with an unknown foster home. Further, the
community would have the advantage of feeling that they are "taking
care of their own."
It would be reasonable to provide the co-parent some compensa-
tion. First, the co-parent should be granted an additional dependency
exemption for federal taxes. Second, the co-parent should be able to
deduct all money spent on the child from his or her taxes. Third, the co-
468. A co-parent is somewhat like a Limited Guardian or a Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA) in regard to the training and appointment. However, it is significantly
different, in that the co-parent advocates for the parenting relationship, while the CASA
advocates for the best interests of the child. The co-parent should be sworn in an adop-
tion-like proceeding to enhance the prestige and gravity of the responsibility.
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parent would be able to receive some subsidy from the parents. 46 9
Fourth, with the approval of the supervising pediatrician, the co-parent
should be awarded some or all of the subsidy normally awarded by the
state to a foster parent. The pediatrician should, with a community co-
ordinator, review the performance of the co-parent every six months to
consider whether to renew the subsidy.
C. Co-Parents as a Political Force
A national association of co-parents could be established to share
strategies and techniques of co-parenting and to allow for information
gathering about the nature and extent of the problems faced in belea-
guered communities. Co-parents could have an important political ef-
fect as community advocates, since they would be intimately aware of the
difficulties faced by many community members. For example, co-par-
ents could, in communities particularly hard hit by poverty, drugs and
violence, argue that their community should be nominated as a "super-
fund" site deserving of special assistance through block grant format.
Co-parents could form a stable political block to ceaselessly represent
the interests of challenged mothers, fathers and their children. Pres-
ently, there is no political lobby for challenged parents and their chil-
dren. They need all of their resources simply to survive. The
organization of co-parents could be a potent force, possibly affiliating
with organizations such as the American Association of Retired Persons
or the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts to advocate for the
manifest unmet needs of the children of our nation. The Association of
Family and Conciliation Courts recently adopted a policy which stated,
in part: "The status of 'co-parent' should be explored and implemented
in a series of pilot projects nationally. Co-parents should be encouraged
in cases where the alleged harm does not constitute child abuse." 4 70
D. An Expanded Role for Family Court Services
It is inevitable that conflicts will develop between co-parents and
parents, health care providers and community authorities regarding the
needs of the child. Normally, the juvenile court or an appointed
caseworker would investigate and make a recommendation. Unfortu-
nately, this creates an adversarial relationship between the co-parents,
and the mothers with obvious negative implications for the future.
Thus, it is preferable for a dispute resolution system to be like the health
care delivery system: voluntary, confidential and mediatory instead of
adversarial.
The four institutions most able to meet these needs are: family
469. This subsidy would only be in cash where the mother had an ability to pay. How-
ever, in kind compensation would be appropriate in the form of presents honoring birth-
days, etc. The co-parent would be given the respect accorded "elders" in traditional
Native American cultures.
470. ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS, MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (May 9, 1992).
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court services, community dispute resolution centers, community cen-
ters and churches. For purposes of illustration, the focus will be on fam-
ily court services. 4 7 1 During the last decade, family court services have
spearheaded the use of mediation to attempt to resolve family disputes
outside of the trial setting. Family court services have expanded media-
tion to address issues of adoption, child support and anti-harassment.
The mediation provided by family court services is confidential, and the
files are kept separate from investigation files.
The family court services could perform functions regarding co-par-
ents. They could investigate and approve co-parents. Family court serv-
ices adoption programs have substantial experience in this area and
would be the best body of individuals to set up protocols for investigat-
ing, approving and legally recognizing co-parents. In addition, they
could mediate extended family disputes. Family court workers have sub-
stantial experience in mediating family disputes around parenting, so
they would be the natural group to turn to in the event of disputes be-
tween the mother, the co-parent and others.
The family court services could maintain centralized care files. Like
those exposed to the AIDS virus, there is a need to maintain centralized
files on each child. Such filing systems are key to keeping track of ongo-
ing medical and psychological problems faced by the child and the
mother. Also, this entire field suffers from a lack of quality data to trace
the variant effects of different programs on the multiple challenges faced
by mothers and children.
The family court services could offer basic education and parenting,
nutrition, self care and career preferences. Many family court services
already offer a variety of classes (either directly or through referral) cov-
ering issues of parenting, negotiation, mediation and other important
skills. This training could be in the form of a series of videotapes that
would be available for any individuals wishing to view them with a series
of group meetings afterwards.
The family court services could train co-parents. Co-parents should
either be related to the parents, friends with the parents' families or be a
long time resident of the child's community. Family court workers,
Child Protection Service (CPS) workers and other state workers are
hired by virtue of their professional qualifications and experience in a
given field. Co-parents, on the other hand, would be nominated for
their experience with the parents, the family and their community.
4 72
Co-parents should be trained in the basics of infant nutrition, infant care
471. Family court services programs began in Los Angeles in the early 1960s with the
first Conciliation Court, which was devoted to helping families address and resolve cus-
tody disputes. Family Court Services have expanded throughout the nation. There is
some form of Family Court Service in almost every county of the United States. The Asso-
ciation of Family and Conciliation Courts, a non-profit organization devoted to coordinat-
ing Family Court Service and expansion, has members in nine countries including the
United States and Canada.
472. Co-parents would come from many different ethnic backgrounds expressing very
different attitudes about appropriate parenting. Thus, it would be important to assist co-
parents of similar cultures to network together to determine how best to use their particu-
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and infant child development. Family Court Services workers could
teach some co-parents how to administer basic psychological tests such
as the Beck's Depression Inventory to assess maternal depression, the
FIRO-B to assess the parental locus of control and the Denver Develop-
mental Inventory to measure infant cognitive capacity and other aspects
of development.
4 73
Family courts could assist in non-adversarial parental transitions.
In the event that comprehensive attempts to habilitate the mother fail
and she remains unable to adequately meet the needs of her child, fam-
ily court services and the co-parents could assist in a gradual voluntary
transfer of parental authority to the co-parent or some other agreed
upon parent figure. Dependency proceedings force family members to
testify against each other in public, creating wounds to the family that
last many generations. Instead, family members, including co-parents
and community members could come together to convince the mother
that until she is better able to take care of herself, she should allow her
child to primarily reside with the co-parent or some other agreed upon
adult. This transition would be mediated, if necessary, by family court
services or some other entity and the parenting agreement would be
made part of the child and mother's permanent confidential file. Over
time, the child would reside more and more with the co-parent (or an-
other) and less and less with the mother. The rights of the mother to
spend time with her child should not (with rare exception) be fully ter-
minated. In a worst case analysis, the status of the child should be that
of open adoption whereby the mother is allowed some contact. This
allows the mother and the community to perceive that, at some level, the
"family" still exists and that the community can "handle its own." From
a medical and psychological perspective, termination is unwise for the
highly needy parent because she may, upon losing one child, seek to
bear another child to compensate for the loss of her first child. Thus,
the cycle begins again.
Family court services could train staff of community dispute centers,
churches and community centers as outreach workers. To truly imple-
ment the ecological model of prevention, the structure and function of
communities and their families must be enhanced. These three groups
would be the primary outreach workers for challenged families. Those
doing outreach would be trained regarding legal, psychological and me-
diation techniques by family court services and trained regarding child
nutrition, malnutrition and health care by the community pediatricians
and public health nurses.
This family court/community based system is preferable to the
CPS/juvenile court system for a number of reasons. An increasing
lar culture to maximize the chance that the parents will meet the many challenges they face
and thus better provide for their child.
473. Administered periodically, such tests would help the co-parent chart changes in




number of pediatricians feel that a CPS is not an ally and that courts in
general do more harm than good (unless the situation is so deteriorated
that immediate removal of the child is medically necessary). 4 74 It is bet-
ter to rely on family court services than an expanded CPS, because CPS
has a strict statutory function to protect that takes priority over its duty to
prevent. There is not much of a lobby on the state level for children who
are battered or abused, so inappropriate cuts in funding are, sadly, quite
common. However, family court services are used by many divorce law-
yers and middle to upper class families to resolve parenting disputes.
Thus, there is a greater demand to maintain relatively high levels of pro-
fessional expertise in family court services than there is in CPS. Also,
there is a greater demand to maintain funding levels such that the dis-
putes of families can be resolved outside of court. Furthermore, family
court services have an institutional history of being able to maintain sep-
arate confidential files for mediations which are sealed from the family
court investigators who do custody investigations for court. They also
have more experience, perhaps, than any other sector of the legal sys-
tem in assisting a family's shift from one family form to another (e.g.,
from married to divorced, from divorced to adding step-parents, from
having children to adding co-parents to open adoption).
E. Community Supports for Challenged Children
Community based day care would allow mothers to attend treatment,
counseling, school and employment. Even if the mother was not making
a good faith effort to habilitate herself, the child's time in day care (prior
to school attendance) would allow a non-intrusive method of assessing
the child's needs and the degree to which they are being met. It is quite
possible that mothers who meet their own personal challenges could
find employment as day care workers. Day care could ensure that the
child is receiving the nutritional supplements necessary to deal with
prior malnutrition or undernutrition.
Community based health care should be the center of attention for the
challenged child. A clinic would maintain records on all the challenged
children. By strengthening the community, it would be better able to
address the issues of poor housing, inadequate food, inadequate educa-
tion and other services that are critical to the mother's capacity to meet
the needs of her failure-to-thrive child. In this way, the community be-
comes better able to create political pressure to ensure that the child's
needs and the mother's needs are met. There is evidence that commu-
nity based health care delivery would be significantly less expensive than
a centralized program run by state and federal authorities. Centralized
programs often miss the simple facts that the existence of a community
is therapeutic and that the existence of a community service that builds
on existing community resources is doubly therapeutic in that it assists
474. The fault lies not with CPS workers but with our historic tendency to create insti-
tutions for the abandoned and later abandon our resolve to fully fund them.
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the mother and enhances the self-esteem of community members. 4 75
The United States Public Health Services already identifies "under-
served" areas nationally. Doctors, nurses and other providers wishing
to serve would receive a salary and have a percentage of their student
loans paid off for each year they serve provided that such service would
extend for at least five years. Although regional hospitals would be key
for high risk births, community health care centers should provide suffi-
cient prenatal and preventive care to reduce the staggering hospital
costs of FAS children, borderline babies and otherwise unnecessarily
traumatized infants. Community health care would be based on commu-
nity epidemiology. This would involve looking to each community as a
medical entity and assessing the various levels of its physical, psycholog-
ical and cultural immune systems. Differences in culture and faith within
communities should be affirmed and utilized to maximize the delivery of
culturally appropriate health care. Each community would create a dif-
ferent challenge for the manner and method in which health care is
delivered.
Community health care should also involve comprehensive out-
reach to all mothers and potential mothers to ensure they receive full
contraceptive education and support so that births can be planned. For
mothers already abusing drugs, methadone and other drugs support
should be available to ensure that the fetus does not suffer from with-
drawals or overdose during gestation. Provision of bleach kits and clean
needles to all drug using women of child bearing age is a responsible
minimum to prevent transmission of life threatening diseases to the
fetus.
Community therapy and co-parenting should be available. Since re-
search indicates that one stable emotionally nurturing relationship can
make a tremendous difference in a challenged parent's ability to cope,
co-parents would be key individuals for habilitation of "challenged
mothers" and their "challenged children." Community therapy would
involve regular meetings amongst challenged mothers and their ex-
tended families to pursue strategies for survival. Community therapy
would not necessarily place the mothers in a group. Rather, it would
bring together a few mothers along with their extended families (rela-
tives, co-parents, etc.) as a counseling group. This unit of therapy would
allow extended families to deal with any shame they have about their
children and to share strategies on how to better support their chal-
lenged children. Within these therapeutic units, the mothers would be
given support for facing the abuse and neglect they may have exper-
ienced as children and to remedy the damage to their self-esteem. Part
of community therapy would be providing community recognition for
the difficult work of parenting challenged children and preventing the
475. The Home Builders program begun in Tacoma, Washington and the Iowa Coor-
dinated Community Program, are good examples of cost effective community based deliv-




birth of more unplanned children. For example, local churches might
choose to "sponsor" certain mothers and their children such that there
could be public acclaim for progress made.
Outreach for fathers is critical, particularly if it is tied to enhancing
their employability in areas where many males have been chronically un-
deremployed. Challenged fathers should be provided comprehensive
social supports to assist in their habilitation as well as psychological sup-
port for any abuse they have experienced that may hamper their capacity
to achieve healthy attachments with the mother and their children. Fa-
thers should also be "sponsored" by institutions within the community,
so their success can be celebrated, and by implication, that their failure
be a source of shame. Substance abuse treatment should occur within
the context of community therapy. This would provide the community
with the sense that it is able to address and assist those who need to be
helped and to "clean up" those who do not seek to be helped.
Community housing for the homeless should be provided. The human
cost to our children of disease, death, depression, retardation, psycho-
pathology, unemployment and sociopathy vastly exceeds the cost of pro-
viding adequate housing. Communities should be primarily responsible
for maintaining low income housing, and such housing should be scat-
tered throughout the neighborhood, not localized into "projects." Ini-
tially, such efforts would involve rehabilitating existing residences with
federal support. This effort could create significant employment oppor-
tunities for community members to rebuild their communities. The fed-
eral government now has control of an unprecedented number of
housing units and apartments through the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion, which are being sold at far below their value to a variety of private
interests. Serious thought should be given to donating such properties
to cities and communities on the condition that they be adequately
maintained and used for families in need.
Community legal advocacy should be available. Class action and impact
litigation will be necessary to secure and maintain adequate city, state
and federal funding for the above programs. It will also be necessary to
secure a change in the definition of poverty and the provision of ade-
quate services to challenged children and their parents. Efforts need to
be made within the legal community to redefine how the law views fami-
lies, children and parents such that institutions charged with providing
supports and services for families can be equally accountable for the
harm resulting to children as parents who mis-parent. 4 76
476. So long as women and children (and slaves in general) were property, the
"owner" was afforded many means of compensation for harm to them. Today's property
owner has increasingly broad powers to look to the government and private parties (Po-
tentially Responsible Parties (PRPs)) for cleaning up polluted property under CERCLA
(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(23)-(25), 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988)). The ecologic analysis used to define degra-
dation of the physical environment can be adapted to assess the degradation of the familial
environment. Areas where housing, schools and community supports are significantly
"degraded" could be declared "Superfund" sites and subject to special funding and scru-
tiny. Co-parents and others could help gather some of the data to document degradation
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Community based research should be undertaken. It would be naive to
assume that this proposed system will solve all the problems raised.
Like the solutions of centuries past, it will likely succeed in some areas
and fail in others. The only certain result is that it will change the nature
of the problem faced. To learn from our mistakes, we must try to deter-
mine how each innovation affects the health, psychology and social sup-
ports of challenged children and parents. The first challenge will be to
better understand what it means to rebuild the infrastructure of belea-
guered communities and their embattled families. The overlay of cul-
ture and faith will alter the needs of each community. One challenge to
the social science research community would be to develop ways of mea-
suring the degree to which each community succeeds in rehabilitating
itself on its own terms instead of standardized terms that may have little
relevance to the cultures and aspiration of community members.
Economic research is important to begin to quantify the true cost of
poverty in terms of increased medical care (the pediatrics of poverty),
increased impairment, lost productivity in the work place, lost capacity
to maintain stable employment relationships and lost capacity to main-
tain stable familial relationships. Perhaps by better understanding the
costs of what we have lost, we could better promote the necessity for
investing in what our families must regain.
VII. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION
As mothers and fathers are challenged, professionals are challenged
to respond. Professional schools must integrate and support an ethic of
care and service throughout their curricula. Law schools must retrieve a
sense of reason that is not divorced from compassion and a sense of
jurisprudence that demands redress of historic abandonment. Healing
should be part ofjustice as well as medicine. Professors must be able to
teach with both their heads and hearts before they are given tenure.
Professional schools should pointedly enhance the status of those serv-
ing the abandoned and create a strong ethic of "giving back" for those
pursuing more lucrative practices. Pressure should be brought to bear
to create an ethic whereby well-paid professionals lend support to their
peers working with challenged families. Although the challenges are dif-
ferent for each profession, a few are summarized below.
A. Challenges for the Legal Community
1. That the American Bar Association (ABA) pass a policy finding
that:
a) criminalization of maternal substance abuse is not in the best in-
terests of the child;
b) civil commitment is also inappropriate unless it can be proven
of the community. Perhaps major employers choosing to move their manufacturing facili-
ties offshore might be PRPs for the unemployment they create. State governments with
regressive tax systems that fail to adequately fund schools and city building departments
that fail to enforce codes on housing might also be PRPs under such a hypothetical statute.
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that the mother refused to avail herself of comprehensive perinatal
care, substance abuse care, parenting and job skills training, ade-
quate housing and counseling;
c) mandatory drug testing and reporting should be discontinued
until comprehensive substance abuse and prenatal care is available
to all regardless of their means;
d) neglect proceedings for maternal substance abuse 4 77 are inap-
propriate until after the mother refuses to avail herself of confiden-
tial comprehensive care;
e) preventable mental retardation and child neglect result from our
systematic failure to provide reasonable health care and legal advo-
cacy for children and parents;
f) Legal services corporations should be allowed to pursue any
class-action or impact litigation reasonably necessary to defend or
promote the rights of the abandoned.
4 78
2. That the ABA Endowment, in league with the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics, sponsor a series of co-parenting pilot projects in at
least four cities nationally. A model for this could be the ABA's recent
sponsorship of Multi-Door Dispute Resolution Centers in Tulsa and
Washington D.C.
3. That a task force be formed4 79 and funded to accomplish the
following:
a) to generate protocols for a diagnosis of "challenged" 4 80 in in-
fants and to generate an ecological evaluation of what comprehen-
sive addiction services and other community supports are needed;
b) to generate protocols for selection and training of co-parents
with minimum standards for their performance and their
compensation;
c) to generate protocols for the use of family court services by chal-
lenged parents, challenged children, co-parents and the child's
health care workers;
d) to generate models of data gathering (including control popula-
477. An ecological analysis should be used for future neglect cases until a better stan-
dard is promulgated.
478. Legal Services should have its eligibility criteria increased to 250% of the poverty
level and should be funded to assist families in settlement of domestic disputes involving
children.
479. It could consist of representatives from the American Academy of Pediatrics,
American Association of Critical Care Nurses, American College of Preventive Medicine,
American Society of Addiction Medicine, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Latino
Council on Alcohol and Tobacco, NAPARE, NCADD, NAACOG, National Association of
State Boards of Education, National Perinatal Association, National Women's Health Net-
work, National Coalition of State Alcohol and Drug Treatment and Prevention Associa-
tion, the National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, the Association for
Family and Conciliation Courts, the National Council ofJuvenile Court Judges, the Office
of Substance Abuse and Prevention of the Department of Health and Human Services, the
National Commission for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, the American Humane
Association, the Children's Defense Fund and other relevant organizations.
480. This could be an enhanced H-PIT criteria for children under 36 months. See supra
note 455.
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tions) such that all programs can be evaluated for their efficacy
(without, of course, revealing the identity of their participants);
e) to develop methods of subsidizing lawyers to work in this area.
Specific attention should be given to the loan forgiveness programs
now in effect at thirty law schools nationally. 4 8' Partial funding
should come from state interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLA),
alumni and prominent law firms in each locality.
4 82
4. That the ABA and the American Association of Law Schools
establish a specialty in pediatric law, which would create a group of law-
yers who were familiar with the medical needs of challenged children,
4 83
federal and state entitlement programs (AFDC, SSI, Medicaid), and the
myriad federal and state administrative organizations charged with in-
suring adequate housing, adequate food, adequate education and ade-
quate health care.
B. Challenges for the Medical Community
1. That the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the AMA
make a policy finding that the failure to provide comprehensive, univer-
sal perinatal care for families constitutes systemic child neglect.
2. That the AAP and other relevant medical authorities work with
the United States Public Health Service to determine appropriate meth-
ods of funding doctors and public health nurses to participate in com-
munity health services delivery to the poor and the near poor. This
could be partly funded by the Public Health Service paying a salary and
undertaking to pay-off a certain percentage of the doctor's student loans
for each year he or she participates in the community health centers.
3. That the AAP and other relevant medical authorities to develop
protocols for community health centers. In this regard, effort should be
made to accomplish the following:
a) for pediatricians and public health nurses to adapt their medical
knowledge to the norms of the community and to implement, to the
481. Michael Marriott, Aid for Law Graduates Who Want To Aid the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, De-
cember 13, 1991, at B-10.
482. The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts recently adopted the Policy
that asked that such an interdisciplinary task force be formed and funded to accomplishing
the following goals:
(a) to generate protocols for a diagnosis of "challenged" children and to deter-
mine which comprehensive addiction services and other community supports are
needed;
(b) to generate protocols for selection and training of co-parents with minimum
standards for their performance and their compensation;
(c) to generate protocols for the use of Family Court Services by challenged par-
ents, challenged children, co-parents and a child's health care workers;
(d) to generate models of data gathering (including control populations) such
that all programs can be evaluation for their efficacy (without, of course, revealing
the identity of their participants); and
(e) to develop methods of subsidizing lawyers to advocate for challenged parents
and children.
ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS, supra note 470, at 3.




degree possible, confidential relationships with all young women in
their care. This would involve detailed sex and contraceptive edu-
cation, and access to counseling for childhood abuse and ne-
glect. 48 4 The pediatrician's role should extend to advocating
enhanced sex education at schools. Initially, the physician may
need to help the teachers and parents clear up misconceptions
about the need for comprehensive sex education and contraceptive
use.4 8 5 Where pediatricians are not available, school-based health
clinics should be funded and expanded to improve access to care
and contraceptive use. Such school-based health clinics have been
shown to reduce the rate of unwanted teenage pregnancy.4 86 The
Federal Healthy Start Program may be a helpful model;
b) to return and enhance school nurse services to each elementary,
junior high and high school with underserved challenged children.
These public health nurses could monitor the progress of the chal-
lenged children, suggest interventions in the event the children are
falling behind and completely restructure the format for health and
childbirth education within schools to the level of concreteness that
would reduce the incidence of unplanned and unwanted teenage
pregnancies.
4 8 7
C. Challenges for Other Professionals
Psychologists, sociologists and educators should explore the struc-
ture and function of abandonment with a sharp eye on how culture and
community can reclaim what was lost. On an individual level, psycholo-
gists should investigate how ego-based psychologies may fail to meet the
needs of women in general and single mothers in particular. They
should explore theories that treat the relationship, not just the ego, as
484. Such sex education should be discussed frankly with the child throughout his or
her childhood, using appropriate names for anatomy. Just prior to puberty, there should
be an openly negotiated shift in the provider's relationship with the child. Prior to pu-
berty, the provider usually shares all medical information with the parents. At puberty,
however, it would be appropriate to establish a confidential relationship between the pro-
vider and the child, while encouraging the child to speak with the parents. An entire sex-
ual history should be taken and the child should have the opportunity to attend small
group meetings to address sexual issues and concerns. Within this trusting concept, the
provider could discuss the perceived stigma of being a virgin when "everyone is doing it"
and support the child's preference to remain a virgin. With the detailed sexual history, the
provider could determine if there are any prior difficulties such as incest and abuse that
would complicate the child's future capacity to engage in mutually rewarding
relationships.
485. While comprehensive sex education may increase the rate of contraceptive use, it
does not promote either early or more frequent sexual activity. Grant & Demetriou, supra
note 431, at 1285 (citations omitted).
486. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY AND CHILDBEAR-
ING, supra note 436; Laurie S. Zabin et al., Evaluation of a Pregnancy Prevention Program For
Urban Teenagers, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119, 125 (1986).
487. The recent policy of the Association for Family and Conciliation Courts called for
medical authorities to develop protocols for community health centers involving pediatri-
cians, public health nurses and others to expand care within the community and within
each elementary junior high and high school that serves challenged children. ASSOCIATION
OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS, supra note 470, at 3.
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the fundamental unit of therapy in order to better meet the needs of
challenged mothers fathers, and their children.
48 8
Legislators need first to divert at least 50% of our antidrug
budget 48 9 to community care facilities. Next, they must face up to alco-
hol as they are being forced to face up to AIDS. Lawmakers must con-
solidate the numerous and often competing agencies and organizations
involved with different infant traumas and disabilities. Down's syn-
drome agencies should not be competing with FAS agencies. The Asso-
ciation of Family and Conciliation Courts recently adopted a policy
endorsing the following action:
A Challenged Child Act should be passed directing a consolida-
tion of services to all challenged children. A Co-Parent Act
should be passed providing co-parents appropriate authority
and compensation so they could serve as a lobby for other chal-
lenged child legislation. Maternal child and health block grants
available though Medicaid should be enhanced to fund school-
based health clinics. Any bans on advertisement of non-pre-
scription contraceptives on radio and television should be lifted
and the significant pressure should be brought on media adver-
tisers and networks for radio, television and magazines to por-
tray sexuality in a responsible manner. Television should be
pressured to frankly and fully deal with prevention of sexually
transmitted diseases.
4 90
Pediatric lawyers, doctors and therapists should work with national
church organizations to cross train pastors to assist as co-parents and,
more importantly, to weave together an interdisciplinary fabric of law,
theology and psychology to best support the needs of challenged chil-
dren, their parents, their co-parents and their communities.
D. Funding for Change
In our present economy, the only thing that exceeds the gravity of
our social problems is our reluctance to find solutions. Legions of ex-
perts intone that Americans will not endure an income tax increase and
that jobs must take priority. The forces seeking to secure reasonable
488. Specific consideration should be given to the Self In Relation theory ofJean Baker
Miller and the emerging masculine psychologies proposed by Robert Moore and James
Hillman, which place a higher value on parenting and the roles of fathering than many
prior psychological theories. For an exploration of dysfunctional families resulting from
an immature, weak or absent father and an equally immature concept of masculine psy-
chology, see ROBERT MOORE & DOUGLAS GILLETrE, KING, WARRIOR, MAGICIAN, LOVER:
REDISCOVERING THE ARCHETYPES OF THE MATURE MASCULINE 58 (1990).
489. Federal antidrug spending is projected to be $11,953.1 million in 1992 and
$12,728.7 million in 1993. CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, supra note 278, at 7. The
concept of diverting 50% of our drug interdiction budget to community care facilities for
parents with drug problems and their children was endorsed by the Association of Family
and Conciliation Courts in its May 9, 1992 policy. ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIA-
TION COURTS, supra note 470, at 3.
490. ASSOCIATION OF CONCILIATION COURTS, supra note 470, at 4. "The American
Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence published a policy paper documenting
the need for more responsible treatment of sexuality in the media." Id. at 5 n.9 (quoting
Canadian Adolescence: Sexuality, Contraception and the Media, Pediatrics, 78, 535, 1986).
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healthcare, to reform the schools, to prevent drug use and to protect
children are routinely forced to confront one another and fight for
budgetary scraps. Perhaps our view of the funding problem is part of
the problem. Looking just to Congress for funding makes the chal-
lenged child system prone to later budget cuts, reducing it to a
mediatory form of CPS. Therefore, lines of dedicated funding should
be pursued. Many assume that the only sources of federal funds are
from cutting other budgets or increasing income taxes. Income tax
based funding places a responsibility upon all taxpayers for the drinking
and drug related behaviors of perhaps 10% of the population.
E. Taxing Consumption
From an ecologic perspective, the producers and users of drugs
should be primarily obligated for the harm created by their use. They
should be held to the same standard as those producing and using other
hazardous chemicals. While we are expending vast sums attempting to
tax illicit drug producers, we are doing little to tax licit drug producers
and consumers. Alcohol is a case in point. In 1910, 80% of our federal
revenues came from an excise tax on alcohol. By 1987, the same alcohol
excise tax had dropped to 0.7% of federal revenues. 4 9 1 Alcohol use is
directly related to 105,000 deaths per year, with direct societal (includ-
ing medical) costs of $100 billion per year in 1990 and a projected $150
billion per year by 1995. In 1988, the total federal excise taxes collected
for alcoholic beverages were $5.8 billion and in 1990, $5.7 billion.
4 92
Assuming that the alcoholic beverages purchased are consumed, the so-
cietal cost (excluding FAS and FAE children) of each ounce of alcohol is
$1.25. Our federal excise tax covers seven cents of each drink and com-
bined federal and state liquor taxes average twenty-three cents per
drink. The actual alcohol in beer and wine, the beverages most highly
promoted for and consumed by young women, are taxed far less than
the alcohol in hard liquor.49 3 Twelve ounces of beer contain approxi-
mately the same amount of alcohol as 4.7 ounces of wine and 1.4 ounces
of eighty proof liquor. Beer is taxed at five cents, wine at four cents, and
eighty proof liquor at twelve cents. Thus, alcohol in beer is taxed at
42% and wine at 30% of alcohol in hard liquor.494 Federal taxes on beer
and wine have been increased only once since 1950. If beer and wine alcohol
were taxed at the same rate as spirits, and all were corrected for inflation
since 1970, $16.6 billion in new revenues would be realized and an esti-
491. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1970,
Part 2, Series Y 358-373 (1976); Department of the Treasury, Monthly Statement of Re-
ceipts for 1987 (cited in CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, STATE ALCOHOL
TAXES: CASE STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF HIGHER EXCISE TAXES IN 14 STATES AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: RAISING REVENUES AND REDUCING ALCOHOL-RELATED PROBLEMS 4
(Feb. 1990)) [hereinafter STATE ALCOHOL TAXES].
492. Statistical Release: Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Collections Bureau of Alcohol Tax and
Firearms, May 1, 1989 (cited in STATE ALCOHOL TAXES, supra note 491, at 2).
493. This is a clear example of political abandonment.
494. See STATE ALCOHOL TAXES, supra note 491.
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mated $11.7 billion in alcohol related costs would be avoided.4 95 Setting
the tax by correcting for inflation from 1934 would raise $62 billion and signifi-
cantly reduce alcohol use among poor mothers.
Taxing alcoholic beverages at a rate near their social cost is both
reasonable and, compared to cigarettes, conservative. The state and
federal taxes on cigarettes are 246% greater than their estimated socie-
tal CoStS. 4 9 6 The scant increase in federal taxes and the reduction of
some state alcohol taxes is a tribute to a v.ery strong alcohol lobby. As of
1989, California, the nation's largest wine producer, taxes wine at
$.0004 per drink or only one cent per gallon. This is 1/1000th the fed-
eral rate.
F. Taxing Promotion
Public marketing of alcohol is estimated to cost over $2 billion per
year. 49 7 The abandoned are strongly targeted. The average child sees
90,000 incidents of alcohol consumption on television before he or she
is old enough to drink. A 1987 Weekly Reader poll found 34% of fourth
graders reported "some to a lot" of pressure to drink wine coolers. 498
A 1988 sample survey of seven to twelve years olds in Washington, D.C.
found the average child able to name more alcoholic beverages than
presidents. This is partly achieved by the use of cartoon characters such
as "Bud Man" or "Spuds Mackenzie."' 49 9 The tax on public promotion
would be paid in the form of public education. For example, for every
$100 spent on television, radio, billboards and magazine advertise-
ments, companies would contribute $20 to a federal fund for public ser-
vice advertisements in the same media. Next, warning labels would be
dropped in favor of a series of rotating educational messages. 50 0 These
495. CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, FEDERAL ALCOHOL TAX FACTS (Dec.
1991).
496. Gina Kolata, Taxes Fail to Cover Drinking Costs, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1989, at A13. The taxes are estimated at $.37 per pack and costs at $.15 per pack.
497. CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, ALCOHOL ADVERTISING FACTS (Apr.
1991). Just one company, Anheuser-Busch, helps sponsor all major league baseball teams,
twenty NFL teams and over 300 college teams. Id. This company has an immense share of
national beer advertising. If it could be persuaded to voluntarily join this effort, perhaps
many others would follow.
498. Id.
499. "Inadequate voluntary industry codes cover only media advertising, thereby al-
lowing promotions such as Anheuser-Busch's licensing of Spuds Mackenzie for some 200
consumer products, including dolls and stuffed animals." Id.
500. Proposed messages are:
i. SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Drinking This Alcoholic Beverage
During Pregnancy Can Cause Mental Retardation and Other Birth Defects.
2. WARNING: Drinking This Alcoholic Beverage Impairs Your Ability to Drive
a Car or Operate Machinery.
3. WARNING: Alcohol May Be Hazardous If You Are Using Any Other Drugs,
Such as Over-the-Counter, Prescription, or Illicit Drugs.
4. WARNING: Drinking This Alcoholic Beverage Can Increase Your Risk of
Developing Hypertension, Liver Disease and Cancer.
5. WARNING: Alcohol Is a Drug and May Be Addictive.
6. Drinking Too Much, Too Quickly, Can Cause Alcohol Poisoning, Which Can
Be Fatal.
CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NUTRITION ACTION HEALTH LETrER, July 2,
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messages would be shown and spoken on all television commercials,
spoken on all radio advertisements and clearly posted on all printed
matter, including the front label of each bottle and the front and back of
every cigarette pack.
G. Tax Credits and Family Stamps
The cost of raising our future workforce, which will fund our Social
Security Benefits, should be born equitably. 50 1 Regardless of the
method, there can be no dispute that income must be distributed from
higher to lower income and from those without children to those with
children. Households without children have risen from 49% in 1960 to
62% in 1988. Looking just at households with adults of childbearing
age, the median income per person for those without children was 67%
higher than for those with two children in 1988.502 In the near term,
middle and upper income parents should receive tax credits for child-
care and child healthcare while those unable to use credits should re-
ceive Family Stamps, which could be exchanged for childcare,
healthcare, housing and services to handle family disputes before they
escalate into violence. Family Stamps could, with the approval of the
pediatrician, be used for counseling of parents for childhood abuse, do-
mestic violence and drug and alcohol addiction.
H. Child Savings Bonds and Asset Forfeiture Funds
Those purchasing United States Savings Bonds should have the op-
tion of buying "Child Savings Bonds," from which all federal revenue
would be dedicated to challenged children's programs. Our War on
Drugs has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars of assets seized
from those convicted. At least 50% of these funds should go to compre-
hensive community based treatment and community care facilities in
high drug use areas.
1992, at 2-3 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEVENTH SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH, Jan. 1990; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NUTRITION AND YOUR
HEALTH: DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS, (3d ed. 1990); Health Warnings on Alcoholic
Beverages, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives (July 18, 1990)).
501. Employer paid parental leave and child care is inequitable in that it provides the
greatest benefit to those who need it least, the well paid parent. It provides scant benefit
to those who need it most, the poor women with limited education and job skills who
cannot maintain full time employment. It operates as a discriminatory tax on particular
employers who historically employ women of childbearing age (e.g., textile mills). A tax
only on these employers encourages them to move their manufacturing to other countries
where they won't be taxed, or, if they remain in the United States, to pay lower wages or
provide fewer benefits to employees in order to pay the leave and daycare. Thus, the
proposal penalizes employers who hire and promote large numbers of women of
childbearing age.
502. Victor R. Fuchs & Diane M. Reklis, America's Children: Economic Perspectives and Policy
Options, SCIENCE, Jan. 3, 1992, at 41, 44.
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CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this Article was to find a way to better address
and understand the complex problem of maternal substance abuse. It
has addressed as abandonments our many streams of parental failure,
societal prejudice and professional neglect. The geography of abandon-
ment is different in each locality, creating needs for very different pro-
grams. This Article has examined as challenges the myriad harms to our
children. It is error, however, to view those we abandon as only being
abandoned. "IT]here is something else: the faith of those despised and
endangered that they are not merely the sum of damages done to
them."'50 3 The "faith of those despised and endangered" can be found
in battered women's shelters, in detoxification programs and behind
triple deadbolted doors of project apartments with crumbling walls,
scrambling rats and faucets that run day and night. The faith needed by
the struggling single mother is not dissimilar to the faith needed by the
lawyers and doctors struggling to reclaim their professions. Such faith
cannot be explained as much as it can be experienced. It cannot be
known as much as felt. In this sense, none of the solutions proposed
herein is complete. Each solution assumes that we will view our profes-
sion and our reason in a way that the stories of the abandoned become
valued, if only to help us better discover how we have strayed. Each solu-
tion assumes a group of doctors, lawyers and professors committed to
pushing the pendulum of professionalism away from an ethic of en-
trepreneurialism and toward an ethic of compassion and healing for all.
The curriculum 50 4 we need remains rigorously intellectual, but intellec-
tual analysis alone is insufficient. It is professionally arrogant to assume
we can heal others before we have healed ourselves. Without individual
change, legislative change will be meaningless:
[T]he moral is ... to notice what one is doing, and in particular
to notice what people are saying .... [I]t very often does turn
out, that people are trying to tell you that they are suffering.
Just insofar as one is preoccupied .... people are likely to suf-
fer still more.
50 5
To the extent we fail to face these challenges, our children will face
them. Our task is to challenge ourselves and revive our professions
from their roots in helping and healing. We must confront our apathy,
prejudice and denial to discern how these abandonments pollute our
hearts' capacity to understand and to act. We must begin to see through
the eyes of the infant that the abandonment of maternal drug use is part
of the larger abandonment of poverty, disease and diminished commu-
503. MACKINNON, supra note 249, at 83 (quoting Adrienne Rich, "Sources").
504. An alternative to our present jurisprudence is necessary to reclaim each abandon-
ment. The Critical Legal Studies movement, the Feminist Jurisprudence movement, and
the impressive scholarship on the black, Asian, Hispanic and gay experiences will hope-
fully lead to a fundamental revision of our concepts of reason, justice and liberty.
505. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 691
(1990) (quoting RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 164 (1988)).
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nities. In the end, we must begin with the wisdom of our oldest
Americans:
Let us put our minds together and
see what kind of life we can
make for our children.
- Sitting Bull
50 6
506. Sitting Bull, quoted in STREISSGUTH ET AL., supra note 413 at i.
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CONSORTIUM CLAIMS INVOLVING CHILDREN:
SHOULD COLORADO CONTINUE AN ARCHAIC





In a tort system premised upon economic compensation for per-
sonal injuries, a child's rights are difficult to define. Under basic tort
principles, one who is injured by a negligent tortfeasor is entitled to
recover for pain and suffering, loss of wages and medical expenses. This
is the rule of recovery in most modern jurisdictions except when, by
happenstance, the victim is married in which case an additional category
of recovery called consortium is recognized. A consortium action allows
the non-injured spouse to sue for the intangible losses resulting from his
or her deprivation of the affection, society, companionship and aid of
the injured spouse. Within the last fifteen years, a minority of jurisdic-
tions have extended the consortium claim to the parent-child relation-
ship. This Article examines the claims of filial consortium (a parent's
claims for a negligently injured child) and parental consortium (a child's
claims for a negligently injured parent). It tracks the development of
consortium at common law and through statutory enactments as the
roles of husband, wife and child have evolved. This Article will conclude
by contending that Colorado should refuse to expand the consortium
concept to the parent-child relationship because to do so merely per-
petuates archaic beliefs of Victorian England, stretches tort law beyond
its intended boundaries and adversely impacts the present tort system.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW
A. The Spousal Consortium Claim and the Master-Servant Analogy
At common law, when a servant was tortiously injured, the master
possessed a cause of action for lost services.I While the servant had a
claim for his injuries, the master's claim was independent and in the
* John M. Palmeri, Partner, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado; A.B. 1981
Columbia University; J.D. 1984 University of Denver.
** Christopher P. Kenney, Associate, White and Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado;
B.A. 1986 University of Colorado; J.D. 1990 University of Denver. The authors wish to
thank Joseph Cachey and Joseph King for their research and editorial work on the article.
I. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 931
(5th ed. 1984) (citingJohn H. Wigmore, Interference With Social Relations, 21 AM. L. REv. 764
(1887)).
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master's own right. 2 This rule was a holdover from the feudal relation-
ship between serf and lord.3 The master's claim was based on the gen-
eral principle of the common law that where a person sustains loss or
damage through the wrong of another, he has an action to be remuner-
ated for that loss in damages. 4 Because the servant owed to the master
the duty of his service or labor, 5 it followed that the master was entitled
to recover for the loss of services or expenses incurred as a result of the
servant's injury. 6 At common law, a wife's relationship to her husband
was similar to the relationship of the servant to his master in that the
wife had a duty to provide her husband service or labor.7 Because the
common law viewed the wife as her husband's servant, with no status to
sue on her own behalf, when a married woman was injured, the husband
sued for the damages and joined his wife in the action. 8 By 1619, the
master's cause of action for the services of his injured servant had ex-
tended to allow a husband's independent recovery for lost services
caused by an injury to his wife.
In Guy v. Livesey, 9 a husband failed to join his wife in an action for
damages arising from the defendant's assault and battery on both
spouses. The defendant argued that the husband could not recover for
the damage done to the wife unless she was joined in the action.10 The
court disagreed, holding that the husband had an independent action
since "he lost the company of his wife, which is only a damage and loss
to himself .... "I I The court further reasoned by analogy that because a
master has a valid cause of action for the loss of his servant's service, a
husband should similarly have such a cause of action. 12 Thus, the claim
for loss of consortium was born.
Although initially a pecuniary claim, consortium soon began to en-
compass intangible elements such as society, affection, conjugal rela-
tions, companionship and sexual relations.13 The reasoning behind
expanding the consortium claim in this manner appears in numerous
decisions from the late 1800s 14 in which courts presented this extension
as a self-evident, pre-existing right rooted in the common law principle
that the husband not only is entitled to loss of services, but also intangi-
ble losses unique to the marital relationship. Many courts determined
that when an injury infringed the husband's right to companionship, he
2. Joseph H. Radensky, The Child's Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium-The Prospects
for the Nineties (The Decade ofa Kinder, Gentler Society?), 17 W. ST. U.L. REV. 277, 281 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Blair v. Chicago & At. Ry., I S.W. 367 (Mo. 1886).
5. Selleck v. City of Janesville, 80 N.W. 944, 946 (Wis. 1899).
6. Blair, I S.W. at 368.
7. Selleck, 80 N.W. at 946.
8. Radensky, supra note 2, at 282.




13. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 125 at 931; Radensky, supra note 2, at 282.
14. David P. Dwork, Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of,4 Parents Love, Care and
Companionship Caused By Tortious Ijury to the Parent, 56 B.U. L. REV. 722, 724 n.22 (1976).
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was entitled to compensation for loss of such right. 15 For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Selleck v. City of Janesville stated:
[f]rom before the days of Blackstone down to the present time,
... the husband's recovery is for the loss or impairment of his
right to conjugal society and assistance, and ordinarily, where
the word 'services' is used, it signifies wifely services, such as
are due from her, and includes the idea of her society.'
6
By the late nineteenth century nearly all American jurisdictions had
passed Married Women's Acts. 17 These so-called "emancipation stat-
utes," which allowed married women to sue and own property in their
own name, cleared the way for the recognition of a wife's claim for lost
consortium.I 8 No longer was a wife seen as merely an appendage of her
husband. It was not until the 1949 decision, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 19
however, that a court first recognized that both husband and wife were
entitled to the comfort, companionship and affection of the other.
20
Plaintiff, Lucia Hitaffer, brought an action against her husband's em-
ployer to recover for her loss of consortium. Her husband had sus-
tained severe permanent injuries to his abdomen while in the employ of
the defendant. Plaintiff's husband received compensation for his inju-
ries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act and was therefore barred from suing his
employer. Ms. Hitaffer, however, initiated a claim in her own right for
loss of her husband's aid, assistance, enjoyment and sexual relations.
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the basis
that plaintiff's consortium claim failed to state a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted. 2 1 The Federal Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed, holding there was no substantial rationale on
which the court could predicate a denial of a wife's action for loss of
consortium due to her husband's injury.2 2 The primary basis for the
court's decision was that a husband already had a cognizable action for
consortium and therefore, the medieval concept that a husband is
master should not survive in the "enlightened day and age" of 1949.23
The court noted that marriage gives each spouse the same rights and
therefore both are entitled to the comfort, companionship and affection
of the other, not only as a natural right, but as a legal right arising from
the marital relationship. 24 Thus, while noting that medieval and anti-
quated concepts should not be furthered, the court expanded a right of
recovery based on just such an arcane theory.
15. Furnish v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 15 S.W. 315, 316-17 (Mo. 1891); Kelley v. New
York N.H. & H. R.R., 46 N.E. 1063, 1063 (Mass. 1897); Selleck v. City ofJanesville, 80
N.W. 944, 946 (Wis. 1899).
16. Selleck, 80 N.W. at 946.
17. Dwork, supra note 14, at 725 n.28.
18. Id. at 725.
19. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
20. 183 F.2d at 816.
21. Id. at 812.
22. Id. at 813.
23. Id. at 819.
24. Id. at 817-18.
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B. Expansion to the Parent-Child Relationship
In the mid-1970s and beyond, law review commentators began call-
ing for expansion of the consortium action to the parent-child relation-
ship both in the form of filial consortium and parental consortium. 25 It
was also during this time that courts began wrestling with the
cognizability of parental and filial consortium claims. 26 At least with re-
spect to the parental consortium claim, the expansionists had history on
their side. From feudal times through the industrial revolution, a child
was an economic asset to the family and often worked outside the home
to contribute to the family economy. Thus, the common law considered
children in the same way that it considered wives, as servants of the fa-
ther or husband. The father, entitled to the services of the child, could
recover for lost services or earning capacity when the child was tor-
tiously injured.2 7 A father was further entitled to recover for the child's
medical expenses. 28 With the institution of child labor laws, however,
children became a financial burden to the family unit thereby decreasing
the importance of a father's right to recovery for services.2 9 At no time
prior to 1980, however, did the claim for the loss of the child's services
expand to include recovery for intangible losses such as companionship,
aid and comfort. Thus, within the context of modern society, the parent
was equipped with what was essentially an inconsequential claim for lost
services when his or her child was negligently injured. Historically,
given that the child was viewed as a servant, he or she had no expecta-
tion of recovery for the negligent injury of a parent. Because the injured
parent could recover for all economic losses, it was thought that the
child's interest would be adequately protected, albeit indirectly.
3 0
Therefore, until recently, the right of recovery within the parent-child
relationship was viewed as strictly pecuniary in nature.
In 1979, twenty-five years after the first judicial decision granting a
wife's right to recovery for loss of consortium, a major step was taken
concerning the same right within the context of the parent-child rela-
tionship. In Shockley v. Prier,3 ' the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled
existing precedent and held that the parents of a blinded and disfigured
25. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note I at 934-39 (1984);Jean C. Love, Tortious Inter-
ference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51
IND. L.J. 590 (1976); Radensky, supra note 2; Mary Lee Tayrien, Note, The Child's Claim for
Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231
(1975); Dwork, supra note 14; Shirley S. Simpson, Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society
and Companionship Resulting from the Negligent Injury of a Child: a Proposal for Arizona?, 1980
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909 (1980); William F. Ellis, Note, Expanding Loss of Consortium in Vermont:
Developing a New Doctrine, 12 VT. L. REV. 157 (1987); Nancy Wanderer Mackenzie, Note,
Aaine Refuses to Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium: Durepo v. Fishman, 41
ME. L. REV. 165 (1988); Marilyn S. Duncan, Comment, Davis v. Elizabeth General Medical
Center:" Loss of Consortium in the Parent-Child Relationship, 43 ARK. L. REV. 405 (1990).
26. See infra note 35 (parental consortium claims); infra note 36 (filial consortium
claims).
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note i, at 934.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 947.
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note I, at 934.
31. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
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infant could maintain an action for loss of aid, comfort, society and com-
panionship. The court reasoned that it would be inconsistent to refuse
recovery for filial consortium due to a nonfatal injury when Wisconsin
law by statute allowed such recovery for a child's death.
3 2
Shortly after the Shockley decision, three more jurisdictions judicially
recognized parental consortium claims.3 3 Today, twelve jurisdictions
recognize the claim for parental consortium, 34 while eleven recognize
filial consortium claims.3 5 These cases generally acknowledge that ex-
pansion of consortium to the parent-child relationship is a logical pro-
gression from the starting point of spousal consortium. For instance,
sharing love, companionship, society, comfort and affection character-
izes both the husband-wife and parent-child relationships.3 6 With re-
spect to filial consortium, some courts note that the modern relationship
between parent and child is, or should be, closer than the relationship
between master and servant.3 7 "The origins of the pecuniary loss limi-
tation 'are rooted in Charles Dickens'[s] England'."3 8 Moreover, these
courts often analogize parental-child consortium to wrongful death
cases in which nonpecuniary damages are allowed. 39 "[I]t would be
anomalous to take the position that, if a child is injured, but does not
die, the parents may not recover."' 40 Commentators have argued that
the need to compensate the parent's loss may be even greater in cases of
severe injury because the injury continually reminds them of their
loss.4 1 Courts have supported their decisions by citing constitutional
concerns protecting the family unit, arguing that the right to associate
with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by state
32. Id. at 499.
33. See Weiti v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audibon-Extra Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois C.G.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983) (l"eitl was overruled on
grounds other than the recognition of a parental consortium claim); Ferrieter v. Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. 1981).
34. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1989); Villareal v.
State Dept. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); IWeill, 311 N.W.2d 159; Ferriter, 413
N.E.2d 690; Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804
S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E. 2d 830 (W.
Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gilette-
Campbell CountyJoint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
35. Reben v. Ely, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. 1985); Yorden v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844 (Fla.
1973); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989); Dymek v. Nyquist, 469
N.E.2d 659 (Ill. App. 1984); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Medical Ctr., 548 A.2d 528 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div.); First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware, 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988);
Noruel v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 463 N.E.2d Ill (Ohio App. 1983); Hall v. Birchfield,
718 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App. 1986), red., 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987); Shockley v. Prier,
225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
36. Simpson, supra note 25, at 922.
37. Shocklev, 225 N.W.2d at 500.
38. Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 26 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
39. See, e.g., .1Iasaki, 780 P.2d at 577; Frank v. Superior Ct., 722 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz.
1987) (en banc); Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 498.
40. .1lasaki, 780 P.2d at 577.
41. See, e.g.. Simpson, supra note 25, at 923.
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and federal constitutions. 4 2
Despite these arguments, the majority of American jurisdictions
continue to disallow claims for parental and filial consortium. Twenty-
seven jurisdictions have expressly rejected parental consortium
claims,4 3 while numerous others have rejected filial claims.4 4 Courts
have denied these claims for various reasons, the most often cited being:
(1) adoption of the right to such claims is properly a legislative function;
(2) increased litigation through multiple claims; (3) possibility of double
recovery; (4) difficulty in assessing damages; (5) inherent differences in
the spousal and parent-child relationships; (6) potential expansion to
distant relatives; and (7) increased societal costs in the form of insurance
and expenses of litigation. 4 5 The merit of these arguments has been the
subject of considerable commentary and, as noted below, has been
criticized.
III. COLORADO LAW
A. The Spousal Consortium Claim and the Master-Servant Analogy
Until 1874, married women in Colorado had no legal existence.
46
This was a holdover from the common law view that a wife was a hus-
band's servant and had no separate legal identity. 4 7 As noted by the
Colorado Supreme Court, this legal theory derived from the view that
marriage made a husband and wife one person.4 8 A husband was there-
fore seated "as the head and governor of the family." '49 He had control
of his wife, her property, children and labor.50 In fact, a husband's con-
trol was so pervasive at common law that he possessed "by law power
and dominion over his wife, and may keep her by force within the
bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel man-
ner." 5 1 The 1868 enactment of the "Act Concerning Married Wo-
men" 5 2 emancipated a wife in Colorado from the condition of thraldom
42. Nulle v. Gillete-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173
(Wyo. 1990) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). See also Villareal v. State
Dept. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 217 (Ariz. 1989).
43. For a list of such cases, see Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1133, n.2 (Okla.
1990); see also Donald D. Schneider, Loss of Parental Consortium, FOR THE DEFENSE, August
1991 at 11; moreover, some commentators have agreed with this view; see, e.g., Don E.
Burrell, Note, Parental Consortium: A House Built on Sand, 58 UMKC L. REv. 145 (1989); Greg
A. Guthrie, Comment, Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Con-
sortium?, 28 DuQ. L. REv. 697 (1990).
44. See Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Parent's Right to Recover for Loss of Consortium in
Connection with Injury to Child, 54 A.L.R. 4th 112 (1987).
45. The seminal decisions advancing public policy concerns to support the rejection
of such claims include: Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977)(en
banc)(parental consortium claim); Baxter v. Superior Court, 563 P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977) (fil-
ial consortium claim).
46. Schuler v. Henry, 94 P. 360 (Colo. 1908).
47. Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1887).
48. Schuler, 94 P. at 360.
49. Id. at 360.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. This act, originally codified at R. S. 1868, ch. LX, § 3, is now codified at COLO.
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in which she was placed at common law. 53 This act granted to the wife
many essential rights but had no effect on the rule denying her the right
to sue for consortium.
In the late 1800s, Colorado recognized that the consortium concept
included the right to recover for various intangible losses. In Denver
Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Riley, 54 the Colorado Court of Appeals rea-
soned that compensation for pecuniary loss resulting from a wife's in-
ability to continue to perform household duties does not, by itself, fully
compensate a husband's loss. 5 5 A wife makes a husband's "home cheer-
ful and inviting, and ministers to his happiness in a multitude of ways
outside of the drudgery of household labor .... All the work of the
house may be done by hired employees, and her services still give char-
acter to the home."' 56 The court recognized the intangible nature of a
consortium award, but reasoned that ajury could capably determine the
amount, not from evidence of value, but from their own observation,
experience and knowledge.
57
Thus, by 1899, Colorado's definition of consortium came to include
society and companionship. 58 Until 1970, however, a married woman
was not allowed to bring an action for loss of consortium based on inju-
ries to her husband. The justification for this denial of a right to sue for
loss of consortium was two-fold. First, this right of action was not recog-
nized under the common law. Second, statutes that allowed women to
sue on their own behalf did not specifically create the consortium right.
Accordingly, the courts held that the action could not be maintained
without legislative grant. 59 The Colorado legislature subsequently en-
acted Colorado Revised Statute (C.R.S.) § 90-2-11 in 1961, which codi-
fied a woman's right for consortium. 60 This enactment led to the 1970
decision, Crouch v. West, 6 1 wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals held
that the enactment of C.R.S. § 90-2-11 expressly overruled the denial of
the wife's right to sue for loss of consortium. The court also held that a
wife's right was "a separate right similar to that held by married men."
'62
Today, like the vast majority of jurisdictions, 63 Colorado recognizes
REV. STAT. § 14-2-202 (1987) and provides: "Any woman, while married, may sue and be
sued, in all matters having relation to her property, person, or reputation, in the same
manner as if she were sole."
53. Vells, 3 Colo. at 493.
54. 59 P. 476 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899).




59. Franzen v. Zimmerman, 256 P.2d 897, 898 (Colo. 1953); Giggey v. Gallagher
Transp. Co., 72 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Colo. 1937).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 90-2-11 (1963), which is now codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2-209 (1987), and provides: "In all actions for tort by a married woman, she shall
have the same right to recover for loss of consortium of her husband as is afforded hus-
bands in like actions."
61. 477 P.2d 805 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
62. Id. at 806.
63. Five American jurisdictions do not recognize a claim for loss of spousal consor-
tium. See Carey v. Foster, 221 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Va. 1963) (holding that the Married
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both spouses' right to recover for lost consortium. Under current Colo-
rado law, consortium encompasses "noneconomic damages in the form
of loss of affection, society, companionship, and aid and comfort of the
injured spouse, and ... economic damages in the form of lost household
services the injured spouse would have performed .. "64
B. Direct Actions by Parents and Children
Although consortium recovery has not been expanded to the par-
ent-child relationship in Colorado, a negligently injured child's parent is
not without a form of recovery. In Colorado, when a child is negli-
gently, but not fatally, injured the parent can recover pecuniary loss in
the form of reasonable medical expenses, 65 the child's past and future
earnings 66 and lost services. 6 7 The right to recover for injuries sus-
tained by a child lies exclusively with the parent. Furthermore, when a
parent is negligently injured, the child has no independent cause of ac-
tion under the theory that the child's economic loss will be compensated
in the parent's own action. Burdsall v. Waggoner6 8 is one of the first Colo-
rado cases to expressly rule that "the father is entitled to the earnings of
his son during minority."'6 9 The court noted that the father may relin-
quish the right to claim the wages when "such minor son contracts on
his own account for his services, and the father knows of it and makes no
objection." 70 Under such circumstances "there is an implied assent that
the son shall be entitled to his earnings." 7 ' In Burdsall, the issue arose
as to whether the son was entitled to the purchase price of a lot that he
had earned as wages during his minority. Because he had lived away
from home without parental control, earning his own living with his fa-
Women's Act divested the husband of his common law right of recovery for loss of consor-
tium as a result of his wife's disabilities caused by negligently inflicted injury, and the wife
should not be exclusive treasurer of the right to recover for consortium); Hoffman v.
Dautel, 388 P.2d 615 (Kan. 1965) (citing the standard drawbacks to any loss of consortium
award, including indefinite nature and amount of damages and possible double recovery
based on an award to the husband as justification for holding that the common law stands
until it has been specifically overruled or modified by the legislature); Roseberry v.
Starkovich, 387 P.2d 321 (N.M. 1963) (deciding not to endorse the right due to uncertain
and indefinite nature of the recovery; the general and communal nature of the recovery;
possibilities of double recovery; the fact that the legislature had not seen fit to speak on the
subject); Cozart v. Chapin, 241 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1978) (holding that no cause of action for
loss of consortium survived the transfer effected by North Carolina's Married Woman's
Act of a husband's common law right of action to recover for the wife's services); Hackford
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) (relying on previous Utah decisions
which held that the common law cause of action for loss of consortium had been abolished
in Utah by the Married Women's Act of 1898, and stating that if the cause of action were to
be created anew, it should be done by the legislature).
64. COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Civ. 3d § 6:6 (1988) [hereinafter CJI].
65. Id. at 6:3.
66. Burdsall v. Waggoner, 4 Colo. 261 (1878); Pawnee Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Pow-
ell, 227 P. 836, 839 (Colo. 1924); CJI, supra note 65, at § 6:3.
67. Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 300 P. 606 (Colo. 1931); CJI, supra note 65, at
§ 6:3.
68. 4 Colo. 261 (1878).





ther's full knowledge and consent, he was essentially emancipated. He
was therefore legally and justly entitled in his own right to his wages,
which were applied to the purchase price of the property.
7 2
In Pawnee Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Powell 73 a father brought an action
as his minor's next friend rather than joining as an individual plaintiff.
The court noted that there could be no recovery for the amount of the
minor's lost wages since the father was not a plaintiff in the action.
74
According to the court, the minor had a cause of action in his own name
for the injuries he sustained, but it was exclusively the father who was
entitled to recover for the minor's lost earnings. 7 5 The rules set forth in
Burdsall and Pawnee are the present state of the law in Colorado regard-
ing direct actions by parents and children, although, as noted below,
attempts were made to broaden those actions.
C. Parental and Filial Claims in Colorado
By the early 1980s, as courts began recognizing parental-filial con-
sortium claims, the stage seemed set for judicial acceptance in Colorado.
Spousal consortium claims had become a common form of recovery.
Moreover, both the judiciary and legislature recognized recovery for de-
rivative noneconomic loss, i.e. injury such as pain and suffering, incon-
venience, emotional stress and impairment of the quality of life.7 6
Furthermore, proponents of the claim found significance in Miller v.
Subia,77 often cited as a case that implicitly recognizes a filial consortium
claim. In Miller, a father brought an action on behalf of himself and his
minor son for damages arising from the son's automobile-motorcycle
accident. After a $1,000 jury award, the father appealed, contending
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on his entitlement
to damages for loss of companionship. The court of appeals affirmed,
finding no merit in the father's contention that the jury was not in-
structed on all elements of his damages. 78 The court did not specifically
rule on the validity of the father's consortium action. Rather, it merely
stated that there was inadequate evidence to support his claim. 79 For
many, Miller stood for the proposition that damages for filial consortium
could be recovered if adequately supported by the evidence.
Further inroads toward recognition were made in Reighley v. Interna-
tional Playtex, Inc. 8 0 In this wrongful death action, the district court af-
firmed the right of children to bring an independent claim for loss of
parental consortium and companionship. Stephen Reighley sued the
72. Id.
73. 227 P. 836 (Colo. 1924).
74. Id. at 839.
75. Id.
76. See Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978)(en banc)(recognizing the
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102.5(3)(a)(1987).
77. 514 P.2d 79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (N.S.F.O.P.).
78. Id. at 80.
79. Id.
80. 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985).
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
defendant individually and on behalf of his two minor children for inju-
ries resulting in the death of his wife as a result of "toxic shock" caused
by the defendant's product. The defendant sought partial summary
judgment seeking dismissal of the children's claim for loss of consor-
tium. The Reighley decision, however, came four years before the enact-
ment of C.R.S. § 13-21-203, allowing a spouse or heir to recover for
nonpecuniary damages such as loss of consortium in wrongful death
claims. The Reighley court conducted an analysis of parental consortium
case law from other jurisdictions. The court found cases supporting the
cause of action to be persuasive and additionally noted "the family unit
has been recognized by the Supreme Court to bear constitutionaly pro-
tected aspects." 8' The court further opined that Colorado tort law had
"evolved by legislation and judicial decision to impose duties and liabili-
ties on individual conduct interfering with the family relationship."
82
This includes the judicial recognition of the spousal consortium claim
83
as well as the child's right to a secure home environment as manifested
in the preamble to Colorado's Children's Code. 84 The court noted that
"[f]or the state to declare its responsibility to protect and foster the par-
ent-child relationship in this context and to ignore it when a third party
negligently injures the family unit is too anomalous to be counte-
nanced." 8 5 The court dismissed concerns about multiple suits, unlim-
ited liability and the difficulty of calculating damages as knee-jerk
reactions that arise each time a new cause of action is considered.
86
Moreover, if a spouse is entitled to recover for loss of consortium and a
parent is allowed to recover for the intangible loss sustained due to the
negligent death of a child, "[t]he child's loss of parental consortium is
no more intangible .... -87 The court adopted certain guidelines set
forth by other jurisdictions for the management and determination of
these actions, including joinder, wherever feasible, of the child's claim
with that of the parent and a requisite showing that the minor child was
dependent on the deceased parent for both economic and emotional
support.8 8
81. Id. at 1081, citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But see Dearborn
Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990) (reversing a lower
court ruling that recognized a claim for parental consortium. The Indiana Supreme Court
noted that recognizing the claim would only invite defendants to minimize its validity by
proving inadequacies in the familial relationship, resulting in pretrial investigation attack-
ing the quality of parent-child relationship enjoyed by the child before the parent's inju-
ries, and these attacks could lead to children suffering significant emotional harm from the
litigation process).
82. Reighlev, 604 F. Supp. at 1081.
83. Id.
84. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-1-101 to 116 (1986), which provides in part that the pur-
poses of the Children's Code are to "secure for each child . . . such care and guidance,
preferably in his own home, as will best serve his welfare and the interests of society; [and]
[t]o preserve and strengthen family ties . . . including improvement of home environ-
ment." Id. at § 19-1-102(l)(a) & (b).
85. Reighle', 604 F. Supp. at 1083-84.
86. Id. at 1082.
87. Id. at 1082-83.
88. Id. at 1084.
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D. Lee v. Colorado Department of Health
The uncertainty surrounding parental-filial consortium claims in
non-fatal injury cases in Colorado appeared to end with the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health.89 In Lee,
an injured driver's five children joined their father's suit and requested
an award of damages for their loss of companionship and support result-
ing from the father's injury in the car accident. The supreme court up-
held the trial court's determination that the children's claims were not
cognizable under Colorado law. Chief Justice Joseph A. Quinn, writing
for a unanimous court, recited the standard difficulties with recognizing
the claim, including: efficacy of monetary compensation as a substitute
for companionship and guidance; intangible character of the loss; socie-
tal costs and risk of double recovery. 90 Moreover, the court noted that
the legislature was in the best position to determine the viability of the
claim.9 ' Without reference to the modem trend, the Reighley opinion or
views of legal scholars and commentators, the Colorado Supreme Court
left little doubt that the claims for parental consortium, and by analogy,
filial consortium, were not judicially recognized in Colorado.
E. Post-Lee v. Colorado Department of Health Developments
On the heels of Lee, the district court also retreated from the
Reighley opinion, holding that under Colorado law a minor had no in-
dependent right of action to recover for loss of parental consortium in a
wrongful death action.9 2 In Beikman v. International Playtex, Inc., Judge
Jim R. Carrigan held that in light of Lee, any reform within the context of
parental consortium claims would have to await legislative action. 9 3 It is
obvious from Judge Carrigan's opinion, however, that he favors the
child's right to recover for parental consortium. Labelling the modern
trend of authority "the more persuasive cases,"'94 Judge Carrigan rea-
soned that the child's need for protection under the law is even greater
than a spouse's, since the spouse is more able to fend for himself or
herself.9 5
Another significant development in the parental-filial consortium
controversy occurred in 1989 when the Colorado General Assembly
amended the wrongful death statute9 6 to permit a surviving party's re-
covery for noneconomic loss, including grief, loss of companionship,
89. 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986).
90. Id. at 233.
91. Id. at 234. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Kansas Supreme
Court's reasoning for denying a child's claim for loss of consortium in Hoffman v. Dautel,
368 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1962). The Colorado court cited the Kansas court's decision in Hoffman
for denial of the consortium claim due to "[tihe possibility of multiplicity of actions based
upon a single tort and one physical injury, when added to the double-recovery aspect of
such situation in the absence of some statutory control . I..." d. at 234.
92. Beikman v. International Playtex, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 255 (D. Colo. 1987).
93. Id. at 259.
94. Id. at 258.
95. Id.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-201 to 204 (1987).
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pain and suffering and emotional stress. 9 7 Although the enactment of
similar provisions in other jurisdictions may have provided an analogy
for compensating familial consortium claims for personal injuries, these
provisions were not often construed as pronouncements by the legisla-
ture that damages for lost consortium could be recovered in nonfatal
cases. This is similarly true in Colorado where the wrongful death stat--
ute and its amendments do not create new causes of action; rather, they
merely allow causes already recognized to survive death. 98 Because Col-
orado does not recognize filial and parental consortium claims under
the auspices of Lee, it is doubtful that the wrongful death statute and the
amendments thereto could logically be construed to create a new action
in nonfatal cases.
The Colorado Court of Appeals was asked recently to consider the
propriety of the Lee decision in McGee v. Hyatt Legal Services, Inc.99 The
McGee plaintiffs, a mother and her daughter, charged that the negligence
of the Hyatt law firm caused temporary custody orders to be issued con-
trary to the mother's wish for sole legal custody, and as a result, there
was a wrongful interference with her parental relationship. Citing Lee v.
Department of Health, the court rejected the claim, because of the impossi-
bility of ascertaining whether any tangible damages were or would be
sustained by the mother because of the custodial order. l0 0 Although
certiorari in McGee v. Hyatt was denied by the Colorado Supreme Court,
given the immense judicial attention the consortium claim has caused of
late, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the Colorado Supreme
Court should re-examine its decision not to extend consortium recovery
to the parent-child relationship.
IV. CRITIQUE OF COLORADO LAW
A critical analysis of Lee provides ample support for the proposition
that the court has not been intellectually honest in rejecting consortium
claims and that the basis for its decision is inherently flawed. As noted,
the primary reasons for the court's decision are the intangible character
of the loss, threats of double recovery and that legislative action is the
proper means by which extensions of law should be accomplished.'10
Courts and legal scholars have rejected these arguments, espousing
countervailing methods and considerations, which reveal Lee's flawed
analysis. 102
The double recovery argument in support of nonrecognition is that,
as a practical matter, the jury implicitly awards an amount of damages
for the impairment of the child-parent relationship when it considers its
award for the injured family member. To the extent that implicit recov-
97. 1989 COLO. SESS. LAws 752 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1991
Cum. Supp.)).
98. Id.
99. 813 P.2d 754 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
100. Id. at 758.
101. See Guthrie, supra note 44, at 705.
102. See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
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ery presents a problem, it can be remedied by the use of narrowly tai-
lored jury instructions that distinguish between nonderivative pecuniary
loss and consortium damages. '0 3 "The specter of double recovery can
be easily eliminated by the trial court's distinctly specifying in proper
jury instructions the respective elements of damages to which the parent
and the child are each entitled."' 1 4 Moreover, there is a presumption
that the jury reads and follows its instructions. 10 5 This procedure is
used successfully in spousal claims. Parental-filial claims should pose no
greater problems.
The concern for multiple claims and protracted litigation can be
minimized by requiring joinder where feasible.l 0 6 The perceived threat
of multiple suits is primarily concerned with parental consortium claims
where numerous children seek recovery. It has been suggested that
there is no difference between these claims and tort claims involving nu-
merous victims such as bus accidents or airline accidents.' 0 7 Requiring
all children in a family to sue as a class would solve this problem.'
0 8
The intangible nature of the award seems to be an artificial distinc-
tion when state law compensates similar losses such as pain and suffer-
ing, spousal consortium, emotional distress and nonpecuniary loss in
wrongful death actions. 10 9 Thus, the same judicial rules which guide
the jury in these instances can be applied relative to parental-filial con-
sortium claims." l0 Along these lines it has been suggested that mone-
tary compensation will merely make the consortium deprived child or
parent a wealthy person rather than enabling them to regain the lost
companionship and guidance. II Proponents of consortium claims es-
chew this argument, claiming that although a monetary award may be a
poor substitute, it is the only workable way our legal system has found to
ease an injured party's tragic loss. 1 12 One court has expressly stated
that allowing such an award is preferable to complete denial.' IS
The Lee court additionally believed that recognition was best left to
the legislature.' 14 Causes of action for loss of consortium have histori-
cally been allowed or denied by common law.' 15 Courts have long rec-
ognized their responsibility to adapt common law to the needs of society
103. See, e.g., Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Colo. 1990); Belcher v. Goins,
400 S.E.2d 830, 838 (W. Va. 1990); Radensky, supra note 2, at 293-94.
104. Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990).
105. Id.
106. See Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g Corp. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988), rev'd., 551 N.E.2d 1,135 (Ind. 1990); Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc.,
734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987); Nulle, 797 P.2d at 1175-76.
107. Simpson, supra note 25, at 925.
108. Love, supra note 25, at 604.
109. See Simpson, supra note 25, at 925.
110. Id.
Ill. Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977).
112. Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Wis. 1984).
113. Id.
114. Lee, 718 P.2d at 234.
115. Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988), rev'd., 551 N.E.2d 1135 (1990).
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when the legislature has not spoken. 16 As noted by one court, "when
the crowd is marching in the wrong direction, it is time to break ranks
and strike out on our own."'1 17 Deference to the legislature flies in the
face of the common law responsibilities of the judiciary. In all, there
exist well-reasoned rebuttals for the policy arguments set forth in Lee
and in other cases rejecting filial-spousal consortium claims. As previ-
ously noted, a majority of courts have had occasion to consider and deny
parental and filial claims and are no doubt aware of these countervailing
arguments. Why then are courts continuing to cling to the seemingly
"artificial" concerns of double recovery, multiple claims and intangible
recovery? What should Colorado's position be in this regard?
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Original Analogy to Master-Servant Should Not Be Extended
As noted above, spousal consortium recovery was based on an out-
dated and faulty premise that a woman was the servant of her husband
with no independent legal identity. The claim grew from this erroneous
idea when so-called enlightened courts recognized the fallacy of the hus-
band's role as master, but chose to demonstrate their enlightenment by
extending the consortium claim to the wife rather than eliminating it
altogether. As such, the consortium claim has been imbedded in legal
jurisprudence despite the archaic concept behind its early recognition.
Extending it to the parental-child relationship only perpetuates an aber-
ration in the law. The mere existence of a suspect form of recovery
should not be the basis for its unrestricted expansion. Thus, any anal-
ogy to the spousal claim is not persuasive, and parental and filial consor-
tium actions should not be recognized.
B. Basic Tort Principles and Costs To Society Should Be Considered
If the Colorado Supreme Court re-examines its position and does
not reverse Lee, it should be intellectually honest and acknowledge the
procedural mechanisms and considerations that exist to remedy the con-
cerns raised in Lee. It could be that the Lee court and other courts that
reject parental-filial claims are using these policy concerns in an attempt
to limit spiraling tort recovery for those not directly injured, but who
stand in a special relationship with the victim. Allowing secondary tort
victims to sue is somewhat of an idiosyncracy in the law, extending liabil-
ity from those who are immediately and directly injured to those whose
liability is established by some source other than foreseeability. 1 18
While it is true that secondary claims are allowed in most jurisdictions
for spousal consortium, wrongful death and emotional distress, recogni-
116. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 995 (Alaska 1987); see also
Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 519 (noting that in defering to the legislature, the court would be
shirking its responsibilities).
117. Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).




tion of those claims does not necessarily support the abandoning of
traditional tort concepts in favor of creating a consortium claim within
the parent-child context.
Compensating a secondary victim who views a tragic accident for his
or her emotional distress requires physical manifestations of injury as
well as the observer being physically present or in the "zone of dan-
ger." 119 With respect to parental-filial consortium, the child sitting in
school across town, or for that matter in an entirely different state, is
allowed to recover for injuries sustained solely by his or her parent. The
child has suffered no cognizable physical injury, yet is allowed to recover
in his or her own name against the tortfeasor. Thus, if parental-filial
claims are viewed as independent claims, recognition would seem to be
entirely contrary to the bounds of tort law and the reasons for their
existence. In the words ofJustice BenjaminJ. Cardozo in Palsgrafv. Long
Island Railroad, 12
0
the conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation
to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to
the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not neg-
ligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that the fall-
ing package had in it the potency of peril to persons thus
removed .... The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach
of duty to another.i
2 1
With respect to the analogy to wrongful death causes of action, it has
been pointed out that the policy considerations are different where a
victim is killed and therefore can bring no direct action of his own.
122
The wrongful death action serves as the only means by which the family
unit can recover compensation for the loss of parental care and services,
whereas when the parent or child lives, the tangible aspects of the child's
care can be compensated in an independent cause of action.1
2 3
Recognition of the parental-filial consortium claim also effectively
creates a tort claim and extends liability beyond the ordinary principles
of negligence, which limit recovery to those who are immediately in-
jured and liability to those for whom liability is established by some legal
source. 124 In essence, the spousal consortium claim, a legal idiosyn-
crasy, would be allowed to abrogate the sound principles of duty and
foreseeability. Recognition would necessarily create a cause of action
for psychic or emotional injury not accompanied by any actual or
threatened physical harm or any injury to another legally protected in-
terest. 12 5 In regard to the bounds of tort law, Judge Charles D. Breitel
119. Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978).
120. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
121. Id. at 99-100.
122. Schneider, supra note 43.
123. Id.
124. Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517 A.2d 1348, 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), allocatur
granted, 532 A.2d 437 (Pa. 1987), aff'd without opinion, 540 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1988).
125. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 327 (Or. 1982).
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of the Court of Appeals of New York in Tobin v. Grossman 12 6 wrote a
poignant and persuasive opinion wherein, with regard to emotional dis-
tress damages, he stated:
Beyond practical difficulties there is a limit to attaining essen-
tial justice in this area. While it may seem that there should be
a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by
the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying conse-
quences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The
problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree. The risks of indirect harm
from the loss or injury of loved ones is pervasive and inevitably
realized at one time or another. Only a small part of that risk is
brought about by the culpable acts of others. This is the risk of
living and bearing children. It is enough that the law estab-
lishes liability in favor of those directly or intentionally
harmed. 1
2 7
It is further instructive to note that in the context of actions not
brought by the primary victim, concerns about the uncertainty of the
intangible loss alleged and the inherent inadequacies of money damages
as compensation loom larger, especially since the primary victim may
also recover a sum for intangible, uncertain damages, i.e. pain and suf-
fering, etc. Additionally, it may not be far-fetched to say that the cost of
being a human being in a modern society could become too expensive,
since one negligent mistake could lead to a tort award not only to the
injured party but also to all those with whom he has relationships. Of
course there is insurance. The insurance company raises its premiums
and the public pays for the jury awards. It soon becomes too expensive
for the average person to obtain liability insurance. Taxation, prices
paid for consumer goods and medical service necessarily increase.'
2 8 If
the manufacturing industry is too adversely affected it could result in the
loss of jobs. 12 9 Suggestions are made that these factors should not
stand in the way of an enlightened tort system, which must be properly
administered in terms of natural justice.13 0 However, according to one
commentator, this is not necessarily true: "A sound and viable tort sys-
tem-generally what we now have-is a valuable incident to our free
society, but we must protect it from excess lest it become unworkable
and alas we find it replaced with something far from desirable."'
3 '
Of course, if compensation should prove too costly, the legislature
could also put a ceiling on the amount of damages recoverable, 13 2 as the
Colorado legislature has done in wrongful death actions for lost society
126. 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
127. Id. at 424.
128. See Guthrie, supra note 43, at 702.
129. Id. at 702.
130. See Love, supra note 25, at 604.
131. Guthrie, supra note 43, at 702 (citing Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517 A.2d 1348 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986)).
132. Id. at 702.
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and companionship.13 3 Nevertheless, once done, another secondary
victim will be allowed to recover and an additional ripple of tort law will
reverberate toward an unknown shore.
C. Children Should Be Fully Compensated For Direct Injuries
While the earlier consortium cases were consistent with English
common law dealing with master-servant relationships, the more recent
cases are simply not in step with modern trends. Very few minors at the
present time would be considered an economic asset. Under Colorado
law, when a child is negligently injured, medical expenses and past and
future earnings are recoverable by the parent who must bring an in-
dependent action. Thus, Colorado law has continued the antiquated
idea that the child is a servant of his or her parents and, like the servant
in common law, can only recover for his or her injuries. When a parent
is negligently injured, the child has no cause of action and, it is submit-
ted, needs none since any economic losses will be compensated in the
parent's own action. In both instances, however, the tortfeasor is held
liable for all damages cognizable under general tort principles. Accord-
ingly, Colorado courts simply need to address the issue that a minor, as
with any injured party, should be entitled to complete and full compen-
sation for his or her own losses. All earnings, during minority or follow-
ing emancipation, should be awarded to a child. Of course, these
earnings, as with any personal injury award, should be held in trust for
the minor. Applying such a formula would provide the child with the
same right of tort recovery as all other tort victims. Under this rule,
both parent and child would be entitled to obtain the fullest recovery
allowed within the proper boundaries of common law tort principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, derivative claims for consortium were premised upon
archaic views of master-servant and husband-wife relationships. Society
should no longer tolerate such views. Expansion of the concept of con-
sortium to include filial or parental claims merely continues this fiction.
As noted by Judge Breitel, the law today must recognize that, although
injuries impact many people, difficult and somewhat arbitrary lines must
be drawn.' 3 4 Direct injury to a child must be fully compensated. Simi-
larly, an injured parent should be entitled to recover in his or her own
action for the change he or she experiences in dealing with a child in the
form of expenses incurred in caring for the child. Derivative consortium
claims, however, should not be expanded. Such claims would necessar-
ily entail the abandonment of common law tort principles in favor of
extending liability for psychic injuries not accompanied by actual or
threatened physical harm. If such claims were recognized, liability
would be improperly extended from those who are immediately and di-
133. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-102.5(2)(b) and 203(l) (1991 Cum. Supp.).
134. See supra note 127.
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rectly injured and whose cause of action is established by foreseeability,
to those whose only connection with the accident is their fortuitous rela-
tionship with the primary victim. The tort concepts of duty and foresee-
ability and the reasons for which they exist would necessarily be
abandoned. Recognition would mean disregarding the fundamental
concepts which limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable
degree. In sum, the ripples from an injury must end if the tort system
that we find so valuable is to remain effective.
JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON CHILD VICTIMS:




Dedicated to L.S. and A.L.G., whose cases were
the catalyst for this Article
I. PROLOGUE
This Article explores statutory and case law which address the ques-
tion of disclosure of medical records pertaining to physical and psycho-
logical evidence in cases involving adult victims, child victims and the
accused in a variety of settings. Inconsistent results in Colorado give
rise to the concerns expressed in this Article. Specifically, both child
and adult victims have a right to assert a privilege and prevent disclosure
of their confidential medical records when a case is brought in the crimi-
nal setting. If, however, a case is brought in the context of a depen-
dency and neglect (D and N) proceeding or a criminal case subsequent to a
report of abuse made under the Children's Code, the privilege appears
not to exist. Additionally, even though the statute appears to also elimi-
nate the privilege for the alleged perpetrator, in practice, only the
child's records are sought. One is left with the question of why the Chil-
dren's Code, the purpose of which is to protect children, provides this
class of victims with the least protection in judicial proceedings.I
These problems first come to light when social services attorneys or
District Attorneys (representing the county or state) and parents' de-
fense attorneys in D and N custody or criminal cases request or sub-
poena medical records from health care institutions and professionals
without proper consent. 2 Whether to produce these records or to assert
the patient's privilege is an extremely difficult decision for the provider
because there is conflicting guidance in the law. An improper disclosure
can have grave consequences for the subject of the records;3 not to men-
* Corporate Counsel, Children's Health Corporation, Denver, Colorado; Univer-
sity of Colorado (B.A., 1971); University of Colorado School of Law (J.D., 1975).
** Executive Director, Children's Legal Clinic, Denver, Colorado; University of
Pittsburgh (B.S., 1970); Rutgers University (J.D., 1975).
1. For an excellent in-depth discussion of protected communications, see Robert
Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected
Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143 (1984).
2. The authors caution members of the bar, health care providers and record custo-
dians that a subpoena only triggers the question of whether disclosure is proper; it does
not obviate the need for an appropriate consent, court order or determination that consent
is unnecessary. Otherwise, testimonial privileges, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987
& Supp. 1991), would be meaningless whenever a subpoena issued for such information.
3. Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (the physician-pa-
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tion the risk to the integrity of the legal proceeding4 and the provider
who makes the wrong choice.
5
Disclosure of medical records in response to a request or subpoena
is not determinative of whether the records will be admissible as evi-
dence in the subsequent judicial proceeding. However, the health care
professional's obligation to assert the patient's privilege attaches at the
point of the initial request for disclosure, and the law will provide pro-
tection at this point.6 This Article focuses on the disclosure quandary,
although admissibility of records are discussed where pertinent. The
tensions between privilege and disclosure are addressed below in the
context of D and N, criminal, civil and domestic relations (custody)
cases. The inconsistency of outcomes is explored and suggestions for a
more uniform approach are made below.
II. DEPENDENCY AND NEGLECT CASES
Cases of abuse, ill treatment, physical or medical neglect of children
are regulated by the Colorado Children's Code. 7 In these cases, county
departments of social services or local law enforcement agencies investi-
gate reports of suspected abuse or neglect.8 Often medical records are
sought in order to establish the nature of the child's injury, abuse, ne-
glect or trauma (mental or physical). The Code is silent as to whether
such records are to be disclosed to the investigators by health care prov-
iders or records custodians. Individual professional licensing laws gen-
erally prohibit disclosure.9 The Children's Code, however, abrogates
these privileges such that communications between a minor patient and
provider are admissible as evidence in any case resulting from a report
of child abuse or neglect.' 0 The statutory language is broad enough to
tient relationship and information acquired from that relationship are extremely private
matters for which a high degree of protection is warranted).
4. See, e.g., id. at 865 (improper admission of testimony which could have influenced
the verdict is reversible error).
5. For example, unauthorized release of confidential information may result in civil
liability for invasion of privacy, Levias v. United Air Lines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985); Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 978 (M.D. Ala.
1974), as well as criminal liability, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-412(1), (3) (1986 & Supp.
1991) (unauthorized disclosure of medical records is a class 6 felony theft); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 25-4-1409(20) (Supp. 1991) (unauthorized release of HIV information is a
misdemeanor).
6. Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1983) (once medical communications
privileges attach, they prohibit both pretrial discovery of information as well as testimonial
disclosure). See also Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1991).
7. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-101 to -702 (Supp. 1991), see especially definitions in
§ 19-3-102(1) (Supp. 1991).
8. Id. § 19-3-308(l).
9. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-9 0-107(l)(g) (1987) (privilege for psychologists and
persons working under the supervision of a psychologist); id. § 13-90-107(l)(d) (1987 &
Supp. 1991) (protected communications with physician, surgeon or registered profes-
sional nurse); id. § 12-43-218(1) (1991) (nondisclosure by psychologists, social workers,
marriage and family therapists, professional counselors and certified school
psychologists).
10. Colorado Revised Statute § 19-3-311 provides that such communications are not
privileged evidentiary matter:
The incident of privileged communication between patient and physician, be-
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address communications and observations of both physical and psycho-
logical harm. If the privilege cannot bar testimony, it follows that the
records may properly be disclosed in advance of the judicial proceed-
ing, I I and therefore production in response to a request or subpoena
appears to be authorized, if not compelled, by the statute.
This abrogation of the patient's right to assert a privilege as to testi-
mony about certain communications is a companion to the statutory
duty of providers to report suspected child abuse. 12 However, the iden-
tity of the "patient" in this statute is ambiguous: is it the victim or the
accused or both? The presumed purpose of this abrogation is to en-
hance the reporting of child abuse and to prevent the accused from hid-
ing behind the privilege and thereby conceal admissions or physical
evidence needed to determine what happened to the child. 13 On the
other hand, the respondent often seeks the child's records in order to
establish the child's lack of credibility, propensity to not tell the truth, or
to give inconsistent accounts. In these cases, the alleged perpetrator,
who should not be permitted to hide his or her own conduct behind the
shield of privilege, seeks to use the statutory exemption to the child's
privilege as a sword, to attack and undermine the child's testimony.
In the authors' experience, however, this section is relied upon by
attorneys and providers to justify disclosure of a child's entire medical
record. 14 This paradox thwarts society's desire to protect the child
15
and instead exposes the minor victim to further assault in a judicial fo-
rum, either in person through cross examination or by proxy if a profes-
sional testifies about the victim's statements as a permitted exception to
the hearsay rule. 16
tween patient and registered professional nurse, or between any person licensed
pursuant to article 43 of title 12, C.R.S. [psychologists, social workers, therapists
and other counselors], or certified school psychologist and client, which is the
basis for a [abuse or neglect] report [required to be filed] pursuant to section 19-
3-304, shall not be a ground for excluding evidence in any judicial proceeding
resulting from a [filed] report ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-311(1) (Supp. 1991).
11. See Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 11 n.7 (Colo. 1983) (where a party intends
to present testimony as to mental or physical condition, the substance of such testimony
may be required to be disclosed prior to trial). SeeJett v. State of Florida, WL 226466 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (permitting defendant's discovery of child victim's communications
with therapist under similar statute).
12. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (Supp. 1991).
13. See, e.g., In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 1990) (disclosure of mother's past mental
health records); In re M.S., 569 N.E.2d 1282 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (mother's medical records
admissible in termination case); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(mother's drug treatment records disclosed in addicted infant D & N case); Common-
wealth v. Arnold, 514 A.2d 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (defendant convicted of sexual as-
sault was not permitted to assert privilege for inculpatory communications to a social
worker).
14. The betrayal of trust by disclosure of a child's statements about a parent with
whom the child still seeks a healthy relationship subjects the child to substantial distress.
See Weisberg & Wald, supra note I, at 211 n.215; Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 39-
40 (Colo. 1984).
15. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102 (Supp. 1991) (generally, the legislative declara-
tions of the general assembly demonstrate an intent to advance the welfare and best inter-
ests of an abused or neglected child).
16. A proxy is a professional who testifies about the child victim's statements in lieu of
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
It is important to note at this juncture that the authors assume, for
purposes of this Article, that D and N cases involve injury allegedly
caused by persons related to or known by the child, because the respon-
dents in these proceedings are parents who have either caused harm to
the child or have failed to protect a child from harm by another. In D
and N cases therefore, the child's testimony often is to be used against
the parent. How is the need for information in a proceeding to establish
mistreatment or neglect of a child to be balanced with the child's need
to confide in a health care professional and begin the process of physical
and psychological recovery? Where the victim's physical or mental con-
dition is a crucial component of such proceedings, evidence of same ap-
pears to be appropriate. The Colorado Court of Appeals has held there
was no physician's privilege as to physical evidence because a report to
Social Services constituted an automatic waiver.
17
There do not appear to be any published Colorado cases addressing
production of a child's post trauma mental health treatment records in a
D and N proceeding.' 8 In Colorado the statutory waiver provides the
basis for disclosure of such records to Social Services and this seems
proper at the investigative stage. However, disclosure to respondents
and/or evidentiary use by the parties at hearing subjects the child to
betrayal of those confidences which the privilege was intended to and
should continue to protect, just as in the case of an adult victim.' 9
If the respondent seeks records of the child abuse investigation by
the county social services agency or other social services records, an in
camera evaluation has been held to be appropriate. 20 If these files con-
tain the child's mental health records, the authors contend a hearing
rather than an in camera inspection is required. There exits a virtually
unknown and certainly under-utilized statute which establishes a hearing
procedure to determine whether mental health records should be re-
leased 2 1 in the absence of a valid consent or other specified circum-
the child's testimony. In Colorado, such testimony has been allowed through use of the
residual hearsay exception (CoLo. R. EVID. 803(24) (Supp. 1991)). See Oldsen v. People,
732 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Colo. 1986) (child's hearsay statements related by psychologist, phy-
sician and social worker had sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to sup-
port admission).
17. In re T.S. and T.M., 781 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, Oct. 10,
1989, (automatic waiver of mother's privilege).
18. In D and N cases from other states, the courts have denied fathers' requests for
Social Services and mental health records of a child. E.g., In re D.G., 416 A.2d 77 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). Courts have also denied requests for a child's statements
made to a treating therapist. E.g, In re Daniel C.H., 269 Cal. Rptr. 3d 624 (Ct. App. 1990).
Such access has also been denied in delinquency cases. E.g., In re L.P., 593 A.2d 393 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (notes of school psychologist protected by confidentiality).
19. See Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33, 39-40 (Colo. 1984) (protective orders
may be issued when appropriate to prevent disclosure of communications); infra Section
III, discussion regarding criminal cases.
20. People v. District Court, 743 P.2d 432, 436 (Colo. 1987) (in camera review re-
quired where the accused party who seeks access has proven an exception to confidential-
ity applies).
21. Colorado Revised Statute § 27-10-120(1) provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section [disclosure of information
regarding a criminal defendant or crimes], all information obtained and records
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stances.2 2 This shall, for purposes of this Article, be referred to as a
"27-10-120" hearing. This statute requires a hearing of which the subject
of the record and the custodian must be given notice (in compliance with
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure) and an opportunity to appear.
2 3
The authors theorize that the purposes of requiring notice to the custo-
dian are twofold: first, to allow for assertion of privilege and, second to
give notice to the treating professional. The latter may then also attend
the hearing and offer testimony to the court about the potential harm to
the subject and/or an ongoing therapeutic relationship if the pertinent
records were to be disclosed. This may not always occur in a hearing on
a motion for protective orders under Rule 26(c) of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure. The further value of a 27-10-120 hearing is the
unique necessity of notice to the subject of the record, which is not re-
quired in a hearing on a motion to quash a subpoena (in which the court
is asked to prevent disclosure of documents or testimony). This allows
the subject, the party most affected by the outcome, to be present and
place his or her consent or opposition to disclosure on the record. This
statute is not restricted in its applicability to any particular kind of pro-
ceeding;24 its definitions are broad and cover any mental health serv-
ices.2 5 It would seem very appropriate to use the 27-10-120 proceeding
whenever a request for disclosure of a child's mental health records is
received. The child can be represented and the custodian/provider can
be present to fully advise the court as to the impact of disclosure on the
child.
At this point, the question of consent to release the minor's mental
health records must be considered, since existence of a valid consent
moots the privilege issue and obviates the need for a hearing. Ordina-
rily a parent has legal authority to consent to the release of his or her
child's records. 26 However, in a D and N proceeding, the interests of
the parent and the child often conflict. For this reason, the respondent
parent's consent should not be sufficient for disclosure,2 7 especially
prepared in the course of providing any services under this article [care and treat-
ment of the mentally ill] to individuals under any provision of this article shall be
confidential and privileged matter. Such information and records may be dis-
closed only . . . To persons authorized by an order of the court after notice and
opportunity for hearing to the person to whom the record or information per-
tains and the custodian of the record or information pursuant to the Colorado
rules of civil procedure ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-120(1), (1)(f) (1989).
22. See id. §§ 27-10-120(I)(a)-(e), (g)-(h) (which permit disclosure to other providers,
payors, researchers, courts reviewing commitments and families of adult patients).
23. One New York court denied a motion to compel the release of confidential
records for lack of notice to the records custodian. Susan W. v. Ronald A., 558 N.Y.S.2d
813 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990).
24. When this arises in the criminal context, it assumes constitutional dimensions. See
itfra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
25. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-102(1) (1989).
26. Ann Sayvetz, Consent to Treatment and Access to .1linors' Medical Records, 17 Coi.o.
l.wv. 1323, 1324 (1988).
27. Despite the provisions of section 27-10-120(1.5), which permit parent access to
the mental health records of the minor child. See COLO. REV. STrAT. § 27-10-120(l.5)
(1989).
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where the contents of the records may be used to attack the child's cred-
ibility as a weapon in parent's defense. In other words, the release of
the child's information to the parents may well promote the self interest
of the parent; not the best interest of the child. 2 8 The child's interest in
nondisclosure is more compelling than that of the adult, based on the
potential threat to the child's physical and emotional well being.
If the parent in a D and N case is not able to act in the best interests
of the child, who is? The Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.) who is appointed
in D and N cases would appear to play this role.2 9 The G.A.L. may as-
sert the child's privilege to bar disclosure of records.30 However, it is
not clear whether the G.A.L. may waive it, since unlike the child's legal
guardians, the G.A.L. has no authority to make treatment or placement
decisions for the child. If Social Services has been granted temporary
legal custody, the agency could provide a valid consent to release
records to the parents. However, the authors submit that obtaining a
judicial opinion ordering disclosure after a 27-10-120 hearing, which en-
courages provider input, is the wiser course.
If the court is to resolve the matter of disclosure of the child's
records, what standard is to be applied? The courts could look to the
already established statutory standard for a patient's access to his or her
own hospital records: access to notes or psychological records may be
denied if inspection would have a significant negative impact on the pa-
tient. 3 ' This procedure would be consistent with the fundamental pur-
pose of a child protection system.
Sometimes, the facts of a D and N case appear to establish criminal
conduct and a criminal case is filed. The respondent/defendant faces
proceedings in two different settings with different disclosure and dis-
covery rules. The Children's Code not only abrogates the privilege in D
and N cases, but in "any judicial proceeding resulting from a report pur-
suant to this part 3 .... .32 At present, the victim's mental health
records are often available to the parent respondent in the D and N case
under social services' broad discovery policies. The parent-defendant in
the criminal case may already have obtained the records in the D and N
case, or may seek them directly in the criminal case under the provisions
of C.R.S. § 19-3-311. The existence of this statutory language explains
the dearth of Colorado cases addressing disclosure of a child's mental
health records in these circumstances.
Since the language of the Children's Code is ambiguous, the ques-
tion of access to records where the D and N respondent is the "patient"
28. For a discussion oflD & N cases where the parent's interests are elevated above the
child's, see David C. Hoskins, Representation of D & .V Respondents: ,. Balanced Approach, 21
CoLo. LAw. 49 (1992).
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111(1) (Supp. 1991).
30. See id. § 19-3-203(3).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801(l)(a) (1989). The authors believe the opinion re-
quired by this statute as to the significant negative impact of release of records may be
supplied either by the child's therapist or an expert appointed by the court.
32. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-31 i(1) (Supp. 1991) (See supra note 14 for the full text
of this section).
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must be addressed. In one unreported Colorado case experienced by
the authors, the trial court asked the mother to waive the privilege to her
records; in the absence of such waiver, the court drew negative infer-
ences as to the mother's psychological condition. Arguably, the Colo-
rado statute eliminates the privilege, and a waiver by the parent should
not be necessary for disclosure. Although the statute seems to permit it,
the authors are concerned that treatment records of a D and N respon-
dent are seldom sought. Admissions of an alleged perpetrator should
not be shielded by the adult's assertion of a privilege with the provider,
who is otherwise obligated to report suspected abuse. Cases from other
jurisdictions have held that the privilege yields to the paramount inter-
ests of the child.33 Full disclosure of such admissions clearly support
the statutory intent to protect the child.
3 4
III. CRIMINAL CASES
When an adult is the victim of an assault and evidence of physical
harm is to be used, a waiver (either explicit3 5 or implied 36) is required.
Medical records reflecting post-trauma mental health treatment of an
adult victim are privileged and not subject to disclosure to the alleged
perpetrator in a criminal case.3 7 This is true whether the provider is a
psychiatrist, psychologist, nurse or social worker.3 8 Testimony about
the assault and the fact that counselling took place does not constitute a
waiver, and an in camera review of the records by the court has been held
to be inappropriate. 39 The burden of establishing a waiver is on the
party seeking to overcome the privilege and the application of the privi-
lege does not violate the defendant's right of cross examination.
40
Where a child is the victim of an assault by a stranger, the case is
usually reported directly to the police, prosecuted solely as a criminal
case and is not the subject of a report under the Children's Code.
Therefore, the abrogation of privilege in the Children's Code does not
apply, and the child's privilege now remains intact under the state crimi-
nal statutes. Before 1988 the statute on sexual assault on a minor child
stated there was no victim-patient and physician privilege.4 1 In 1988,
the reference to "victim-patient and physician privilege" was deleted
(for any crimes committed after July 1, 1988), thereby resurrecting the
33. Seesupra note 13.
34. To this end, there is also no spousal privilege in child abuse cases. Id. § 19-3-
311(2); see also People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687, 688-89 (Colo. 1983) (applying former
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-112 (1973) in denying spousal privilege).
35. See Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1034, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 1988).
36. Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo. 1983).
37. People v. Silva, 782 P.2d 846, 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
38. See statutes cited supra note 9.
39. Silva, 782 P.2d. at 850.
40. Application of the privilege does not violate a defendant's right to confrontation.
People v. District Court, 719 P.2d at 726-27 (construing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107
(l)(g)(Supp. 1985)).
41. COLO. REV. STAr. § 18-3-411(5) (1986). There is no ambiguity as to identity of
the privilege holder in this statute; the defendant's privilege is not involved.
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privilege. 4 2 Today, in the case of criminal assault, there is a privilege
protecting the child's records, and the stranger is denied access; but the
relative who commits an assault reported under the Children's Code
may gain access to the child's post-trauma psychological records in the
companion criminal case. 43 This inconsistency is contrary to the public
policy of "child protection", 4 4 and legislation is needed to remedy this
patently differential treatment.
4 5
The privilege pertaining to a child's physical harm may be handled
independently from that of psychological treatment. In one Colorado
case, the mother waived the privilege for the hospital records of her
child's physical examination, but the court held that such explicit waiver
did not include a waiver of the psychologist-patient privilege for treat-
ment at the Kempe National Center for Prevention and Treatment of
Child Abuse.4 6 The child's psychological condition was not an element
of the crimes of sexual assault and sexual assault on a child. Therefore
there was no implicit waiver. There is a danger of ignoring this distinc-
tion when both types of treatment are provided at one institution, and
reflected in a single medical record.
A corollary issue is raised by testimony of a professional about a
criminal assault in lieu of the child victim, under C.R.E. 803(24), 4 7 the
residuary hearsay rule. So long as the scope of testimony is restricted to
"what happened" as opposed to the rehabilitative process of the child,
the substitute testimony should not be deemed a waiver such that all
mental health records would be disclosed. 4 8 The contrary results in an
unconscionable choice: either the child faces the trauma of testifying or
where testimony is inappropriate, disclosure of confidences resulting in
great harm to the therapeutic process.
4 9
The issue most frequently highlighted in such a case is the defend-
42. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(5) (Supp. 1991). An argument could be made, at
least in sexual assault cases, that the privilege restored to the child-victim pursuant to the
1988 amendment of section 18-3- 411(5) overruled the 1987 Children's Code abrogation
of privilege in section 19-3-311 (1) under the rules of statutory construction: where stat-
utes are irreconcilable, statute passed later in time prevails. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 2-4-206
(1980). The amendment to section 18-3-411(5) was passed in 1988 (1988 Colo. Sess.
Laws 713), while the Children's Code was repealed and reenacted in 1987 (1987 Colo.
Sess. Laws 695).
43. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-311, -308, -303(4.7) (Supp. 1991).
44. See generally id. § 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d) (legislative declarations to promote welfare
and interests of children).
45. This problem has not gone unrecognized by courts addressing similar legislation.
SeeJett v. State of Florida, WL 226466, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (SharpJ, dissent-
ing) ("[A] close relative who rapes a child will have the benefit of requiring disclosure of
the child's statements to his or her psychotherapist, but a stranger who rapes a child under
similar circumstances will have no such right. Such an anomalous and unequal application
of the law should be avoided.").
46. People v. Pressley, 804 P.2d 226, 228 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
47. See supra note 16.
48. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992) (the Supreme Court approved the admissi-
bility of testimony of adults recounting the four year old child's statements about a sexual
assault under established exceptions to the hearsay rule, and rejected the defendant's
Confrontation Clause challenge).
49. See cases cited supra note 18.
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ant's constitutional right to confrontation. 50 In the 1987 case of Penn-
sylvania v. Ritchie,5 ' the United States Supreme Court found that
protection of a child's records did not violate the accused's right to con-
frontation. The Court did, however, require an in camera review of the
child's records after which only that information that was exculpatory
was to be disclosed to the defendant. In 1984, Illinois passed a statute
providing an absolute privilege for statements made to rape crisis per-
sonnel. 5 2 The Illinois Supreme Court found the statute did not violate
the defendant's rights to due process or confrontation, and upheld the
trial court's refusal to conduct an in camera hearing to examine the com-
munications. 53 Legislation such as that in Illinois should be considered
in Colorado and elsewhere. In the meantime, the authors contend that
27-10-120 hearings offer greater protection for the child, in part to
avoid the temptation for overworked judges to disclose the entire rec-
ord, rather than engage in the time consuming task of in camera review.
54
We now turn to the question of the criminal defendant as "patient"
in a case arising from a report to Social Services. This in part involves
the question of fairness of disclosure of confidential information of vic-
tim, defendant, neither or both. Where the defendant's medical condi-
tion is not an element of the crime, there is a privilege and a waiver is
required. 55 However, if the criminal case arose out of a report under
the Children's Code, at least under the current law, there may not be a
privilege such that the District Attorney should be able to obtain and
introduce admissions and observations contained in the defendant's
medical records.5 6 This may not, however, extend to records of court
ordered therapy under a treatment plan for sexually abusive parents.
5 7
Further, in criminal cases of assault on a child, there is no spousal privi-
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See EbrahimJ. Kermani, The U.S. Supreme Court on Victim-
ized Children: The Constitutional Rights of the Defendant versus The Best Interest of The Child, 30J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY, 839, 840-42, (1991); see also People v. Reidout,
530 N.Y.S.2d 938, 944 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988) (court must balance the competing
interests between witness confidentiality in psychiatric records and defendant's right to
confrontation).
51. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (5-4 decision, distinguishing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), which disapproved the trial court's prohibition of cross-examination on the issue
of a witness's prior juvenile record, which was privileged under state law, as a violation of
the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses).
52. ILL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 8-802.1 (1985).
53. People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1047 (1988).
54. This was the experience of one author following production to the court of a
child's psychiatric record.
55. Cf People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant's patient-
psychologist privilege was upheld under CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(g) (1987)). The
court noted, however, that in Children's Code cases after 1989, statutory amendments
would dictate the opposite result, since psychologists and social workers had been added
to the class of providers whose privilege was abrogated. Bowman, 812 P.2d at 728-29.
56. Credit for this idea is owed to the mother of a child, who, upon being informed by
hospital counsel that her child's records would probably be disclosed to the defendant
accused of sexually assaulting her daughter, without consent, asked why her ex-boyfriend's
group therapy records recounting his admission of the assault would not be available in
the criminal case. See also supra note 45.
57. See People v. District Court, 731 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1987).
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lege, 58 and one parent may have to testify about the other's inculpatory
statements.
IV. CIVIL CASES
In civil cases, parties are entitled to assert a privilege for protection
of medical records, unless the information is the basis of a claim or af-
firmative defense (including emotional distress). 59 This includes drug
and alcohol records, which may only be disclosed with consent or a
court order.60 Where mental health records are sought (other than for a
court ordered evaluation) in any civil matter, it should be presumed by
the provider that the physician/psychologist/social worker privileges ap-
ply.6 1 A 27-10-120 hearing should be utilized, especially where the pa-
tient has or had an expectation of confidentiality.
6 2
The status of the medical communications privilege is less clear in
custody proceedings. The Colorado Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act 63 creates a right of access to the child's medical records for a parent
who has joint legal, 64 but not physical, custody at the time of the medi-
cal records request "[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law to the
contrary." 65 However, the "notwithstanding" clause arguably supports
a right of disclosure to a consenting parent whose parental rights have
been terminated. This is patently contrary to the social aims of child
protection, and the statute needs to be amended to make explicit the
right of access applies only in the cases of joint custody.
V. VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION?
It appears from the above discussion that disclosure of medical in-
formation, physical and psychological, varies with the situation. A child
victim of an assault by a stranger or any adult victim has a privilege for
post trauma mental health records, but a child assaulted by a relative or
person known to the child, which is reported under the Children's Code,
does not. This is an unfortunate and unintended byproduct of the stat-
utes designed to protect children. It may well rise to the level of consti-
tutional infirmity: a violation of these children's right to equal
protection of the laws.
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by the federal constitu-
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(l)(a)(II) (Supp. 1991).
59. Clark v. District Ct., 668 P.2d 3, 9-10 (Colo. 1983). Of course, counsel for the
parties will be aware of whether the privilege has been waived because a medical condition
is the basis of a claim or defense, but the provider receiving the request for records will
not know this. For optimal certainty in these situations, counsel should obtain consent or
a judicial determination that the privilege has been waived before requesting records from
the provider.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290 dd-3, ee-3 (1988).
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-218(1) (1991).
62. Id. § 12-43-214(l)(d)(4).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-101 (1987 & Supp. 1991).
64. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123.5(1) (1987) (defining joint custody).
65. See id. § 14-10-123.5(7).
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tion.6 6 Generally, the state may not classify groups of persons similarly
situated and treat those classes differently unless the classification is ra-
tional and furthers a legitimate state interest. 6 7 If the affected right is a
fundamental one, or a suspect class has been created, the legislation
must pass a much more rigorous test of judicial scrutiny. 6 8 Where the
state has declared that the purpose of the Children's Code is "[t]o se-
cure for each child subject to [the Code's] provisions such care and gui-
dance... as will best serve his welfare and the interest of society,"'6 9 and
where the application of privilege laws affords the least protection to
this class of children, a court may find the situation deserving of height-
ened scrutiny. Of three groups similarly situated (victims of assault),
one group (minors reported under the Children's Code) has no ability
to protect their confidences necessary for rehabilitation and treatment,
unlike the other two groups (adults and minor victims of assault by
strangers). This disparity and unequal treatment may not withstand a
constitutional challenge, and should therefore be remedied by legisla-
tive or judicial action. In the meantime, the use of 27-10-120 hearings
should result in more equitable and uniform treatment.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The authors recommend the following actions to remedy the ineq-
uities detailed above:
a) Custodians of records and professionals should oppose requests
for production of a child victim's mental health records except to Social
Services in the context of an investigation. If any mental health records
are subpoenaed, the attorney issuing same should be promptly told of
the provider's objection, advised of 27-10-120 procedure, and if the
matter cannot be informally resolved, a motion to quash should be filed.
The custodian should notify and involve providers in the hearing to tes-
tify about potential damage to the child and the therapeutic relationship
based on disclosure. Treatment by psychiatrist, psychologist, social
worker or school counsellor should be handled uniformly. Notice of re-
quest for disclosure should be given to parents/legal guardians and the
child.
b) As long as the current law stands, district attorneys, county at-
torneys and guardians ad litem should consider the use of 19-3-311 to ob-
tain records of respondents and/or defendants in D and N or criminal
cases arising from reports under the Children's Code. Admissions may
be contained therein.
c) District attorneys should use 18-3-411(5) to protect children
from disclosure of psychiatric or psychological treatment records in
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
68. For a recent discussion of equal protection analysis by the Colorado Supreme
Court, see State v. Defoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992) (applying federal law; the Colorado
constitution does not contain an equal protection clause).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-102(1)(a) (Supp. 1991).
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cases arising outside the Children's Code setting. Also, district attor-
neys should argue that disclosure of the victim's records is inappropriate
in cases of substitute testimony under Colorado Rules of Evidence
803(24).
d) Social Services agencies need to refuse disclosure to D and N
respondents of a child's mental health records unless the court so orders
after a 27-10-120 hearing. Colorado Revised Statute sections 19-1-113
and 114 may be cited as a basis for seeking initial orders against
disclosure.
e) Judges and attorneys should recognize the applicability of the
27-10-120 hearing procedures to production of any mental health
records (whether in D and N, criminal, domestic or civil cases) and use
such hearings (with notice to the custodian of records and the subject of
the records) to resolve questions of disclosure and privilege.
f) Legislation is needed to clarify the Children's Code to (1) abro-
gate the alleged perpetrator's privilege, (2) restrict disclosure of a
child's medical records to those portions relevant to the reportable in-
jury suffered by the victim, and (3) specifically preserve the child's privi-
lege as to post trauma psychological records so as to treat children in D
and N cases the same as child and adult victims in criminal cases. The
latter could partially be achieved by changing the language from "any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this part 3 . . ."
to "any proceeding brought pursuant to this part 3 .... " At a minimum,
this would limit access to and use of the child's records to D and N cases,
and not permit access in a companion criminal case. Also the Illinois
statute establishing absolute privilege for communications to rape coun-
sellors could be considered for adoption in Colorado and elsewhere.
70
VII. EPILOGUE-CASE STUDIES: DEMANDS FOR PRODUCTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
You represent a hospital where a child has been treated for non-
accidental injuries which may include sexual assault. The child has also
received post-trauma mental health treatment. Reports of suspected
abuse have been made to the local social services agency. The hospital
is served with subpoena duces tecum to produce all of the child's medical
records to:
a) the attorney for the parents in a dependency and neglect
proceeding;
b) attorney for the father in a criminal case for sexual assault
against his minor child;
c) attorney for the suspect unrelated to the child in a criminal case
for sexual assault;
d) attorney for same defendant in a civil case brought by the child's
parents for injury and emotional distress.
70. See supra notes 52 & 53.
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Are the records to be produced or should a motion to quash be
filed? Is the "medical" portion of the records to be handled differently
than the "mental health" portion? What notice, if any, is given to the
child's providers (medical and mental health) that records are being
sought? Is there any difference in outcome if the child has been seen by
a psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker? What notice, if any, is
given to parent/legal guardian that records are being sought? What no-
tice to the child? Is a hearing needed? Is in camera review of records
necessary?
e) Alternatively, you represent a healthcare provider who has
treated or counselled the parent or defendant who has provided infor-
mation about the abuse or assault. The district attorney, county attor-
ney, or child's attorney or G.A.L. subpoenas records. Are they to be
produced? Is notice, consent and/or a hearing required?
The authors recommend the following responses to the situations
presented in the case studies:
a) The parents in a D and N proceeding should be able to obtain
their child's medical treatment records pertaining to any reported in-
jury, either from the provider or Social Services. Other psychological
records should not be produced unless a 27-10-120 hearing results in a
finding that disclosure would not have a significant negative impact on
the child.
b) The father accused of sexual assault in a criminal case may re-
ceive records pertaining to the child's injuries which are also an element
of the crime with which he has been charged. However, an objection to
disclosure of any other records, including post trauma treatment, should
be made by provider and guardians and G.A.L.s, based upon privilege
and equal protection claims.
c) Defendant (stranger to the child) should not be able to obtain
any mental health records under C.R.S. § 18-3-411(5).
d) Civil case: only those records pertaining to issues in the case. If
emotional harm is a basis for a claim for damages, those records may be
ruled to be discoverable after a 27-10-120 hearing or Rule 26(c) motion
for protective orders.
e) The records of the accused may be subject to discovery without
consent in a D and N or companion criminal case. In all other cases, a
27-10-120 hearing should be employed.
1992]

STIGMATIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION: VISITATION RIGHTS
OF NONCUSTODIAL HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS AND THE
EFFECT OF PARENTAL DEPRIVATION ON
CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
The division of a family following a divorce and the subsequent
reordering of legal relationships present numerous difficulties for courts
determining custodial and visitation issues. Courts are frequently called
upon to resolve such sensitive issues as which parent is better suited to
serve as the child's custodian, and whether visitation with the child
should be granted to the noncustodial parent. These issues are further
complicated when one parent is homosexual I but has a child from a het-
erosexual marriage.2 In this situation, many courts deny custody to the
gay parent and severely restrict or deny visitation with the natural child.
3
This Note examines the legal status of homosexual parents seeking
post-divorce visitation. In many jurisdictions, parental rights are denied
on the basis of prejudicial and false judicial rationales. This Note argues
that children are harmed more by deprivation of parental contact when
1. The terminology regarding individuals who are sexually oriented toward persons
of the same gender is often imprecise. The terms "homosexual" and "gay" are used
either synonomously, to refer only to males, or are used to refer to both males and fe-
males. According to one historian, the word "homosexual" is a relatively new term, and
has been criticized because of its "bastard origin and vague connotations." JOHN BoS-
WELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 43 (1980). Boswell asserted
that "gay" is a more accurate and useful word, in that it refers to "persons who are con-
scious of erotic preference for their own gender." Id. The term "homosexual" is broader,
and "comprises all sexual phenomena between persons of the same gender, whether the
result of conscious preference, subliminal desire, or circumstantial exigency." Id. at 44.
This Note follows contemporary usage and employs the terms "gay" and "homosex-
ual" to refer to both men and women who are sexually and emotionally oriented toward
persons of the same gender and "lesbian" to refer exclusively to gay females. However,
"homosexual" is used as an adjective, rather than a noun. Boswell noted:
The word 'homosexual' implicitly suggests that the primary distinguishing
characteristic of gay people is their sexuality.... Sexual interest and expression
vary dramatically in the human population, and a person's sexual interest may be
slight without precluding the realization that he or she is attracted to persons of
the same gender and hence distinct in some way from the majority.
Id. at 45. See also Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Homosex-
ual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 804 (1979) ("[Ulsing 'homosexual' as a
noun ... implies a being whose sole dimension is an erotic one.").
2. A related issue beyond the scope of this article is whether a lesbian woman is
entitled to parental rights following the termination of her relationship with another wo-
man when her companion has borne a child conceived through artificial insemination. See
Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), aff'g 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div.
1990) (woman could not be considered a parent and had no visitation rights); In re Interest
of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), aff'g 459 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet
the N\eeds of Children in Lesbian-lother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459
(1990) (arguing that parenthood should be redefined to include anyone in a functional
parent-child relationship).
3. See cases cited infra notes 20-21, 23-27.
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visitation is denied than by the alleged adverse effects caused by expo-
sure to a parent's homosexuality. The child's best interests are served
when courts engage in unbiased inquiry regarding gay parents and ac-
knowledge that parental contact is important for the child's psychologi-
cal development.
Part I of this Note examines visitation actions and the standards that
courts use to evaluate such disputes. Part II reveals the approaches
courts use in visitation cases involving homosexual parents. Part III
scrutinizes the factors courts advance to support presumptions of gay
parents' unfitness. Part IV surveys the psychological research regarding
the effects on a child deprived of post-divorce visitation and argues that
the child's best interests are served by continued visitation with the non-
custodial parent, absent an affirmative showing of harm as a result of
exposure to the parent's homosexuality.
I. POST-DIVORCE VISITATION
Post-divorce visitation awards are generally decided simultaneously
with custody determinations. 4 The typical visitation order occurs after
sole custody5 is awarded to a party in the divorce. Courts usually grant
the noncustodial parent visitation with the child, absent any evidence of
parental unfitness. The concept of "best interests of the child" is the
primary consideration in both custody and visitation adjudications.
6
4. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. 1978). Visitation
decisions are usually made in the context of custody determinations between natural par-
ents, although visitation disputes also occur in situations involving nonparents. More
states are awarding visitation rights to nonparents. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117
(Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1985 & Supp. 1990). See generally Henry H.
Foster & Davis J. Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J.
643 (1979); Samuel V. Schoonmaker III et al., Constitutional Issues Raised by Third-Party Access
to Children, 25 FAM. L.Q. 95 (1991); Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party
Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q 19 (1991); Howard G.
Zaharoff, Access to Children: Towards a Model Statutefor Third Parties, 15 FAM. L.Q. 165 (1981);
MichaelJ. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 IND. L.J. 191 (1984)
(arguing that visitation rights should be granted to any third party if such visitation would
benefit the child).
5. Sole custody is not the only possible award; increasingly, courts are granting joint
custody to parents. Joint custody has been defined as "co-parenting" following a divorce.
H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham,Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVis L.
REV. 523, 528-29 (1979). "Its distinguishing feature is that both parents retain legal re-
sponsibility and authority for the care and control of the child .... " Id. Joint custody
differs from sole custody in that the parents share legal custody of the child, and are jointly
responsible for making major decisions regarding the child's welfare. Physical custody
may be split between the parents or retained primarily by one parent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 518.003(3) (1990). Over half of the states currently authorize joint custody awards by
statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). Courts may award
joint custody even if not authorized by statute. See generally DavidJ. Miller,Joint Custody, 13
FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979); Holly L. Robinson,Joint Custody: An Idea Whose Time has Come, 21 J.
FAM. L. 641 (1982-1983); Sheila F.G. Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18
FAM. L.Q. 225 (1984).
6. The concept of the "best interests of the child" is not new. Judge Turley stated in
1843: "It is to be observed that in all cases the interest and welfare of the child is the great
leading object to be attained .... " Paine v. Paine, 23 Tenn. 523, 535 (4 Hum.) (1843).
Judge Cardozo expanded upon the best interests standard in Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E.
624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) ("[A judge] acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest
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Virtually every jurisdiction requires courts to award custody and visita-
tion rights based on each jurisdiction's adaptation of this standard.7 In
visitation cases, courts often presume that some form of continued ac-
cess by the noncustodial parent is in the child's best interests.8 Visita-
of the child."). Cardozo recognized that in a custody proceeding a court is not determin-
ing rights as it does in an adversary proceeding. Rather, the court is seeking to place the
child in the best environment in which to mature.
The best interests standard is by nature indeterminate. Although some custody stat-
utes list relevant factors that a court must consider, these guidelines are open to consider-
able interpretation. California's custody statute states:
In making a determination of the best interests of the child ...the court
shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following: (a)
The health, safety and welfare of the child[,] (b) [a]ny history of abuse by one
parent against the child ... [and] (c) [t]he nature and amount of contact with both
parents.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992).
Some commentators have criticized decisions made under the best interests standard
as biased and often irrational. One commentator noted:
Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts to predict the future
rather than to understand the past. In most other litigation, the result will de-
pend upon the court's determination that some event did or did not take place at
an earlier time. Aside from possibly bearing on credibility, the litigants' personal-
ity, priorities, lifestyle, financial resources, emotional stability, and other personal
attributes have no relevance to the outcome. In custody litigation ... those very
factors will determine the result in large measure, with the court making a judg-
ment as to whether the child is likely in the future to be "better off" with one
parent than with the other. Not surprisingly, decisions made in this framework
are less a product of reasoned application of precedent than of the personality,
temperament, background, interests, and biases of the trial judge or the commu-
nity that elected him.
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modication of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 762
(1985) (footnotes omitted). Another author stated that "neither legislatures nor custom
has provided judges with a coherent framework for thinking about what children's inter-
ests are. [An] equally serious [flaw] has been the inability ofjudges to make accurate de-
terminations . ..of the quality of most individual children's relationships with their
parents or of parents' skills at childrearing." David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive
Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 477, 568 (1984). See also Robert H.
Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRORS. 226 (1975) (discussing the consequences of indeterminate custody
standards).
7. This standard gives courts a great deal of discretion in the determination of pa-
rental fitness as it relates to the child's best interests. Steve Susoeff, Note, Assessing Chil-
dren 's Best Interests IVhen a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32
UCLA L. REV. 852, 853 (1985). The best interests standard is mandated by statute in most
states for custody disputes. Many statutes list the factors that a judge must consider in
determining the child's best interests. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608(a)-(c) (West Supp.
1992); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987) (listing factors to be considered in custody
determinations). Other statutes only require that the best interests standard be applied
and give no guidance to judges. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1990) (specifying appli-
cation of best interests test without listing factors). See generally HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF
DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19.4, at 797 & nn.3-4 (2d ed. 1988) (citing
statutes and cases employing the best interests standard). In other states, case law re-
quires that judges award custody based on the child's best interests. See, e.g., Wolff v.
Wolff, 349 N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D. 1984).
In visitation cases, the best interests standard is also frequently required by statute.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-59 (1991); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-914 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (1985 & Supp. 1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.3 (Burns Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 518.175(l) (1990); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney Supp. 1991). If not mandated by statute, case law may require
that the child's best interests prevail in visitation actions. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 385 So.
2d 1323 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
8. In many states, the presumption of visitation by the non-custodial parent is man-
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tion is typically restricted only if there is evidence that the child will be
harmed by contact with the parent. 9
Visitation awards vary in the degree of circumscription imposed.' 0
Courts prefer to grant "reasonable" or "general" visitation rights to the
dated by statute. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125.460 (Michie 1986); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5301 (Supp. 1991). See also In re Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879,
886 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that courts should attempt to preserve visitation rights when-
ever possible). In some states, joint custody is presumed to be in the child's best interests
by statute. See supra note 5. In these states, the term "visitation" might not be not used
because each parent possesses legal custody of the child. Rather, such statutes use other
terms to express the concept of visitation with each parent for a period of time. See, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (F) (Michie 1989) (authorizing a "period of responsibility" to
each parent).
9. Many states follow the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's visitation provision,
which states, "[a] parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visita-
tion rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 407(a), 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337(A) (Supp. 1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129 (1987 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607(a)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-24 (Burns 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-1616(a) (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.400(1) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-217(1) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.05.22(2) (1991); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1989).
Another group of states has modified the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provi-
sion while still retaining the basic intent of the Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727
(Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE § 598.41(1) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(A) (Ander-
son 1989 & Supp. 1990); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301-5310 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-5-16 (1988 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(4) (1989 & Supp. 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15(b)(1) (1986 & Supp. 1991).
Other states have no statute dealing specifically with visitation, implicitly leaving visi-
tation awards to the discretion of the court. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.150 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (Michie 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-107
(Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin
1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131, 134 (West Supp. 1992); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § I-
201(b)(1) (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 208, § 28 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-364 (1988 & Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1986 & Supp. 1989);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17(I) (1983 & Supp. 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2a:34-23 (West
1987 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-45 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-101 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1983 & Supp. 1991); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-113 (1977 & Supp. 1991).
10. A radical alternative to the traditional visitation award was proposed by Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit. SeeJOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL; BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(2d ed. 1979). The authors opposed legally enforceable visitation altogether and con-
tended that all decisions regarding visitation should be left to the discretion of the custo-
dial parent. Id. at 38. Thus, the noncustodial parent would have no legally enforceable
right whatsoever and visitation could be completely foreclosed by the custodial parent.
The authors stated:
Once it is determined who will be the custodial parent, it is that parent, not the
court, who must decide under what conditions he or she wishes to raise the child.
Thus, the noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable right to visit
the child, and the custodial parent should have the right to decide whether it is
desirable for the child to have such visits.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The authors based their conclusion upon the theory that the relationship between the
child and the "psychological parent" is crucial. The psychological parent, as opposed to
the biological parent, is the one who meets the child's emotional and psychological needs,
as well as providing physical care. Id. at 17. The authors argue that even a short absence
by the psychological parent may harm the child. Thus, continuity of the relationship with
the psychological parent and child must be maintained to the greatest extent possible. Id.
at 31-34. If the parents do not have positive contact with each other, visitation may disrupt
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noncustodial parent. "General" visitation awards impose no specific
time or place for the visit, leaving the details of the visit to the divorced
parents.' I Such an award presumes the parents are capable of coopera-
tion and can arrange a mutually acceptable schedule. 12 If the parents
cannot cooperate to arrive at an agreement, the court may impose "spe-
cific" visitation. Conditions regarding the date, day of the week, time,
location and circumstances of visitation may be judicially imposed.'
3
II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CUSTODY, AND VISITATION
Custody and visitation disputes involving homosexual parents and
their children arise frequently.14 As in any custody or visitation deter-
mination, courts must decide whether a gay parent is fit to serve as the
child's custodian, or, alternatively, if the parent is fit to have visitation
with the child.' 5 The crucial analysis is the court's perception of the
the needed continuity with the psychological parent because of the inherent loyalty con-
flicts of the child. Id. at 37-38.
The implications of the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit thesis extend beyond visitation
rights. The authors assert that recognizing the primacy of the psychological parent-child
relationship compels many profound changes in the legal ordering of the family relation-
ship. They contend that the time periods involved in custodial and adoptive decisionmak-
ing be sharply reduced. Thus, infants should be placed even before birth and custody
decisions should be made prior to the divorce. Correspondingly, post-divorce custody
modification would be eliminated. Id. at 42-47.
Courts have not adopted the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach to visitation, and
commentators have strongly criticized their thesis. The book was criticized for failing to
provide any empirical data supporting the underlying presumptions. See Daniel Katkin et
al., Above and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Social
Science and Social Action, 8 LAw & Soc. REV. 669 (1974). The Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit
thesis has also been criticized on policy grounds. Commentators have pointed out that the
practical effects of giving one parent complete control over visitation would be vengeful
behavior and extortion. See Henry H. Foster, A Review of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
12 WILLIAMEr-rE L. REv. 545, 551 (1976); Steven L. Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Unty-
ing the Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 160-65 (1983). Given the accepted view
that children should have continued contact with noncustodial parents (so long as neither
parent is homosexual), it seems unlikely that the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit approach to
visitation will be adopted by any court.
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dirnberger, 773 P.2d 330 (Mont. 1989).
12. Judith A. Fournie, Note, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27
DE PAUL L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Ward v. Sams, 391 S.E.2d 748 (W. Va. 1990) (visitation order was
amended to include specific times, days, and holidays, and also provided that visitation was
to take place away from the mother's former sister-in-law).
14. There are approximately three million homosexual parents in the United States,
and between eight and ten million children are raised in these households. Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1629 (1989). Cus-
tody issues are the most litigated of gay and lesbian issues. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent
Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 327 (1980-1981).
Suits in which gay parents fight to gain custody or visitation of their children have
increased in recent years and are expected to increase further. This is probably due to
growing pride on the part of gay parents as well as a growing support system to help them
in these cases. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 886.
15. A parent's same-sex orientation usually becomes an issue only when that parent is
at the time involved in a relationship with a person of the same gender. A parent's sexual
orientation in the abstract may not necessarily provide adequate grounds for a denial of
custody or visitation. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Pro-
tection Anolysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618-19 & n.9 (1989).
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impact that the parent's homosexuality has or will have upon the child. 16
In visitation disputes, courts use two different approaches to make this
evaluation.17 Some courts create an irrebuttable presumption that a gay
parent is unfit to have custody or visitation. 18 Other courts reject that
presumption and rule that visitation may only be denied upon an affirm-
ative showing of a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and
any adverse effect upon the child. 19
A. Irrebuttable Presumption Jurisdictions
Courts adopting an irrebuttable presumption of parental unfitness
for homosexual parents generally hold that custody of the child shall not
be granted to that parent. Custody is denied whether or not the child
would suffer any adverse effect from the parent's homosexuality and re-
gardless of any evidence that the heterosexual parent is unfit.2 0 The
same approach is used to determine visitation, although outright denial
of visitation is rare. 2 1 Instead, courts commonly impose a variety of re-
strictions upon the gay parent's visitation. Most commonly, the homo-
sexual parent is not allowed to have the child overnight 22 or have the
same-sex companion present during the visitation period. 23 Some
courts have ordered that the child cannot be in the presence of other
"known homosexuals" 24 or even be in the presence of any unrelated
member of the parent's sex.2 5 The effect of these restrictions is that the
16. Custody and visitation statutes in nearly half of the states list relevant factors for
determining the child's best interests; many of these factors can be interpreted to allow
judges to consider the parent's sexual orientation. For example, Alabama law allows con-
sideration of a parent's "moral character." ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989). But see D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-911(a)(5), 16-914(a) (1989) (only jurisdiction with a statute declaring sexual
orientation irrelevant in determining custody or visitation). See generally Donald H. Stone,
The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical
Study, 23 SUFFOLK L. REV. 711 (1989) (survey of 81 family law attorneys regarding their
impressions of custody cases involving homosexual parents).
17. In custody disputes, a third approach is also used. These courts impose a rebut-
table presumption which places the burden on the gay parent to prove that his or her
sexual orientation will not harm the child. See Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 513
(Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v.
J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985).
18. See cases cited infra notes 20-21, 23-27.
19. See cases cited infra notes 60-62.
20. See S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Bennett v. O'Rourke, No.
83D1327, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985); Dailey v. Dailey, 635
S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Va. 1985).
21. See Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); White v. Thompson,
569 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Miss. 1990); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987);J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (court rejected expert
testimony that stated no harm had or would occur to the child).
22. See, e.g., In rejane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
23. See, e.g., Irish, 300 N.W.2d at 741; L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638 (App. Div. 1978); Collins v. Collins,
No. 87-238-I, 1988 WL 30173, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 30, 1988).
24. See Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
25. See Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).
[Vol. 69:3
STIGMA TIZA TION AND DISCRIMINATION
homosexual parent is often effectively prevented from visiting or having
meaningful contact with his or her child.
A typical case utilizing an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness is
p. P. p. P.W 26 InJ. P., the Missouri Court of Appeals considered an ac-
tion to modify a child custody decree. 27 The father and mother in the
action married and had a daughter in 1986.28 The wife left her husband
and commenced divorce proceedings after learning that he was involved
in a homosexual relationship during the marriage. 2 9 The father contin-
ued this relationship after the separation and moved in with his compan-
ion.3 0 The court granted the divorces' and ruled that the father could
have visitation with the child for ten days every other month.3 2 Pursuant
to an interim visitation order, the child visited the father for ten days
following the divorce.
3 3
The mother moved to modify the custody order in 1988 to restrict
visitation.3 4 At the hearing, the mother testified that the child's behav-
ior negatively changed and physical abuse was present following the
visit.3 5 The mother stated that she was concerned about the child's ex-
posure to the AIDS virus as a result of contact with the father.3 6 The
trial court ruled that the evidence did not establish a change of circum-
stances and, therefore, visitation could not be denied.3 7 However, the
trial court modified the visitation order by ruling that neither the fa-
ther's lover nor any other live-in companion could be present in the
home during the visitation period. Additionally, the father's companion
could not exercise any discipline over the child nor accompany the fa-
ther when visiting the child outside the home.38 Following the trial
court's ruling, the mother appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
contending that the restrictions were inadequate.3 9 The father cross-
appealed, asserting that the restrictions were improperly imposed.
40
TheJP. majority ruled that a change had occurred in the circum-
26. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
27. Id. at 786-87.
28. Id. at 787.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The parties stipulated to the terms of the original divorce decree. Brief for Cross-
Appellant at 3, J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (No. 15981-2).
32. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 786.
33. Id. at 788.
34. Id. at 786, 788.
35. The mother asserted that the child exhibited "clinging" and insecure behavior
after the visit. She also noticed vaginal swelling after examining the child. Id. at 788.
36. Id. at 788-89.
37. Id. at 789. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.410 (Vernon Supp. 1991) provides in part:
[Tlhe court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless ... it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circum-
stances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child.
38. Brief for Cross-Appellant at 8-9,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
(No. 15981-2).
39. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 787.
40. Id.
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stances of the parties, thus allowing modification of the earlier custody
decree because it was in the child's best interests. 4 ' The court first
stated that Missouri had a state interest against the practice of homosex-
uality and in protecting minors from influence by gay men or lesbians.
4 2
Noting that Missouri law prohibited deviate sexual intercourse with a
person of the same sex,4 3 the court concluded that unrestricted visita-
tion with the gay father would threaten the child's physical and emo-
tional welfare. 4 4  It cited holdings establishing that homosexual
relationships are immoral and illicit, and render the parent an unfit cus-
todian. 4 5 Missouri law states that no child may be placed or remain in
the custody of a homosexual parent, and visitation rights must be re-
stricted or terminated.
4 6
The J.P. majority stated that it need not wait for a child to be
harmed before removing him or her from a gay parent.4 7 Furthermore,
expert testimony is not necessary for the court to find that the child
would be harmed by exposure to the same-sex relationship. 4 8 The court
noted, however, that there was evidence in JP. that the child was
harmed by the visit. The child's swollen vaginal area indicated there may
have been sexual abuse. 49 The fact that the child's behavior had
41. The court found that the change in the child's behavior, her swollen vaginal area
and the fact that the father and his companion kissed and held hands in the child's pres-
ence constituted a sufficient change of circumstances to modify the earlier decree. Id. at
793.
42. Id. at 792 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985)).
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090.1 (Vernon 1979). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (upholding a sodomy statute and refusing to grant a fundamental right to con-
sensual homosexual sodomy); Darryl R. Wishard, Note, Out of the Closet and Into the Courts:
Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DICK. L. REv. 401, 405 & n.23 (1989) (noting that
approximately half of the states have statutes prohibiting consensual homosexual acts).
44. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 794. See also S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987);J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
45. J.P, 772 S.W.2d at 793. SeeJacobson v.Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that a lesbian woman living with her same-sex companion is not a fit custodian);
Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("The father's continuous exposure of the
child to his immoral and illicit [homosexual] relationship renders him an unfit and im-
proper custodian as a matter of law.").
46. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
47. Id. at 792. See also In re Marriage of P.I.M., 665 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that court need not wait for manifestation of harmful consequences in child
when mother engages in adulterous relationships and smokes marijuana).
48. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793. SeeJL.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 869 (holding that court may
determine adverse effect of homosexual father upon child).
49. The court did not explicitly state that the father or Reed had sexually abused the
child. However, it mentioned the child's swollen vaginal area and stated that "sexual
abuse need not be established by direct evidence." J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793. The inference
by the court that the father or Reed sexually abused the daughter is absurd. Even if the
assertion is accepted that homosexual men are more likely to molest children, the Court
overlooked the fact that the child in this case is a female, and presumably is not attractive
to gay men. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. The dissent noted that no
evidence supported the abuse claim. Id. at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting). The father's brief
pointed out that the child was in the process of toilet training when the impairment oc-
curred; furthermore, the mother did not call the daughter's physician to testify to the
cause of the injury. Brief for Cross-Appellant at 18,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (No. 15981-2).
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changed indicated that she may have been emotionally disturbed by the
visitation or the alleged sexual abuse. 50 Because of the likely harm to
the child, the court ruled that the father could have only supervised visi-
tation in the presence of a responsible adult and no overnight or ex-
tended visits would be permitted.
5'
TheJ.P. dissent disagreed with the majority's ruling that no homo-
sexual parent should be allowed custody or unrestricted visitation.
52
Judge Prewitt argued that each custody case should be determined on its
own facts, rather than creating a per se rule of unfitness for gay par-
ents.5" The dissent contended that the trial court had reached a reason-
able result in the case and did not abuse its discretion. 54 No proof
indicated the father ever physically abused his daughter or allowed any
abuse to happen. 5 5 Moreover, the evidence failed to show that the child
would suffer emotional harm from visitation with her father. 56 The dis-
sent emphasized that it was important for the child to receive paternal
guidance and love.5 7 Furthermore, the restrictions imposed by the ma-
jority would effectively result in little or no visitation, a result not in the
child's best interests.
58
B. Nexus of Harm Jurisdictions
A majority of states reject the presumption that a homosexual par-
ent is unfit and require that a nexus of harm59 be shown between a par-
ent's sexual orientation and any adverse effect upon the child before
denying custody to a gay parent.6 0 Similarly, the mere fact of a parent's
50. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793 (quoting State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986) ("Common experience teaches us a sexual offense can cause behavioral and
personality changes in the complainant.")).
51. Id. at 794.
52. Id. at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting). See G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (Lowenstein, J., dissenting) (arguing that Missouri's irrebuttable presumption
of harm should be abandoned in favor of a rebuttable presumption).
53. JP., 772 S.W.2d at 795 (Prewitt, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 794-95.
55. Id.
56. Id. Cf Shepherd v. Shepherd, 719 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that restrictions on visitation rights could not be upheld absent evidence that child's stress
was due to visit).
57. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 795 (Prewitt,J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. The first case to explicitly apply the nexus test was Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d
1207 (Mass. 1980). The court held that the mother's sexual orientation was irrelevant to
her fitness as a parent; custody would only be denied if a nexus could be established be-
tween the mother's lesbianism and harm to the child. Id. at 1216. See also Barbara A.
Smart, Note, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "Coming Out" Custody Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in
Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 331 (1981).
60. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); In re Marriage of Birdsall,
243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1988); D.H. v.J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981); Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (awarding joint legal
custody and primary physical custody to lesbian mother); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d
321, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding joint custody); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983); In reJ.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd,
362 A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1986); A. v.
A., 514 P.2d 358, 360, (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06
(S.C. Ct. App. 1987); Medeiros v. Medeiros, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (Vt. Super. Ct.
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same-sex orientation is not sufficient to deny visitation to a homosexual
parent; affirmative evidence of harm or likely harm to the child must be
shown.
6 1
A typical case using the nexus of harm approach is In re Marriage of
Birdsall.6 2 In Birdsall, the California Court of Appeals considered an ac-
tion to restrict a homosexual father's visitation rights. Greg and Linda
Birdsall separated after eight years of marriage, having had one son dur-
ing the marriage. 6 3 At the initial hearing to show cause, the parties stip-
ulated to joint legal custody of the child with the mother having physical
custody and the father being granted specific visitation of one weekend
per month and alternating legal holidays. 64 The mother requested a
temporary restraining order to deny the father visitation at his resi-
dence because of his acknowledged homosexuality. The father stipu-
lated to this request.
65
At trial, the parties reiterated that physical custody of the child
would be awarded to the mother,66 but the issue of visitation was sub-
mitted to the court for determination. The father testified that he was
leasing an apartment with two other gay men. He had never engaged in
sexual relations With either of the men, but he was currently in a rela-
tionship with a man who visited his home approximately twice a month.
The father testified that he had no intention of raising the child to be
homosexual. 6 7 The mother testified that the child's behavior after pre-
vious visitation with the father was rude, insolent and unaffectionate and
that the child was depressed for several days following visits. 68 The trial
court ruled that the father could have visitation consisting of one week-
end per month, Monday afternoons, alternate legal holidays and two
weeks during the summer. However, the court ruled that the father was
prohibited from visitation with the child in the presence of a known ho-
mosexual. 69 On appeal, the father contended that the trial court erred
in imposing the restrictions. 70 He argued that the evidence was insuffi-
1982); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); Rowsey v.
Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 60-61 (W. Va. 1985); see also State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't, 764
P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that the homosexuality of child's mother was not
sufficient to deny custody).
61. See Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91; In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492,
497 (Iowa 1990);J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 94; DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638
(App. Div. 1978); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Con-
kel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599
P.2d 475, 477 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d at 888.
62. 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988).
63. Id. at 288. In his petition to dissolve the marriage, the father requested joint legal
custody and primary physical custody with visitation rights for the mother. In her re-
sponse, the mother requested sole legal and physical custody of the child. Id.
64. Id.





69. Id. The order forbade the father from having overnight visitation "in the pres-




cient to support the finding that unrestricted visitation was not in the
child's best interests.
7 1
The Birdsall court first recognized that California law mandates con-
tinuing contact with both parents following a divorce or separation, un-
less visitation is detrimental to the child's best interests. 72 The court
then addressed the issue of same-sex orientation and its effect on child
custody determinations and noted that courts in California may not de-
termine custody on the basis of sexual orientation alone. 73 The issue of
sexual orientation and visitation rights, however, was a question of first
impression. 74 The court reviewed public policy concerns regarding visi-
tation restrictions by examining cases in another context, noting that
restraints on expression of religious views were also invalidated.
7 5
Basing its conclusion on the premise that judges' moral values
should not influence decisions, the Birdsall majority ruled that an affirm-
ative showing of harm or likely harm is necessary to restrict parental
visitation. 76 The court reviewed the trial court's conclusions and found
no evidence of detriment to the child. 7 7 No evidence supported the trial
court's finding that the father's sexual practices were indiscreet. 78 The
father's stipulation to restricted visitation could also not be used as evi-
dence that he recognized his lifestyle as harmful to the child. 79 Simi-
larly, the father's statement that he would not raise his child to be
homosexual failed to support an inference that he believed his lifestyle
was harmful to the child.8 0 Because there was no evidence of past or
future harm to the child, the court vacated the portion of the judgment




72. Id. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983) ("[I1t is the public policy of this
state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after
the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, and to encourage parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy."). See also In re
Marriage of Matthews, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[Tlhe courts will attempt
to preserve visitation rights whenever possible.") (citation omitted).
73. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (citing Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352,
354 (Ct. App. 1967)). However, the court recognized that a parent's sexual orientation
may be considered. Id. (citing Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1975)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Ct. App. 1983) and In re
Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Ct. App. 1980)).
76. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
77. Id.
78. Id The trial court concluded that the father's sexual practices had "hardly been
discreet" as evidenced by the fact that "his church membership was terminated due to it."
Id. The court rejected this bald assertion, noting there was no evidence linking the father's
departure from the church with his homosexuality. Id.
79. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290 (quoting In re Marriage of Lewin, 231 Cal. Rptr. 433,
436 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 490 nA (Cal. 1986)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 291. The court stated:
The unconventional lifestyle of one parent, or the opposing moral positions of
the parties, or the outright condemnation of one parent's beliefs by the other
parent's religion, which may result in confusion for the child, do not provide an
adequate basis for restricting visitation rights. Evidence of one parent's homo-
sexuality, without a link to detriment to the child, is insufficient to constitute
19921
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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTORS USED TO RESTRICT OR DENY GAY PARENTS'
VISITATION RIGHTS
In disputes involving homosexual parents, courts often employ dis-
criminatory generalizations and stereotypes regarding homosexuality
8 2
and its effect upon the children, rather than engage in an analysis of the
fitness of the parents and the best interests of the child. One commenta-
tor noted, "widespread prejudice and discrimination against homosexu-
als and lesbian parents, as well as widespread misunderstanding about
these parents, are apparent in child custody decisions to this day, de-
spite studies supporting the suitability of gay individuals as parents."
'8 3
Gay parents often have parental rights restricted or denied on the basis
of these false assumptions. For example, courts have denied custodial
or visitation rights to gay parents due to the following fears: A child may
become homosexual through exposure to the parent;8 4 a child may be
molested by the gay parent;8 5 a child may be exposed to the AIDS vi-
rus;8 6 a child may be harassed by peers;8 7 or a child's moral values may
somehow be adversely affected through exposure to homosexuality. 8
These rationales are often the result of judges' lack of current knowl-
edge. These judicial rationales may, however, reflect judicial
homophobia, heterosexism and prejudice.8 9 One commentator has
characterized these stereotypes as "discriminatory ideologies disguised
as scientific truth to serve as the basis for judicial and statutory activism
in the area of child rearing." 90 Empirical analysis of these judicial pre-
harm. In the absence of any indication of harm, the restraining order is unrea-
sonable and must be vacated.
Id.
82. See generally RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND
LAw 22-27 (1988) (discussion of anti-gay stereotypes and generalizations).
83. Stone, supra note 16, at 739-40.
84. See cases cited infra note 92.
85. See cases cited infra notes 110-11.
86. See cases cited infra notes 116-17.
87. See cases cited infra notes 127-28.
88. See cases cited infra notes 143-44.
89. Homophobia is defined as fear and pathological hatred of individuals sexually ori-
ented toward persons of the same gender. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Mean-
ing of Gender, Wis. L. REV. 187, 195 (1988). But see BOSWELL, supra note 1, at 46 n. II
(asserting that the derivation of "homophobia" actually suggests the meaning of "fear of
what is similar," rather than "fear of homosexuality."). One commentator asserted that
the bias against gay men and lesbians by the American judiciary merely reflects the
prejudices held by the public. Joshua Dressler,Judicial Homophobia: Gay Rights Biggest Road-
block, 5 Civ. LIBERTIES REV. 19, 22 (1979). Professor Law suggests that the underlying
roots of homophobia are found in societal "heterosexism." Heterosexism embodies
"[t]he pervasive cultural presumption and prescription of heterosexual relationships-and
the corresponding silencing and condemnation of homosexual erotic, familial and commu-
nitarian relations .... " Law, supra at 195. Another author defined heterosexism as "a
world-view, a value system that prizes heterosexuality, assumes it is the only appropriate
manifestation of love and sexuality, and devalues homosexuality and all that is not hetero-
sexual." Gregory M. Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia: Toward a Practical Theor,,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 923, 925 (1986). Pervasive heterosexist attitudes, struc-
tured into basic societal relationships, may affect judges dealing with gay and lesbian
issues.
90. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 545.
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sumptions reveals no factual or scientific basis to support them.9 1
Visitation denials based on these assumptions bear no relation to the
child's best interests, and such restrictions will likely harm the child if
they result in deprivation of parental contact. Absent any affirmative
showing that the child will or has been harmed as a result of the parent's
sexual orientation, full visitation rights should be granted to homosex-
ual parents. Outdated myths regarding homosexual parenting must be
discarded to truly serve the best interests of the child.
Courts have based custody and visitation denials on a fear that the
child will become homosexual through contact with the gay parent.
9 2
These courts rely upon the preconceived assumption that children de-
velop their sexual orientation by modeling themselves after their par-
ents. Courts seek to prevent this by limiting the contact the child has
with the homosexual parent.9 3 This rationale is premised on the belief
that sexual orientation is primarily influenced by environmental, rather
than biological or genetic factors. 94 This assumption is contradicted by
recent research indicating that sexual orientation may be, to a great ex-
tent, biologically determined. 95
91. See generally Law, supra note 89 (arguing that negative legal attitudes toward homo-
sexuality are a reaction to the violation of gender norms, rather than scorn for the sexual
practices of gay men and lesbians).
92. See S v. S, 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606
S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In reJ.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Collins v. Collins, No.
87-238-Il, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988); Dailey v. Dailey, 635
S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
93. "Young people form their sexual identity partly on the basis of models they see in
society. If homosexual behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an adolescent
may question whether he or she should 'choose' heterosexuality." Collins, 1988 WL 30173
at *6.
94. One court rejected expert testimony that stated that sexual orientation is biologi-
cally, not environmentally, influenced by pointing out that the father of the child must
have developed his homosexuality after marriage, because he had previously engaged in
heterosexual relationships.
The father in this case is himself an example of the weakness of the [biological]
theory espoused by the expert witnesses, since the father has engaged in a hetero-
sexual relationship with the mother of this child and produced a child. He has
engaged in heterosexual activity with, admittedly, one other woman since the di-
vorce. He has, during the course of his marriage and subsequent to it, developed
homosexual tendencies....
... Whatever the father's rights may be . . . concerning his own choice of "lifes-
tyle," those rights do not extend to activities designed to induce in a child similar
behavior.
J.L.P(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 868-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis added). This reasoning
ignores the possibility of a bisexual father or suppressed sexual orientation. Instead, the
court relied upon anecdotal evidence and its own presumption to disregard scientific
testimony.
95. A recent study found that a region in the brain that influences sexual behavior is
structurally different in homosexual and heterosexual men. Simon LeVay, A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Sci. 1034 (1991). Dr.
LeVay, a researcher at the Salk Institute, discovered that certain groups of nerve cells in
the anterior hypothalamus of the brain were more than twice as large in heterosexual men
than in homosexual men or women, suggesting that sexual orientation may be biological
in nature. Id. at 1035. However, Dr. LeVay stated that the study is very preliminary and
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Whether or not one accepts the hypothesis that sexual orientation is
totally or partly biological in nature, a large body of research shows
there is no correlation between a parent's and a child's sexual orienta-
tion. Virtually every comparative study of heterosexual and homosexual
parents has found that homosexual parents are no more likely to have
gay children than are heterosexual parents,9 6 and that children develop
their sexual orientation independent from parental influences.9 7 One
study compared fifty lesbian-mother families and forty heterosexual-
should not be viewed as conclusive. Id. at 1036. Further research, including a study of
lesbian and heterosexual women's brains, is planned.
Dr. LeVay's findings have sparked a great deal of controversy in both the gay and
heterosexual communities. Robert Bray, spokesperson for the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, stated, " 'Some will say society could 'cure' or 'fix' gays if we just tweak this
chromosome or zap that cell.'" Charlene Crabb, Are Some Men Born to be Homosexual?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. Sept. 9, 1991, at 58. One commentator attacked the research as
impliedly "legitimizing" homosexuality:
Suppose some scientist does find the gene or the section of the brain that "con-
trols" hotheadedness? Does that mean that we should cease urging hotheads to
calm down? Does that mean that we must regard hotheadedness as morally
equivalent to even-temperedness? No. We are all born with countless innate ten-
dencies - to violence, to sloth, to selfishness - that we are socialized to control.
Mona Charen, Copping Out: 'My Brain Made Me Do It', NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 1991, at 86. One
person attacked the study as biased: "[Dr. LeVayl is a professed gay who would have, I
think, every reason to want to find some kind of finding as he is now reaching out for, but I
would simply say that as a Christian minister, we look on homosexuality as we do any sin
.... .Jerry Falwell, on Nightline: Is Homosexuality Biological? (ABC television broadcast, Aug.
30, 1991).
Another recent study also concluded that sexual orientation is biologically deter-
mined. Professors Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard studied the rate of homosexuality in
identical and fraternal twin and adoptive brothers. They found that 52% of the identical
twin brothers were gay, 22% of the non-identical twin brothers were gay, and only 11% of
the adoptive brothers were gay. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born
Gay?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1991, at A21. See also Neil Buhrich et al., Sexual Orientation,
Sexual Identity, and Sex-Dimorphic Behaviors in Male Twins, 21 BEHAV. GENETICS 75 (1991)
(finding significantly higher rate of homosexuality in identical twin brothers than in frater-
nal twins). But see Elke D. Eckert et al., Homosexuality in Monozygotic Twins Reared Apart, 148
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 421 (1986) (study suggested that female homosexuality may be an
acquired trait, but genes may play some part in male homosexuality).
96. See Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosex-
ual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 562-63 (1983) (find-
ing no difference between children raised in lesbian or heterosexual single parent
households and concluding that rearing a child in a lesbian household did not lead to
atypical psychosexual development); Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Chil-
dren: A Comparison with Solo Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES SEX-
UAL BEHAV. 167, 179-83 (1986) (same); Richard Green, Sexual Identity of37 Children Raised by
Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978) (finding typical
psychosexual development in children raised by lesbian or transsexual parent); Martha
Kirkpatrick et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Survey, 51 AM.]. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 545, 551 (1981) (reporting no difference in gender identity development in
children studied); Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544,
551 (1979) (concluding that gay fathers do not have a higher percentage of gay children
than heterosexual fathers). See generally David Cramer, Gay Parents and Their Children: A Re-
view of Research and Practical Implications, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 504, 504-05 (1986) (re-
viewing studies of sex role development of children raised by a homosexual or lesbian
parent).
97. Homosexual men and women are raised predominantly in heterosexual couples,
thus disputing the notion that parental influence is the primary factor in sexual identity
development. Donna J. Hutchens & Martha J. Kirkpatrick, Lesbian Mothers/Gay Fathers, in
EMERGING ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 115, 121 (Diane H. Schetky & Elissa
P. Benedek eds., 1985).
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mother families and found no significant differences in the sexual iden-
tity of the children studied.9 8 The authors stated, "boys and girls raised
from early childhood by a homosexual mother without an adult male in
the household for about 4 years do not appear appreciably different on
parameters of psychosexual and psychosocial development from chil-
dren raised by heterosexual mothers, also without an adult male pres-
ent." 9 9 A denial of visitation rights based upon the premise of a child's
emulation of the parent's sexual orientation simply ignores current
scientific knowledge and can only reflect judicial prejudice and
homophobia.
Even if it is assumed arguendo that sexual orientation is learned or
chosen behavior and not biologically determined, the underlying prem-
ise is that being gay is inherently harmful and not in the best interests of
the child.' 0 0 This reflects the common prejudice that gay men and les-
bians are psychologically maladjusted' 0 1 and unhappier' 0 2 than the het-
erosexual population. Indeed, many still view homosexuality as a
mental illness.103 This conclusion, however, is not accepted by the sci-
entific community nor supported by research.' 0 4 The American Psychi-
atric Association no longer regards homosexuality as a mental disorder
or sexual deviation 10 5 and announced this resolution: "The sex, gender
identity, or sexual orientation of natural or prospective adoptive or fos-
ter parents should not be the sole or primary variable considered in cus-
tody or placement cases."' 1 6 Research has shown that homosexual men
and women are no more unstable, immature, or unhappy than compara-
ble groups of heterosexuals.' 0 7 Indeed, several studies have found that
lesbians may be emotionally more well-adjusted than heterosexual wo-
men.10 8 A judicial presumption based on the mental instability of gay
98. Green et al., supra note 96, at 179-82.
99. Id. at 182.
100. Note, supra note 14, at 1639.
101. Hutchens & Kirkpatrick, supra note 97, at 117.
102. Note, supra note 14, at 1639.
103. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 870 & n.120 ("[T]he judiciary has been slow to recog-
nize that homosexuality is no longer regarded as a mental or emotional illness.").
104. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 870-74 (reviewing research regarding same-sex orien-
tation and mental illness).
105. "In December 1973, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion voted to eliminate homosexuality per se as a mental disorder .... AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 380 (3d
ed. 1980). See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 296 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
106. John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association Incorporated, for the
Year 1946: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Counsel of Representatives, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
408, 432 (1977).
107. See ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF HUMAN
DIVERSITY (1978); Marcie R. Adelman, Comparison of Professionally Employed Lesbians and He!-
erosexual Women in the MMPI, 6 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 193 (1977); Marvin Siegelman,
Adjustment of Male Homosexuals and Heterosexuals, 2 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 9 (1972); Nor-
man L. Thompson et al., Personal Adjustment of Male and Female Homosexuals and Heterosexuals,
78J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 237 (1971). See generally Law, supra note 89, at 202-06, 212-14.
108. See Andrea K. Oberstone & Harriet Sukoneck, Psychological Adjustment and Lifest'les
of Single Lesbians and Single Heterosexual Women, I PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 172 (1979) (finding that
lesbian women were more satisfied in their relationships than heterosexual women); Mar-
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men and lesbians is contradicted by a significant body of reseach and
cannot logically justify visitation restrictions. 109
Courts have denied custody or visitation to homosexual parents be-
cause of the fear that the parent or the parent's friends may sexually
molest the child.' 10 A good example of the judicial reluctance to aban-
don this stereotype is the statement injL.P.(H.) v. D.J.P.: "Every trial
judge, or for that matter, every appellate judge, knows that the molesta-
tion of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the psychologi-
cal experts' testimony indicated." '' This rationale is usually raised
only in cases involving a gay father, thus perpetuating the myth that gay
men are attracted to and may take advantage of children. 1 2 There is no
scientific evidence to support this view. Research shows that almost all
child abusers are heterosexual men."13 Visitation restrictions based
upon the supposed inclination of gay men to "prey" on young boys are
not supported by scientific knowledge and embody judicial heterosex-
ism and homophobia.
114
The issue of the child's possible exposure to the Human Immu-
vin Siegelman, Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Vomen, 120 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 477
(1972) (noting that lesbians were better adjusted than heterosexual women in certain
areas).
109. Some courts recognize this point. For example, one court stated, "homosexuality
is not a 'disease,' and it is not, in and of itself, a mental disorder." Baker v. Wade, 553 F.
Supp. 1121, 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986). The court added, "homosexuality in society does not ad-
versely affect the growth and development of children." Id. at 1131.
110. See Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849, 851 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); In reJ.S. &
C., 324 A.2d 90, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (quoting expert testimony, "'it is
possible that these children upon reaching puberty would be subject to either overt or
covert homosexual seduction ......."), aff'd, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
111. 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Judge Dixon continued:
A few minutes research discloses the following [seven] appellate decisions involv-
ing such molestation. It may be that numerically instances of molestation occur
with more frequency between heterosexual males and female children, but given
the statistical incidence of homosexuality in the population, which the father
claims is 5 to 10%, homosexual molestation is probably, on an absolute basis,
more prevalent.
Id. (citations omitted). This analysis would be almost comical, if not for the tragic conse-
quences of such flawed reasoning. Thejudge ignored uncontradicted expert evidence and
instead based his conclusion on the existence of seven cases involving child molestation by
gay men, thus illustrating some judges' absolute refusal to acknowledge empirical data
that rebuts long-held assumptions. One commentator pointed out that the generalization
concerning the alleged predilection of gay men toward child abuse is perpetuated by
judges' tendency to take "tacit" or "unconscious" judicial notice of this false stereotype.
Susoeff, supra note 7, at 880.
112. See cases cited supra note 111. One student Note pointd out that because women,
either lesbian or heterosexual, rarely molest children, "[i]f courts were making custody
decisions based solely on the risk of molestation, therefore, they would award custody to
the mother, whether or not she were a lesbian." Note, supra note 14, at 1640.
113. See ROBERT L. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 75
(1979); Marny Hall, Lesbian Families: Cultural and Clinical Issues, 23 Soc. WORK 380, 383
(1978) (noting that child abuse is disproportionately heterosexual in nature); Miller, supra
note 96, at 546 (same). See generally Susoeff, supra note 7, at 880-81 & nn.183-86 (reviewing
research showing that homosexual men are unlikely to be child molesters).
114. At least one court has recognized that this generalization is unfounded. "The vast
majority of sex crimes committed by adults upon children are heterosexual, not homosex-
ual. Homosexuals do not have a criminal propensity simply because they are homosexu-
als, any more than heterosexuals do." Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130-31 (N.D.
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nodeficiency Virus (HIV) 115 from a homosexual parent has arisen in sev-
eral states and may become a significant factor as the disease spreads.' 16
Despite greater public awareness about AIDS, many parents may oppose
visitation by gay parents because of the fear that the child will contract
the virus through contact with that parent, even though the parent may
not be HIV-positive. 117 Two separate issues are raised by the AIDS vi-
rus in regard to visitation. First, should visitation be denied solely on
the assumption that a homosexual parent is more likely to contract HIV
than a heterosexual parent? Second, should visitation be restricted or
denied when a parent is actually HIV infected?
The mere possibility of HIV infection from a homosexual parent can-
not logically be used to deny or restrict visitation with a child. The as-
sumption that gay parents are more likely than heterosexual parents to
contract AIDS is not logically or scientifically justified. First, AIDS can
no longer be thought of as exclusively a gay disease. Because the dis-
ease has spread to the heterosexual population as well as the homosex-
ual population, the possibility exists that either gay or heterosexual
parents may be HIV infected.' 18 Moreover, if a court bases custodial
decisions on the statistical probability of HIV infection, then lesbian
mothers should never be denied parental rights, because lesbians have
the lowest rate of AIDS and HIV infection of all demographic groups.l" 9
The second issue-whether courts are justified in denying visitation
Tex. 1982) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
115. HIV is the virus that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
AIDS is the final, invariably fatal stage of the immune system deterioration caused by the
HIV virus. The virus impairs the human body's immune system, rendering a person vul-
nerable to various infections and diseases. An individual can also become sick and die of
AIDS Related Complex (ARC) without progressing to AIDS. Edward P. Richards, Commu-
nicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to AIDS, 65 DENv. U. L. REV. 127, 127
n.3 (1988). HIV is transmitted by three methods: sexual intercourse, sharing contami-
nated syringes and blood or blood-product transfusions. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha
A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 141 (1988).
116. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Roe, 526
N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1988); "Jane" W. v. "John" W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1987);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
117. See, e.g.,J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
118. While any statistical breakdown is necessarily imprecise, current numbers indicate
that approximately 23% of reported AIDS cases involved heterosexual men and women.
Apparently, 19% of those contracted the virus through intravenous drug abuse, while the
other 4% were exposed to the virus through heterosexual intercourse. CENTER FOR DIs-
EASE CONTROL, WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REP. (June 6, 1988), quoted in Larry Gostin, The Poli-
tics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017,
1018 n.5 (1989). See also James W. Curran et al., The Epidemiology of AIDS. Current Status and
Future Prospects, 229 Sci. 1352 (1985). The incidence of heterosexual cases will likely in-
crease if effective programs to reduce transmission through the use of contaminated syr-
inges are not implemented. Homosexual transmission of AIDS may decrease due to
changed gay sexual practices adopted in response to the threat of the disease. John L.
Martin, The Impact of AIDS on Gay Male Sexual Behavior Patterns in New York City, 77 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 578, 580 (1987).
119. Law, supra note 89, at 195. Professor Law noted that "AIDS poses no risk to gay
men in relationships that are affectionate but not sexual, or to monogamous, uninfected
gay couples." Id. See also Mark S. Senak, The Lesbian and Gay Community, in AIDS AND TlE
Law 290, 292 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
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based on a parent's actual HIV infection-is more troublesome.12 0
Judges understandably wish to protect the child's best interests by mini-
mizing the inadvertent risk of HIV transmission from the parent. This
concern is unfounded, however, because current research shows the
AIDS virus cannot be transmitted through casual contact.' 2 ' No docu-
mented cases of HIV transmission through casual contact exist-not
even while a household is shared with an infected person.122 Common
household practices such as sharing silverware and towels with an HIV
infected person do not present any risk of contracting HIV. 12 3 One
court acknowedged that casual transmission of HIV is highly unlikely
and stated, "[tihe overwhelming weight and consensus of medical opin-
ion is clear; the HIV virus is not spread casually."' 124 Several courts
have addressed the issue of visitation rights when a parent is HIV in-
fected and have ruled that parental rights cannot be terminated solely
on the basis of parental HIV infection. 125 HIV infection alone should
not be used as the sole basis for denial of visitation or custody, because
the medical risk to the child is virtually nonexistent and greater harm
may result to the child from parental deprivation. 1
2 6
Denial of custody or visitation has been based on a fear that the
child may be harassed or subject to community prejudice because of the
parent's homosexuality. 127 One court stated that it was compelled "to
120. See cases cited supra note 116.
121. See Gerald H. Friedland et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV/L4V-III Infection to
Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MEDICINE 344, 348 (1986) (study indicating that household members who have no
sexual contact with AIDS carriers are at minimal risk). See generally Nancy B. Mahon, Note,
Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visitation Disputes Involving an HIV Infected
Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092, 1101-02 (1988) (reviewing studies).
122. See Margaret A. Fischl et al., Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and House-
hold Contacts of Adults with AIDS, 257 J.A.M.A. 640, 644 (1987) ("Of 90 HTLV-III/LAV-
seronegative children at entry into the study, there was no evidence of horizontal transmis-
sion.... These observations are important and suggest that contact in other settings (for
example, schools) is not likely to transmit HTLV-III/LAV.").
123. Id. at 642.
124. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 719, 725 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
125. See Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (visitation could
not be terminated because of father's AIDS infection); Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 726 (father's
AIDS would not justify removal of child from his custody); "Jane" W. v. 'John" W., 519
N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (visitation could not be terminated because of father's
AIDS); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (court stated that
only minimal risk of exposure existed even if father had tested positively for the virus).
126. See Mahon, supra note 121, at 1138-41 (arguing that denial of custody or visitation
because of parent's HIV infection ignores medical knowledge about the disease and en-
dangers the child's psychological development). But see Amy R. Pearce, Note, Visitation
Rights of an AIDS Infected Parent, 27J. FAM. L. 715, 731 (1988-89) (suggesting that visitation
precautions or supervised visitation with an HIV infected parent is appropriate to protect
the child).
127. See L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);Jacobson v.Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) ("[W]e cannot lightly dismiss the fact that living in the same
house with their mother and her lover may well cause the children to 'suffer from the
slings and arrows of a disapproving society' .... ); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969
(Okla. 1982); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("[Wle have no hesitancy in
saying that the conditions under which this child must live.., impose an intolerable bur-
den upon her by reason of the social condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably
afflict her relationships with her peers and with the community at large.").
[Vol. 69:3
STIGMATIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION
protect the children from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostraciz-
ing" resulting from the mother's homosexuality. 12 8 The possibility of
societal homophobia, however, is not sufficient to justify the abridgment
of parental rights. First, courts should not assume that such social pres-
sures inevitably exist when a parent is homosexual. ' 29 Such logic inher-
ently presumes that gay parents openly display their sexual orientation,
thus subjecting the child to ridicule and taunting.' 3 0 Homosexual par-
ents, however, can be as discreet as heterosexual parents regarding sex-
ual and familial issues. Moreover, even if the child is subjected to
prejudice and ridicule from peers, courts should not assume that this
harassment will necessarily harm the child.13 1 Available research indi-
cates that children are often able to withstand peer pressure regarding
their parent's homosexuality.' 3 2  Indeed, children are frequently
taunted by peers for reasons unrelated to their parents' sexuality. The
possibility of this harassment does not justify visitation restrictions or
termination of parental rights.' 3 3 Furthermore, courts should recognize
128. S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
129. See Susoeff, supra note 7, at 877 & n.158 (citing research showing that only about
five percent of children living with an openly gay parent had been harassed by other
children).
130. See Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court
System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
497, 532 n.147 (1984) ("The stigma rationale rests in part on the untested assumption that
children have extensive knowledge of the lifestyles of their playmates' and schoolmates'
parents.").
131. One court has recognized that the child's moral values may actually be strength-
ened by standing up to prejudice. M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979) ("It is ... reasonable to expect that they will emerge better equipped to search
out their own standards of right and wrong, [and] better able to perceive that the majority
is not always correct in its moral judgments .... ").
132. One study reported that no significant differences were found in peer group rela-
tionships between children of homosexual and heterosexual parents.
Eighty percent of the daughters of lesbian mothers and 75% of the heterosexuals'
daughters said that they were liked "much more," "somewhat more," or "as
much" by their same-sex peer group as other girls in their class. More than 80%
of the sons of lesbian mothers and of the heterosexual mothers reported corre-
sponding self-ratings of popularity with their male classmates. . . . The lesbian
mothers rated 90% of their daughters and 96% of their sons as leaders or good
mixers, compared to the heterosexuals' ratings of 92% for their daughters and
85% for their sons.
Green et al., supra note 96, at 178. Another study found that a majority of children of
lesbian mothers were not conscious of any societal prejudice against their mothers. The
children who were aware of the prejudice supported their mothers and rejected stereo-
types. "[T]he majority of children combine any embarassment of initial uncomfortable-
ness with an understanding that society has created the prejudice; that it is society, and not
their mothers, that should re-examine its position." Lonnie G. Nungesser, Theoretical Bases
for Research on the Acquisition of Social-Sex Roles by Children of Lesbian Mothers, 5J. HOMOSEXUAL-
rrv 177, 184 (1980) (quoting Barbara S. Bryant, Lesbian Mothers 73A (1975) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file at Lymar Associates, 330 Ellis St., Room 401, San Francisco,
Cal.). See generally Polikoff, supra note 2, at 561-66 (reviewing research showing that chil-
dren of homosexual parents are psychologically well-adjusted).
133. "Children whose families are in some way different froin the norm may have to
confront distressing reactions from others. These differences can include, among other
things, the family's ethnic traits and practices, race, religious affiliation, the parent's coun-
try of origin, physical appearance, or occupation." Polikoff, supra note 2, at 567-68. Pro-
fessor Polikoff also noted, "it is unwarranted to assume that . . . harassment based on a
parent's sexual orientation will be more troubling than harassment based on other rea-
sons." Id. at 569.
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that the child may be subject to harassment by peers merely because the
parent is homosexual. ' 3 4 Reducing contact with the gay parent would
have no effect on the possibility of peer pressure and prejudice.'
3 5
Even if the possibility of harassment is acknowledged, courts may
not give judicial effect to this form of societal prejudice or stigmatiza-
tion. In Palmore v. Sidoti,13 6 the Supreme Court ruled that a mother
could not be denied custody of her child because community prejudice
could result following her interracial remarriage.' 3 7 The Court ac-
knowledged: "There is a risk that a child living with a step-parent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic
origin."' 3 8 The Court recognized that custody determinations based on
the best interests of the child are a substantial governmental interest,
but ruled that the denial of custody based upon the effects of racial prej-
udice was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' 3 9 The Court
stated, "[t]he Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither
can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."140 Although
Palmore involved potential racial discrimination, the principle applies
equally to discrimination based on sexual orientation. 14 1 One court re-
134. One court acknowleged this fact and stated:
[T]he children's exposure to embarrassment is not dependent upon the identity
of the parent with whom they happen to reside. Their discomfiture, if any, comes
about not because of living with defendant, but because she is their mother, be-
cause she is a lesbian, and because the community will not accept her.
M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262. See also Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of
Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REV. 691, 730-31 (1976)
("[I1f the mother is known in the community as a lesbian, counsel can point out that the
children may be harassed, if at all, regardless of with whom they live.").
135. See M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262 ("Neither the prejudices of the small community in
which they live nor the curiosity of their peers about defendant's sexual nature will be
abated by a change of custody."). See also Donna Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy in
Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451, 469
(1978-1979) ("Denying custody does not eliminate the mother's lesbianism. The child still
has a lesbian mother and possibly faces a greater stigmatization as a result of having a
mother who is considered so immoral or dangerous that she is denied the custody of her
children."). M.P. involved an action for change of custody, but the argument used in a
visitation context is even stronger. Limiting visitation with a homosexual parent to spare
the child harassment or embarrassment will not affect existing community prejudice, and
may threaten the child's best interests by decreasing necessary contact with the noncus-
todial parent. See infra part IV.
136. 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (unanimous decision).
137. Id. at 434. The father of the child sought to modify the earlier decree granting
custody to the mother. He based his petition on changed conditions; the change was that
the mother, a Caucasian, was living with and later married an African-American man. Id.
at 430. The trial court, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the child's best interests
would be served by changing custody to the father and stated, "it is inevitable that Melanie
will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come."
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984) (quoting from Application to Petition for
Certiorari at 26-27).
138. Id. at 433.
139. Id. at 433-34.
140. Id. at 433.
141. For discussions of homosexual individuals as a class entitled to heightened protec-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause, see Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the
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lied on Palmore to deny a father's motion for change of custody based on
the mother's homosexuality.142 It follows that judicially imposed visita-
tion denials are similarly invalid, if premised on the possibility of dis-
crimination or prejudice resulting from a parent's sexual orientation.
Courts often deny custody or restrict visitation because of the sup-
posed danger to the child's morals from exposure to the parent's homo-
sexuality.' 4 3 Illustrative is the statement by the court in S.E.G. v. R.A.G.:
"Such [homosexual] conduct can never be kept private enough to be a
neutral factor in the development of a child's values and character. We
will not ignore such conduct by a parent which may have an effect on the
children's moral development."' 144 To be sure, the promotion of a
child's moral development is a legitimate parental concern. However, it
is impermissible for a court to impose majoritarian standards of morality
on families. 145 Given the subjective nature of morality, it is difficult
even to determine what prevailing standards of morality exist in a com-
munity. 146 Courts often point to state laws forbidding consensual sod-
omy as evidence of community standards condemning homosexuality as
immoral.14 7 The existence of these laws, however, does not support the
premise that homosexuality is immoral. 1 4 8 The majority of these stat-
Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classification Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as
a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985). For discussions of custody decisions
and equal protection, see David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Be-
cause They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes,
26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395 (1990); Note, supra note 15.
142. See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985). The court stated, "Simply
put, it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's
status as a lesbian." Id. But see S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that Palmore does not apply to custody disputes involving homosexual parents).
143. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); L. v. D.,
630 S.W.2d 240, 243-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 10
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
144. 735 S.W.2d at 166.
145. See generally Katheryn D. Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L.
REv. 405 (1988) (arguing that fundamental parental rights should not be abridged because
of community standards).
146. Religious doctrine may be invoked to establish that a community disapproves of
homosexuality. Professor Polikoff noted, however, that "contemporary mainstream reli-
gious thought does not uniformly hold that homosexuality is immoral." Polikoff, supra
note 2, at 550. Polikoff further pointd out that biblical references to homosexuality are
open to interpretation: "Diversity of biblical interpretation defies the concept of a univer-
sally held religious conviction that homosexuality is immoral." Id. at 549.
147. See, e.g., Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 514 (Cracraft,J., concurring) ("The people of this
state have declared, through legislative action, that sodomy is immoral, unacceptable, and
criminal conduct."). For an example of a sodomy statute that specifically prohibits only
same-sex contact, see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1986) ("[Elvery person of
full age who commits the infamous crime against nature shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 6 years .... The 'infamous
crime against nature' means anal intercourse, cunnilingus or fellatio between consenting
adults of the same sex."). In 1986, the Supreme Court held that the enforcement of sod-
omy statutes did not violate the Due Process Clause because there is no right of privacy for
acts of consensual homosexual sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
148. Sexual conduct alone is not determinative of morality. Professor Katz notes that,
"There are moral choices other than sexual behavior. The decision to nurture, care for
and protect one's child is also a moral choice, a choice entitled to encouragement and
support." Katz, supra note 145, at 468-69 (footnote omitted).
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utes do not specifically prohibit only homosexual sodomy, but rather
prohibit all heterosexual and homosexual consensual sodomy. 149 One
commentator noted, "[i]n those states that have sodomy statutes,
neither the derivation nor the language of the statutes reflects a belief in
the immorality of homosexuality. This is because sodomy and homosex-
uality cannot be equated."' 5 0  Even if a court is able to determine that
sodomy statutes are indicative of community standards condemning ho-
mosexuality as immoral, these standards do not justify visitation denials
to gay parents. First, courts cannot presume that all homosexual par-
ents engage in the prohibited sexual conduct. A significant percentage
of gay parents do not engage in any form of sodomy. 15' A denial of
parental rights, without any affirmative evidence that the gay parent has
violated the sodomy law, is illogical and prejudicial. 15 2 Moreover, even
if the sodomy law has been violated by the gay parent and is affirmatively
proved, this breach does not render the parent immoral. The existence
of a law does not necessarily mean that the infringement of that law is
immoral. Laws against slavery and racial intermarriage are but two ex-
amples of laws that were immoral in themselves; violating these laws was
not an immoral act and did not confer immorality upon the violators.1
5 3
Furthermore, courts act selectively and prejudicially to focus on viola-
tions of sodomy laws by gay parents, while ignoring the violation of laws
by heterosexual parents. 154 Denying a child parental visitation because
149. See Note, supra note 15, at 1520 (noting that, of the 25 jurisdictions that have
sodomy laws, only seven specifically prohibit homosexual sodomy).
150. Polikoff, supra note 2, at 551.
151. See Note, supra note 15, at 635 (citing studies showing that many lesbians and gay
men do not engage in sodomy). See also Martin, supra note 118, at 580.
152. Courts' homophobia and heterosexism is expressed when this reasoning is used
to deny custody or visitation to gay parents. The majority of sodomy statutes apply to both
homosexuals and heterosexuals, yet courts do not automatically assume that all heterosex-
uals engage in sodomy, without affirmative evidence.
153. See Polikoff, supra note 2, at 553 ("[T]he criminal law does not provide proof of
morality or immorality, but instead expresses dominant values designed to preserve a par-
ticular social order."). One author noted that social mores do not confer morality on laws:
Sometimes by "morality" is meant the overall beliefs affecting behavior in a soci-
ety-its current mores, norms, and customs. On this understanding, gays cer-
tainly are not moral: lots of people hate them and social customs are designed to
register widespread disapproval of gays. The problem here is that this sense of
morality is merely a descriptive one. On this understanding of what morality is,
every society has a morality--even Nazi society, which had racism and mob rule as
central features of its popular "morality." What is needed in order to use the
notion of morality to praise or condemn behavior is a sense of morality that is
prescriptive or normative ....
Moral thinking that carries a prescriptive or normative force has certain basic
ground rules to which all people consent when attention is drawn to them. First,
normative moral beliefs are not merely expressions of feelings. Rather we ... are
expected to be able to give reasons or justifications for them .... Second, moral
thinking must be consistent and fair . . . .Third, we must avoid prejudice and
rationalization ....
MOHR, supra note 82, at 31.
154. One commentator noted,
The judiciary's concern with public policy and its concomitant fear of "con-
doning" illicit and immoral behavior seems highly selective, given the wide range
of immoral behavior, (some of it even criminal) in which most parents engage at
one time or another. The depth of the hatred and irrationality of the condemna-
tion evoked by the sexual practices of parents, for example, is in sharp contrast to
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of the gay parent's "immoral" violation of sodomy laws ignores the
child's best interests. The morality or immorality of the homosexual
parent's sexual practices is irrelevant to the child's need for parental
care and guidance.1
55
IV. ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON CHILDREN FROM LACK OF VISITATION
Parental separation and divorce are invariably traumatic for the chil-
dren involved. After a divorce, the child experiences feelings of grief,
fear, guilt and rejection.15 6 One study noted, "[w]hatever its shortcom-
ings, the family is perceived by the child at this time as having provided
the support and protection he needs. The divorce signifies the collapse
of that structure, and he feels alone and very frightened."' 157 When
courts restrict visitation because of a parent's sexual orientation, the
trauma may be exacerbated by the subsequent denial of parental con-
tact. Courts should recognize the psychological implications on the
child from deprivation of parent-child contact, and deny visitation with a
gay noncustodial parent only when a clear nexus of harm to the child
exists. 158
A large body of psychological research shows that the noncustodial
parent's visitation is vital to the child. The most extensive study of chil-
dren of divorce was conducted by Wallerstein and Kelly and involved an
examination of sixty families over a five-year period. 159 The authors
found that soon after the divorce "children expressed the wish for in-
creased contact with their fathers with a startling and moving intensity.
... Complaints about insufficiency of parental visits were heard not just
from those youngsters who rarely saw the absent parent, but from many
who were being visited rather frequently as well."' 60 In the year follow-
ing the divorce, only twenty percent of the children were reasonably
content with their individual visiting situations. 16 ' Wallerstein and
the legislative and judicial condonation of abusive physical behavior toward
spouses and children by their rejecting or ignoring it as a factor in custody and
visitation decisions.
Katz, supra note 145, at 461.
155. See Note, supra note 15, at 635 ("Surely, assuming the child is not present during
the sexual activity, the difference between the child's parent receiving sexual gratification
through oral or manual stimulation will not affect the child's well-being.").
156. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP-How CHIL-
DREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-50 (1980).
157. Id. at 35.
158. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("If the courts
are concerned with the best interests of the child, then visitation by the non-custodial
parent must be recognized as necessary to the child's well-being.").
159. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 156, at 134. Wallerstein conducted a ten year
follow-up study and found that the conclusions made in the book were still valid. See
Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a Ten-Year Follow-Up of Young
Children, 54 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 444 (1984). But see Carol S. Bruch, Parenting At and
After Divorce: A Search for New Models, 79 MICH. L. REV. 708, 708 (1981) (reviewingJuDITH
S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP-How CHILDREN AND PARENTS
COPE WITH DIVORCE 35-50 (1980) (suggesting that Wallerstein and Kelly's research should
be viewed as suggestive and not conclusive)).
160. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 156, at 134.
161. Id. at 143. The authors found that nearly 40% of the children who were visited by
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Kelly examined the same children five years after the divorce and discov-
ered that thirty-four percent of the children had adjusted successfully to
the divorce. 1
62
Regular and frequent visitation was found to be an important factor
in the children's psychological health. 163 Twenty-nine percent of the
children were classified as exhibiting "adequate and uneven function-
ing."' 164 The authors classified a third group of children as extremely
unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives.1 65 The study revealed that lack
of visitation played a large role in the children's maladjustment.
166
Children who were not visited by the noncustodial parent felt rejected
and unloved, 16 7 suffered severe psychological damage' 68 and exper-
ienced difficulties in school.1
6 9
Other studies show that visitation by the noncustodial parent is im-
portant to a child's psychological adjustment. 170 One study found that
the noncustodial parent experienced feelings of intense excitement and eagerness for the
visit to occur. Id. Not surprisingly, "[d]isappointment was most intense when the visits
were, in fact, few and far between or when a father failed to keep a scheduled appoint-
ment." Id. at 144. However, the authors found that reluctance to visit occurred in 11% of
the children studied, mostly preadolescent girls. Id. at 146.
162. Id. at 209. The authors found that these children had high self-esteem and were
coping well with the tasks of school and home. Id.
163. Id. at 219. The authors noted that "[tihe trio of good father-child relationship,
high self-esteem, and absence of depression appeared.., to hold for all age groups." Id.
164. Id. at 212-13. No data was given for this group on the effect of visitation upon the
children. The children were considered uneven in their overall ego functioning; teachers
considered the children average.
165. Id. at 211. Over one-third of the children studied fit into this group five years
after the separation. These children were found to be moderately to severely depressed,
and emotionally needy. Id.
166. Id. at 248.
167. Id. at 218. "The negative effect of irregular, erratic visiting was clear. The fa-
ther's abandonment, relative absence, infrequent or irregular appearance, or general un-
reliability, which disappointed the child repeatedly, usually led the child to feel rejected or
rebuffed and lowered the child's self-esteem." Id.
168. Id. at 248.
169. Id. at 283. One pair of authors, relying heavily on Wallerstein and Kelly's data,
proposed that the noncustodial parent's visitation with the child be enforced by law follow-
ing separation prior to the divorce.
We propose that where one parent serves as the primary, day-to-day caretaker of
the child, minimum standards of child visitation and child support be established
by law, to go into effect immediately upon the separation of the parents. For
either parent to fail to abide by at least the minimum standards of support and
visitation, without court approval, would be a violation of the law.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of
Parental Separation on Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 356-57 (1983).
170. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WO-
MEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 232-40 (1989) (study showed that a strong
father-son relationship following a divorce was crucial to the overall psychological adjust-
ment of the children); William F. Hodges, The Effect of Divorce on Children: Developmental
Stages and Implications for V/isitation, in CHILD CUSTODY CONFERENCE: VISITATION-FROM
CHAOS TO COOPERATION 30, 39 (1982) (reviewing research suggesting that the greater the
time lost with the father as a function of divorce, the greater the maladjustment of the
child); Gerald F. Jacobson & Doris S. Jacobson, Impact of larital Dissolution on Adults and
Children: The Significance of Loss and Continuity, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEPARATION AND Loss
316, 329-31 (Jonathon Bloom-Feshbach et al., eds., 1987) (reviewing research on visita-
tion and its effect on children). But see James H. Bray & Sandra H. Berger, Noncustodial
Father and Paternal Grandparent Relationships in Stepfamilies, 39 FAM. REL. 414, 418 (1990)
(study found conflicting data regarding the effect of frequent visitation by the non-custo-
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children exhibited severe "distress symptoms" following withdrawal of
visitation by the noncustodial parent.17 1 One researcher conducted in-
depth interviews with forty children and teenagers who had experienced
a divorce and found that children preferred flexible and unrestricted vis-
itation arrangements. 172 The author stated, "[t]he children who were
more content were those who maintained contact with the non-custodial
parent on a continuous and flexible basis .... Our findings repeatedly
single out the significance that children attach to maintaining relations
with [noncustodial] fathers."l
7 3
Another study suggested that denial of visitation imposed by the
custodial parent may hinder children's psychological health. The author
commented, "[w]hen mothers had cut off fathers from parenting, it was
reflected in children's poorer adjustment in the home."' 174 Another re-
searcher reported that, "visitation patterns of low frequency . . . and
inconsistency are predictive of maladjustment in the child.... [B]ecause
of the relationship of consistency of visitation to child adjustment,
courts and parents might attempt as much as possible to provide
predictible patterns of visitation for the preschool child."'
17 5
Lack of visitation with the noncustodial parent may have a detri-
mental effect on a child's psychological and social functioning. Courts
should take these factors into account when analyzing parental fitness
and sexual orientation. The child's best interests are served by requir-
ing a showing of direct harm from a parent's homosexuality before im-
posing visitation restrictions or denying visitation with the child
altogether.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, gay parents have encountered great difficulty in se-
curing parental rights. Many courts have restricted post-divorce visita-
tion on the basis of outdated stereotypes and misconceptions regarding
sexual orientation and gay parenting. This Note shows that homosexu-
dial father on the children);Joseph M. Healy,Jr. et al., Children and Their Fathers After Paren-
tal Separation, 60 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531, 540-41 (1990) (study showed that although
frequent visitation was beneficial to male children, frequent visits correlated with low self-
esteem in female children).
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit contend that visitation is not always necessary for the
child. "Visits under favorable circumstances are, at best, a poor substitute for a parent in
the family. Weekend visits do not compensate the child for parental absence at crucial
moments in his life." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 118-19 n.*; see also supra note 10.
But see Novinson, supra note 10, at 146-62 (criticizing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's con-
clusions regarding visitation).
171. JANET R. JoHNSON & LINDA E. G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS
AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 253-54 (1988).
172. R. Neugebauer, Divorce, Custody, and Visitation: The Child's Point of View, 12 J. Di-
vORCE 153, 166-67 (1988-89).
173. Id.
174. Anne H. Fishel, Children's Adjustment in Divorced Families, 19 YOUTH & Soc'Y 173,
194 (1987).
175. Carol W. Tierney, Visitation Patterns and Adjustment of Preschool Children of
Divorce 132, 138 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado
(Boulder)).
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ality alone is not a permissible basis for visitation denial or restriction. If
a child is denied regular contact with and affection from the noncus-
todial parent, greater harm will likely result from the deprivation of pa-
rental contact than from any possible adverse effect of a parent's sexual
orientation. Absent an affirmative showing of harm to the child from the
parent's homosexuality, courts should acknowledge the fundamental
rights of gay and lesbian parents and allow unrestricted visitation.
David L. Weiden*
* The author would like to thank Professor Penelope Bryan for her helpful com-
ments and guidance.
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HODGSON V. MINNESOTA: BALANCING THE COMPETING
INTERESTS OF THE STATE, PARENTS AND MINOR-A
MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade I established that the constitu-
tional right to privacy encompassed a woman's choice to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion. 2 This controversial 1973 ruling inspired a
plethora of legislation as states sought to define the parameters of the
abortion right; many states enacted statutes imposing informed consent,
spousal consent and hospitalization requirements.
Further testing the scope of Roe, some state legislatures enacted
regulatory provisions requiring parental consent or notification 3 before
a minor could obtain an abortion. These parental involvement statutes
purported to further the legitimate interest of the state in protecting the
welfare of pregnant minors, and-to some extent-the parents' interests
in the control and well-being of their pregnant child. Parental consent
and notification provisions have been successfully challenged, however,
when the asserted state and parental concerns supplant the minor's au-
tonomy and fundamental right to choose abortion.
In Hodgson v. Minnesota,4 the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of a Minnesota statute 5 requiring an unemancipated minor 6 to
notify both of her parents 7 of her intent to obtain an abortion at least
forty-eight hours8 before the procedure was performed. 9 The Minne-
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153. Noting that the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to
privacy, the Court recognized that the right is found in the concepts of personal liberty
and restriction upon state action contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153-54.
3. Consent provisions require the minor to secure parental approval of her decision
to obtain an abortion. In contrast, notification provisions require the minor to inform her
parents of her decision to have an abortion. Whether, in reality, "parental consent" is
significantly different from "parental notification" remains to be seen.
Statutes differ with respect to the number of parents involved in the minor's decision;
the state may require either single-parent or two-parent involvement with various excep-
tions. See infra appendicies 1 and 2 and notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
4. 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
5. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989).
6. Minnesota has no statutory definition of "emancipation." See Streitz v. Streitz,
363 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The Supreme Court, however, accepted the
Minnesota case law notion of an emancipated woman as one who is living apart from her
parents or who is either married or has borne a child. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931 n.3
(applying MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.341-.342 (West 1989)).
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(3) (West 1989) provides in part: " 'parent' means
both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant
woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably
diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one."
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(2) (West 1989) provides in part: "[N]o abortion op-
eration shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a
guardian or conservator has been appointed.., until at least 48 hours after written notice
of the pending operation has been delivered [to the parent]."
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sota statute provided no exception regarding notification of a divorced
or noncustodial parent.' 0 In anticipation of a challenge to the statute,
the Minnesota legislature incorporated a provision that became effective
if ever a court enjoined the two-parent notification requirement."l This
alternative proviso retained the core notification requirements of the
original statute, but provided a judicial bypass proceeding whereby a
mature or "best-interests" minor could seek court approval of her deci-
sion instead of notifying her parents.' 2 Through two different majori-
ties, the Supreme Court held that the primary two-parent notice
provision alone was unconstitutional,' 3 but that the same two-parent
notification requirement withstood constitutional challenge when ac-
companied by the judicial bypass alternative.
14
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's treatment of the
most restrictive' 5 parental notification statute in the Nation. Part II
traces the progression of Supreme Court abortion rulings from the rec-
ognition of a woman's fundamental right in Roe through cases limiting
the scope of Roe with respect to parental consent and notification provi-
sions. Part III surveys the facts and procedural history of Hodgson, pro-
viding a synopsis of the Justices' divergent opinions. Part IV presents an
analysis of the Hodgson decision including: (1) a discussion of the com-
peting interests of the state, parents and minor; (2) application of the
judicial bypass alternative and (3) the burdens of two-parent notifica-
tion. Part V concludes that the Supreme Court has validated a statute
that surpasses both the degree of regulation necessary to effectuate the
legitimate interest of the state in protecting the welfare of pregnant mi-
nors and the parents' interest in the well-being of their child. Unlike the
9. An analysis of the constitutionality of delay requirements is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a general discussion of the issue, see Debra Harvey, Note, Zbaraz v.
Hartigan: Mandatory Twenty-Four Hour Waiting Period After Parental Notification Unconstitution-
ally Burdens A Minor's Abortion Decision, 19J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1071 (1986).
10. See supra note 7.
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1989) provides in part:
If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or en-
joined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced as though the following
paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c) of that subdivision; provided, how-
ever, that if such temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever
stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have
full force and effect, without being modified by the addition of the following sub-
stitute paragraph which shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction
or restraining order is again in effect.
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(i) (West 1989) provides:
If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one or both of her
parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appropriate hearing, authorize a
physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant wo-
man is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion.
If said judge determines that the woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman
does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance
of an abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, guardian,
or conservator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to
perform the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the
pregnant woman's best interests would be served thereby.
13. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2947.
14. Id. at 2961.
15. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota two-parent notification provision, a single-parent notice re-
quirement, combined with a judicial bypass option, would better balance
the competing interests of the state, parents and minor. A single-parent
involvement provision protects the welfare of pregnant minors and en-
courages minors to consult a parent without imposing an undue burden
upon a minor's fundamental right to choose abortion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Recognition of the Fundamental Right
Although Roe established that the right to privacy encompassed a
woman's decision to choose abortion, 16 her freedom of choice is not
absolute and "must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." 7 Reaffirming "strict scrutiny" as the applicable standard
of review, the Supreme Court observed that regulation of a fundamental
right is justified only by legislation that is narrowly drawn to express a
compelling state interest. 18 Compelling interests include those that
safeguard maternal health and protect certain potential life. 19
Applying the Roe standard, the Court determined that the impor-
tant state interest in the mother's health became compelling at the end
of the first trimester, and its interest in protecting potential life became
compelling at fetal viability. 20 During the first trimester of pregnancy,
therefore, the woman and her physician could choose to terminate the
pregnancy without state interference.
2 1
B. Restricting A Minor's Fundamental Right
Since Roe, the Supreme Court has decided several cases concerning
the constitutionality of statutes restricting a minor's fundamental right
to obtain an abortion through parental consent and notification provi-
sions. One such case of particular importance is Planned Parenthood v.
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court noted that only personal rights, which can be
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," are included in the
guarantee of personal privacy. Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
17. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
18. Id. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 163-65. "Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks), but
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160.
21. Id. at 163. Roe's trimester framework for limiting a state's authority to regulate
abortions "is inherently tied to the state of medical technology that exists whenever partic-
ular litigation ensues." Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
458 (1983)(O'Connor, J., dissenting). As a result, Roe's trimester standard may be ill-
suited for analysis as technological developments move the point of fetal viability further
toward conception and enable the states to regulate the performance of an abortion at an
earlier point in the pregnancy. Id. ("As medical science becomes better able to provide for
the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back to concep-
tion."). See also Jan G. Laitos, The abortion question: Reasoning of Roe vs. 11'ade out of date,
ROCKY MTN. NEws, Mar. 1, 1989, (Colorado Views), at 37 (questioning whether the exer-
cise of a woman's right to an abortion should "vary according to the progress of medical
technology").
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Danforth.22 There, the Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a
Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions by requiring
the written consent of one parent or a person acting in loco parentis unless
the abortion was necessary to protect the mother's life.
23
The Danforth Court recognized that minors, as well as adults, re-
ceive constitutional protection because "[c]onstitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority."' 24 The Court observed, however, that states
may regulate the activities of children to a greater extent than is permis-
sible for adults.2 5 This greater degree of control is reflected in the
Court's application of the less-stringent standard of "intermediate re-
view" to the challenged parental consent provision. Using an ends-
means analysis, which required only a "significant state interest" to con-
dition a minor's abortion on the consent of a parent, the Court demon-
strated the application of this intermediate standard.2 6 In contrast, the
Court employed the "strict scrutiny" standard to provisions of the stat-
ute as applied to adult women.
Heeding the Roe requirement of narrowly drawn statutes that regu-
late fundamental rights, 2 7 the Danforth Court held the parental consent
provision unconstitutional. It concluded that the asserted state interests
did not justify an absolute and possibly arbitrary parental veto over the
decision of the minor to terminate her pregnancy. 28 In so ruling, the
Court observed that the award of parental veto power would not
strengthen the family unit or enhance parental control "where the mi-
nor and nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict that the
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family struc-
ture." 29 Although the Danforth Court placed the minor's autonomy
before the asserted state and parental interests, the majority emphasized
that its holding did not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or
maturity, may give effective consent to an abortion. 30 The Court, in-
stead, limited its holding to statutes imposing unjustified third-party
consent requirements as a prerequisite to a mature minor's abortion.
3 1
In 1979, the Supreme Court presented guidelines that, if incorpo-
22. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
23. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(4) (Vernon 1974). The plaintiffs also challenged statu-
tory provisions concerning fetal viability, informed consent, spousal consent, the standard
of care for physicians, the custody of infants who survived an attempted abortion, amni-
ocentesis, and reporting and record-keeping requirements. See id. §§ 188.010-040.
24. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
25. Id. at 73-75 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
26. Id. at 75. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsistent application of
standards of review in the abortion context, see Note, Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law; E.
Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1990).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
28. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.





rated, would have salvaged the infirmities of the Missouri statute under
scrutiny in Danforth. In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti IJ), 32 the Court addressed
a facial challenge to a Massachusetts statute requiring the consent of
both parents before a minor could obtain an abortion.3 3 Unlike the con-
sent provision struck down in Danforth, the Massachusetts statute pro-
vided for judicial authorization of the minor's abortion for "good cause
shown" when one or both parents refused consent.
3 4
The Bellotti II plurality observed that a child's peculiar vulnerability
and inability to make informed, critical decisions-together with the im-
portance of the parental role in child rearing-justified regulating a mi-
nor's fundamental rights to a greater extent than those of an adult.
3 5
The parental consent requirement of the Massachusetts abortion statute
reflects that legislature's desire to exercise greater control over abortion
rights of minors. The Bellotti II plurality concluded, however, that a
pregnant minor was entitled to avoid a parental consent requirement
through a judicial determination where either (1) she was mature and
capable of giving informed consent independent of her parents' inter-
ests, or (2) the abortion was in her best interests regardless of her level
of maturity.3 6 The plurality also noted that the judicial proceeding
should ensure the pregnant minor's anonymity and be expeditiously
conducted to allow the minor an effective opportunity to obtain the
abortion.3 7 Thus the Court attempted to balance the pregnant minor's
constitutional right with the state's interest in encouraging parental in-
volvement by safeguarding against provisions that would amount to the
veto power found impermissible in Danforth.3 8 The plurality empha-
sized the balance that the bypass procedure lends to the competing in-
terests rejecting the contention that, as a general rule, two-parent
consent requirements unduly burden a minor's fundamental right to ob-
tain an abortion.
3 9
The plurality determined that the Massachusetts statute was uncon-
stitutional because it failed in two respects to satisfy the articulated stan-
dards for a valid restraint on a minor's right. First, the statute permitted
judicial authorization to be withheld from a minor who was otherwise
32. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellolti 1, reported as Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132
(1976), the Court vacated the judgment of a three-judge panel of the district court which
had sustained a facial challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in not abstaining and certifying questions concerning the meaning of the stat-
ute to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. On remand, the district court certified
nine questions to the state court. Following the judgment of the state court, the district
court again found the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
Bellotti II, the appeal from the district court's ruling on remand, is a plurality opinion.
Justice Powell's lead opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's concur-
ring opinion. Only Justice White dissented.
33. MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983).
34. Id.
35. Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 634-37.
36. Id. at 643-44.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 649.
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found to be mature and capable of giving informed consent.40 The plu-
rality observed that ajudge could, in effect, place the state's and parents'
interests above those of the minor and deny authorization. 4 1 Second,
the statute required parental involvement before the minor was afforded
an opportunity to receive a judicial determination. 4 2 Under Bellotti II's
guidelines, a pregnant minor must have an opportunity to obtain judi-
cial approval of her decision without first consulting her parents; 43 the
pregnant minor may be denied authorization only where the court is not
persuaded that the minor is mature or that the abortion would be in her
best interests.
4 4
Both Danforth and Bellotti II involved statutes that conditioned a mi-
nor's right to abortion on parental consent to her decision. In contrast,
the Supreme Court first addressed a constitutional challenge to a paren-
tal notification statute in H.L. v. Matheson.4 5 This 1981 case presented a
facial challenge to Utah's notification provision requiring a physician to
"notify, if possible" the parents of a pregnant minor before performing
the abortion. 46 The statute did not provide a judicial bypass alternative
to the minor.
The plaintiff, a pregnant minor living with and dependent upon her
parents, asserted that the statute was unconstitutional because courts
could construe it so as to apply to all unmarried minors who were ma-
ture or emancipated. 4 7 The Court found, given the plaintiff's depen-
dence upon her parents and her failure to allege that she was mature,
that the minor lacked standing to advance the overbreadth argument. 48
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the provision only as it applied to imma-
ture and dependent minors. The Court reasoned that, as so limited, the
statute was reasonably calculated to protect that class of pregnant mi-
nors by "enhancing the potential for parental consultation concerning a
decision that has potentially traumatic and permanent consequences." '49
Over a sharp dissent,50 the Matheson Court observed that the Utah
statute did not afford parents the veto power characterized by some con-
sent provisions and noted that the "mere requirement of parental notice
does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature dependent mi-
nor." 5 1 In effect, the lesser degree of intrusion accompanying notifica-
tion, in contrast to requiring parental approval under a consent
40. Id. at 651.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id. at 647-48.
45. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
46. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1990).
47. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 405.
48. Id. at 406.
49. Id. at 411-12.
50. Led by Justice Marshall, the dissent rejected the majority's narrow holding
grounded on a lack of standing. Moreover, the dissent argued that state-imposed notifica-
tion results in the same infringement on the minor's right as does a consent requirement.
Id. at 425-41.
51. Id. at 409 (quoting Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 640).
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provision, enabled the statute to survive a constitutional challenge with-
out incorporation of the judicial bypass alternative. As applied to the
class of immature and dependent minors, the statute furthered the inter-
ests of the state in protecting the welfare of its minors and preserving
family integrity, and was narrowly drawn to protect only those
interests.
5 2
In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld an entire parental consent stat-
ute regulating a minor's right to abortion. That statute was the one
challenged in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft 53 requiring an uneman-
cipated minor to (1) secure the consent of one parent or (2) obtain a
court order for "good cause" shown before she could obtain an abor-
tion. 54 Adhering to the criteria set forth in Bellotti II for a valid restraint
on a minor's abortion right, 55 the question presented in Ashcroft was
whether the Missouri statute provided a judicial alternative that satisfied
those criteria without unconstitutionally burdening the minor's right.
56
The Supreme Court concluded that the interest of the state in protect-
ing immature minors sustained the consent requirement because of the
judicial bypass alternative. Because a court could not deny a pregnant
minor's petition "for good cause" unless it first found that the minor
was immature, the statute avoided any constitutional infirmities.
57
The Ashcroft dissent, however, emphasized that Bellotti II did not
command a majority, and thus, the Court was not bound by the judicial
bypass guidelines. 58 It further maintained that ajudicial proceeding im-
poses a burden on the minor of at least the same degree as obtaining
parental consent and that the discretion inherent in the proceeding re-
sults in nothing less than a judicial veto of the minor's decision to obtain
an abortion. 59
In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron HJ),60 the com-
panion case to Hodgson, the Supreme Court upheld a parental notification
statute prohibiting the performance of an abortion upon an unmarried,
unemancipated minor unless, inter alia, the physician provided notice to
52. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411-13.
53. 462 U.S 476 (1983).
54. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
55. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493.
56. Id. at 491. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger viewed the issue as a matter of
statutory construction and applied the Bellotti II criteria. Id. at 491-92. Justices O'Connor,
White and Rehnquist concluded in a concurring opinion that the provision was valid be-
cause it imposed no undue burden on the minor's fundamental right. Id. at 505.
57. Id. at 493.
58. Id. at 504. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion.
59. Id.
60. 110 U.S. 2972 (1990). In City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health
(Akron I), 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that prohib-
ited, inter alia, the performance of an abortion on a woman under 15 years of age unless
the physician obtained the consent of one parent or the minor received judicial authoriza-
tion. The Court stated that the judicial proceeding failed to meet the standard provided
by Bellotti II, and was invalid because the ordinance made a blanket determination that all
minors under the age of 15 are too immature to provide informed consent or that an
abortion would never be in their best interests without parental consent.
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one parent, or the minor received judicial authorization to obtain the
abortion.6 1 The majority concluded that the notification requirement
and accompanying judicial bypass procedure did not impose an uncon-
stitutional burden on the minor's right since the statute was in accord
with the guidelines propounded by the Court in previous abortion rul-
ings. 62 The bypass proceeding allowed the minor to avoid parental no-
tification by establishing either her maturity or that the performance of
the abortion, without notification, would be in her best interests. 63 Fur-
thermore, the statute provided for an expedited and confidential deter-
mination of the minor's petition if she sought a judicial bypass. 64 The
Court left unanswered, however, the question of whether parental notifi-
cation statutes must contain a judicial bypass alternative to be held consti-
tutional. 65 Recall that the Ohio statute included a bypass procedure
that satisfied Bellotti II's standards, but the Ashcroft Court stated only that
"it is a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statutes that a
bypass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also
for a notice statute."
66
III. HODGSON V. MINNESOTA
A. Facts and Procedural History
On July 30, 1981, two days before the effective date of the Minne-
sota parental notification provision, 67 the plaintiffs68 commenced their
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
challenging the constitutionality of the statute and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.69 The primary requirement of the statute de-
manded an unemancipated minor notify70 both her parents of her intent
61. Akron 11, 110 S. Ct. at 2982. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson 1990).
62. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2981-82.
63. Id. at 2979.
64. Id. at 2979-80. The Court rejected the challenges to: (1) the constructive author-
ization condition of the bypass provision; (2) the standard for establishing maturity or
best interests and (3) the pleading requirements. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(A)-
(C) (Anderson 1990).
65. Akron II, 110 S. Ct. at 2978-79.
66. Id. at 2979.
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West 1989). The statute amended the "Minors'
Consent to Health Services Act" which remains in effect as §§ 144.343(1) and 144.346.
For a brief discussion of the Act, see Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931.
68. The plaintiffs included six class-action minors who claimed to be mature, two phy-
sicians and four abortion clinics in Minnesota. They argued that notification of one or
both parents of the minors would not be in the minors' best interests. A mother of a
minor plaintiff claimed that notifying the minor's father would not be in the minor's best
interests.
69. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756 (D. Minn. 1986). The plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
and various provisions of the Minnesota Constitution.
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4) (West 1989) states:
No notice shall be required under this section if:
(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's medical record that
the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient
time to provide the required notice; or
(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are enti-
tled to notice; or
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to obtain an abortion at least forty-eight hours before the procedure was
performed. 7 1 The Minnesota legislature incorporated a judicial bypass
provision, however, that was to become effective if the primary two-par-
ent notification requirement was ever temporarily or permanently en-
joined.72 Under this contingency, a pregnant minor could obtain a
waiver of the notification requirement if the court determined that the
minor was mature or that the performance of the abortion, without pa-
rental notification, was otherwise in her best interests. 73 The statute
provided that the bypass hearing must be confidential and be given pre-
cedence over other matters. 74 An expedited appeal was available to mi-
nors who were denied judicial authorization by the lower court.
75
The district court temporarily enjoined the pure notification provi-
sion of the statute before its effective date, but allowed the enforcement
of the notice-bypass provision since it was constitutional per se. The
court determined, however, that the plaintiffs should have an opportu-
nity to offer evidence in support of their allegations that the notice-by-
pass provision was unconstitutional as applied. 76 During a five-week
trial, the court considered, apart from the remainder of the statute, both
the forty-eight hour delay and two-parent notification requirements.
The district court held that the waiting period was unconstitutional per
se because it unduly burdened the opportunity of pregnant minors to
obtain an abortion. 77 The core two-parent notice requirement, without
the judicial bypass, was also held unconstitutional because it failed to
promote the interests of the state and placed an unjustified burden of
obtaining parental approval on mature and "best-interests" minors.
7 8
The trial court determined, however, that the judicial bypass procedure
complied both on its face and in practice with the guidelines established
by the Supreme Court 79 although extensive factual findings suggested
that the procedure did not significantly further the interests of the state
(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of that declara-
tion shall be made to the proper authorities as provided in section 626.556, sub-
division 3.
71. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(5) (West
1989) provides in part: "Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a
misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied
notification."
72, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6) (West 1989). See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(6)(c)(i)(West 1989).
74. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(iii) (West 1989) provides in part: "[p]roceedings in
the court under this section shall be confidential and shall be given such precedence over
other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay
so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman."
75. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(c)(iv) (West 1989) states in part: "[a]n expedited
confidential appeal shall be available to any such pregnant woman for whom the court
denies an order authorizing an abortion without notification. An order authorizing an
abortion without notification shall not be subject to appeal."
76. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2934.
77. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 779.
78. Id. at 778.
79. Id. at 775-76. See 4shcroft, 462 U.S. at 476; Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 622.
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in protecting pregnant minors or fostering intrafamily communica-
tion.8 0 While the forty-eight hour delay provision was severable from
the remainder of the statute, the statute could not be given effect in the
absence of the two-parent notification requirement.8 ' Accordingly,
though the judicial bypass was held constitutional in isolation from the
remainder of the statute, the two-parent notification requirement neces-
sitated that the statute be enjoined in its entirety.
82
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed,8 3 thus rejecting the state's
argument that the two-parent notification requirement was constitu-
tional without a judicial bypass option.8 4 Concluding that a bypass pro-
cedure was constitutionally required under Bellotti II, Ashcroft and
Matheson,8 5 the Eighth Circuit determined that the two-parent notice re-
quirement was valid only when accompanied by the judicial bypass alter-
native.8 6 The appellate court considered the statute as a whole and
stated that, by providing for a judicial bypass, the statute safeguards
those minors for whom parental involvement may not be in their best
interests, while at the same time encouraging parental involvement for
those minors who may be greatly assisted at a difficult time.8 7 Although
the district court's factual findings concerning the burdens associated
with the two-parent notice requirement and judicial bypass raised "con-
siderable questions about the practical wisdom of the statute," the
Eighth Circuit deferred to the decision of the legislature.
8 8
Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Minne-
sota challenged the determination of the Eight Circuit that the pure no-
tification provision was unconstitutional.8 9 In contrast, the plaintiffs
challenged the approval of the same two-parent requirement when ac-
companied by the judicial bypass alternative. 90 The Supreme Court,
however, affirmed the holdings of the Eighth Circuit in two different ma-
jority opinions.
In the first opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor joined Justice Stevens in striking down the primary two-par-
ent notification provision. In the second, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia joined Justice Kennedy in upholding the two-
parent notice requirement with the appended judicial bypass. As be-
80. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 775-76. Between August of 1981 and March of 1986,
judges denied only nine of the approximately 3500 judicial bypass petitions. In addition,
the judges-hearing 90% of the petitions-viewed the process as a means to affix a "rub-
ber-stamp" to the minor's decision. Id. at 781.
81. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(7) (West 1989) provides in part: "[i]f any provision
•.. of this section ... shall be held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions...
which can be given effect without the invalid provision ..
82. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 780-81.
83. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988)(en banc).
84. Id. at 1456.
85. Id. at 1462.
86. Id. at 1464.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1459.
89. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2927.
90. Id. at 2961.
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tween the two opinions, Justice O'Connor provided the swing vote in
the decision by concurring with the judgment upholding the two-parent
requirement when it was accompanied by the bypass procedure.9 '
B. The Stevens Majority
The Stevens majority began its scrutiny of the pure notification pro-
vision by noting that none of the Court's prior decisions in the abortion
context focused on the significance of involving both biological parents
in the abortion decision. 92 The majority then summarized the unchal-
lenged factual findings of the district court concerning the distinction
between one and two-parent involvement.
9 3
The majority noted that-on the basis of testimony amassed at trial
concerning the impact of the statute in operation-the district court
found the two-parent notification requirement had harmful effects on
both the minor and custodial parent where the parents were divorced or
separated. 9 4 Some minors anticipated reestablishing their relationship
with the absent parent after gaining that parent's advice, and were often
disappointed when reestablishment did not occur.95 In addition, the re-
action of the custodial parent to the requirement of forced notification
was often one of anger, resentment and frustration at the intrusion of
the absent parent. 96
The district court also found that involvement of the absent parent
was especially detrimental when the minor came from an abusive, dys-
functional family. Studies, introduced into evidence, suggested that vio-
lence and harassment often continued well beyond the divorce,
particularly where children were involved, and notification of the mi-
nor's pregnancy and abortion decision could provoke further violence.
9 7
Moreover, the district court believed that "a mother's perception in a
dysfunctional family that there will be violence if the father learns of the
daughter's pregnancy is likely to be an accurate perception."
'9 8
The two-parent notification requirement also had adverse effects in
families where the minor lived with both parents in circumstances in-
volving domestic violence. Even where minors lived in fear of physical
and sexual abuse, few invoked the statutory exception to notice because
of the reporting requirements and attendant loss of privacy. 9 9 Conse-
quently, the two-parent notification requirement actually reduced, in-
stead of fostered, intrafamily communication. Minors who would
ordinarily notify one parent were dissuaded from doing so when notifi-
91. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined. Justice Scalia also filed a separate opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part.
92. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938.
93. Id.
94. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. 756, 768-69 (D. Minn. 1986).
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cation would involve the parent "in the tortuous ordeal of explaining to
a court why the second parent should not be notified."' 0 0
Justice Stevens then analyzed the statute while considering the dis-
trict court's extensive findings of fact. Noting that the state did not rely
primarily on its asserted interest in protecting the welfare of pregnant
minors in defending the statute, Justice Stevens concluded that instead
it concentrated on its interest in protecting the right of the parents "to
determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their chil-
dren."' 0 ' Wherever the emphasis, neither of these interests justified the
two-parent notification requirement according to Justice Stevens. He
concluded that the state had no legitimate interest in (1) questioning
one parent's judgment that notice to the other parent would not benefit
the minor and (2) in presuming that the custodial parent was incompe-
tent to make decisions concerning the minor's health and welfare.
10 2
Thus, the two-parent requirement was unconstitutional because the
"combined force of the separate interest of one parent and the minor's
privacy interest must outweigh the separate interest of the second par-
ent" in shaping the child's values and lifestyle.
10 3
C. The Kennedy Dissent to the Stevens Majority
Justices Kennedy, White, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented from the portion of the Stevens opinion that struck down the
primary two-parent notification requirement of the Minnesota statute.
The dissent maintained that a state furthers legitimate ends when it at-
tempts to foster and preserve intrafamily relations by "giving all parents
the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of their chil-
dren."' 1 4 The Kennedy dissent rejected Justice Marshall's assertion
that Minnesota attempted, through the two-parent notification require-
ment, to force families to conform to a state-designed ideal.' 0 5 Instead,
the dissent supported the state's interest in providing information to
both parents by arguing that such an interest was valid regardless of
whether the child was living with one or both biological parents, or the
particular relationship between the parents.
10 6
The Kennedy dissent further observed that the notification statute
was consistent with joint custody laws in Minnesota since it enabled di-
vorced or separated parents to share the legal responsibility and author-
ity for making decisions regarding their child's welfare.1
0 7
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the state did not dictate in-
trafamily communication by requiring parental notice. The Court ar-
100. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2939 (discussing Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769).
101. Id. at 2946. See Brief of Respondents at 28-29, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2926 (1990) (No. 88-1125).
102. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2946.
103. Id. at 2946-47.
104. Id. at 2963 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2964.
107. Id. at 2964-65.
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gued that Minnesota acted only on the common-sense proposition
that-in counseling their minor child-parents could best fulfill their
roles only when fully informed of the child's medical condition and rela-
tive choices. '0 8
The dissent criticized the Stevens majority for doing the state and
"our constitutional tradition a sad disservice by impugning the legiti-
macy" of such essential objectives. 10 9 In conclusion, Justice Kennedy
stated that the permissive language and incorporated exceptions of the
statute, combined with the less demanding nature of a notice provision as
opposed to a consent provision, did not place an absolute obstacle before
a pregnant minor seeking an abortion. Instead, Justice Kennedy viewed
the statute as representing a considered weighing of the competing in-
terests of minors and their parents.' 10
D. The Kennedy Majority
The Justices favoring the Kennedy dissent, with the addition ofJus-
tice O'Connor-who represented the swing vote between the two major-
ities-saved the two-parent notice component of the statute. Although
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, White and ChiefJustice Rehnquist would have
upheld the two-parent notice requirement without an appended judicial
bypass option, they were defeated by the Stevens majority. With the
addition of Justice O'Connor, however, the Kennedy group succeeded
in upholding the two-parent notification requirement when it was ac-
companied by the judicial bypass mechanism.
The Minnesota notification statute with a judicial bypass alternative
purportedly conformed to the framework supplied by the Bellotti II plu-
rality. The Kennedy majority noted that Bellotti II's guidelines would
support a two-parent consent or notification statute if it provided, as did
Minnesota's provision, for a sufficient judicial bypass alternative. I'
Minnesota's judicial bypass, according to the Kennedy majority, was
valid since it furnished mature and best-interests minors with an oppor-
tunity to avoid parental notification through a confidential judicial
proceeding. ' 12
The Kennedy majority also reconciled the decision in Matheson with
the facts presented by the Minnesota statute. Justice Kennedy observed
that, as in Matheson, if a two-parent notification statute is constitutional
as applied to immature minors whose best interests are served by notifi-
cation, but not as applied to mature or best interests minors, "a judicial
bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the
applications of the law which are constitutional from those which are
not." 113 Thus legislatures are entitled to combat the wrongs of parental
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2964.
110. Id. at 2969.
Ill. Id. at 2970.
112. Id. at 2971.
113. Id.
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failure and social ills and still take reasonable measures to "recognize
and promote the privacy of the family tie. ' 14 This concept, maintained
Justice Kennedy, was destined to constitutional irrelevance under the
Stevens opinion. 15
E. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence with the Kennedy Opinion
In casting the decisive vote, Justice O'Connor concluded that inter-
ference in the intrafamily relationship associated with requiring two-par-
ent notice does not exist where the minor can avoid notification through
the use of the judicial bypass mechanism."16 If the questioned regula-
tion does not unduly burden the fundamental right, observed Justice
O'Connor, then the Court's evaluation is limited to a determination of
whether the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state
purpose. "17
Justice O'Connor maintained, as did Justice Stevens, that Minnesota
offered no sufficient justification for the notice requirement's interfer-
ence with the family's decision-making processes." 8 In support of her
conclusion, she cited the stringent nature of the two-parent require-
ment, the ineffectiveness of the state's physical and sexual abuse excep-
tion, and the unreasonableness of requiring two-parent notice when
only one-half of the minors residing in Minnesota live with both biologi-
cal parents." 9 Emphasizing the Court's decision in Danforth, Justice
O'Connor further observed that the infirmities of the statute were ne-
gated by the inclusion of the judicial bypass option. She concluded that
the existence of such an alternative avoids unduly burdening the minor's
limited right to obtain an abortion and alleviates the possibility of paren-
tal notification serving as an absolute condition upon the minor's funda-
mental right. '
2 0
F. Justice Marshall Concurring and Dissenting in Part
Joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Justice Marshall con-
curred in the judgment with respect to the Court's rejection of the "un-
reasonable and vastly overbroad requirement" that a pregnant minor
notify both her parents of her decision to obtain an abortion. 1 2 1 Justice
Marshall adopted the Stevens rationale for holding the two-parent noti-
fication requirement unconstitutional, and noted that the provision
would not satisfy the standard of strict scrutiny applicable to restrictions
114. Id. at 2972.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 2950. Justice O'Connor seems to apply the minimum rationality standard of
review to the regulation of a minor's fundamental right to abortion, whereas the Marshall
dissent would utilize the strict scrutiny standard applied in Roe. See supra note 26.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2950.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2960.
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on fundamental rights. 12 2 According to Justice Marshall the parental
notification requirement significantly restricted a young woman's repro-
ductive freedom and was not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling
state interest. Justice Marshall rejected the asserted state interest in pro-
tecting independent parental rights because the family's right against
state interference in personal matters would be undermined by govern-
mental intrusion in the form of forced compliance to the state's "arche-
type of the ideal family."' 123 Furthermore, he argued, the exercise of
parental authority in some instances obstructs the minor's decision to
have an abortion. Stern parental disapproval, with the threat of with-
drawal of financial support, accompanied by physical and emotional
abuse would effectively become an impermissible veto over the minor's
decision. '
2 4
Justice Marshall objected to forced notification of even a single par-
ent, an argument which served as a foundation for opposing the rigors
of a two-parent notification requirement. Justice Marshall observed that
any notification requirement violates the privacy right of pregnant mi-
nors who choose not to inform their parents and further precipitates
severe physical and psychological effects on the minor. 12 5 Additionally,
Justice Marshall observed that a single-parent notice requirement may
force some pregnant minors to travel outside of the state to obtain an
abortion and others to resort to self-induced or illegal abortions.
126
Justice Marshall vehemently dissented from the Kennedy decision,
reasoning that the mere presence of ajudicial bypass alternative did not
rid the underlying notice requirement of its unconstitutionality.1 2 7 The
Marshall dissent argued that the judicial bypass procedure could not sal-
vage the parental notification requirement because the procedure itself
was unconstitutional. The bypass was invalid, according to Justice Mar-
shall, since a court's refusal was the equivalent of a veto with respect to
women who were denied a judicial bypass and were forced either to
carry the fetus to term or were otherwise obstructed by their parents.' 2 8
The dissent argued that an immature minor has no less right to
make decisions regarding her own body than a mature adult, and that
the conditional defects in any provision effectively allowing for a third-
party veto were exacerbated by the vagueness of Minnesota's statute.'
29
In particular, the Marshall dissent challenged the standards, or lack
thereof, for determining the maturity and best interests of the pregnant
minor. '
30
The Marshall dissent then noted that the Court had never before
122. Id. at 2951.
123. Id. at 2956.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2953.
126. Id. at 2953-54.
127. Id. at 2952. The Justices also dissented from the portion of the Court's decision
upholding the 48 hour delay requirement. Id. at 2954.
128. Id. at 2957.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2958.
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addressed the constitutionality of a bypass option as applied.' 3 ' Justice
Marshall focused in large part on the factual findings of the district court
and concluded that the Minnesota bypass provision was an excessive
burden, not a remedy to an otherwise unconstitutional statute.' 32 He
argued that the statute "forces a young woman in an already dire situa-
tion to choose between two fundamentally unacceptable alternatives:
notifying a possibly dictatorial or even abusive parent and justifying her




A. The Minor's Rights
The historical attitude regarding children was one in which children
were regarded as personal property of their parents or appendages of an
entity, unable to develop an autonomous image.' 3 4 In effect, children
had no rights and were wholly subordinate to those who had power over
them whether in the family, the factory or the community. 135 The Chan-
cery Courts rejected appeals to subject parental authority to state inter-
vention and ignored the wishes of children when they conflicted with
those of their parents.136 Furthermore, minors-not recognized as per-
sons in their own right-could not consent to medical care, and physi-
cians feared charges of assault and battery if they treated minors without
first obtaining parental consent.'
37
Today, children are regarded as individuals, with constitutionally
protected rights,' 3 8 actively involved in decisions that affect their
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2960.
134. Nan Berger, The Child, the Law and the State, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TOWARD THE
LIBERATION OF THE CHILD 153, 179 (1971).
135. Maxine Greene, An Overview of Children s Rights: A Moral and Ethical Perspective, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N.
Brody eds., 1979).
136. Berger, supra note 134, at 153. In effect, the father's rights were superior to those
of the child since mothers had few legal rights in relation to their children. Id. "The right
of a father to the custody and control of his children is one of the most sacred rights." Id.
(quoting Lord Justice James, Chancery Court (1878)).
For a discussion of the protective nature of the current juvenile court system, see
Laura J. Staples, Comment, Parental Notification Prior to Abortion: Is Minnesota s Statute Consis-
tent With Current Standards, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 653, 662-67 (1988)(discussing Harti-
gan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987), and the ruling in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d
1452 (8th Cir. 1988)).
137. Harriet F. Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 463 (1972).
There are three recognized exceptions to the general rule requiring parental consent to
medical treatment of a child. First, parental consent is not required in emergency situa-
tions involving an immediate danger to life or limb. Id. at 464. The second exception
allows an emancipated minor to give effective consent provided he or she understands the
nature and consequences of the treatment. Id. at 464-65. Third, mature minors, even if
unemancipated, may give effective consent where the minor understands the nature and
consequences of the treatment. Id. at 466.
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 13 (1966)("neither the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone"). Juveniles are entitled to due process protection including
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lives.1 3 9 Remnants of the common law are evident, however, in parental
involvement statutes since some restrictions, having no legitimate basis
as applied to adults, may be used to purportedly further significant state
interests with respect to minors.
140
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality in Bellotti II, stated three jus-
tifications for sanctioning greater state regulation of the constitutional
rights of children: "[1] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and
[3] the importance of the parental role in child rearing."' 14 1 The
Supreme Court, however, has yet to articulate a general theory that
properly balances the competing interests of the state, parent and
child. 1 42 At the core of these rival concerns and the inconsistencies in
the case law 14 3 preventing the formation of a standard "lies a contro-
versy over the scope of the Constitution's protection of the individual's
rights to autonomy and respect as a person."' 144 Although the Supreme
Court has addressed the minor's right to autonomy in developing the
constitutional right to privacy, the right has been "unduly limited [by]
the protection of biological parenthood."'
14 5
The inquiry, therefore, is "whether biological parenthood is the
proper locus for the constitutional values of autonomy and respect in-
herent in the right to privacy."' 46 In this sense, it would seem that re-
the rights to timely notice of the charges, assistance of counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination and the rights to confrontation and cross-examination. Id. at 49-57.
139. Berger, supra note 134, at 179.
140. Richard F. Thomas, Comment, Distinguishing Guidelines for Minors Abortion Rights,
56 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780 (1988).
141. Id. (citing Bellotti I, 443 U.S. at 634); see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court stated that the protection of a minor's right to privacy would not be
equated with that of an adult since a significant state interest, as opposed to a compelling
state interest, would sustain restriction of a minor's fundamental rights. Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977)(The Court also questioned whether the
means employed by the New York legislature were related to the end it sought to
achieve.).
142. David A.J. Richards, The Individual, The Family, and The Constitution: A jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1980). Failure to articulate such a theory is to some
extent a consequence of a judicial method focused on "cases and controversies" and "the
idea that a decision need only articulate those principles that are necessary to the reason-
able disposition of a particular case." Id.
143. Id. at 3-4. "Some decisions respect a child's right to autonomy, while others,
inexplicably, ignore it." Id. (discussing Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)(constitutional right to privacy extends to minor's access to contraceptives despite
parental disapproval); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)(denial of hearing or re-
view after corporal punishment); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976)(parents cannot assert veto power over minor's constitutional right to privacy, abor-
tion); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)(to satisfy due process concerns, students enti-
tled to some form of hearing after suspension by school); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)(parents' religious objections were sufficient to overcome the state's interest in
education beyond the eighth grade); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (19 69)(extending First Amendment rights to public school students); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(state's interest in regulating child labor outweighed
parents' religious interest in having child distribute religious literature)).
144. Richards, supra note 142, at 4.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4-5. "Protecting the nuclear family by the right to privacy may only rein-
force malign features of the American family." Id. at 5 n.36 (for a discussion of these
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quiring a minor to notify an absent parent of her intent to obtain an
abortion hinders the achievement of a proper balance between the op-
posing interests.
B. The Judicial Bypass Mechanism
While the judicial bypass may, in some instances, further the as-
serted state interest in protecting the welfare of pregnant minors with-
out unduly burdening the minor's fundamental right, courts are
selective in its application. The judicial bypass alternative allows only
mature and best-interest minors to circumvent the rigors of notifying
both parents. The mechanism provides no alternative to pregnant wo-
men deemed immature or to those minors whose best interests, accord-
ing to the juvenile court, would not be served without parental
notification. The limited application of the bypass, thus, forces the class
of immature and non best-interest minors either to adhere to the two-
parent notification requirement and its inherent burdens or to carry the
fetus to term.
The judicial bypass mechanism, however, is not flawed merely be-
cause it excludes some pregnant minors from an alternative to parental
notification. Rather, the procedure is warranted because the class of im-
mature and non best-interest minors that are denied circumvention of
the notice requirement arguably benefit from parental advice to a
greater extent than their mature and best-interest counterparts. The
real dilemma underlying the Hodgson holding concerns the ability to ap-
pend a judicial bypass option to salvage an otherwise unconstitutional
parental involvement requirement.
The judicial bypass option embodied in the Minnesota statute al-
lowed the core two-parent notification requirement to pass constitu-
tional muster. 14 7 Contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court, the
incorporation of a judicial bypass mechanism does not negate the many
burdens associated with the underlying two-parent notification require-
ment and thereby purge the statute of its unconstitutionality. 148 The
judicial proceeding exists not for the purpose of making an unconstitu-
tional notice provision constitutional, but because even a valid notice
requirement may be imposed only on minors who are immature or
whose best interests are not served by making the abortion decision
without parental involvement. 149 The bypass alternative is intended
only to address exceptions from a reasonable general rule and to
thereby preserve the constitutionality of the substantive requirement. 1
50
In contrast, statutes requiring single-parent involvement in the mi-
possible consequences, see ARLENE S. SKOLNICK, THE INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 63, 134-35, 210-31 (2d ed. 1978).
147. The Court reaffirmed the Bellotti II guidelines for regulating a minor's fundamen-
tal right to obtain an abortion through the incorporation of a valid judicial bypass alterna-
tive. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2970.
148. See Hodgson, 853 F.2d at 1468 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Hodgson, I10 S. Ct. at 2948 (Stevens, J. dissenting). See infra notes 165-67 and
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nor's abortion decision are reasonable general rules. Therefore, when
an immature or non best-interest minor is denied judicial approval, she
faces a single-parent involvement provision that balances the competing
interests without unduly burdening her fundamental right.
C. The Two-Parent Notification Requirement
The Supreme Court effectively ignored the district court's extensive
factual determinations that were based on the operation of the statute
during the four and one-half years before it was enjoined.15' The Court
relied instead upon the incorporation of a valid judicial bypass alterna-
tive 1 52 to uphold the most restrictive parental notification statute in the
Nation. 1
53
In addition to Minnesota, only five' 54 of the thirteen states 15 5 man-
dating parental notification before the minor may obtain an abortion im-
pose a two-parent requirement. In comparison, five' 5 6 of the twenty-
three states' 5 7 requiring parental consent impose a two-parent require-
ment. Each of the other five two-parent notification statutes-even
where the statute does not include a valid judicial bypass158 -provide
exceptions to notice in the case of divorced or noncustodial parents, or
where notice is otherwise impossible.' 59 In contrast, the Minnesota
statute provides no exception for notice to a divorced, noncustodial or
disinterested biological parent. Furthermore, the statute makes no ex-
ception to notice for a parent, custodial or not, whom the minor consid-
ers likely to react abusively to notification, unless the minor declares that
accompanying text for a discussion of the burdens associated with the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement.
151. See Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 759-70.
152. Bettotti 11, 443 U.S. at 622.
153. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-16-801 to 808 (Michie Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-
610(6) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-63 to 68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-4-202 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1990).
155. The seven parental notification statutes that impose one-parent requirements are
as follows: MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3
(1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-2-107 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.255 (Michie
1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-110 to -118 (Michie 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-347
(1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12 (Anderson 1987).
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.731 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to 57 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1983); N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 14-02.1-03.1 to 04 (1991).
157. The 18 other consent statutes are as follows: ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1991);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-1 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 (Michie 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (West 1988); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-2152 (West Supp. 1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (West Supp. 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3206 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1991); ALA. CODE §§ 26.21-1 to 5 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2.5 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.5 (Supp.
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 722.902 to .909 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-7 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-30 to 37 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1990); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-118 (Supp. 1991).
158. After Hodgson, statutes that require parental involvement without providing ajudi-
cial bypass option for mature and best-interest minors are presumptively unconstitutional.
159. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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she is a victim of physical or sexual abuse. 160
The infirmities of this statute become more evident when one con-
siders the characteristics of the modern-day family. National statistics
indicate that approximately one out of every two marriages ends in di-
vorce, and a study suggests that only fifty percent of the minors residing
in Minnesota live with both biological parents. 16 1 Yet the statute makes
no exception for minors residing in a single-parent home even where
the minor has voluntarily notified the custodial parent. As a result,
twenty to twenty-five percent of the minors who choose to initiate the
judicial bypass procedure are either accompanied by one parent or have
voluntarily consulted one parent, but are nonetheless required to en-
dure the burdens of the court proceeding.
16 2
The two-parent notification requirement also ignores the existence
of dysfunctional two-parent homes. A pregnant minor, residing in such
a home, may choose to consult with one parent, but not the other, out of
fear of psychological, physical or sexual abuse directed toward her or
the notified parent. Considering that domestic violence occurs in at
least two million families in the United States, 163 the trauma inflicted
upon a pregnant minor in such circumstances is exacerbated by the bur-
densome choice of facing either the two-parent notice requirement or a
judicial bypass proceeding.
Only Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, recognized
and addressed the significant distinction between a statute requiring the
involvement of both parents in the abortion decision and a statute re-
quiring the involvement of only one. 164 The Ashcroft Court, using an
ends-means analysis, upheld a statute requiring the pregnant minor to
either secure the consent of one parent or succeed in a judicial bypass
proceeding before she could obtain an abortion. 165 Justice Stevens
noted that a two-parent notification provision must also be tested by its
relationship to the legitimate state interests that it purportedly re-
flects.16 6 States have a "strong and legitimate interest in providing the
pregnant minor with the advice and support of a parent during the deci-
sional period."' 167 A single-parent provision, whether it requires con-
sent or notification, combined with a judicial bypass alternative, furthers
that legitimate interest without unduly burdening the minor's funda-
mental right. A provision, however, that requires a pregnant minor and
160. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343(4)(c) (West 1989). Minors who are victims of physi-
cal or sexual abuse are often reluctant to report such abuse in order to invoke the excep-
tion. Reporting often results in parental notice and lost confidentiality. See Hodgson, 110
S. Ct. at 2950 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 768. See Brief for American Psychological Association as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 12-13, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2629 (1990) (No. 88-1125)(by age 17, nearly 70% of white children, and 94% of black
children, will have lived in single-parent homes for some period of time).
162. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769.
163. Id. at 768.
164. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2948 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.




a consenting parent to petition a court to override required notice to the
second parent constitutes an "unjustified intrusion into the family's de-
cisional process."' 68 The "minor and her custodial parent, by virtue of
their major interest and superior position, should alone have the oppor-
tunity to decide to whom, if anyone, notice of the minor's abortion deci-
sion should be given."'
169
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hodgson further retreated from Roe by up-
holding unjustified regulation of a minor's right to choose abortion.
Although the conservative composition of the Court coupled with the
appropriate case may once again provide the states with limitless control
over a woman's freedom to choose abortion, 170 Hodgson seems limited
by allowing only for two-parent involvement in the minor's decision
where the statute includes a valid judicial bypass alternative. The rule
stands though Minnesota failed to establish that the two-parent notifica-
tion requirement was narrowly drawn to further, or actually served dur-
ing its operation,' 7 ' the asserted state interests in protecting the welfare
of pregnant minors, promoting intrafamily communication or improving
family integrity in any meaningful way.' 7 2 The statute actually served to
undermine those interests because minors who would ordinarily notify
one parent were often dissuaded from doing so when presented with the
opportunity to avoid notice through a judicial bypass alternative.
173
Furthermore, a minor does not make better informed decisions upon
counsel by a disinterested parent nor is family integrity fostered by forc-
ing the minor and her custodial parent to notify the noncustodial parent
of the minor's decision to obtain an abortion.
174
The Supreme Court has, by implication, elevated the interests of
noncustodial parents in the activities of their children to a level which
surpasses the combined interests of the custodial parent and pregnant
minor. After Hodgson, a pregnant minor who gains the consent of one
parent must either receive judicial approval of her decision or notify a
person who may have a propensity for abuse toward the minor or the
consenting parent.
The Court should have held the two-parent notification require-
ment, which provides no exception for divorce or desertion, unconstitu-
tional per se, and thus forced the Minnesota legislature to enact a statute
168. Id. at 2949.
169. Id.
170. President Bush appointed David H. Souter and Clarence Thomas to replace Jus-
tices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, respectively. Although Justices Souter
and Thomas have yet to articulate their views on a right to abortion, they will likely vote to
further restrict the minor's fundamental right.
171. For a discussion of facial and as-applied challenges, see Lisa K. Richmond, Note,
The Art of Constitutional Bootstrapping A Minor's Right to Abortion: Hodgson v. Minnesota, 34
S.D.L. REV. 158 (1989)(analysis of the Eighth Circuit's determination).
172. Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 769.
173. Id.
174. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2955 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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consistent with those of the other thirty-five states that require only one-
parent involvement in a minor's abortion decision. A single-parent noti-
fication requirement and an appended judicial bypass option better bal-
ance the legitimate interests of the state in protecting pregnant minors,
the parents' interests in the control and well-being of their child and the
minor's need for autonomy. Such balance is accomplished without forc-
ing compliance to any elusive ideal of "the family" or exacerbating an
otherwise traumatic experience.
The rights of children must develop into a concept widely accepted
as a primary social value that influences social policy and planning at
every level.17 5 Moreover, the acceptance of the child as a person with
rights independent from those of his or her parents admits fully to the
child's individual human and legal rights. 176 Children should be en-
couraged to consult their parents, however, when they are faced with
making decisions as fundamental to their future as the choice to obtain
an abortion.' 77 In this context, "[p]erhaps the term 'parental responsi-
bility' should be substituted for 'parental rights,' emphasizing the social
obligation and accountability rather than suggesting a kind of finality
that cannot rationally be granted."' 7 8 The important societal interests
in protecting the welfare of our minors and encouraging communication
between parent and child should only be reflected in abortion regulation
that balances the competing interests of the state, parents and minor by
providing a method, such as the judicial bypass alternative, to address
exceptions from a constitutionally valid general rule.
James Shortall
175. Albert E. Wilkerson, Children's Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT
CONCEPrS IN LAW AND SOCIETY 305 (Albert E. Wilkerson, ed., 1973).
176. Id.
177. Cf Richards, supra note 142, at 57.
[T]he willingness to allow people to experiment, make their own mistakes, and
learn from bearing the consequences is part of the education in self-awareness
that rights cultivate. We allow adolescents their rights to privacy because it ap-
pears, in the contexts of contraception and abortion, that we thus better respect
their potential for dignity. Any mistakes they make in exercising these rights not
only do not appear irreparable but also appear to be of the kind that will better
enable them to achieve a rational vision of their own good.
Id.
178. Wilkerson, supra note 175, at 305-06. See also Richards, supra note 142, at 57.
[A]dults have a special responsibility for affording the kind of education that will
enable children to exercise these rights wisely. It is cruel folly to extend the right
of privacy to children and not, concomitantly, to ensure the kind of sexual educa-
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7-304 (1990) Guardians
W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 Parent or Legal Yes* * 24 hours Actual
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Generally, parental consent and notice statutes apply to pregnant minors who are
under eighteen years of age, unmarried, and otherwise unemancipated. Statutes provid-
ing a judicial bypass option typically waive the parental involvement provision where the
minor establishes either that she is mature and capable of giving informed consent or that
the abortion is in her best interest without parental involvement.
* Idaho, Tennessee and Utah require a pregnant minor to notify her "parents" of her
intent to obtain an abortion, but do not specify whether "parents" refers to either of the
parents or both parents. Nor do these states specify whether notice to one parent would
constitute constructive notice to the other parent. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2931 n.5.
•* Maryland and West Virginia allow a physician to perform an abortion on a pregnant
minor, without parental notification, where the physician determines-in his or her profes-
sional judgment-that the minor is either mature and capable of giving informed consent
or where parental notification would not be in the minor's best interest. MD. HEALTH-
GENERAL CODE ANN. § 20-103(c)(i) (Supp. 1991)(physician may also perform the abortion,
without parental notice, where the physician determines that notice may lead to physical or
emotioinal abuse of the minor); W. VA. CODE § 16-2F-3(c) (1985)(the physician waiving
the notice requirement must not be associated professionally or financially with the physi-
cian who is to perform the abortion; physician's waiver is independent from the judicial
bypass alternative of § 16-2F-4).
•** Statute is currently enjoined from enforcement.
IN SEARCH OF MULTI-DIsCIPLINARY
ENLIGHTENMENT TO THE JUDICIAL STANDARD OF
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: THE ABA
RIPON CONFERENCE: FAMILY LAW AND
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
HONORABLE MARIANNE E. BECKER*
On April 11, 1991, a conference concerning children in the legal
system was convened in Wisconsin on the campus of Ripon College.
The conference, as a conference, was not a remarkable event. Ripon
College hosts many conferences. Lawyers and judges frequently meet
to discuss the adequacy of forum in addressing children's needs.' The
American Bar Association, Family Law Section, lists no less than eight
standing committees which continually review the law and social trends
relative to the affected needs of children in court.2 The respective state
bar associations multiply this reviewing process at least fifty-fold.
Mediators, social workers and other professionals who serve as adjuncts
in support of courts meet with similar frequency and like dedication in
an effort to ascertain and respond to specific needs of children in court.
Often, leaders and scholars of other disciplines are invited to address
gatherings and conferences of attorneys and judges on specific issues;
but generally, it can be said that lawyers, judges and other governmental
professionals most frequently talk to each other about the best interests
of children.
The idea for "another kind of conference" began in a 1988 meeting
discussion within the Alimony, Maintenance and Child Support Sub-
committee of the Family Law Section. 3 The lawyers and judges on that
subcommittee were then engaged in examining the link, if any, between
the increasing numbers of children living in poverty or below the pov-
erty line and the concept of no-fault divorce. 4 A seminal and controver-
* State of Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge, Waukesha County, 1985 to present.
Chair of the international multidisciplinary group "Toward 2020: Family Law and 'The
Best Interest of the Child'." B.A. 1963, Ripon College;J.D. 1966, Marquette University.
1. The American Bar Association/Family Law Section and the Johnson Foundation
co-sponsored an October, 1988 national conference at the Wingspread Conference
Center in Racine County, Wisconsin. The conference was entitled: The Law and Contested
Child Custody. Most of the conference transcript was published in August, 1989 under the
title: ABA SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES: SEARCHING FOR SOLOMON
(1989). The opinions expressed by the experts at Wingspread provided the impetus for
the ABA/Ripon inquiry.
2. The Family Law Section of the 1991-92 ABA Handbook lists thirty-eight addi-
tional standing committees, which can also be said to address the needs of children.
3. In 1988 the author was Chair of the Alimony, Maintenance and Child Support
Subcommittee.
4. Although no book has been published at this writing, the author believes the con-
cept will be included in a future ABA book entitled: TWENTY YEARS OF No-FAULT.
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sial concern was whether no-fault divorce was destructive to the best
interests of children born into an intact family unit. That discussion led
to further questions: Whether a troubled parental situation in an intact
family is less, more or as damaging to children, than a marital dissolu-
tion; whether family life is necessary to the development of the child; if
so, whether a child's needs supersede parental rights; and if so, to what
degree.
The committee observed that personal parental decisions often ap-
peared to be in derogation of the developmental best interests of the
children. Yet the law and lawyers are not particularly well educated in
understanding the developmental needs of children beyond food, shel-
ter and clothing. Before positing any more legislative solutions to child-
orientated issues in court, it was determined that the law and lawyers
and judges should be educated in the best interests of the children, by
those who understand all the developmental needs of children, as these needs are
ascertained by other professional disciplines.
The idea to more closely examine the situation of children of di-
vorced parents, and to do so as a multi-disciplinary exercise with refer-
ence to the children's best interest, was submitted to the Family Law
Section leadership who endorsed the formation of a de facto committee
to study the issue. This author was appointed Chair of the de facto com-
mittee in the summer of 1989, and, with the assistance of the other
members of the committee, 5 began a search for a co-sponsoring entity.
By autumn, Ripon College had accepted an invitation to co-sponsor the
inquiry, and Robert Hannaford, Ph.D. and Douglas Northrup, Ph.D of
the Ripon College faculty joined the committee.
The dedication of the de facto committee was unquestionable. Nu-
merous meetings began. Telephone meetings were attempted but lim-
ited in-depth discussion. Face-to-face meetings were necessary, and
they were held each month in Chicago or Milwaukee at substantial un-
reimbursed financial and scheduling costs to the scholars and the
attorneys.
The Ripon College committee members were not lawyers; rather,
they were scholars and academicians appointed to enrich the diversity of
overview and experience. Each group educated the other, preparatory
to examination of the judicial "best interests" standard. While the
scholars originally accepted the best interests standard as flexible and
straightforward, they were concerned to learn that the various states'
legislatures were free to require their judges to interpret the best inter-
ests standards in keeping with specific factors recognized in that state.
6
5. The author would like to express her gratitude for the work of attorney committee
members Thomas Bailey, Esq., Milwaukee, Wis.; John Becker, Esq., Brookfield, Wis.; Ira
Lurvey, Esq., Los Angeles, Cal.; Margaret McGovern, Esq., Chestnut Hill, Mass.; Thomas
Mulroy, Esq., Pittsburgh, Pa.; Richard Podell, Esq., Milwaukee, Wis.; and Daniel Schultz,
Esq., Wash., D.C., a Ripon college alumnus, who was most helpful in interesting the col-
lege in this project.
6. For example, in Wisconsin, legal custody and physical placement decisions are
mandated under Wis. STAT. § 767.24 (Supp. 1991) and appropriate case law. The legisla-
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Noting that the factors might be different among adjoining states of the
same region, they raised questions: Was the nature of children's needs
changed by passing from Wisconsin to Illinois? Are active parenting
skills significantly altered at a state line? Who determines the factors
and on what basis? Where was the statutory definition of the develop-
mental needs of the child including the child's moral developmental
needs? The lawyers, on their part, learned that existing legislative fac-
tors might not reflect the children's actual needs; that parental rights to
have and raise their natural children might conflict with the children's
developmental needs if judges interpreted those children's needs as
children's rights.
Even as the array of questions before it expanded, the committee's
commitment to build a bridge of understanding between the child and
his or her needs intensified. Within the committee, it became clear that
the law was, in fact, the best means by which to affect the best interests
of the child. However, lest the standard be relegated to a platitude, or
worse, to an institutionalized expression in justification of legal effi-
ciency at the expense of the child, the inquiry must extend beyond chil-
dren in divorce and identify, a priori, the needs of the child, that the law
should substantively and procedurally promote.
To many readers, this retreat to the basics may appear obvious, but
it was in fact, begrudgingly concluded. After many months, a mission
statement was carefully prepared and disseminated to delineate what
would become the conference charge. 7 In essence, it states:
ture has established eleven criterion which must be considered. Sub-section 5 of that stat-
ute provides:
Factors in custody and physical placement determinations. In determining legal custody
and periods of physical placement, the court shall consider all facts relevant to
the best interest of the child. The court may not prefer one potential custodian
over the other on the basis of the sex or race of the custodian. The court shall
consider reports of appropriate professionals if admitted into evidence when
legal custody or physical placement is contested. The court shall consider the
following factors in making its determination:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(b) The wishes of the child, which may be communicated by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem or other appropriate professional.
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent
or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child's best interest.
(d) The child's adjustment to the home, school, religion, and community.
(e) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and
other persons living in a proposed custodial household.
(f) The availability of public or private child care services.
(g) Whether one party is likely to unreasonably interfere with the child's
continuing relationship with the other party.
(h) Whether there is evidence that a party engaged in abuse of the child, as
defined in §§ 48.981(1)(a) and (b) or 8 13.122(l)(a).
(i) Whether there is evidence of interspousal battery as described under
§ 940.19 or domestic abuse as defined in § 8 13.12(l)(a).
(j) Whether either party has or had a significant problem with alcohol or
drug abuse.
(k) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to
be relevant.
7. The document was originally entitled TOWARD 2020: FAMILY LAW AND 'THE BEST
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Survivors of the past two decades in American society bear wit-
ness to a national crisis in the lives of American children.
Traditionally, we have held the ideal of the family as the
basic cell of society, centered around a marital union, the adult
partners charged with the mutual responsibility for the nur-
turance, education and security of the children.
Given the frequency of divorce, the number of children
born out of wedlock and the deprivation of a traditional cul-
tural consensus, increasingly society has turned to the legisla-
tures and courts of the many states which have reacted to
provide various solutions to child oriented issues.
The legal community in most jurisdictions currently relies
on the standard of "best interest of the child(ren)" to guide the
development of law in family/child issues. When a cultural
consensus of marriage-until-death prevailed, when divorce if
not rare, was uncommon, most child-centered issues were re-
solved in family rather than in court. Society had little need to
challenge, define or amplify the legal "best interest" standard.
Affected were the few, not the many.
Frequently, the legislative branch interprets and confines
"the best interest standard" to an economic context. Child
support percentage guidelines, inter-state collection mandates
and equitable property division statutes are examples of legisla-
tion directed to the correction of highly visible financial
problems relating to children. However, our legislatures, and
in turn, courts and lawyers, have given too little consideration
to the non-economic ethical components of the "best interest
of the child," the lack of which may profoundly impact on the
ability of a child to mature into a responsible adult.
But, legislators buffeted by special interests, family law
practitioners attempting to resolve the individualized problems
of their clients, judges responding to the demands of too
crowded calendars, seldom have the opportunity to examine
the theoretical-ethical underpinnings of the law which they
fashion, promote and enforce. When there is opportunity for
discourse, most often, it is among themselves.
Law is a means, not an end. Law provides structure, order
and sanctions to the substantive thought of other disciplines, in
the absence of which, law is inherently arbitrary.
The existence of the child crisis raises fundamental ques-
tions about the role of family and of Law in the attempt to pro-
mote and secure the best interests of the child and the best
interests of society, if these concepts are as they appear to be:
mutually dependent.
While the legal profession, alone, cannot solve societal
problems, the legal profession must be a part of the solution.
The legal profession, the academic disciplines, and others con-
cerned with serving the well-being of children must interact to
INTEREST OF THE CHILD.' Except for the specifics of the invitation to the conference, the
statement above is quoted as written.
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examine that which we think we have known, and determine
whether that wisdom shared can provide societal focus in the
21st Century.
For those reasons the American Bar Association, Family
Law Section and Ripon College will sponsor and facilitate an
interdisciplinary symposium entitled "Toward 2020: The Fam-
ily and the Best Interest of the Child." The symposium will
seek the substantive thought of the various disciplines. It will
ask: What elements of family life are necessary for a child to
acquire the attitudes and values by which to become a healthy
and responsible adult in society; and what impact should this
identification have on family law and social policy in the 21st
Century?
To that end we propose to gather a panel of legislators,
lawyers,judges, clergy, and representatives of the disciplines of
philosophy, anthropology, history, sociology, psychology and
psychotherapy on the campus of Ripon College from April 11
through April 14, 1991.
The discussion should be spirited, the exchange of views
insightful. We are looking for a new consensus and expression
of appropriate measures toward which to direct the best inter-
ests of children as they relate to family and society.
While the committee had succeeded in preparing a focused state-
ment of its inquiry, the scope of that inquiry had expanded exponen-
tially. Under this statement, the committee could be confronted with an
apparently endless inquiry in a controversial area that transcends many
disciplines, with token funds and limited time to accomplish the task.8
However, in the view of this author, this "labored conclusion in commit-
tee" may be one of the most significant determinations of the committee
and of the conference that followed. The statement represents our re-
luctant realization that there is no easy way and no quick fix; that limit-
ing an inquiry to a part of the problem produces limited if not skewed
results; that the needs of the child are multiple; and that the best inter-
ests of the child are as dynamic as the society in which she or he lives.
The committee agreed that the ABA/Ripon conference would con-
sist of scholars of the several disciplines who would begin at the begin-
ning, identify the basics and hopefully establish a continuing forum
through which the various disciplines can collaborate in the definition
and refinement of the judicial standard of best interests of the child.
The committee proceeded to locate and invite individuals who had ac-
quired experience and professional distinction as academicians in phi-
losophy, psychology, history, anthropology; and as practicing
psychologists, social workers, educators, psychiatric counsellors, legisla-
tors, lawyers and doctors. The dedication of those who accepted was
manifest by the lack of honoraria, special recognition of individual
achievement or lavish surroundings. Additionally, the conferees agreed
8. The conference had many "ifs," funding chief among them. The conference dates
and location, however, were never in doubt after January, 1990.
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to read hundreds of pages of pre-conference materials submitted to
them and to seriously consider working for the best interest of the chil-
dren after the conference concluded. These limitations, imposed by the
mutual tenets of cognitive direction and limited funding, were the mak-
ing of the conference. Conferees came to examine what they thought
they knew and to confront myths and their own personal bias(es). Each
committed to think more than to act, a concept difficult for many profes-
sionals often motivated by expectation to produce visible and immediate
solutions, the bottom line of the "fix-it yesterday" era in which we live.
From Thursday, April 11, through Sunday, April 14, 1991, the con-
ferees met, endured the changing Wisconsin weather, rejoiced in the
gracious hospitality of Ripon College and formally listened, conferred
and debated with each other until as late as 11:00 p.m. Historians and
child development specialists put their particular issues into perspective.
Educators and anthropologists discussed the issue of the nuclear Ameri-
can family as myth, image and/or expectation vis-a-vis our actual his-
tory. Physicians, child psychologists and behaviorists explained child
development from pre-birth through adolescence. They concentrated
their explanation on birth through age three, the period of time during
which the child learns the quickest and his or her moral, intellectual and
emotional development are most influenced. It is also the period during
which the child experiences the greatest amount of parental or child
care-giver modeling.
The conferees met as a large group, then were split into smaller
groups as diverse in education and academic background as possible.
With the help of word processing equipment and Ripon College stu-
dents, the points of consensus of the various groups were submitted in
writing to the larger group for discussion and further critical
examination.
The exchange of views among the conferees proved to be a valuable
learning experience in itself. For instance, that which might have
seemed self-evident to the attorney or psychologist was questioned by
the analysis of the historian. That which appeared to be an obvious so-
lution to child development specialists was frequently challenged by law-
yers, ever-mindful of constitutional rights of the natural parents in the
care, custody and control of their children. This mutual introduction
was beneficial, but time consuming and limited the symposium's ability
to more closely refine the following points of consensus and/or to or-
ganize any scheme of implementation. 9
In summary, the conclusions receiving the greatest consensus
among conferees are as follows:' 0
9. Refinement and implementation will hopefully be the charge to later conferees.
10. The author compiled this list from small group consensus sheets and her personal
notes. She took license, for the purpose of this article, to list only those points that met
with significant approval and/or were within the meeting mission. For example, small
groups listed "guaranteed parental leave for a minimum of four months in aspects of the
labor force" and noted "we are in a hell of a mess," but such observations were omitted.
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1. A child develops quickly and after birth through the first three
years of life, learns chiefly by the example of his or her early caregivers,
usually his or her natural parents.
2. Every child requires a secure, consistent, supportive, nurturing
and loving environment provided by caring adults throughout its
development.
3. These needs of the child must be more carefully defined and
expressed in terms of psychological, moral and educational
development.
4. A child's first experience of community is in its family. The
raising of children within a natural family is expressly endorsed and
promoted.
5. Children are the building blocks of our society; each must enjoy
the respect of the other and understand his or her role in
interdependency.
6. Parenting or child rearing must be elevated to national promi-
nence; every member of society should bear a moral responsibility for
the proper care of all the children of the community.
7. While all families require the support of the community, some
families require more intensive support. Where the methods of raising a
child in a family are inconsistent with the child's developmental needs, it
is appropriate that society intervene to safeguard the child through the
informed efforts of the extended family, close community associations
and/or welfare agencies respectively.
8. The physical, moral, intellectual and emotional-developmental
stages of a child should be widely disseminated, formally taught in
schools and considered by all whose conduct affects the life of the child
in order to avoid predictable developmental, intellectual, emotional,
and moral damage.
9. There are predictable developmental crises in a child's life and
appropriate times, many also predictable, to intervene on behalf of a
child.
10. Mindful that there are different methods to encourage the
moral intellectual and emotional development of the child, society must
strictly avoid cultural, ethnic, gender or socio-economic stereotyping of
children.
11. When a child-centered issue, especially that of child custody, is
before the court, the standard of best interests of the child must con-
sider that:
A. Individual moral responsibility is as necessary to societal con-
tinuation as it is to the physical development of each individual in soci-
ety. The individual moral development of the child is of equal
importance with that of its physical well-being.
B. Children learn moral responsibility primarily from the example
of their parents or caregivers. Education as to moral responsibility is
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reinforced by repetition, verbal declaration and ongoing discipline ap-
propriate to the child's developmental capacity.
C. Moral behavior is culturally dependent; parental lifestyle will
influence the moral development of the child. The child's moral needs
are its right, equal or superior to the rights of the parent.
D. The best interests of the child must be supported and enforced
by the work of other disciplines and cannot be determined by the legal
processes alone.
E. The litigants to a disputed custody proceeding should be edu-
cated as to the child's needs in an effort to mediate a determination sep-
arately from the other issues confronting the parties.
F. Judges, lawyers and other helping professions should be edu-
cated in child development and family dynamics as part of law school
curriculum or continuing education.
Many conferees were surprised at their findings. Those non-legal/
non-judicial delegates were clearly concerned that the best interests
standard was often over-shadowed by a struggle with legally asserted
parental rights. Legal/judicial conferees were likewise somewhat taken
aback that current legislatively endorsed factors, which often disallow
parental lifestyle issues from consideration in child placement matters,
might be in opposition to the actual developmental best interest of the
child. " I
All parties concluded that the moral development of all children
was necessary to the healthy maintenance and continuance of society
and the advancement of appropriate social goals. The statement was
inherent that moral development must be promoted, particularly in a
non-religious state where parents or child rearers, rather than the
church, are expected to exemplify and convey to children moral princi-
ples of honesty, trust, loyalty and respect for human life, property and
culture.
As the conferees concluded their deliberations, many resolved to
continue multi-disciplinary efforts and their own personal efforts to pro-
mote public policy and to provide protection of all the needs of children,
not only their financial needs.12 The participants felt the weight of their
four days deliberations; yet, they were refreshed and encouraged by
their fellow conferees, three-quarters of whom opted to accept the chal-
lenge to continue to work together to promote a multi-disciplinary effort
for children both in and out of court.
As Dean Northrop closed the conference, he reminded the group
that "137 years ago, about fifty people gathered in Ripon to confront an
11. Attorneys expressed more distress than non-legal conferees. For example, legal
conferees took note of the attachment theory argument vis-a-vis the right of the mother to
work outside the home and away from the infant. A second example, early intervention to
prevent child abuse/neglect or infant failure to thrive, flies in the face of parental notifica-
tion and the opportunity to correct conditions authorized by various jurisdictional
statutes.
12. See mission statement, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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issue of concern, and their efforts contributed to the founding of a new
political party dedicated to the abolition of slavery. 13 A few people
deeply committed can make a difference if we care enough, work enough
and draw on our resources and those of others."'
4
From those moving words, action must follow.
Children have necessary developmental needs which are known and
predictable. While theories to meet these needs may be in or out of
vogue or favor, the child's needs do not fluctuate. When a court inter-
venes in a particular matter, it must employ the best interests standard
flexibly and effectively for that particular child, in keeping with what we
know about the developmental needs of all children. Judicial platitudes,
legal presumptions and currently fashionable legislatively mandated fac-
tors must not be the fulcrum of the best interests balancing decision;
rather, the needs of the child must be the cornerstone of child-centered
decisions.
The basic cell of tomorrow's society is today's developing child.
The developmentally healthy child is likely to grow to be a fulfilled, ma-
ture adult. If a child's nurturance needs have been met, that individual
will be willing and likely to assume adult responsibilities of citizenship.
If a child's developmental needs have not been met, he or she is more
likely to grow into an immature individual, unable to positively respond
to societal demands.
To defend the smallest, least politically powerful members of soci-
ety has long been the challenge to the legal profession, to lawyer and
judge alike. It is appropriate that the considerable influence of the legal
community should be joined with the efforts of other professionals and
scholars interested in and knowledgeable about a child's total develop-
mental needs. To elevate the child's total developmental needs to the
standard of legal rights is to promote the total health of society.
13. The Republican Party was founded in Ripon, Wisconsin in 1854.
14. Douglas Northrup, Ph.D., is Academic Dean of Ripon College. His statement was
quoted in the Ripon College press release issued at the conclusion of the conference.
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Our laws regarding children and youth generally mirror the prevail-
ing societal perceptions of these age groups. As societal perceptions
change, so do the laws regarding children and youth. Since the 1960s,
our perceptions of children and youth have been more reflective of the
needs and priorities of adults then they have been of what is in the best
interests of the young. To the extent that the law reflects these dysfunc-
tional perceptions, it contributes to hardships experienced by children
and youth.
Without fully realizing it, perhaps, we have experienced a momen-
tous, tectonic shift in our society that has affected all aspects of our
existence and challenged the basic premises of our established world
view. This transformation has perhaps been best described as a change
from modern to postmodern ways of thinking, understanding and per-
ceiving.' This change has been occasioned by a movement away from
the assumption of rationality on which modern western thought was
founded, namely, Descartes' assertion that "I think, therefore I am." In
contrast, postmodern thinkers argue that language, not thought, has to
be the starting point for our philosophical, scientific, literary, political
and economic understanding of the world.
2
This tectonic shift from modernism to postmodernism has necessar-
ily affected our family life, our perceptions of children and youth and the
laws that pertain to them. Accordingly, this Article will attempt to show
how family perceptions of children and youth have changed from the
modern to the postmodern era and the ways in which the modern and
postmodern laws reflect these changed perceptions. This Article will
also attempt to demonstrate how contemporary laws that mirror the pre-
vailing perceptions of children and youth are dysfunctional for them. A
final section will suggest ways to make our laws less debilitating to chil-
dren and adolescents.
This is not the place to discuss postmodernism at length, but is pos-
sible to suggest some of the major shifts that make it different from
modernism.
* David Elkind, Ph.D., is currently Professor of Child Study at Tufts University in
Medford, Massachusetts. He is author of THE HURRIED CHILD among other books and is a
contributing editor to Parents Magazine.
I. STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE (1989); DAVID HARVEY, THE ORIGIN OF
POSTMODERNITY (1989).
2. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERME-
NEUTICS, AND PAXIS (1983).
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From Universals to Particulars
In philosophy, literature and the arts there has been a movement
away from the belief in universals that was implicit in the Descartian as-
sumption of a rational universe. Freud, for example, writing within a
modern perspective, assumed that the "Oedipus Complex" was a uni-
versal phenomena and even argued that monotheism was one of its
products.3 However, today we recognize that Freud was writing within
the context of a middle-class, victorian, Viennese family. Outside this
context, the Oedipus Complex may never be experienced by children
growing up within single parent families or in communal settings. Mod-
em writers assumed they could transcend time and space and speak for
all humankind. Postmodern writers accept the fact that they are always
working within a social historical context and cannot get outside of it.
From Harmony to Pastiche
Modernism was also characterized by the belief in harmony. This
was expressed in the arts and architecture as well as in literature. Mod-
ernist architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, designed not only the
building, but the building's furnishings; including the drapes and lamps
as well. All elements of a building had to combine to form a harmonious
whole. Postmodern architecture-like postmodern art and literature-is
characterized by pastiche; a heterogeneous mixture of styles and ele-
ments. Modern buildings tend to be stark glass and steel. Postmodern
buildings combine Greek columns, with atrium and copper domes.
Postmodern art, like the portraits of Picasso, reflect this "pastiche"
agenda and clash with the harmonious and perspective oriented paint-
ings of the impressionists.
II. FROM THE MODERN TO THE POSTMODERN WORLD
Not surprisingly, the changes in the ways we view the world, along
with the actual societal changes that came about as a result of the revolu-
tions of the 1960s, have transformed the character of American family
life. These changes have also transformed our perceptions of children
and youth. In turn, the law has progressively sought to reflect and rein-
force these new social perceptions.
The modern era perceptions of children and youth, as well as the
laws growing out of these perceptions, were generally beneficial to those
they affected. An example is the child labor laws. Postmodern percep-
tions of children and youth, and the laws that mirror them, on the other
hand, are often more stressful than beneficial. Indeed these laws add to
the many other inappropriate demands being made upon contemporary
children and youth.
3. SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (W.J.H.
Sprott trans., 1933).
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III. FROM MODERN To POSTMODERN FAMILY TIES
The modern family ties that once nourished, supported and pro-
tected us have now been replaced by postmodern family ties that often
put us under stress. Family ties include not only our basic kinship ties
but also our feeling ties; the sentiments, values and perceptions that
unite us, as family members, one with the other. The family ties of the
modern era were centripetal in the sense that they tended to draw us
together. In contrast, the family ties of the postmodern family are
centrifugal in that they tend to pull us apart. It is this centrifugal ten-
dency of postmodern family ties that makes them so stressful, particu-
larly to children and youth.
Kinship Ties
The transformation from centripetal to centrifugal family ties has
taken place over the last half century. The kinship structure of the mod-
ern nuclear family was an ideal: two parents living together in harmony
for their entire lives; two or three children doing well in school, getting
into the right colleges and eventually marrying and providing grandchil-
dren for the doting grandparents. This kinship structure emphasized
the importance of mutual dependence, caring and subordination of
one's self to the family.
In the postmodern world, there is not one, but several, acceptable
family kinship structures. The postmodern family is a pastiche of differ-
ent kinship structures. Two-parent working families, single parent fami-
lies, blended families, adoptive families, like-sex parent families, test-
tube-babies and surrogate-mothers are all acknowledged, if not ac-
cepted, kinship structures. What characterizes these kinship structures
is that they often necessitate mutual independence and autonomy. In
the postmodern kinship structure, each family member is constrained, in
whole or part, to subordinate family to self.
Feeling Ties
In addition to these postmodern changes in family kinship struc-
ture, there has also been a change in the structure of family feeling ties.
The modern family feeling ties, its sentiments, values and perceptions,
were such as to provide a palisade that protected family members from
the dangers and the temptations of the outside world. In the
postmodern world, however, these feeling ties reflect the permeability
of the postmodern family. These new sentiments serve not as a wall
against, but rather as a pathway to, the larger society.
The sentiments of the modern nuclear family: romantic love, ma-
ternal love, domesticity4 and the value of togetherness, formed a tight
nucleus that protected family members from the harsh, cruel outside
world. In this nuclear family, children were perceived as innocent and in
4. EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1977).
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need of the care and protection of a mother guided by her instinct of
maternal love. Adolescents were seen as immature and as going
through necessary periods of storm and stress. 5
In contrast, the sentiments of the postmodern, permeable family:
consensual love, shared parenting and urbanity,6 reflect the new open-
ness of the family to societal influences. As marriages become less per-
manent, as non-parental caregivers share childrearing and as images of
violence, depravity and disease invade our homes, our perceptions of
children and youth have changed. Within the context of postmodern
realities, children are perceived of as being competent to deal with any
and all of life's vicissitudes, and teenagers are seen as sophisticated
users of the media, technology and commodities.
It is important to emphasize that these postmodern perceptions of
childhood competence and of adolescent sophistication did not origi-
nate in the media. Nor were these perceptions introduced to correct the
wrongs or injustices that the modern conceptions of childhood inno-
cence and of adolescent immaturity had brought down upon young peo-
ple. On the contrary, the perception of childhood innocence and
adolescent immaturity were, for the most part, beneficent. They gener-
ated what has come to be seen as a "golden age" of childhood and youth
that lasted from the end of the last century to the middle of this one.
The postmodern perceptions of children and youth are essentially ac-
comodations to the demands upon and limited time available to parents.
IV. LAWS AND THE SOCIETAL PERCEPTIONS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH
The Modern Era
In the modern era, the perceptions of children as innocent and
teenagers as immature gradually led to the enactment of laws that mir-
rored these perceptions. In the early nineteenth century, the obligation
of parents to nourish, protect and educate young people was so well
accepted it was seldom thought to require enforcement by "Human
Laws." In the same way, "'the promptings of parental affection and
wholesome public opinion' were assumed to be enough to prevent the
abuse of parental authority .... -7
The abuses of child labor in the latter part of the nineteenth century
increasingly pressured the state to pass and enforce "Human Laws" to
ensure that parents did indeed, protect, nurture and educate their chil-
dren. Parents who neglected their responsibilities were very much on
the minds of "[A]merican reformers who advocated strenuous exercise
of parens patriae (the duty of the state to protect children from all who
5. See generally ERIE H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOcIETY (2d ed. 1963)(Erikson
termed these periods of storm and stress as an "identity crisis;" the proving ground of
separation from the family to an independent adult life).
6. DAVID ELKIND, TIES THAT STRESS: MALADIES OF THE POSTMODERN FAMILY AND
SELF (1992)(manuscript on file with the author).
7. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., YOUTH TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 30 (1974)(citation
omitted).
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would harm them) to supplant the authority of parents who neglected
their obligations to offspring." 8
In the latter part of the nineteenth, and the first half of the present
century, the State acted to ensure that children's health, education and
welfare was looked after:
Using the data of medicine, physiology, psychology and
pedagogy, progressive reformers viewed childhood as a criti-
cally important period of life, during which the child required
protection, care, and special treatment, not just in the interests
of future citizenship, but in order to develop and realize his
potential as a human being. More effective regulation of child
labor by the states, creation ofjuvenile courts, establishment of
the federal Children's Bureau, the manifold activities of that
bureau, and improvements in the administration of public child
welfare services at all levels of government represent the
achievements of the "rights of childhood" movement. 9
The overall thrust, then, of the laws for children and youth during
the modern era was to protect them from themselves as well as from
others. In this way, the laws recognized the developmental differences
between children and adolescents on the one hand and adults on the
other. In many ways, childhood, and to a lesser extent adolescence,
were regarded as special periods of life that were unique and valuable.
Many portrayals of fictional characters such as "Peter Pan," "Huckle-
berry Finn" and "Penn Schofield" reflected this idealized image of
childhood that the laws sought to preserve and protect.
The Postmodern Era
With the movement into the postmodern era and the emergence of
the sentiments and perceptions of the permeable family, the temper of
the laws regarding children and youth have changed. The change in the
laws is very much in keeping with the new perceptions of children as
competent and teenagers as sophisticated. In addition, these changes
also mirror the new egalitarianism engendered by the Civil Rights and
the Women's Movements. The emphasis is no longer upon protecting
children but rather upon protecting children's rights.
Not surprisingly, however, there are still many carryovers from the
modern era. As a consequence, there is a great deal of contradiction in
the contemporary laws regarding children and youth. Some
postmodern laws are founded upon the modern perception of children
as innocent and teenagers as immature, while others are based on the
perception of children as competent and teenagers as sophisticated.
Although the Supreme Court has said that children are possessed of
fundamental rights that the state must respect, it is not clear what rights
these are and whether, and in what situations, these rights preempt pa-
rental rights.
8. Id. at 31 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
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Americans have not made up their minds on the matter of
children's rights. In 1967, for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court (In re Gault) ruled that juveniles charged with delin-
quency were entitled to adult rights of due process-right to
counsel, right to appeal, and so on. Yet juvenile offenders are
still considered special. Thus, in Arizona, upon reaching 18 a
person may have his juvenile court and police records de-
stroyed (even if the crime involved was murder). Other states
also have such "wipe the slate clean" provisions.' 0
Likewise, children and youth are still not regarded as fully entitled
to the right to protection from cruel and inhuman punishment. For ex-
ample, an act amounting to assault and battery is not punishable if done
by a teacher while exercising his disciplinary authority over a pupil,
where the punishment inflicted by the teacher consists only of a whip-
ping with a switch, a ruler or something in the nature of a stick.' l
In other cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that children have the
same rights as do adults. In Belloti v. Baird,12 a state law requiring paren-
tal consent for a minor's abortions was successfully challenged. In Goss
v. Lopez,' 3 the Court ruled that schools were required to provide stu-
dents with due process before subjecting them to short term suspen-
sions. Likewise, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 14 the Court ruled that New York City authorities were required
to hold a hearing before a child could be transferred from one foster
home to another.
In The Best Interests of Children and Youth
It is certainly true, of course, that in many of these cases the chil-
dren have benefited from adults defending their constitutional rights.
But many postmodern adults argue on the children's behalf because
they have accepted the postmodern perceptions of childhood compe-
tence and teenage sophistication, not because of their abiding commit-
ments to the health and welfare of children. Lawyers themselves are
beginning to question this overemphasis upon children's rights. For ex-
ample, Bruce C. Hafen wrote:
With our loss of confidence in paternalism, however, a sub-
tle but important shift has occurred in the public mind away
from a commitment to the right of children to belong and to be
nurtured....
Similarly, some commentators have argued that children
must be "liberated" from minority status or from other age-
related legal limitation, sometimes drawing parallels between
the inferior statuses of slaves, women, and children. The re-
form movement for children's rights, especially in its approach
10. Philippe Aries, The Sentimental Revolution, WILSON Q, Autumn 1982, at 51.
11. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Battery § 46 (1963).
12. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
13. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
14. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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to group litigation and its reliance on constitutional theories,
has borrowed extensively from the legal experience of the civil
rights movement, risking some uncritical transfers of egalita-
rian concepts that ignore children's lack of capacity and their
need to be protected from their own immaturity. 15
Another legal commentator, Philippe Aires, concludes that "[[or
better or worse, American children enjoy more "adult rights" today
than they did 20 years ago-and often more adult responsibilities as
Well." 16
V. LAW AND THE NEW (POSTMODERN) MORBIDITY
The postmodern perceptions of children as competent and teenag-
ers as sophisticated appear to have had mostly detrimental effects.
Although correlation is certainly not the same as causation, the increase
of stress-related indices among children in step with the progressively
more accepted postmodern perceptions of children and youth is
strongly suggestive. To the extent that our laws mirror and reflect these
perceptions, they contribute to the dysfunction of contemporary youth.
The data on the increase of stress-related dysfunction in children
and youth has come to be called the "new morbidity."' 17 That is to say,
some fifty years ago the leading cause of death among children and
youth was disease.' 8 Fortunately, many of the diseases that once ac-
counted for the majority of deaths among young people, such as tuber-
culosis and polio, have now been conquered by medical science. Today,
psychological and social pressures, not physical disease, account for
most of the deaths among young people. 19 Stress-related deaths among
youth thus constitute the new, postmodern morbidity.
The facts regarding the new morbidity are all too easy to document.
On every measure that we have, children and youth today are doing less
well than they did hardly a quarter century ago. On tests of strength,
endurance and general muscle tone, young people today perform less
well than young people of comparable age even ten years ago.20 Verbal
Scholastic Aptitude scores have fallen almost fifty points from the late
fifties and early sixties. 2 1 Alcohol related accidents are the leading cause
of death for fifteen to twenty-four year old Americans, either as passen-
gers or drivers.
2 2
15. Bruce C. Hafen, Exploring Test Cases in Child Advocacy, 100 HARV. L. REV. 435, 447
(1986)(footnotes omitted)(reviewing ROBERT H. MOONKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN:
ADVOCACY, LAw REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985)).
16. Aries, supra note 10, at 51.
17. ROBERTJ. HAGGERTY ET AL., CHILD HEALTH AND THE COMMUNrrY (1975).
18. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
AND IMPROVEMENT, YOUTH INDICATORS 95 (1988) [hereinafter YOUTH INDICATORS].
19. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY IN
IMPROVING ADOLESCENT HEALTH, CODE BLUE: UNITING FOR A HEALTHIER YOUTH 3-4
(1989) [hereinafter CODE BLUE].
20. YOUTH INDICATORS, supra note 18, at 92.
21. Id. at 68.
22. Id. at 102.
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Other statistics add to this picture. Suicide rates for teenagers have
more than doubled since 1965.23 Overall, ten percent of adolescent
boys and eighteen percent of adolescent girls have attempted suicide.
24
The United States also has the highest teenage pregnancy rates of any
Western country, twice that of any other industrialized country.25 The
incidence of sexually transmitted diseases among young people have
reached epidemic proportions. The number of young people diagnosed
with gonorrhea and syphilis has increased a thousandfold since 1965.26
The number of teenagers between the ages of fourteen and seventeen
arrested per year has increased nearly thirtyfold since 1950.27 Every day
135,000 American students bring guns to school.
28
VI. TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE LAWS FOR CHILDREN
AND YOUTH
The contradictory messages being given to young people by society
in general, and the legal system in particular, contributes to the stresses
young people experience, and thus to the "new morbidity." In many
cases the contradictions in the laws regarding the children and youth
derive from the fact that in some cases the law takes account of human
development, whereas in others it does not. However, human develop-
ment must always be taken into account when dealing with the young.
This is particularly true today because we now have more than a century
of research on all facets of child growth and development.
Lawmakers must come to appreciate that recognizing the limits im-
posed by children's developmental level is in no way limiting their
rights. In fact, just the opposite is true. Only when we recognize the
limits as well as the capacities of children and youth do we really accord
them their full rights under the law.
This need (of children for parental love, affection, disci-
pline and guidance) suggests a general right of children to be
protected from their own immaturity. Of course each child re-
quires gradually increasing freedom to make important
choices, even at the risk of harming himself through bad judg-
ments. The capacity to weigh risks in making personal choices
is only developed as children live with, and learn from, the un-
pleasant consequences of their decisions. For this reason, ado-
lescence should be seen as a time in which children are given
low-risk levels of autonomy as a way of learning how to assume
greater responsibility. Still, in a paradoxical but important




24. CODE BLUE, supra note 19, at 2.
25. See id. at 3.
26. YOUTH INDICATORS, supra note 18, at 95.
27. Id. at 115.
28. CODE BLUE, supra note 19, at.4.
29. Hafen, supra note 15, at 446.
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Within the postmodern perspective, the law, like every other human
invention, is necessarily couched in the perceptions and discourse of its
social and historical context. A major tenet of postmodernism is the
importance of the particular and the doubtfulness of universals. In
many ways, the insistence on children's rights as on a par with adult
rights is an appeal to universals that is a throw-back to modernism. Par-
adoxically, therefore, many of the older laws, geared to protecting chil-
dren, were more postmodern than many of the newer laws seeking to
protect children's rights.

1992: A YEAR TO REDISCOVER THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
HONORABLE HUGH S. GLICKSTEIN*
InJackson v. State,1 I made the following suggestion:
I suggest that we are a society pervaded with not just the visible
dysfunctional family, but also invisible non-harmonious fami-
lies which do not produce the tragedy of suicide, but do pro-
duce tragedies of emotionally unhealthy children who pass
along their toxic shame to their own children.
One psychologist has recently observed that our challenge is to change a
society of human doers to human beings. We start with ourselves. Ac-
cordingly, to the bumper sticker question "Have you hugged your child
today?" we now answer "Yes, my inner child." We judges, I suggest,
could set an example by learning to understand ourselves. Arthur
Schopenhauer put such individual challenge best "All truth passes
through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently op-
posed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."
'2
My personal core belief was expressed in Costa v. Costa:3
It would be society's greatest reward-tangibly and other-
wise-were the future adult inhabitants of this state able to look
back to the 1980's and reflect how their predecessors finally
came to recognize the priority to be given the well-being of
children. Such future citizens would undoubtedly be the bene-
ficiaries from (1) our present awareness that children are our
most precious gift and entitled to enjoy the happiness which
those adults responsible for them can provide; and that they
are our only priceless commodity-the key to the well-being of
society; and (2) our recognition that without prioritizing the
physical, emotional and educational needs of children, all the
efforts to eliminate crime, poverty and ignorance are only
kneejerk, bandaid solutions which cure none of society's basic
* ChiefJudge Hugh S. Glickstein of the Fourth District Court of Appeal was elected
by his colleagues as ChiefJudge in April, 1991. He was the first chairman of The Florida
Bar Legal Needs of Children Committee and the first chairman of the ABA Family Law
Section Task Force for Children. This article originally appeared in FLA. B.J., Feb. 1992,
at 67.
1. 553 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
2. Id. at 727 (emphasis in original). When this opinion was written, I pointed out
that a book by Dr. Scott Peck had been on The New York Times' paperback best seller list for
over 300 weeks and suggested that it "will continue to be read because of our growing
appreciation of the indispensable need to understand ourselves." It has remained on that
list two years later and, I hope, will continue to appear there each week as a sign of our
perceived need to understand and feel better about ourselves. See Scorr PECK, THE ROAD
LESS TRAVELED: A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE, TRADITIONAL VALUES, AND SPRITUAL
GROWTH (1985).
3. 429 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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ills. 4
The foregoing still rings true nine years after becoming the initial state-
ment of purpose for The Florida Bar's Special Committee for the Needs
of Children, an interdisciplinary committee.
Our involvement in the best interests of the child requires, in my
view, unlocking a series of doors, the first of which is getting in touch
with our own feelings as adults to validate our inner child's feelings from
birth, respect our inner child's uniqueness and allow our inner child's
self-esteem to grow and flower.
5
Opening the next door means that we need to understand that our
parenting has multi-generational effects-both positive and negative.
Since hearing Reverend Glen Rediehs speak on parenting in 1984, I
have often said that in child advocacy, parenting is the dog and every-
thing else is the tail. This translates into educating our young people
about parenting skills and alerting our new mothers and fathers about
realistic expectations of their children's behavior to prevent and diffuse
possible child abuse. 6 It means educating the community to understand
that an infant without bonding can wind up a psychopathic killer;7 that a
small child without nurturing will be a dysfunctional adult;8 and that by
the time a child is as young as three, he or she becomes "shame based"
because of dysfunctional parents.9
In his most recent best seller, John Bradshaw says this:
PARENTING-THE HARDEST JOB OF ALL
Being a good parent is a tough job. I believe it is the hardest job
any of us will ever do. To be a good parent, you must be mentally
healthy. You need to be getting your own needs met through
your own resources, and you need a spouse or significant other
to support you in the process. Above all, you must have healed
your own wounded inner child. If your inner child is still wounded,
you will parent your child with this frightened, wounded, and
selfish inner child. You will either do a lot of what your parents
did to you or you will do just the opposite. Either way, you will
be trying to be the perfect parent your wounded inner child
dreamed of. However, being just the opposite is equally dam-
aging to your children. Someone once said, "One hundred and
eighty degrees from sick is still sick."' 1
4. Id. at 1252.
5. See SUSAN FORMAN, Toxic PARENTS (1989).
6. Having heard Reverend Rediehs discuss the parenting programs he had instituted
at Valencia Community College, I called the President of Broward County Community
College and the Chairman of its Board of Trustees and asked them to join me for break-
fast. When we finished our breakfast, the two of them had conceived a Parenting Resource
Center for their college.
7. See KEN MAGID & CAROLE A. MCKELVEY, HIGH RISK: CHILDREN WITHOUT A CON-
SCIENCE (1987).
8. See E. KENT HAYES, WHY GOOD PARENTS HAVE BAD KIDS (1989).
9. See JOHN BRADSHAW, BRADSHAW ON: THE FAMILY (1988). Bradshaw says: "[g]uilt
says I have made a mistake; shame says I am a mistake." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
10. JOHN BRADSHAW, HOMECOMING: RECLAIMING AND CHAMPIONING YOUR INNER
CHILD 87 (1990) (emphasis in original).
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Florida statutes establish, as the public policy of that state, that
shared parental responsibility shall be ordered unless it would be detri-
mental to the child.' I Professor Hyde suggests shared parenting is a
message to the child that says your mother and father love you very
much and are both going to care for you. 12 If the child is to understand
it whenever possible and if the parents are to give the message to the
child whenever possible, then lawyers and judges should view them-
selves as Western Union-making sure the message is delivered and un-
derstood. The Florida statutes provide the blanks that must be filled
with solid, accurate information so that the trial court's decision upon
the best interests of the child rests on a sure, factual footing. This
brings the dissolution contest quickly to an end with an enlightened plan
for the child's future.
13
Shared parental responsibility was a visionary act by the Florida leg-
islature. Trial judges and lawyers, however, must still deal with emo-
tionally dysfunctional parents who blame each other instead of learning
to understand themselves through available therapy. What went awry
was the legislature's fiddling with the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
criteria, leaving out one critical criterion and chopping up another.
I never focused on the omission until the Florida Supreme Court's
recent decision in Schutz v. Schutz, 14 involving a mother's ongoing post-
dissolution invalidation of the father in the children's eyes and ears.
Neither the trial court nor the supreme court had the benefit of the
omitted criterion protecting the children: "The willingness and ability
of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing
parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent." 15 All
that either court had was the Florida criteria for establishing the best
interests of the child based on which parent was more likely to allow
contact with the nonresident parent. 16 Obviously, this section is simply
is not enough.
In my concurring opinion in Frisard v. Frisard,17 I compared the
Florida and Michigan versions of the act. 18 The opinion shows that
Michigan requires inquiry as to: "the capacity and disposition of the
parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and con-
tinuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion or
11. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b)2 (1991).
12. Laurance M. Hyde. Jr., Child Custody in Divorce, JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOUR-
NAL, Spring, 1984, at 1, 22.
13. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(a)-(j) (1991).
14. 581 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 1991).
15. MICH. COMp. LAws § 722.23 (3)(j) (1991).
16. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(a) (1991). "The parent who is more likely to allow the
child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent."
17. 453 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Glickstein,J., concurring).
18. Id. at 1153 (quoting DorisJ. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States:
An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 415 (1984)). FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(a)-(j) (1991). MIc.
CoMp. LAws § 722.23 (3)(j) (1991). Michigan's statute reads a little differently in that it
refers to the court's finding the child to be of sufficient "age." Florida's statute does not
mention age. It speaks to the child's intelligence, understanding and experience, which we
should not forget.
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creed, if any." 19 The Florida legislature chose only to require inquiry as
to "the love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the par-
ents and the child."
'20
The existing language in Florida's version is a "take 'er as you find
'em" approach, while the Michigan version opens the door to changing
dysfunction to function before writing off the family's existence as a fam-
ily. I heard one out-of-state family lawyer describe his specialty as a "fu-
neral director." Families in crisis need therapy, not funerals. Without
studying the legislative history, I do not know why the legislature chose
to omit one critical criterion and shorten up another. Otto Von Bis-
marck observed: to retain respect for sausages and laws, one must not
watch them in the making.
2 '
The third door we face is the Child's Bill of Rights. The Report of
the Florida Study Commission on Child Welfare, 2 2 in March, 1991, said
that:
Florida must formulate a policy for children and their families
around these basic concepts:
a. Every child must be:
1) protected from harm;
2) provided with basic food, clothes, and shelter;
3) provided with necessary medical services and a ba-
sic education; and
4) provided with the opportunity for cognitive, aes-
thetic and emotional development.
b. When help is needed, the first obligation is to assist
the child in his or her family. If, despite such assist-
ance, the family cannot meet the basic needs of its chil-
dren, government must assure that their needs are
met, regardless of economic status.
c. Local communities are best suited to identify needs,
provide accountability, and support a child's sense of
identity. Local communities should be given more
control in selecting, purchasing, and delivering serv-
ices to children and families in compliance with state-
wide standards. 23
This door requires a number of keys to open, the first of which is
risk taking. Emerson wisely observed that every revolution begins with a
single thought in an individual's mind.2 4 I believe that, in child advo-
cacy, individual heroes and heroines conceive programmatic responses,
then have the courage to take the risks necessary for success. As has
been said, one cannot have lemonade without lemons; and one cannot
meaningfully address the best interests of the child without leaders-
19. Id. at 1152.
20. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(b) (1991).
21. Quoted in, in re Graham, 104 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1958).
22. STUDY COMMISSION ON CHILD WELFARE, REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (Fla. 1991) [hereinafter STUDY].
23. Id. at 1.
24. Ralph Waldo Emerson, History, in EMERSON'S ESSAYS 1, 2-3 (Harper & Row, 1951).
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individuals with vision, faith, courage, energy, creativity and commit-
ment. Such individuals understand that their involvement is neither a
marathon nor a sprint, but is more like a mile run-requiring pacing and
grit but having a destination in mind and in sight. They act out Rein-
hold Niebuhr's Serenity Prayer: God, give us grace to accept with seren-
ity the things that cannot be changed, courage to change the things which
should be changed, and the wisdom to distinguish the one from the
other.
25
The next key to this door is interdisciplinary networking. The success
of this mission lies in its multi-discipline composition-legislators, Gov-
ernor and cabinet officers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, judges, social
workers and others in common focus. Networking must be horizontal
and vertical. Associations and institutions must join hands; counties
must exchange ideas and programs; every area of government-judicial,
legislative and executive-must play an equal role. Similarly, within
each state, the individual communities are best able to focus on preven-
tion and early intervention to thwart a child's misdirection, with the re-
sources of the state opened to rehabilitation and long-term treatment.
The final key to this door is political will. If a state or community has
it, results will be achieved. Two examples of political will in Florida
were The Florida Bar's Children's Committee in 1984 which undertook
to establish guardians ad litem in Florida for children caught up in dis-
solution proceedings, and a consortium of groups bringing the Family
Court to Florida, as authorized by the supreme court's opinion in In re
Report of the Commission on Family Courts,2 6 which held:
We approve the recommendations of the Commission on Fam-
ily Courts, and we accept the Commission's recommendation
concerning the jurisdiction of a family division. We emphasize
our support for the recommendation that there be a means to
assign all family court matters that affect one family, including
dissolution of marriage, custody, juvenile dependency and de-
linquency proceedings, to one judge. In approving these rec-
ommendations, we note the need for each circuit to design a
family division to best serve its particular area. Geography,
population, and available facilities are all factors that must be
considered in tailoring a family division to the needs of a partic-
ular circuit.
We agree that the assignment of a judge to family law cases is
one of the most difficult and stressful of all the responsibilities
of a circuit judge. Consequently, we acknowledge that there is
a need for rotation among judges assigned to the family divi-
sion. For such a division to work, judges must be committed to
carrying out this judicial responsibility and willing to partici-
pate in education and training programs in this area of the law.
Family law is a developing and expanding area of court jurisdic-
tion. As noted in the Commission's report, approximately fifty
25. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE SERENITY PRAYER (emphasis added) (JOHN BARTLETr, FA-
MILIAR QUOTATIONS, 823 (15th ed. 1980)) (1943)).
26. 588 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1991).
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percent of the civil court jurisdiction in our circuit courts, with-
out the inclusion of juvenile delinquency and dependency
cases, is comprised of family law matters. New techniques are
regularly being implemented to try to make this jurisdiction of
our courts work more effectively. Further, we recognize that
delays in family law matters aggravate the parties' problems.
Clearly, an early resolution is best for all concerned.
2 7
It took until 199028 to get legislation to authorize appointments of
guardians ad litem. 2 9 Without the statute, many trial judges were not
making the appointments due to an absence of authority. Children need
the protection of a guardian ad litem in many dissolution cases because
one or both of the parents is likely to be emotionally dysfunctional.
Lawyers, judges and parties need to understand that; and if
Schopenhauer is right, someday we shall understand it. 30 What the leg-
islature did not do, however, was to provide any funding for guardians
ad litem. The irony is that the lawyers representing the adults in the
marriage may receive a statutory fee and costs but the guardians of the
unprotected children have no fiscal support in individual cases. This has
to be corrected.
Another problem in the area of guardians ad litem came to light
with the 1991 National Study of Guardian ad Litem Representation. 3 '
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974 required states
to appoint a guardian ad litem for maltreated children as one condition
of receiving federal grant funds authorized by the act. 32 The repassage
of the act in 1988 required the Administration for Children, Youth and
Families to conduct a study to determine how each state was providing
guardian ad litem representation.3 3 The national study's conclusions
27. Id. at 591.
28. In 1983, The Florida Bar sponsored the first interdisciplinary state bar-sponsored
children's committee, upon which other states such as Virginia, Delaware, Massachusetts,
Missouri and Utah have patterned similar efforts. The Florida committee discovered im-
mediately that other states were providing guardians ad litem for children caught up in
dissolution cases while Florida's children had to fend for themselves. Audrey Schiebler,
vice-chairwoman of the committee, dogged the legislature for four sessions until it funded
pilot programs in several judicial circuits. In 1988, committee members joined with the
state guardian ad litem program in training volunteers.
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.401-404 (1991).
In an action for dissolution of marriage, modification, parental responsibility,
custody, or visitation, if the court finds it is in the best interest of the child, the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child. In such actions
which involve an allegation of child abuse or neglect as defined in ch. 415.503(3),
which allegation is verified and determined by the court to be well-founded, the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.
Id. at ch. 61.401 (emphasis added).
30. See supra text at page 1.
31. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL STUDY OF
GUARDIAN AD LITEM REPRESENTATION (1990).
32. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247. 88 Stat. 4 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07) (1974).
33. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, sec. 104, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 102
Stat. 102 (1988).
[Vol. 69:3
A YEAR TO REDISCOVER
and nine recommendations should awaken our consciousness. In Flor-
ida, the study found:
Florida has a statewide volunteer GAL [guardian ad litem] pro-
gram. In 1979, the Florida Office of the State Courts Adminis-
trator studied the use of lay volunteers, Public Defenders, and
private attorneys in abuse and neglect proceedings and con-
cluded that lay volunteers are effective advocates for children.
In 1982, Florida Supreme Court Rule 8.300 approved the use
of lay volunteers as GALs. Florida Statute § 415.508 mandates
the appointment of GALs in all civil and criminal abuse and
neglect proceedings. Despite this requirement, only 3 of the 11
counties sampled provide representation for 100 percent of all
abused and neglected children. Eight counties do not appoint
GALs in 20 to 100 percent of their cases. While Glades, Hen-
dry, and St. Johns Counties provide representation in 100 per-
cent of their cases, Clay, Dade, DeSoto, Duval, Lake, and Polk
Counties provide representation only in 50 percent, 50 per-
cent, 75 percent, 35 percent, 8 percent, and 40 percent of their
cases, respectively. In Sumter County, the local court does not
appoint GALs, so no cases are represented. Statewide an esti-
mated 49 percent of the cases are represented. This figure
agrees with an estimate given by the State-level respondent.
Respondents in all of the counties reporting a lack of represen-
tation said that there were not enough GALs for all cases.
3 4
Other states should follow Florida's example and seize the opportu-
nity to open all of these doors for children, and to set an example for
those states that are reluctant. After all, to influence others, example is
not the main thing-it is the only thing. How well will we involve our-
selves in the best interests of the child? Gabriela Mistral cautioned us:
WE ARE GUILTY
OF MANY ERRORS AND
MANY FAULTS
BUT OUR WORST CRIME
IS ABANDONING THE CHILDREN,
34. STUDY supra note 22 at 84. In August, 1991, I successfully tendered to the Execu-
tive Council of the ABA Family Law Section a resolution, which was revised and adopted,
subject to approval by the ABA House of Delegates in February, 1992. It now reads:
RESOLUTION
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association urges:
(1) Every state and territory to meet the full intent of the Federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, whereby every child in the United States who is
the subject of a civil child protection related judicial proceeding will be repre-
sented at all stages of these proceedings by a fully-trained, monitored, and evalu-
ated guardian ad litem in addition to appointed legal counsel.
(2) That state, territory and local bar associations and law schools become in-
volved in setting standards of practice for such guardians ad litem, clarify the
ethical responsibilities of these individuals and establish minimum ethical per-
formance requirements for their work, and provide comprehensive multidiscipli-
nary training for all who serve as such guardians ad litem.
(3) That every state and territory, where judges are given discretion to appoint a
guardian as litem, in private child custody and visitation related proceedings, the
bench and bar jointly develop guidelines to aid judges in determining when such
an appointment is necessary to protect the best interests of the child.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
NEGLECTING THE
FOUNTAIN OF LIFE.
MANY OF THE THINGS WE NEED
CAN WAIT. THE CHILD CANNOT.
RIGHT NOW IS THE TIME
HIS BONES ARE BEING
FORMED, HIS
BLOOD IS BEING MADE, AND
HIS SENSES ARE BEING
DEVELOPED.
TO HIM WE CANNOT ANSWER
"TOMORROW."
HIS NAME IS "TODAY."
3 5
35. Gabriela Mistral, Nobel Laureate of Chile, cited in 397 N.W.2d 81, 88 (S.D. 1986).
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TIMING, FRAGILITY AND CHILDREN'S LAW
ROBERT V. HANNAFORD*
Last April, Ripon College's ABA Family Law Section conference,
"Family Law and the 'Best Interests of the Child,' " focused on two fun-
damental questions: (1) what elements of family life are most important
to children's moral development and (2) how are these elements rele-
vant to family law and public policy? Although these questions could
not be fully answered in any conference, they suggest that law and pub-
lic policy should aim to protect and secure those elements most impor-
tant to children's moral development. The discussion of children's
moral development was unusually productive during the conference and
produced legally relevant questions regarding the importance of under-
standing the elements of children's moral development.
Pediatric psychiatrists, clinical and experimental psychologists and
moral theorists presented evidence and arguments which supported this
basic point: Caretakers must treat infants as responsive and concerned
for others and give consistent and loving nurturing if children are to
attain a sense of identity and self-esteem. Otherwise, children will lack
the means for communicating and establishing relations with others and
for determining how to control their own impulses. If children lack these
qualities, they are more likely to become delinquents. Moreover, care-
takers should themselves be morally concerned and responsive so that
children's moral development is enhanced by example and guidance. In
sum, children need loving, consistent caretakers who provide an exam-
ple of acting with respectful concern for others and who place moral
demands and expectations on them from infancy onward.
Although conference participants continued pressing for their indi-
vidual cherished views of family as the best means to secure the essential
elements of children's moral development, a consensus as to what those
elements are soon formed. This consensus owed a great deal to the gen-
eral agreement of observers from a variety of disciplines regarding a
new awareness of the importance of the elements of timing and fragility
to children's moral responsiveness. Until recently, both lawyers and
moral development theorists spoke and acted as if our treatment of in-
fants and toddlers made no great difference to their moral development.
For example, lawyers often spoke of children's "best interests" as if they
were property rights, treating children as if they were chattels disposed
of strategically in divorce settlements.
At the same time, child development theorists, such as Jean Piaget
and Lawrence Kohlberg, proceeded from the assumption that toddlers
and infants were egoistically self-absorbed. These theorists believed
Professor of Philosophy, Ripon College.
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that infants and toddlers had neither concern for, nor the ability to un-
derstand, others' intentions and purposes.' In Piaget's highly influential
study of the language of Swiss pre-school children, he asserted that the
young child does "not attempt to place himself at the point of view of his
hearer," for the child's egoism is "complete and unconscious." '2 In an-
other study, Piaget argued an infant's perception cannot differentiate
one person from the rest of the world.3 To Piaget and Kohlberg, tod-
dlers' "moral responses" are little more than mere expressions of feel-
ings. 4 From Piaget's and Kohlberg's assumptions, it follows that
children must be amoral and exploitative until they develop new intel-
lectual capacities and broader interests. These most influential studies
of children led to the general belief that it would be a mistake-it would
be unscientific-to treat pre-schoolers as sensitive and responsive to
others' interests or needs. Any efforts to begin early work toward in-
fants' and toddlers' moral development would be wasted.
Conference participants provided abundant evidence and reasons
for calling Piaget's and Kohlberg's assumptions into question. For ex-
ample, conference participants provided evidence that an infant (1) no-
ticed when its caretaker showed concern; (2) responded with delight to
loving attention; (3) failed to thrive when no concern was shown and (4)
followed and responded to the caretakers' intent in simple interactions.
How could this be if the Piaget-Kohlberg account had been correct?
These and other observations called into question the accounts of Piaget
and Kohlberg and showed how moral development is crucially depen-
dent on the early care and treatment of infants and toddlers.
This Article focuses on the philosophical arguments drawn from ac-
tion theorists, which call into question the assumptions of Piaget and
Kohlberg regarding children's moral development. 5 Action theorists
study how beliefs, desires and intentions are involved in human action,
including communication and language use. Action theorists' work im-
1. Jean Piaget, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain trans.
1955). Kohlberg patterns his six stages of moral development after the stages presented
by Piaget. Kohlberg's definition of stage one of moral development, which characterizes
responses of youngsters up to age 10, holds that for persons in this stage: "There is no
differentiation between the moral value of life and its physical or social status value." 1
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 118 (1981). Even his
stage two is described as a case in which the "[v]alue of a human life is seen as instrumen-
tal to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or others." Id. However, this is a posi-
tion that Kohlberg does not hold with complete consistency; he also states that "[a]t every
stage, children perceive basic values such as the value of human life and are able to em-
pathize and take the roles of other people and other living things." Id. at 143. Still, his
repeated theme is that young children act only out of self-concern and respond only to the
threat of punishment at the earlier two stages. Moreover, he urges that it is a mistake to
attempt to treat children at the earlier stages as if they were capable of responding out of
empathic concern. A number of people offered decisive criticism of this position in the
conference. See MICHAEL PRITCHARD, ON BECOMING RESPONSIBLE (1991).
2. See generally Piaget, supra note 1.
3. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1958).
4. 1 KOHLBERG, supra note 1, at 118.
5. My focus will be on philosophical arguments drawn from action theorists. A de-




plies awareness of, and concerned responsiveness to, others' intentions
and actions are conceptually necessary to a toddler's moral develop-
ment. Current psychological observations support the argument of ac-
tion theorists that this responsiveness, or attentive concern for others, is
fundamental to our moral anatomy and is with us from earliest infancy.
Observers from various disciplines agree that a child's moral responsive-
ness is dependent on the quality of attention given to its moral
development.
These new philosophical arguments rest on the conception that
morally responsible people are accountable and responsive to others.
By this conception, a morally responsible person must: (1) be able to
give an account of his or her actions; (2) have acquired moral language
by which to describe actions; (3) be able to describe motives and ascribe
them to others; (4) be able to give acceptable moral reasons for actions
and (5) be prepared to act in ways that are morally permissible or re-
quired. 6 Thus, at the center of our moral development is responsive
concern, or the capacity to respond to another person out of interest
and concern. These five characteristics of a morally responsive person
will be considered in turn.
The first characteristic concerns accountability and holds that a re-
sponsible person is able to account for his or her actions as well as an-
swer questions and give reasons for these actions. In order to do this, a
responsible person must be able to describe actions in language under-
stood in the community, recognize what others include in the descrip-
tion and know particular actions belong under that description.7 This is
a conceptual, not an empirical, point: To be accountable (by our com-
mon understanding of the notion), an individual must know how to de-
scribe actions and, to be responsible, must also aim to achieve some
result when engaged in voluntary action.
The second characteristic concerns the ability to view one's actions
as similar to those of other community members. As pointed out by P.F.
Strawson, in order to describe one's own actions, one must be able to
ascribe the same intent to oneself as one ascribes to others. States of
consciousness can only be ascribed to others by identifying others as
subjects of experience and possessors of states of consciousness. 8
There must be some identifiable, observable criteria to ascribe states of
consciousness if language is to be intelligible for people generally, or if
intentions or subjective states are to be communicated. As Donald Da-
vidson noted, individuals must describe their own purposes and situa-
tions in a language that can be applied to others.9 Strawson explains
6. While other characteristics of the morally responsible person might be cited, these
five carry considerable philosophical agreement and rest on mutually supportive
arguments.
7. See, e.g., Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in PERSONAL IDENTITY, 175, 191
(Amelia Oskenberg Rorty, ed., 1976).
8. P. F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS, AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS 100 (1959).
9. DONALD DAVIDSON, PSYCHOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON ACTION AND EVENTS
229-34 (1980).
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that we must see the connection between the first and third person ap-
plication of language.' 0 We must see ourselves as persons like others.
If I correctly describe myself as melancholy or angry, the words "melan-
choly" and "angry" must mean the same things as when applied to
others. Hence, to acquire the ability to apply personal predicates and
descriptions to my own behavior, I must identify others' intentions and
determine these intentions are similar to my own." 1 As Lawrence Blum
notes, self-knowledge cannot be sharply separated from knowledge of
others.' 2 To develop self-descriptive language, a person must be able
to reason about others' intentions and must, in some measure, conceive
of him or herself as a person among persons with motives and intentions
like others' to develop any language to describe his own actions.
The "first person criteria," the criteria for applying words describ-
ing conscious states, must correlate with the "third person criteria," the
criteria for words describing the same states in others. This ability to
conceive of oneself and other persons must be a matter of degree. It
does not come to everyone all at once or in equal amounts. Some emo-
tions and intentions are understood by the very young while others re-
quire more human relations and world experience. A toddler may
recognize anger or hurt, while only more mature persons can correctly
identify and describe jealousy or ambition in themselves and others. We
are (and should be) held responsible in various degrees, partially be-
cause we are capable of understanding ourselves and others in various
degrees that change as we acquire a clearer conception of ourselves and
others through acquiring language. In learning language, an individual
must be interested in, and attentive, to other persons, for it is from
those persons that the individual acquires the language with which to
describe feelings and situations.
The third characteristic concerns the ability to describe motives in
language understandable to the community. Some words we learn to
describe states of mind are words by which we ascribe motives and give
general reasons, words that must have the same meaning for others as
for ourselves. For example, in order to describe my own penitence or
impartiality, we must know how those terms are tied into others' inten-
tions and actions. To learn these words, we must (1) understand others'
intentions; (2) compare these intentions and motives with our own; (3)
master language to describe actions; (4) give reasons for these actions
and (5) compare these reasons with others' reasons. Once again, self-
knowledge is tied to attention to, and knowledge of, others.
The fourth characteristic concerns an individual's ability to compare
reasons, to know what are good reasons and evaluate those reasons. To
be accepted as adequate, reasons must be relevant to the conclusion
reached and proceed from morally acceptable motives. By our common
10. STRAWSON, supra note 8, at 100.
11. Lawrence Blum, Particularity and Responsiveness, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL-




understanding, if we are correctly described as acting responsibly, our
reasons for acting must be acceptable to impartial judges generally. To
understand the reasons for acting, actions must be described in general,
intelligible terms. But a central feature of understanding actions is un-
derstanding whether the action is permissible in society. Until an indi-
vidual recognizes whether actions are acceptable to others in the moral
community, an understanding of the true effect of these actions is in-
complete. An individual must view these actions as an impartial specta-
tor to acquire and correctly use moral language in order to articulate
actions as permissible. Until this language is mastered, one cannot de-
scribe or clarify one's own purposes or plans of action.
It follows that a person who projects responsible plans of action,
must to some degree, master the moral language with its matrix of ac-
ceptable reasons and permissible actions. A person does not under-
stand the language of reasons until he or she learns how the reasons
apply and how the acts and reasons supporting them are perceived as
affecting others and oneself. Thus, once again, moral reasons rest on
the language of self-description, which requires a conception of oneself
as a person among persons with the ability to focus alternately on his or
her own and others' interests and purposes.
Some might object to this argument by asserting that we cannot
know that this quest for moral reasons is indeed universal for all cul-
tures. While it is common enough in our own culture for people to be
ignorant of their reasons for acting, nonetheless, we agree that people
should have relevant reasons. If someone fails to give a reason for hit-
ting another or the reason is irrelevant (e.g., "I hit him because his eyes
are green"), our culture will not accept the action as valid. The action
must be suited to the situation and the supporting reasons relevant to
the situation in order for the reasons to be adequate. Otherwise, we
blame the persons for their inadequate reasons.
The concept of blaming is part of every human culture and involves
the giving of reasons. When we blame someone, we judge that individ-
ual as having acted wrongly in some identifiable particular. Whoever
blames (with adequate reason) must be able to identify the particular
feature that makes the act wrong and give reasons in support of the
blaming judgment. Whoever cannot identify the specific feature that
makes an action wrong has not made a clear or reliable judgment. To be
valid reasons, their relevance must be clear to members of the general
community. Giving and assessing reasons are features of every cul-
ture;13 the characteristics necessary to give and assess reasons must
equally be a feature of our moral anatomy.
Agreement as to others' moral reasons involves agreement as to
13. See Richard Shweder, Elliot Turiel, and Nancy Much, The Aoral Intuitions of the
Child, in SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES (John Flavell
and Lee Ross, eds., 1981).
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their motives and intentions. Thomas Nagel and Richard Peters' ex-
plain how those whose motives we accept as responsible are those who
exhibit some concern for others. These observations are similar to Her-
bert Fingarette's description of responsibility as a specific kind of care.
15
Theorists, such as Roger Beehler, note the link between caring for
others and prescriptive moral language' 6-that is, specific criteria for
moral language exists and these criteria include the requirement of car-
ing about one another, just as specific criteria exist for language describ-
ing colors (such as "red"). Thus, caring is a central factor in moral
reasoning. To be acceptable, our reasons must, at a minimum, indicate
we have considered others. We must know how others view a situation
and what motives they will accept. We must recognize what it means to
be a person in the process of communicating about and judging our and
others' actions.
On one hand, the notion of "good reasons" implies the notion of a
community of moral reasoners whose agreement gives at least a prima
facie sanction of one's judgment. On the other hand, "good reasons"
implies the notion of acceptable motives, or acting out of deference or
concern for others' desires and intentions. Although some theorists ar-
gue all our motives are selfish, our language condemning selfishness
shows that one's motives in acting will not, as a rule, be acceptable if
one shows no concern for how one's acts undermine others' interests.
The component of selfishness will be condemned, perhaps as "heed-
less" or "greedy," perhaps as "callous" or "ruthless," but condemned
in any case.
Moreover, as many have argued, to act voluntarily to protect others'
moral rights, some concern must be shown for those whose rights are
protected. A morally responsible person takes his or her self-description
from society, responding to its demands as reflected in its moral lan-
guage. Choosing one's identity in this way is an expression of regard for
its members. Having concern for others and seeing oneself as a person
among persons must, in some degree, be with us from infancy. It is part of
the process by which we become morally responsible. Without concern
and attention to others' interests, children could not learn language with
which to describe their situation. Without the language, they could not
achieve self-knowledge nor offer reasons in support of their choices.
Thus, in a language-using and reason-giving community, mutual aware-
ness and concern must pervade moral relationships.
Toddlers must learn to use the moral language. Infants possess this
reciprocating awareness and interest in others as observed in their earli-
est learning of social relationships. This awareness and interest-the
abilities and responses of an infant-are vividly suggested in the follow-
ing description by the father of a newborn:
14. THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970); RICHARD PETERS, REASON
AND COMPASSION (1973).
15. HERBERT FINGARETrE, ON RESPONSIBILITY (1967).
16. ROGER BEEHLER, MORAL LIFE 32 (1978).
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Thirty minutes after her birth, my daughter was already taking
my measure. She lay in my lap, startlingly alert, scanning me
as I scanned her, our gazes moving about each other's bodies,
limbs, faces, eyes, returning, then locking. The same thing
happened, I soon noticed, as she lay cradled in my wife's em-
brace, this locking of gaze into gaze. And it was only gradually
that the wondrous mystery of that exchange began to impress
me-for even an hour ago my daughter's eyes had been
sheathed in undifferentiated obscurity-and now what captured
their attention? Other sets of eyes . . . of all the possible ob-
jects of attention, what is so naturally compelling about two
dark pools of returned attention.
17
Observations of infants show a parallel kind of interest.
Part of our fun and our philosophical interest in baby-watching
comes from seeing an infant's delight and excitement grow with the ap-
pearance of its mother, perhaps beginning to cackle and to pedal its feet
in the air, as she engages its eyes, and then seeing the delight with which
it imitates her moves. Our fun comes in witnessing their communication
and in seeing the baby's demonstration of its awareness of its mother
and its delight in her. Our philosophical interest is drawn to its concern
for her and its lively interest in others, but it is especially drawn to the
baby's delight in entering into little games with its mother and others.
For in order to play a game, a baby must recognize what the other person
is up to, what kind of rule is to be followed.
We may feel our own observations are inconclusive because we can-
not be sure we are reflecting on the same kind of mother-child in-
terchange. But if there is doubt on that score, we can turn to some of
the filmed studies that have been used in support of attachment the-
ory. 18 In these studies, mothers are filmed playing with and caring for
their babies. In one such study-an extensive one-the mother-child
relationship was filmed during the first twenty weeks of the infants' lives.
From studying the films, the authors report that, from the first, the
mother takes on facial expressions, motions and postures indicative of
emotion, as though she and her baby were communicating . . . Most
mothers, in sum, are unwilling or unable to deal with neonatal behaviors
as though they were meaningless. 19 But of course, if the earlier dis-
cussed Piaget-Kohlberg view were correct, 20 infants' behavior would be
17. Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 9, 1987, at 25.
18. "Attachment theory" is perhaps too grand a term; it consists of a series of studies
begun by John Bowlby, and taken up by Mary Ainsworth and her followers, which show
how infants become "attached" or psychically bonded to loving caretakers. Mary Ains-
worth's account of how an infant's pattern of behavior comes to form a system, in which a
securely attached child of 12 months takes its caregiver as a base for explorations, sharing
and growth. See MARY AINSWORTH, PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT (1978). See also ATTACHMENT
IN THE PRE-SCHOOL YEARS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION (Mark Greenberg, Dante
Cicchetti and Mark Cummings, eds., 1990).
19. T. Berry Brazelton, B. Kosloski & M. Main, Otigins of Reciprocit in THE EFFECTS OF
THE INFANT ON THE CARE GIVER 49 (Michael Lewis and Leonard Rosenblum, eds., 1974).
20. 1 KOHLBERG, supra note 1, at 118.
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meaningless in the sense that it could involve no mutual caring relation-
ship between caretaker and infant.
The account of the filmed study continues, describing how the
mother's treatment initiates a reciprocal caring relationship with the in-
fant through which it learns to play, and hence, communicate. The
mother treats her time with the infant as a time for communicating, ad-
justing the complexity of her behavior to fit the infant's stage of devel-
opment. She presents behavior as a model for the infant. She imitates
its activity, enlarging upon it, and it delightedly enters into the play.
Thus the infant "becomes aware of his action, visualizing her imitation
of it and reproduces it for himself again. As he does so, he has the op-
portunity to add on to it... (in part) by modelling his behavior to match
the enlarged version."' 2 1 After observing mothers with their newborns
over a 20-week period, the authors concluded that both mother and child
were learning rules for their interaction, rules "which were being con-
stantly altered by each."
22
In films of infant attachment made by the investigators, we see that
the child's capacity for seeing what its mother is doing and responding
to it requires that the child see her intent and reciprocate, knowing she
will see its intent and respond to it: reciprocity and taking the view of
the other is essential to the play. Theirs is a kind of game in which the
mother does this, the infant does that, then the mother does another
thing (in accord with a pattern), or it might be a case of imitation in
which if the mother does this, then the infant does this also. In either
case, there is a kind of rule generation involved in the communication:
the infant knows how to take the mother's intention, knows what she has
in mind for it and knows that she will also know how to take what it does.
So the infant must have an awareness of its behavior as falling under
what it takes to be intended for it. Thus, contrary to what Piaget and
Kohlberg would lead us to expect, at the age of four weeks (when one
can definitely say that such play begins) we see, in primitive form, the
abilities that are described as necessary to moral personhood in the phil-
osophical literature-down to and including the beginnings of self-con-
sciousness. The infant's self-consciousness is not consciousness of
behavior as falling under a verbal description that is known to the infant,
but it is consciousness which it uses in its game with its mother and on
which it builds in subsequent play and learning.
Both parties possessed a consuming interest in the other partner to
the play. Investigators report that in looking at films of four-week-old
infants, they could look at any segment of the infant's body shown on
the film and detect whether he was watching an object or interacting
with his mother because the child's attention was quite different if vocal-
izing, smiling and using motor behavior in response to inanimate stimu-
lus as opposed to the mother.2 3 Thus, we find in primitive form, not
21. Brazelton, supra note 19, at 74.
22. Id. at 73.
23. Id. at 53.
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only the ability to gain insight into another's desires and intentions (re-
quired for moral reasoning), but also the understanding of intentions,
an indication of the concern for others that enters into moral motiva-
tion, according to the foregoing account of our moral anatomy. The
infant's consuming interest in others appears at a time when the infant
could not calculate what would serve its own future interests: the inter-
est it exhibits is in others' delight and response. Moreover, the con-
cern-the interest and delight in others' activity and responses-is an
important factor in the mother-child games in which the infant begins to
develop moral capacities. The games begin and attachment is formed
through the infant's first interest in others, which is apparently height-
ened because of mother-child games. In those interchanges we observe
its first exercise of capacities that will be required in order for it to de-
velop rational competence. Thus, the interest shown in others is not a
lapse from some rational calculation of self-interest. The interest, the
responsiveness, must be there for the reasoning to begin. It is in us
from the beginning, waiting to be channeled into the many determinate
kinds of concern and respect that figure in moral action and reasoning.
Such interchanges mark peaks of cognitive performances for an in-
fant of under six months old. But the child builds on that beginning.
Other studies, made of children from six months to one year old, show
during that period the child is more likely to become involved in activi-
ties turning on such reciprocity and mutuality. 24 If given a caring envi-
ronment during this time, it will be likely to be working out what a
number of investigators describe as a secure attachment. This attach-
ment is characterized by the child's preference for its caretaker, shown
by its heightened interest directed toward her or him and by the fre-
quency with which it takes care to establish eye contact with her or him.
It is also characterized by its initiating interchanges with the caregiver
and by what investigators describe as trust.
Our philosophical interest in attachment is drawn to the point that
the child can only become attached through an already present respon-
siveness and ability to read others' intentions. It is as a result of the
attachment that it moves toward limited autonomy and independent sat-
isfaction in its activities and becomes more responsive toward others. A
number of observers of child development support these conclusions
and suggest the child's relation to other members of the family is crucial
to that development. Martin Hoffman is among those who have called
attention to toddlers' ability to take an interest in, and to interpret,
others' intentions. He noted that very young children are able to learn
about social rules through conversations between family members
about their feelings and inner states.2 5 Judy Dunn reports that two-
year-olds grow in their ability to anticipate others' feelings, to under-
24. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
25. Martin Hoffman, Empathy, Role-Taking, Guilt and the Development ofAltruistic Motives
in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH & SOCIAL ISSUES 124 (T.
Likona ed., 1976).
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stand others' intentions and to understand and communicate about so-
cial rules. She observes that such children ... take part in conversations
about others' feelings in the second year; they play and show interest in
the cause of such feelings. While they are not able to make judgments
about complicated hypothetical moral dilemmas, she writes "they are
very close to being able to assign responsibility for family transgres-
sions, to make choices about whom to support in family disagreements
and to use this understanding .".."26 Moreover, their preparedness to
act out of concern for others seems not to be a matter of fixed phases or
stages, as both Piaget and Kohlberg claim, but is instead related to the
concern exhibited by other members of their family. Dunn notes that as
parents were more intense in their concern in discussing the importance
of not hurting others, children were more likely subsequently to be
sympathetically aroused and helpful in response to others' distress.
Then too, she finds that toddlers with close, affectionate relations with
their siblings show an earlier development of the ability to role-play, to
act as conciliator and to cooperate with others.
Thus, family members' concern about others and their feelings for
the child are instrumental in introducing the child to a sense of member-
ship in the larger moral community. The family's interest in providing
moral education is an important feature of the child's moral develop-
ment from infancy. A philosophical perspective on child development
that focuses on a child's learning and using moral language will hold
that a child comes to apprehend moral meaning through observing and
using moral language in action, a process that can only take place
through its entering into relationships of mutual concern in the moral
community. It must learn what it means to share and to wait one's turn.
The evidence of attachment theory and of other observers support this
view. Attachment theory evidence suggests, contrary to much of the
psychological opinion of the past, that a child's earliest human relation-
ships (as well as its subsequent learning) are made possible by its con-
cern for others and its awareness of their concern and their intentions
both for itself and for others. 2 7 Other psychologists observing child de-
velopment now report that a toddler exhibits the responsiveness that
moral relations require-in the ability to see itself as like others, as a
person among persons. It is worth noting that the toddler can do so
because members of its family have insisted on it entering into moral
relationships; by insisting that it not hurt others, that it share, that it wait
its turn, that it respect others' rights.
On the other hand, the fact that abused and neglected infants often
fail to develop (if they survive) or develop into violent and aggressive
children indicates that the process of moral development is a fragile
one, one where timing is all important.
One of the most essential elements of family life is the caretakers'
26. Judy Dunn, The Beginnings of loral Understanding, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY
IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra, note 11, at 91-110.
27. See generall AINSWORTH, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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evident concern about others' rights and their fair treatment: their lov-
ing, consistent, and stable nurturing and their introduction of the child
into their micro community of mutual respect and concern. As the de-
velopment process is shown to be fragile and timing critically important,
let us hope the law attends to those elements.
As I have no training in the law, I am not competent to proceed
from these points to suggest specific changes which should be made in
law or court procedure. But speaking broadly, I, or anyone, can men-
tion some of the more important points which are indicated. The timing
and fragility of a young child's moral development mean that we have
stronger reasons for providing for its moral development than we have
for either parent's custodial rights. The courts must work within a small
window of time. Clearly it cannot postpone providing for the child's
interests in favor of its parents whose claims are more forcefully
presented by their lawyers.
Indeed, unless parents can provide the requisite consistent, loving,
nurturing moral guidance, there is no reason they should be considered
to be eligible for custodial rights. The foregoing implies that the family's
importance to the child's best interests is its ability to provide the requi-
site conditions and the parents' biological relationship to the child is
irrelevant to their being able to provide an acceptable claim to the cus-
tody of the child. It seems clear the law's definition of "family" should
be shaped around that point.
As no prospective caretakers could produce decisive evidence that
they would be able to provide such care on a continuing basis, there is
no reason for treating custody decisions as single, final decisions.
Rather, they are matters which require monitoring and continuing re-
view. Moreover, the monitoring can only be intelligently reviewed by
someone who understands the complexity of the developmental pro-
cess and its relation to family life. Thus, special qualifications of educa-
tion and training should be attached to the position of family court
judges or to whatever court officer is empowered to review and decide
such cases: we require a whole new set of criteria of eligibility for family
court judges or the court officers to whom such authority is delegated.
2 8
28. I do not propose that these are all of the changes which need to be made, but they
are the substantive ones. These changes are essential to providing for the well-being of
children whose destinies are affected by courts' decisions.
1992]






Our justice system articulates reliance upon the best interests of the
child standard when dealing with the child. This simple standard im-
plies that the child is the focus of any decision making process which
impacts upon the placement or welfare of the child. In application, how-
ever, courts appear to experience great difficulty with the application of
the test, particularly because they must consider the competing interests
of parents in custody and access conflicts, and the interest of the state,
or its agencies, in child welfare matters. The focus of this Article is cus-
tody and access. Notwithstanding difficulties applying the best interest
test, we are of the view that the test should remain the primary analytical
tool used by courts in the determination of child custody and access
cases. However, to ensure that the best interests of the child are met,
independent representation for children should be made mandatory in
all child custody cases.
Interest in the subject matter evolved as a result of an invitation to
participate in the American Bar Association conference titled "Family
Law and the 'Best Interest of the Child,'" held at Ripon College, Ripon,
Wisconsin, April 11-14, 1991. The multi-discipline symposium focused
on the issue of best serving the interests of the child. It became appar-
ent during the four day conference that our institutions that were
designed to serve the needs of the child often ignore that voice and fail
to represent the child's best interests. This Article explores the history
of the best interest test and its application within the justice system by
first considering custody and access from a Canadian perspective,
through Canadian statutes and jurisprudence and their respective appli-
cation in Canadian courts, and second, considering similar develop-
ments in England and other common law jurisdictions, specifically
making comparisons with the United States. The Article concludes with
a discussion of the role of counsel for the child in custody disputes.
Upon examination of the inherent difficulties in applying the stan-
dard and the available alternatives, our conclusion is that in order to
ensure that the best interests of the child are met, mandatory independ-
ent representation of the child is an essential safeguard and worthy of
* Emile R. Kruzick, Partner, Osier, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto, Canada; B.A.
1967, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1970, Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law.
** David H. Zemans, Student-at-Law, Osiler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto, Canada;
LL.B. 1991, Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law.
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the resources necessary to implement such a program. Without in-
dependent representation, it is impossible to guarantee that the best in-
terest test will be applied in such a manner as to protect the child's best
interests.
I. THE BEST INTEREST TEST
A. Early History
The best interest test is relatively new to the common-law system.
Until the last century in our society, the common-law regarded children
as an economic asset which denied them legal identity and treated them
as objects. Fathers had the prerogatives of ownership until children
reached twenty-one years of age,' and only "extraordinary unfitness
would deprive the father of his custodial right."12 Through the vague
doctrine of parens patriae, however, the Chancery Court did occasion-
ally intervene to ameliorate a paternalistic common-law system.3 The
phrase "parens patriae" is used to describe the power of the court to act
in loco parentis to protect the personal or the property interest of a
child.
4
Under this "wardship" jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery as-
sumed guardianship of the child. This power developed ...
from about the time of the Restoration of the Monarchy in
1660, when the Ancient Court of Wards was abolished.., and
for three centuries was used almost exclusively to protect the
property and persons of infants. The power was not created by
any statute and could not therefore . . .be affected, restricted
or curtailed by any legislation unless that legislation [was]
clearly directed to that power or purpose.
5
In the old English case of Shelley v. Westbrooke,6 the court exercised
its parens patriae jurisdiction after considering whether a father was fit
to exclusively make decisions on behalf of his children. The court
stated:
I consider this, therefore, as a case in which the father has
demonstrated that he must, and does deem it to be [a] matter
of duty which his principles impose upon him, to recommend
to those whose opinions and habits he may take upon himself
to form, that conduct in some of the most important relations
of life, as moral and virtuous, which the law calls upon me to
consider as immoral and vicious - conduct which the law
animadverts upon as inconsistent with the duties of persons in
such relations of life, and which it considers as injuriously af-
1. Tenures Abolition Act , 1660, 12 Car. II, ch. 24, (Eng.).
2. Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests of the Child: By Whose Definition? 18 PEPP. L. REV.
383, 384 (1991) (citing Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850, 851 (1821)).
3. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
4. Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. REV., 167, 173.
5. OLIVE M. STONE, THE CHILD'S VOICE IN THE COURT OF LAw 123-24 (1982).
6. 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817).
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fecting both the interests of such persons and those of the
community.
I cannot, therefore, think that I should be justified in delivering
over these children for their education exclusively, to what is
called the care to which Mr. S. wishes it to be intrusted.
7
Not until the 1839 enactment of the Custody of Infants Act 8 could a
mother apply to the Court of Chancery, which "might, in its discretion,
give her custody of her younger children . . . and access or visitation
rights to all her minor children." 9
The past century saw the demise of the common-law notion that the
father should always have custody, and the emergence of the best inter-
est test. In the United States, these opinions were first expressed by
Justice Brewer,' 0 and later by Justice Cardozo. I I Assuming a mother
was morally fit, this new standard resulted in an almost automatic pref-
erence for the mother with no meaningful inquiry into what would be in
the best interest of the child.12 What emerged was a shift in the proprie-
tary interest in children from the father to the mother.' 3 However, at
the turn of the century in most common-law jurisdictions, legislation en-
trenched the rights of children expressed in the best interest test,
though it was not until the last half of this century that the status of the
child gained attention and courts gave children individual identity and
attention as an independent person.
B. Current Applications
Legislation in most jurisdictions has entrenched the application of
the best interest test. In Canada, the statutory basis for the test is found
in the federal Divorce Act of 1985.14 The Divorce Act has universal ap-
plication in all of Canada when parties are dissolving a marriage and
continues to apply to the status of children after the divorce judgment
where custody and access are at issue. As well, each province has its
own applicable legislation. Provincial legislation can be invoked where
there is no divorce proceeding or in conjunction with a divorce action.
In the Province of Ontario, for example, the Children's Law Reform
Act 15 deals with custody and access. While both the federal Divorce Act
and the provincial Children's Law Reform Act differ in some respects,
they both provide guidance and parameters to the adjudication of cus-
tody matters, and require that the issue of custody and access be deter-
7. Id. at 851.
8. Custody of Infants Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., ch. 54 (Eng.).
9. Id. (custody was considered for children up to age 7 in 1839, and later extended
to age 16 in 1873).
10. Chapsky v. Wood, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881).
1I. Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
12. Robert F. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Famity Law, 2J. FAM. L.
101 (1962).
13. HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN 3-7 (1974).
14. Divorce Act of 1985, S.C., ch. 4 (1986) (Can.).
15. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. 152 (1980) (Can.).
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mined in accordance with the best interests of the child. 16 Section 24(2)
of the Children's Law Reform Act, however, is more directive and pro-
vides more statutory criteria than the federal Divorce Act which must be
considered by a court in determining what constitutes the best interests
of the child. The Act reads:
In determining the best interests of a child for the purposes of
an application or motion under this Part in respect of custody
of or access to a child, a court shall consider all the child's
needs and circumstances, including
(a) the love, affection and emotional ties between the child
and,
(i) each person seeking custody or access,
(ii) other members of the child's family residing with
him or her,
(iii) persons involved in the child's care and
upbringing,
(b) the child's views and preferences, if they can be rea-
sonably ascertained;
(c) the length of time the child has lived in a stable home
environment;
(d) the ability of each person seeking custody or access to
act as a parent;
(e) the ability and willingness of each parent seeking cus-
tody to provide the child with guidance, education and ne-
cessities of life and meet any special needs of the child;
(f) any plans proposed for the child's care and upbringing;
(g) the permanence and stability of the family unit with
which it is proposed that the child will live; and
(h) the relationship, by blood or through an adoption or-
der, between the child and each person who is a party to
the application or motion.
17
Both the federal and provincial statutes, which are meant to achieve
similar purposes, exemplify the differing approaches that the various
provincial legislatures have taken.' 8
An examination of relevant case law leads to the conclusion that
Canadian courts have difficulty in applying the applicable law and its
best interests philosophy. In the Ontario Court of Appeals case of Carter
v. Brooks,' 9 the court considered the best interest test and how it remains
the primary analytical tool used by contemporary courts when determin-
16. Compare Divorce Act at § 16(8) ("In making an order under this section, the
court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as
determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the
child.") with Children's Law Reform Act at § 24(1) ("The merits of an application ... in
respect of custody of or access to a child shall be determined on the basis of the best
interests of the child.").
17. Children's Law Reform Act at § 24(2).
18. See R.S.A., ch. D-37, Part 7 (1980) (Can.); R.S.B.C., ch. 121, sec. 24 (1979) (Can.);
R.S.M., ch. 8, sec. 2(1) (1985-86) (Can.); S.N.B., ch. F-22, sec. 129 (1980) (Can.); NFLD.
R.S., ch. 61 (1988) (Can.); R.S.N.S., ch. 160, sec. 18(5) (1989) (Can.); R.S.P.E.I., ch. C-33
(1988) (Can.); R.S.Q., ch. 39, sec. II, arts. 568-70 (1980) (Can.); S.S., ch. c-8.1, pt. II, sec. 8
(1990) (Can.).
19. 30 R.F.L.3d 53 (Ont. C.A. 1990).
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ing custody. The court also discussed some of the difficulties courts face
in their application of the test. The court stated:
What guidance can be given for the application of the best in-
terests of the child test? This area of the law is no different
from many others where, in the application of a broad legal
standard, what is desired is both predictability of result and jus-
tice to the parties based on the particular circumstances of the
case. It is often difficult to ensure by "rules" that both objects
are met. If the rules are too precise, it may be that important
circumstances in some cases will be left out of account in apply-
ing the governing test, and justice will suffer. On the other
hand, if there is [sic] not certain common understandings in
how the issue is to be approached, the danger is one of undue
subjectivity, with the consequence of reduced predictability.
Having regard to the foregoing, I am satisfied that the best in-
terest test cannot be implemented by the devising of a code of
substantive rules, even if this could be done within the confines
of a single case.
2 0
In the British case ofJ v. C,2 1 Lord MacDermott outlined his view of
the statutes to be considered by a court applying the best interests test. He
stated:
Reading these words in their ordinary significance, and relating
them to the various classes of proceedings which the section
has already mentioned, it seems to me that they must mean
more than that the child's welfare is to be treated as the top
item in a list of items relevant to the matter in question. I think
they connote a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, re-
lationships, claims and wishes of parents, risks, choices and
other circumstances are taken into account and weighed, the
course to be followed is that which is most in the interests of
the child's welfare as that term is now to be understood. That
is the first consideration because it is of the first importance in
the paramount consideration because it rules upon and deter-
mines the course to be followed.
22
It appears that the best interest test is a balancing and weighing of
numerous factors that may impact upon the upbringing of the child.
Consequently, this is an area of law where subjective views and feelings
can and often do, exert subtle influences.
Author Kingsley Davis discussed the difficulty with the application
of the best interest test and wrote that "[t]he welfare of the child rather
than the claims of the parents is supposed to be the goal, but what is
'welfare' to one Judge is apt to differ from what is welfare to another."' 23
Professor Adrian Bradbrook later discussed the Ontario Court's applica-
tion of the best interest test, and compared the similarities between On-
20. Id. at 61.
21. 1 All E.R. 788 (1969).
22. Id. at 820-21.
23. Kingsley Davis, Sociologic and Statistical A-nalysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 700,
706 (1944).
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tario's application of custody law with the findings of Kingsley Davis'
similar Pennsylvania study twenty-seven years earlier. 2 4 Professor Brad-
brook writes:
There is no area of law over which the Judge has a wider discre-
tion than child custody adjudication.... In view of the dispar-
ity of opinions expressed by the judges in almost every topic
discussed in the study, it would seem that the findings of the
1943 Pennsylvania study, that there are no universally applica-
ble principles in custody disputes, still apply today ... in Penn-
sylvania there was an almost complete lack of crystallized
opinion regarding custody. The judges needed to use rough
and vague rules of thumb in making their decisions and be-
lieved that general principles were inapplicable because of the
different fact-situation in each case. Although the majority of
the judges relied to some extent on the advice of social work
agencies, only twenty-five percent admitted that they were in-
fluenced by changing customs and social values when formulat-
ing their judgments.
2 5
It is submitted that in the twenty years following Professor
Bradbook's article, and despite clearly defined statutory guidelines,
common-law courts continue to grapple with the application of the best
interest test in the determination of child custody and access.
II. ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE BEST INTEREST TEST
A. Inherent Difficulties
In presenting the issues that impact the child, a parent's position is
not only opposing, but also subjective. In Ford v. Ford,26 the United
States Supreme Court considered the application of the best interest
test and the inherent problems in relying on bitter and acrimonious par-
ents to adequately represent their children during the custody proceed-
ing. The Court found "experience has shown that the question of
custody, so vital to a child's happiness and well being, frequently cannot
be left to the discretion of parents. This is particularly true where ... the
estrangement of husband and wife beclouds parental judgment with
emotion and prejudice."
'2 7
Canadian authors Philip Epstein and Susanne Goodman find that
the central issue in child custody disputes is determining what type of
evidence must be presented to enable the presiding judge to objectively
ascertain the best interests of the child.2 8 In addressing custody and
access issues, the authors write:
24. Adrian Bradbrook, An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of the Judges of the Supreme Court
of Ontario regarding the IIWorkings of the Present Child Custody Adjudication Laws, 49 CAN. B. REV.
557 (1971).
25. Id. at 571.
26. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
27. Id. at 193. See also Donald N. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Decisions:
All that Glitters is not Gault, 15J. FAM. L. 27 (1976-77).
28. Philip Epstein & Susanne Goodman, Custody and Access, in FAMILY LAW REFERENCE
Materials, ch.4, I (Law Society of Upper Canada 1991).
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It is clear from the opening words of § 24(2) [of the Ontario
Legislation] that the enumerated criteria are not to be viewed
as exhaustive. Also evident from this section is that the para-
mount consideration in a custody dispute is the best interests of
the child. Accordingly, the object of the proceeding is to place
the child, rather than the persons applying for custody, at the
crux of the decision. Due to the inherently adversarial nature
of a court proceeding, coupled with the emotional anxiety
which is part and parcel of a custody dispute, the central focus
is often misplaced. As was stated by Mr. Justice Bayda in
Wakaluk v. Wakaluk (1976), 25 R.F.L. 292 (Sask. C.A.), at 292-
293:
The issue of custody is without doubt the most impor-
tant one - and was so treated by counsel at the hear-
ing of this appeal - and the most troublesome. While
at the hearing of the appeal the parties concentrated
their attention on this issue, they were not so mindful
at the hearing of the petition, even though the issue
was far from settled. From the standpoint of custody,
the meaning of the petition was, in my respectful view,
quite unsatisfactory. Virtually no evidence was di-
rected to this issue. The parties primarily concerned
themselves with adducing evidence to show whether,
on the basis of the many material battles engaged in
by them, one or the other of them should be favoured
by the trial judge in his determination of the issue of
cruelty.
No one bothered to bring forward much information
in respect of the two individuals who of all the persons
likely to be affected by these proceedings least de-
served to be ignored - the children.
2 9
Child psychiatrist Dr. Richard Gardner studied the effects of cus-
tody litigation on parties and concludes from his research that parents
may not be capable of the objectivity required to represent the best in-
terests of their child during a custody dispute.30 Dr. Gardner writes:
People involved in custody litigation are fighting. They are
fighting for their most treasured possessions - their children.
The stakes are extremely high. Litigation over money, prop-
erty, and other matters associated with the divorce produce
strong feelings of resentment and anger. However, they are
less likely to result in reactions of rage and fury than are con-
flicts over the children. Children are the extensions of our-
selves, our hopes for the future, and thereby closely tied up
with our own identities. Fighting for them is almost like fight-
ing for ourselves. The two may become indistinguishable, and
the fight becomes a 'fight for life.'
3 '
29. Id. at 4-8.
30. RICHARD GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION - A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986).
31. Id. at 19.
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Custody hearings are wrought with underlying hostility and con-
flicting opinions and attitudes regarding the child's best interests.
When considered logically, the only reason courts are involved is be-
cause of the parents' inability to agree on what is in the child's best
interest.
B. Alternatives
Many writers have criticized the best interest test in child custody
proceedings and have argued for a more defined and easily applied test.
Professor Martha A. Fineman argues that there are viable and perhaps
preferable alternatives to the best interest test. 32 Professor Fineman
recommends a test that is not dependent on the weighing of parental
attributes, but one that boldly prioritizes the most significant factors to
be considered by courts when determining child custody. In her article,
Professor Fineman discusses what she considers to be the amorphous,
undirected, incomprehensible and indeterminable subjective standard
that has evolved in custody matters as a result of the best interest test,
and argues in favour of courts alternatively applying a "primary-care-
taker" rule. 33 With respect to the "primary-caretaker" rule, Professor
Fineman states:
This rule has been characterized in different ways, but the es-
sence of the primary-caretaker standard is that children need
day-to-day care, and that the parent who has performed this
primary care during the marriage should get custody.... The
primary-caretaker rule implicitly recognizes that no expert can
confidently make the predictions required under the future-ori-
ented best-interest placement, and that past behaviour may in
fact be the best indication we have of commitment to the future
care and concern for children.
3 4
Professor Fineman's approach may be distinguished from the gen-
eral judicial application of the best interest test in that it may be a more
intellectually honest approach and more objective in its application as
between the parties, and not as dependent upon the norms and values of
a particular judge or the presentation by parents' counsel. In fact, when
the courts apply the best interests standard, are they not in fact address-
ing who is best able to provide the child with day-to-day care? There is
no doubt that a better test could assist the courts in awarding custody in
a more consistent and seemingly less arbitrary manner. A test where
32. Martha A. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and the Transformation of American Custody
Decision Making, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 829 (1989).
33. Id. at 835 n. 19 ("The best interest of the child test involves a comparative balanc-
ing of the strengths and weaknesses of the parents. Factors such as health, wealth, educa-
tion, and moral conduct have all been considered. The test is indeterminate and easily
manipulated by judges and lawyers. Appellate review is rare since it is very fact specific
and the trial judge has wide discretion to conclude which parent will act in the child's
interest."). See also Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best interest of the Child, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987).
34. MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM 181 (1991).
[Vol. 69:3
1992] MANDA TORY INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION
prior to trial, the parties could know more precisely on what factors the
court will place emphasis could also result in more out of court settle-
ments of custody and access issues. Professor Fineman's approach,
however, has the inherent danger of ignoring the child.
Professor David L. Chambers also perceives difficulties in the appli-
cation of the best interest test.3 5 Professor Chambers writes:
The current approach states use for resolving custody disputes
in divorce - a case-by-case inquiry into the best interests of the
child - has many flaws. One has been that neither legislatures
nor custom has provided judges with a coherent framework for
thinking about what children's interests are. A second, equally
serious, has been the inability ofjudges to make accurate deter-
minations, under the circumstances prevailing in the context of
litigation, of the quality of most individual children's relation-
ships with their parents or of the parents' skill at childrear-
ing. . . . Because of the many ways in which court
determinations under the current rules are likely to be unrelia-
ble, if there is a sound basis for believing that any general rule
will produce better outcomes than a random assignment, such
a rule has a plausible foundation.
3 6
Professor Chambers concludes, however, by stating that despite nu-
merous criticisms of the best interest test, that it should remain the pri-
mary analytical tool used by courts in the determination of child custody
disputes.
3 7
III. MANDATORY INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION: A NECESSARY
SAFEGUARD
We are of the view that the best interest standard is still the best test
to be applied in contested child custody and access cases, and that a
child's best interests can be properly considered by a court if the child is
independently represented by a child advocate or comparable legal
counsel. We are of the view that independent representation is essential
to ensure that the trier of fact is provided with all the salient information
necessary to canvass and consider the issue of child custody. Independ-
ent counsel can also ensure that the child's rights are vigorously advo-
cated and defended. Authors Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, however,
express concerns about encouraging state involvement in the resolution
of "private" domestic disputes.3 8 The authors do, however, acknowl-
35. David L. Chambers, Rethinking The Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MIcH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
36. Id. at 558-59.
37. Id. at 559 ("Having completed the review, I now believe that no new or revived
presumptions based on gender or primary-caretaker status can meet this standard on the
basis of the existing empirical studies standing alone. There is simply not enough hard
evidence that children in general are better off with women, primary-caretakers, or the
parent of same sex than with the opposite parent. However, the state of evidence with
regard to the three factors is not identical, and one of them, primary-caretaker status, may
still warrant some sort of preference, when developmental theory and practical values that
a preference - serve are taken into account.").
38. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET At.., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
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edge the need for intervention by the state to protect the best interests
of the child in contested custody disputes:
In divorce and separation proceedings, the imposition of coun-
sel under this ground is justified only if the parents are unable
to decide custody on their own-that is, if they ask the court to
decide. By failing to agree on a disposition, separating parents
waive their claim to parental autonomy and thereby their right
to be the exclusive representatives of their child's interests.
The child then requires representation independent of his par-
ents' to assure that his interests are treated as paramount in
determining who shall have custody.
39
Independent representation is premised on a growing recognition
that children have interests and rights that need to be considered dis-
tinctly and separately from those of adults, particularly their parents.
Independent representation allows for the identification of the rights
and needs of the child. A policy whereby children would be universally
entitled to, and represented by their own counsel will ensure that the
child's needs are given the priority the best interest test assumes it does.
The authors of one study wrote:
[W]ithout separate representation for the child, the court may
neglect important interests of the child in both the outcome
and the process of the proceeding. Because the best interests
standard is a general principle or statement of values rather
than a precise test, it has been criticized for providing "no indi-
cation of the degree of attention paid to the child's needs" in
application, for reducing judicial opinions to "amorphous plati-
tudes or generalizations," and for leaving the custody decision
essentially indeterminate.
40
Former Chief Judge Andrews of the Ontario Provincial Court's
Family Division, and Pasquale Gelsomino write in their article:
Traditionally, the courts have been satisfied the children's in-
terests were adequately represented by the adult parties. In re-
cent years, however, children have been increasingly
recognized as individual persons, with views, preferences and
interests distinct from those of their parents, guardians and
child protection agencies.
4 1
It is submitted that the best interest test, as it is currently applied,
makes the court dependant upon the feuding parents' counsel to adduce
and present all the information necessary to make an informed decision
with regard to the custody of the child. Consequently, a court's decision
in any proceeding where a child in a contested custody hearing has not
been represented by independent counsel, should be suspect. Further-
more, a lawyer with a professional obligation to an adult client will not
39. Id. at 115.
40. Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Dis-
pites Arisingfrom Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1135 (1977-78) (citations omitted).
41. H. Andrews & Pasquale Gelsomino, Legal Representation of Children in Custody and
Pvtection Proceedings: 4 Comparative View, in FAMILY LAW: DIMENSIONS OF JUSTICE 141, 141
(Rosalie S. Abella & Claire L'Heureux-Dube eds., 1983)).
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present evidence that is relevant to the child's best interests where that
evidence is damaging to the adult's case. As well, if counsel is expected
to represent the parent's and child's best interest, ethical and profes-
sional dilemmas will arise by having to prioritize conflicting interests.
There is also a real danger that if parents are not cross-examined by the
independent counsel representing the child, that the intentions and in-
tegrity of each parent's testimony will not be adequately challenged, or
at the very least not adequately examined through the eyes of the child.
Where a child is not independently represented, the cumulative effect is
that the court may be making decisions without truly addressing the
child's best interest.
4 2
Some would also argue that court appointed mental health profes-
sionals are capable of presenting all the necessary information and evi-
dence pertaining to the child's best interests. It is our view that while
mental health professionals play a crucial role in assisting the court in
child custody disputes, they are not adequate replacements for a child
being represented by independent legal counsel. Legal counsel, unlike
mental health professionals, are able to participate in all aspects of the
proceeding, including negotiations between parents' counsel. A child's
independent counsel is also able to actively participate in the trial and
ensure that the focus of the trial remains in the best interests of the
child.
Appointing independent legal counsel to represent the child will
also "assure that one voice will be raised in sole representation of the
best interests of the minor child."'4 3 Professor Kerin S. Bischoff dis-
cusses the potential dangers of a system in which the appointment of
independent representation is not mandatory, particularly in custody
cases where child sexual abuse has been alleged.4 4 The advocate for the
child, rather than the trial judge or parents' counsel, is in the best posi-
tion to determine whether the child's circumstances have been fully liti-
gated.4 5 Bischoff concludes that absent this vigorous independent
representation, the record available for the trial judge will be "woefully
incomplete," 4 6 and that such representation should be mandatory in all
custody proceedings.
In 1974, the Law Reform Commission of Canada issued a report
challenging the long held belief that a child's interests in a custody mat-
ter would be adequately protected by the child's parents. 4 7 The Com-
42. Seesupra text accompanying note 40. "[T]hejudge is not well placed to reduce the
rancor of the proceedings, and is restricted to the courtroom and cannot on his own ob-
tain the facts pertaining particularly to the child's viewpoint." Id. at 1136.
43. Clark v. Clark, 358 N.W. 2d 438, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Kerin S. Bischoff, The Voice of the Child: Independent Legal Representation of Children in
Private Custody Disputes When Sexual Abuse is Alleged, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1390 (1990).
45. Id. at 1390-91.
46. Id. at 1391.
47. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, WORKING PAPER No. I - THE FAMILY COURT
40-41 (1974) (where the right or interest of a child is directly or indirectly affected by the
court proceeding, it is not enough to rely on the judge, the parents, or the parents' coun-
sel to act as an advocate of the child). See also ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT
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mission's report provoked a number of Canadian provinces to legislate
certain recommendations embodied in the report and to begin consider-
ing the need for children to be independently represented, particularly
in acrimonious custody proceedings where the court could not confi-
dently conclude that the parties would present all the evidence relevant
to the best interests of the child. Ontario's 1984 Court of Justice Act,
for example, makes provision for minors to be represented by the Onta-
rio government's Official Guardian.
48
In the Saskatchewan case of McKercher v. McKercher,4 9 the Court of
Queen's Bench shied away from the normative attitude that the interests
of children always coincide with those of the parents, and that parents
always act in the best interests of their children. 50 The Saskatchewan
court's decision in McKercher reflected a growing recognition of the fact
that a child has interests, wishes and needs which conflict with those of
his or her parents. Despite resistance from the Official Guardian, whose
role had until then been limited to protecting the child's property inter-
ests, the court ordered that the child be represented by independent
counsel.
5'
Legislation governing custody and access in most Canadian prov-
inces now provides for appointment of independent counsel for children
at the court's discretion. The Canadian Law Reform Commission's rec-
ommendation that a child be represented in all custody proceedings,
however, has yet to be adopted in full by any Canadian court or legisla-
ture. The prevailing attitude apparently remains to be that a child's in-
terests and needs will be protected by his or her parents unless the court
determines otherwise.
Some countries and jurisdictions take a more active role in seeing
that the child's interests are independently represented. The Australian
Family Law Act governs the appointment of independent legal counsel
for children in custody disputes and makes specific provisions for a
child's separate representation. 5 2 However, similarly to the statutes in
most North American jurisdictions, the Australian act lays down no
guidelines indicating when the court should appoint independent coun-
sel to represent the child, nor does it absolutely require appointment.
Section 65 of the Australian act provides:
Where, in proceedings with respect to the custody, guardian-
ship or maintenance of, or access to, a child of a marriage, it
appears to the court that the child ought to be separately repre-
sented, the court may, of its own motion, or on the application
ON FAMILY LAW, PART III - CILDREN 124 (1973) (discussing the child's right to be inde-
pendently represented by counsel).
48. Court ofJustice Act, S.O., ch. 11, § 102 (1984) (Can.).
49. 2 W.W.R. 268 (Sask. QB. 1974).
50. Id. at 270.
51. Id. A case comment on McKercher notes it is reasonable to assume that independ-
ent counsel is the most viable method of representing the child, given that other tech-
niques have proven their own inadequacies and no viable alternative has yet presented
itself. Ron W. Hewitt, Case Comments, 42 SASK. L. REV. 295, 297 (1977-78).
52. Family Law Act, No. 53, § 65 (1975) (Austl.).
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of the child or of an organization concerned with the welfare of
children or of any other person, order that the child be sepa-
rately represented, and the court may make such other orders
as it thinks necessary for the purpose of securing such separate
representation.
5 3
In the United States, while the majority of states have enabling leg-
islation authorizing courts to appoint independent representation, only
Wisconsin 54 and New Hampshire 5 5 currently mandate independent rep-
resentation of children in custody proceedings. Legal scholars widely
applaud the Wisconsin approach, stating:
Wisconsin moved to the forefront of developing child custody
law by recognizing the complex aspects of custody disputes.
Wisconsin realized that courts may be incapable of protecting
and advancing the child's best interests because a court must
"evaluate evidence which is offered by the parents within a
highly volatile and emotional atmosphere."
'56
The evolution of Wisconsin's child custody law can be traced to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's Wendland v. Wendland 5 7 decision. In Wend-
land, the court discussed why independent legal representation for chil-
dren, in certain circumstances, was crucial to ensure that the court's
decision reflected what was in the best interests of the child. Justice Wil-
kie stated:
The appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the inter-
ests of children who are the subject of a custody fight in a di-
vorce proceeding is a step that the trial court should take only
in an extraordinary situation where the trial court believes that
what may be in the best interests of the children may not be
brought out by the two contesting parties. . . .Where there
have been instances of immoral misconduct on the part of one
(or both) parties and where the court is concerned over the ef-
fect of such misconduct on minor children, the court, in its ca-
pacity as a family court, recognizing that "children involved in a
divorce are always disadvantaged parties," may well take addi-
tional affirmative steps to protect the welfare of the chil-
dren. . . .Where there is a hotly contested dispute, and the
court is satisfied that the procedure of relying on the two par-
ties and the investigation of a welfare agency may not produce
all the important evidence that the court should consider in
looking after the best interests of the children, a guardian ad
litem should be appointed. Inevitably this will add to the ex-
pense of the divorce proceedings. But such expense will be re-
53. Id.
54. WIs. STAT. § 767.045 (1991).
55. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-a (1989).
56. Brenda M. Flock, Custody Disputes Arising From Divorce: The Child's Need For Counsel In
Pennsyvania, 87 DIcK. L. REV. 351, 354 (1983); see also Tari Eitzen, .4 Childs Right To In-
dependent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute: A Unique Legal Situation, .4 Necessarily Broad
Standard, The Child's Constitutional Rights, The Role of the Attorney whose Client is the Child, 19
FAM. L.Q. I, 53 (1985).
57. 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
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warding if the interests of the children are better served. 58
While the court in Wendland clearly stated that the discretion to ap-
point independent legal counsel should be exercised in only limited cir-
cumstances, the same court held ten years later that children are
"indispensable parties to the proceedings," and stressed the need for
children to be independently represented in any custody proceeding. 59
It is submitted that Wisconsin's legislation is an excellent basis upon
which to model similar legislation in Canada, and for this reason the
germane sections of the Wisconsin statute are worthy of note:
(1) APPOINTMENT (a) The Court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem for a minor child in any action affecting the family if
any of the following conditions exists:
1. The court has reason for special concern as to the wel-
fare of a minor child.
2. The legal custody or physical placement of the child is
contested.
(4) RESPONSIBILITIES. The guardian ad litem shall be an
advocate for the best interests of a minor child as to legal cus-
tody, physical placement and support. The guardian ad litem
shall function independently, in the same manner as an attor-
ney for a party to the action, and shall consider, but shall not be
bound by, the wishes of the minor child or the positions of
others as to the best interest of the minor child. The guardian
ad litem shall consider the factors under s. 767.24(5) and cus-
tody studies under s. 767.11(14). The guardian ad litem shall
review and comment to the court on any mediation agreements
and stipulation made under s. 767.11(12). Unless the child
otherwise requests, the guardian ad litem shall communicate to
the court the wishes of the child as to the child's legal custody
or physical placement under s. 767.24(5)(b). The guardian ad
litem has none of the rights or duties of a general guardian.
(6) FEES. The guardian ad litem shall be compensated at a rate
that the court shall determine is reasonable. The court shall or-
der either or both parties to pay all or any part of the fee of the
guardian ad litem. In addition, upon motion by the guardian ad
litem, the court shall order either or both parties to pay the fee
for an expert witness used by the guardian ad litem, if the
guardian ad litem shows that the use of the expert is necessary
to assist the guardian ad litem in performing his or her func-
tions or duties under this chapter. If either or both parties are
unable to pay, the court may direct that the county of venue pay
the fees, in whole or in part, and may direct that any or all par-
ties reimburse the county, in whole or in part, for the payment.
58. Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
59. Montigny v. Montigny, 233 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Wisc. 1975). One author argues
that even in the absence of statutes mandating consideration of the child's wishes, judges
who fail to elicit or who totally ignore children's custodial preferences are increasingly
likely to have their custody orders reversed on appeal. Howard A. Davidson, The Child's
Right to be Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 270 (1991).
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The court may order a separate judgment for the amount of the
reimbursement in favour of the county and against the party or
parties responsible for the reimbursement. The court may en-
force its orders under this subsection by means of its contempt
power.
60
Wisconsin's legislation clearly articulates the need for children to
be independently represented in contested custody matters and ensures
that the focus of any proceeding remains where the enabling legislation
meant it to be - on the best interests of the child.
IV. ROLE OF COUNSEL FOR THE CHILD
Although the role of counsel for the child is to express the child's
point of view, in court, counsel for the child plays a unique role in con-
tested custody dispute resolutions. Dan L. Goldberg, counsel for the
Office of the Official Guardian in Ontario, Canada wrote:
Unless an assessment has been conducted it is likely that coun-
sel (and possibly his/her social worker) are the only person(s)
to have met all the key people. If we have done a thorough job
of preparation and appropriately express our knowledge the
Official Guardian counsel should be cloaked with a high degree
of credibility with the parties and their lawyers when we hold a
settlement meeting.
Given our previous interviews we will, hopefully be able to
know the difficult issues and those that are capable of easier
resolution. By continually emphasizing the benefits to their
child of an amicable resolution to the dispute as well as the
high cost of litigation the parties' focus often begins to move
from antagonism with each other to a greater willingness to
compromise. 6 1
Because child custody trials have the potential for having a debilitat-
ing effect on all the parties involved, it is of the utmost importance that
negotiation and settlement are encouraged. Dr. Richard Gardner adds
that litigation should be avoided due to its devastating impact on the
respective parents and children involved. 6 2 Dr. Gardner writes:
The adversary system, which professes to help parents resolve
their differences, is likely to intensify the hostilities that it
claims it is designed to reduce. It provides the litigants with
ammunition that they may not have realized they possessed. It
contributes to an ever-increasing vicious cycle of vengeance -
so much so that the litigation may bring about more psycholog-
ical damage than the pains and grief of the marriage that origi-
nally brought about the divorce.6 3
Independent legal counsel for the child in custody disputes is in a
better position to foster out of court settlements because he or she is in
60. WIs. STAT. § 767.045 (1991).
61. Dan L. Goldberg, Representing Children in Custodv and Access hoceedings in Onario,
CAN. B. Ass'N INST. C.L.E. 37 (1989).
62. GARDNER, supra note 30.
63. Id. at 19.
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a unique position that enables them to shift the focus of the dispute
from the feuding parents to the needs of the child. Counsel for the child
is also in a better position to assess the chances of success at trial. At a
preliminary stage, independent counsel can also assist in forcing parents
to seriously consider alternatives to a prolonged and difficult trial, bear-
ing in mind the needs of the child.
In Leatherdale v. Leatherdale,64 the Supreme Court of Canada dis-
cussed the need, and even responsibility of legislatures, courts and the
bar to develop more easily applied and understandable tests in family
law matters. Mr. Justice Estey wrote:
Family law, more than any other branch of the law, must pro-
vide, where it is possible, simple and clear rules which readily
lend themselves to expeditious application in the trial courts.
Litigation over family matters is never economic, always a
heavy expense and a painful experience. The simpler the rules,
the easier their application by the courts; and even more impor-
tantly, the more readily applied by the legal advisors to the
members of the family who must always strive to settle differ-
ences without recourse to the delays, expense and pain of court
proceedings .65
Independent counsel for the child may not necessarily simplify the
case, but the role of counsel for the child should be to attempt to settle
differences from the child's point of view, without litigation if possible.
As well, if parents are confronted with the additional burden of paying
the legal fees of counsel representing their child, as they would be under
the Wisconsin legislation for example, parents will be more likely to
evaluate their chances of success before the beginning of a long trial in
order to minimize the risk of having to pay additional fees to legal coun-
sel who represented their child.
V. CONCLUSION
We support the best interest test because it is simple and clear. Ap-
plication of the standard, however, begs the question, in whose best in-
terest? We must ensure that the child remains central to the test.
Professor Foster's summary targets the denial of due process and the
failure to regard children as persons with rights, as the result of not
providing a child independent legal counsel. Professor Foster writes:
Children do have a right to childhood but it must be recog-
nized that childhood is preliminary to adolescence and eventual
adulthood and moreover, it is the most crucial period in human
development. It is also obvious that much depends upon one's
definition of "childhood".... But there are certain fundamen-
tals that are constant, such as the interest in having independ-
ent counsel whenever the placement of a child is at stake, and
the right to fair treatment from all those who are in authority. 66
64. 2 S.C.R. 743 (1982).
65. Id. at 772-73.
66. Supra note 13, at 3-7.
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Children should therefore have independent counsel whenever
their interest is in issue. This recommendation ensures that the best
interest of the child is met and is made within the context of the legal
and adversarial system, which we believe is here to stay. Given this ad-
versarial system, independent representation is essential if the child's
voice is to be heard. Although most legislation affords the child access
to independent counsel, statutes do not go far enough to mandate rep-
resentation. In the administration of justice, if the best interest of the
child is to be served, then the child must be heard and must have legal
status where placement or welfare is in issue. Counsel for the child
should be afforded full status throughout the matter as if the child were
a party to the proceeding. 6 7 The Law Reform Commission made its rec-
ommendation for independent representation for the child in 1974.68
Professor Foster made his plea some eighteen years ago.6 9 The legal
community has come a small distance, but a great distance remains to
ensure that the legal system serves the best interests of the child.
67. Reid v. Reid, 11 O.R.2d 622, 630 (Orit. H.C.J. 1975).
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 13 & 68.

THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE: ADDRESSING
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN
HONORABLE SHEILA E. McGOVERN*
Several important legal changes for the children of Massachusetts
had their genesis in January, 1986, when the Governor's/Massachusetts
Bar Association's Commission on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children
began its work. This Article details the process the Commission used to
achieve its goals as well as the substantive changes in the law that were
attained. It is hoped that the Commission's success can enable others to
enact the necessary legislative changes that will enhance the develop-
ment and potential of every child.
The establishment of the Commission was in itself a strong state-
ment of policy, an acknowledgment of need and a commitment to
change.' The ultimate goal of the Commission was to make recommen-
dations to address the unmet legal needs of children, including specific
legislative changes. To accomplish this goal, those political forces nec-
essary for change-the executive, the legislative and the legal-were ar-
rayed even before the actual work of the Commission began. The
membership of the Commission was multi-disciplinarian, including law-
yers, judges, state officials, mental health professionals, teachers and
others from diverse backgrounds. The first and most arduous task was
to eliminate many issues worthy of study in order to focus on those we
could pragmatically accomplish. After extensive review, we resolved to
focus on those legal needs that were most immediately pressing and
were not being addressed by any other commission.
The Commission'was divided into seven sub-committees whose task
was to generate two or three specific recommendations. The seven sub-
committees were: Due Process for Children, Family Needs, Rights and
Obligations, Legal Resources and Judicial Education, Guardians ad Li-
tem, Divorce and Custody, and Structure and Jurisdiction of the
Courts. 2 For the next twenty months, the subcommittees participated in
committee and sub-committee meetings, engaged in research, consulted
* First Justice, Middlesex County Probate and Family Court, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
1. The proposal to undertake a survey of children's needs was initiated by Michael S.
Greco, then President of the Massachusetts Bar Association, and presented to Governor
Michael Dukakis who immediately accepted a two-year commitment to the project and
appointed his legal counsel, Stephen Rosenfeld, and the author, Judge Sheila E. McGov-
ern, as co-chairpersons.
2. Amongst other topics, the Commission explored issues relating to divorce and
custody, care and protection and Children in Need of Services (CHINS) cases, termination
of parental rights, tracking guidelines to eliminate court delays, uniform rules of proce-
dure, appointment of counsel for children, the redefinition of the role of guardians ad
litem, continuing education programs for lawyers, judges and court personnel on develop-
mental, psychological and evidentiary issues pertaining to children, and the creation of
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with other experts and held public hearings. In May of 1987, the final
Report 3 was published incorporating twenty-two recommendations of
the Commission, 4 including specific draft legislation and preliminary
court intake centers and mental health clinics for all courts concerned with child and fam-
ily issues.
3. See REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S/MASSACHUSETI'S BAR ASSOCIATION'S COMMISSION
ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN (on file with the Denver University Law Review).
4. The Commission's recommendations included the following:
1. Legislation should be introduced to better define the types of endanger-
ment that justify state intervention in families for the care and protection of
children.
2. All courts with authority to intervene in families for the care and protec-
tion of children should adopt uniform time guidelines to track cases from begin-
ning to end.
3. The District,Juvenile, and Probate Court Departments should adopt uni-
form rules and procedures for handling care and protection cases.
4. G.L. c.210, § 3 should be amended to require that in contested cases
where parental rights may be terminated, the court shall appoint counsel for the
child.
5. G.L. c.210, § 3 should be amended to better define the grounds for ter-
mination of parental rights, and to mandate that when children's interests and
parental rights conflict, the child's interests shall prevail.
6. Legislation should be introduced creating a Children's Services Division
within the Committee for Public Counsel Services, as an experimental pilot pro-
ject in two courts, to provide children's advocacy and representation through ap-
propriately trained and qualified attorneys and support staff. The Children's
Services Division shall supplement, but not replace, representation currently be-
ing provided by the private bar.
7. By legislative or administrative order judges, court personnel, attorneys,
and Guardians Ad Litem handling cases involving children should attend contin-
uing education programs on developmental, psychological and evidentiary issues
pertaining to children. Forjudges and court personnel, such programs should be
regarded as part of their regularly assigned duties.
8. Compensation for attorneys appointed by the court to represent children
should be increased to $60/hour plus reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, exclu-
sive of travel, for work performed in or out of court, and judges should have the
discretion to cap the total amount paid.
9. In the initial stages of proceedings involving CHINS, care and protection
or delinquency the court should consider, on the record, whether the child
should be referred to the local educational agency for a Chapter 766 Team evalu-
ation, if the facts indicate possible impairment of the child's ability to progress
effectively in a regular education program. Parents or legal guardians-or chil-
dren themselves, if over 14-should be parties to such consideration. In addi-
tion, the Office for Children should receive funds to support research and
advocacy related to children's special education and other needs.
10. The Chief Administrative Judge of the Trial Court should establish a
committee to develop and promulgate uniform, comprehensive written rules or
standards for every Department of the Trial Court, including Probation, which
govern Termination of Parental Rights Actions (G.L. c.2 10); Care and Protection
Actions (G.L. c. 119, § 24 or § 23C); Children in Need of Services (CHINS) (G.L.
c.119, § 52 et seq.).
11. Define G.A.L. (Guardian ad Litem) Role by Statute: Legislation should be
introduced to clarify and define the functions of G.A.L.s in cases where the chil-
dren are involved. G.A.L.s should function as Next Friend of the Minor, Investi-
gator or Evaluator, but not as Attorneys/Advocates, as they have in the past.
12. G.L. c.215, § 56A should be amended to give the court discretion to
appoint counsel for children in cases of disputed custody and in cases where the
court determines that visitation, support, or other substantial rights of children
are at stake. Judges should also have the authority to assess said counsel's fees
and expenses to the parties, on the finding of ability to pay, or to the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, subject to a cap to be determined by the court.
If, in a given case, both a G.A.L. and an attorney are appointed by the court
to protect the children's best interests, the G.A.L.'s services shall be to the court
on the children's behalf. That means that G.A.L.s, if asked by the court to make
recommendations, shall do so based on their own perception of what is in the
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guidelines for the judiciary. Although the specific proposals were di-
verse, the underlying and unifying theme was the best interest of the
child, not simply as a legal term of art, but as a shared value and atti-
tude. This thematic principle was emphasized in the Report's introduc-
tory statement that our recommendations were designed to effect
behavioral changes on the part of parents, lawyers and judges. Legal
changes alone, without a corresponding attitudinal change, often be-
come empty formalism. We hoped to make pervasive the principle that
children's needs and rights are paramount and that in conflict situations
other interests should be subordinated. Ideally, in the course of court
proceedings, the parents, their counsel and the judge would come to
children's "best interests," which may or may not coincide with the children's
wishes. Attorneys, by contrast, shall represent the children's position, consistent
with an attorney's representation of any other client.
13. Motions to appoint a G.A.L. may be made by children's attorneys, attor-
neys to other parties, or on the court's own initiative, but the decision to appoint
a G.A.L. should be at the discretion of the court. The court should also specify
whether the appointee will function as a G.A.L. Next Friend, a G.A.L. Investiga-
tor, or a G.A.L. Evaluator. A G.A.L. Next Friend should be an attorney; a G.A.L.
Investigator should be an attorney, social worker or other appropriate profes-
sional; and a G.A.L. Evaluator should be a mental health professional, such as a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or licensed independent clinical social worker. The
G.A.L.'s duties, and timeframes for submission of reports, should be specified in
the court forms.
14. Economic Support: G.L. c.208, § 34 should be amended to add an addi-
tional mandatory criterion, namely, "the present and future needs of dependent
children," in cases of divorce where children are involved. Children's needs shall
be the court's primary concern in determining the distribution of marital assets,
and in assessing alimony and child support.
15. Fiduciary Obligations of Parties to Divorce: To assure full and realistic finan-
cial disclosure, Rule 401 of the Domestic Relations Special Rules should be re-
vised to recognize marriage as a "partnership," to impose fiduciary
responsibilities of full disclosure upon the parties to divorce, and to authorize
sanctions for failure to do so.
16. Emotional Support: G.L. c.208, § 31 should be amended to require di-
vorcing parents who request shared legal custody to demonstrate their ability to
cooperate in protecting the child's interests by developing a mutually acceptable
parenting plan, prior to the date the court renders its final judgment. At a mini-
mum, this plan should provide for decision-making concerning the child's educa-
tion, regular and emergency health care, religious training and observance (if
any), and procedures for resolving parental disputes concerning child-raising de-
cisions and duties after divorce.
17. Creation of Court Intake Centers: Intake Centers staffed with clinical social
workers should be created within each probate court to provide education and
evaluation, as well as direction and access to necessary services, for couples in-
volved in divorce proceeding and custody disputes.
18. Mechanisms should be established to identify all cases pertaining to a
single family unit.
19. Procedures to coordinate and consolidate cases affecting a single family
unit should be implemented by the Courts.
20. Mental health clinics should be established, under the aegis of the De-
partment of Mental Health, for all courts in which child and family issues are
heard.
21. Legislation should be introduced authorizing court-appointed counsel
for minor children alleged to be victims of child abuse in cases where statutory
authority for such appointments does not currently exist, and funds should be
appropriated by the legislature to underwrite the cost of such representation.
22. Increased funding should be made available to encourage expanded
use of mediation by the courts-particularly in CHINS cases-as an informal al-
ternative for families willing to try mediation before resorting to litigation.
1992]
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understand children's needs and respond to them, so that children's
lives are improved by virtue of the court's involvement.
After the Commission Report was officially released at a Governor's
press conference, it was disseminated to libraries and published in legal
newspapers and periodicals. In addition, several seminars were con-
ducted in various parts of the state. However, the most important step
in ensuring that this Report would not die on the vine was the establish-
ment by the Massachusetts Bar Association of a Standing Committee on
the Unmet Legal Needs of Children. This Committee, chaired by the
author, formed subcommittees to draft specific legislative proposals to
implement the Commission's recommendations. As a result of the
Committee's efforts, five bills were filed by the Massachusetts Bar Asso-
ciation at the next two legislative sessions. The endorsement by a
respected state-wide bar association is critical in establishing credibility
with legislators and in being able to utilize the Association's resources
and lobbying efforts. In addition, individual members of the standing
Committee attended legislative hearings on the various bills, gave testi-
mony at public hearings, wrote letters and made calls in support of the
legislation.
The efforts of the Commission have been very successful. Four of
the proposed bills have been enacted into law. 5 These include an Act
5. One of the Commission's proposals was not enacted by the legislature. The pro-
posed legislation would have changed MASS. GEN. L. ch. 215, § 56A (1989), which deals
with Guardians ad Litem. The primary goals of the Commission's recommendations in the
area of G.A.L.s were as follows:
I. To clarify and define the varying roles fulfilled by G.A.L.s in court proceedings
involving children;
2. To distinguish these roles from those of attorneys representing children before
the court; and
3. To specify the qualifications needed by G.A.L.s to fulfill their roles.
The proposed legislation incorporated those recommendations. Part I addressed the
court's role in appointing G.A.L.s, while Part II addressed the G.A.L.'s duties and role.
Part I provided that the court may appoint one of three kinds of G.A.L.s in proceedings
involving a child's welfare. It went on to define the three types of G.A.L.s that could be
appointed and the qualifications that are necessary for each type of G.A.L. Part I also
required the court to specify which type of G.A.L. was being appointed. The three types of
G.A.L.s are the Guardian ad Litem Investigator, the Guardian ad Litem Evaluator and the
Guardian ad Litem Next Friend.
Part II outlined the G.A.L.'s duties, which included conducting his or her investiga-
tion and filing reports with the court. Part II also provided for the court to appoint an
attorney for the child when the court determined that the child's interests cannot other-
wise be protected. This section clarified the distinction between a G.A.L. and an attorney
for the child, stating that the G.A.L. shall not act as the child's attorney. The G.A.L. is not
to act as an advocate for the child per se but rather as an independent investigator/evalu-
ator of the child's needs.
The fundamental purpose of the legislation is to clarify the roles and duties of G.A.L.s
in the court process and to ensure the promotion of the best interests of children involved
in domestic relations proceedings. The text of the proposed legislation read as follows:
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 215, § 56A is hereby amended by striking all of said section and
inserting in place thereof the words:
PART I.
(1) The judge of a probate court, on application of a party or on the court's
own motion, may appoint a guardian ad litem at any stage of a proceeding involv-
ing the care, custody or maintenance of minor children and as to any matter in-
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Providing for Counsel in Certain Proceedings, 6 an Act Providing for the
volving domestic relations except those for the investigation of which provision is
made by section sixteen of chapter two hundred and eight.
(2) The court shall designate in the order of appointment the category of
guardian ad litem appropriate to act in the best interests of the child. The court
shall designate the guardian ad litem as one or more of the following:
(i) Guardian ad Litem Next Friend; (ii) Guardian ad Litem Evaluator; or
(iii) Guardian ad Litem Investigator.
(a) Guardian ad Litem Next Friend shall be an attorney appointed under the
provisions of section thirty-four of chapter two hundred and one and governed by
the provisions thereof.
(b) Guardian ad Litem Evaluator shall be a psychiatrist, psychologist, li-
censed independent clinical social worker or other appropriate mental health
professional appointed by the probate court to evaluate the mental and emotional
needs of the child and the parties to the proceeding or any other mental health
issues pertinent to a determination of the best interests of the child and make
recommendations and report thereon.
(c), Guardian ad Litem Investigator shall be an attorney, social worker or
other appropriate professional or lay person appointed by the court to conduct
an investigation into the facts of the proceeding at issue and make recommenda-
tions and report thereon.
(3) When appointing a Guardian ad Litem Evaluator, the court shall specify
in its order who is to be evaluated and the purpose of such evaluation.
(4) The court shall designate the term of a guardian ad litem's service.
(5) The court shall fix compensation for guardians ad litem and such com-
pensation and any expenses approved by the court shall be paid by the parties or
the commonwealth upon order of the court.
PART II.
(1) The duties of a Guardian ad Litem Next Friend shall be those specified in
section thirty-four of chapter two hundred and one. The duties of a Guardian ad
Litem Evaluator or Guardian ad Litem Investigator shall include performing an
evaluation or making an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of the
child and the family and the available resources within the family and community
to meet those needs; to make a written report; and to promote the best interest of
the child until formally relieved of such responsibility by the court.
(2) Upon request, any agency, person, police officer or probation officer
shall provide a guardian ad litem with all reports made to or by such agency,
person or officer and all records of such agency, party or officer relating to the
child.
(3) A guardian ad litem shall be given immediate notice of any hearings in
the pending case. A guardian ad litem shall report to the court in writing not less
than once during each six month period following the date of appointment or as
is otherwise ordered by the court, regarding such guardian ad litem's activities on
behalf of the child. In any proceeding in which a guardian ad litem is appointed,
the guardian ad litem shall file a current report with the Clerk of Court or Regis-
ter of Probate no later than seven days prior to any final hearing involving the
placement or custody of the child unless otherwise ordered by the court. No
judgment or decree shall enter until the court has reviewed the guardian ad li-
tem's report. Such reports shall be admissible into evidence in lieu of testimony
by the guardian ad litem, subject to the right of the parties to cross examine the
guardian ad litem. Parties may depose guardians ad litem in anticipation of trial
or evidentiary hearing only by order of the court, for good cause shown.
(4) A guardian ad litem shall not act as the child's attorney. Upon a determi-
nation by the court that the best interests of the child would not otherwise be
protected, the court may appoint special counsel for the child to serve as the
child's legal advocate. The court in such cases may assess the child's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs against the parties or against commonwealth.
6. This proposal amended MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 3(b) and read as follows:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
FOR A CHILD IN CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS
SECTION I. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 3(b) as appearing in the 1986 Official
Edition, is hereby amended by adding after the second sentence the following
sentence:
The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child in the proceeding un-
less the petition is not contested by any party.
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Future Needs of Children in Divorce, 7 an Act Relative to Shared Cus-
tody8 and an Act Relative to the Support of Children. 9 The latter three
7. This proposal amended MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34 and read as follows:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUTURE NEEDS OF CHILDREN
IN DIVORCE
SECTION 1. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34, as amended by section 67 of
chapter 23 of the acts of 1988, is hereby amended by inserting after the word
"estate" in the third sentence:
the present and future needs of the dependent children of the marriage.
So the statute would read "the court.., shall consider the length of the marriage, the
conduct of the parties . . . the vocational skills, employability, estate, present and future
needs of the dependent children of the marriage, liabilities and needs of each of the par-
ties .
The following proposal was rejected by the Family Law bar:
PROPOSAL NO. 2. To add an additional paragraph to MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208,
§ 34 as follows:
In making an assignment of property under Section 34 of this chapter, the
court, in order to protect the best interests of any dependent children of the
marriage, may set aside or assign a portion of the estate of the parties to
secure the present and future financial needs of the dependent children of
the marriage. In determining the financial needs of each child, the court
shall consider the following needs in the context of the parties' station in life:
housing, food, clothing, social and recreational, medical and other special
needs, and the educational needs and capacity of each child including higher
education. An order under this paragraph shall be in addition to and shall
not be in lieu of any order for support. An order made pursuant to the pro-
visions of this paragraph, to assign or set aside a portion of the estate of the
parties for a dependent child, may be modified only upon a finding that the
original order no longer serves its intended purpose.
8. This proposal amended MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 31 and read as follows:
AN ACT RELATIVE TO SHARED CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
SECTION 1. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 31, as appearing in the 1986 Official
Edition, is hereby amended by striking out section 31 and inserting in place
thereof the following section:
Section 31. For the purposes of this section, the following words shall have
the following meaning unless context requires otherwise:
"Sole Legal Custody," one parent shall have the right and responsibility to
make major decisions regarding the child's welfare, including matters of educa-
tion, medical care, emotional, moral and religious development.
"Shared Legal Custody," continued mutual responsibility and involvement
by both parents in major decisions regarding the child's welfare, including matter
of education, medical care, emotional, moral and religious development.
"Sole Physical Custody," a child shall reside with and under the supervision
of one parent, subject to reasonable visitation with the other parent, unless the
court determines that visitation would not be in the best interest of the child.
"Shared Physical Custody," a child shall have periods of residing with and
under the supervision of each parent. Physical custody shall be shared by the
parents in such a way as to assure a child frequent and continued contact with
both parents.
In making an order or judgment relative to the custody of children, the rights
of the parents shall, in the absence of misconduct, be held to be equal, and the
happiness and welfare of the children shall determine their custody. When con-
sidering the happiness and welfare of the child, the court shall consider whether
or not the child's present or past living conditions adversely affect his or her
physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
Upon the filing of an action in accordance with the provisions of this section,
section twenty-eight of this chapter, or section thirty-two or chapter two hundred
and nine and until a judgment on the merits is rendered, absent emergency con-
ditions, abuse or neglect, the parents shall have temporary shared legal custody
of any minor child of the marriage; provided, however, that the judge may enter
an order for temporary sole legal custody for one parent if written findings are
made that such shared custody would not be in the best interest of the child.
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Nothing herein shall be construed to create any presumption of temporary shared
physical custody.
In determining whether temporary shared legal custody would not be in the
best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including, but
not limited to, whether any member of the family has been the perpetrator of
domestic violence, abuses alcohol or other drugs, has deserted the child, and
whether the parties have a history of being able and willing to cooperate in mat-
ters concerning the child.
If, despite the prior or current issuance of a restraining order against one
parent pursuant to chapter two hundred and nine A, the court orders shared legal
or physical custody either as a temporary order or at a trial on the merits, the
court shall provide written findings to support such shared custody order.
There shall be no presumption either in favor of or against shared legal or
physical custody at the time of the trial on the merits.
At the trial on the merits, if the issue of custody is contested and either party
seeks shared legal or physical custody, the parties, jointly or individually, shall,
submit to the court at the trial a shared custody implementation plan setting forth
the details of shared custody, including, but not limited to, the child's education;
the child's health care; procedures for resolving disputes between the parties
with respect to child-raising decisions and duties; and the periods of time during
which each party will have the child reside and/or visit with him or her, including
holidays and vacations, or the procedure by which such periods of time shall be
determined.
At the trial on the merits, the court shall consider the shared custody imple-
mentation plans submitted by the parties. The court may issue a shared legal
and/or physical custody order and in conjunction therewith accept the shared
custody implementation plan submitted by either party or by the parties jointly or
may issue a plan modifying the plan or plans submitted by the parties. The court
may also reject the plan and issue a sole legal and/or physical custody award to
either parent. A shared custody implementation plan issued or accepted by the
court shall become part of the judgment in the action, together with any other
appropriate custody orders and orders regarding the responsibility of the parties
for the support of the child.
Provisions regarding shared custody contained in an agreement executed by
the parties and submitted to the court for its approval that addresses the details
of shared custody shall be deemed to constitute a shared custody implementation
plan for purposes of this section.
An award of shared legal or physical custody shall not eliminate responsibil-
ity for child support. An order of shared custody shall not constitute grounds for
modifying a support order absent demonstrated economic impact that is an
otherwise sufficient basis warranting modification.
The entry of an order or judgment relative to the custody of minor children
shall not negate or impede the ability of the parent not granted custody to have
such access to the academic, medical, hospital, or other health records of the
child, as he or she would have had if the custody order or judgment had not been
entered; provided however, that if a court has issued an order to vacate against
the noncustodial parent or an order prohibiting the noncustodial parent from
imposing any restraint upon the personal liberty of the other parent or if nondis-
closure of the present or prior address of the child or a party is necessary to
ensure the health, safety or welfare of such child or party, the court may order
that any part of such record pertaining to such address shall not be disclosed to
such noncustodial parent.
Where the parents have reached an agreement providing for the custody of
the children, the court may enter an order in accordance with such agreement,
unless specific findings are made by the court indicating that such an order would
not be in the best interests of the children.
9. This proposal amended MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 28 and read as follows:
AN ACT RELATIVE TO THE SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
SECTION 1. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 28, as appearing in the 1988 Official
Edition, is hereby amended by inserting after the second sentence the following
sentence:
The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and educa-
tion for any child who has attained age twenty-one but who has not attained
age twenty-three if such child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is
principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.
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statutes were drafted by the Divorce and Custody Subcommittee.' 0 It is
in the arena of divorce that children's needs are most often subsumed
with parental needs or worse, when they are perceived as being aligned
with one or another parent in the oppositional camp. Too often the
ends of justice were deemed served by "cutting the baby in half," in an
effort to appease both parents. This was especially revealing in joint
custody situations where a child was shuttled back and forth between
parental homes, too often with little regard for his or her best interest.
To remedy this problem and to clarify the widespread confusion
between legal and physical custody, and shared and sole custody, the
amended statute provides a definitional section for these terms. The
statute explicitly requires a court to consider certain factors in the deter-
mination of whether temporary shared legal custody is appropriate, in-
cluding incidents of domestic violence, alcohol or substance abuse or
child neglect. As a prerequisite to the granting of shared custody at the
trial on the merits, the new statute also requires the submission of a
shared custody implementation plan prepared by the parties including
provisions for the child's education, health care and a schedule of
shared parental time as well as procedures for resolving disputes be-
tween the parties regarding the child. To minimize the misuse of shared
custody to exact monetary concessions, the amended statute explicitly
deals with the relationship between shared custody orders and responsi-
bility for child support.
Another area of divorce in which children's needs were often ig-
nored was in the area of property division. One of the most controver-
sial proposals involved amending our equitable distribution statute to
include the present and future needs of dependent children as a
mandatory factor for the judge to consider in making a division of prop-
erty in divorce. Under the law as it existed, the trial judge was required
to make specific findings on the parties' automobiles, but not on their
children in reallocating the family's resources. The amended statute re-
quires the judge to consider the present and future needs of the depen-
dent children of the marriage in making an award of property.' I
SECTION 2. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209, § 37, as appearing in the 1988 Official
Edition, is hereby amended by inserting after the first sentence the following
sentence:
The probate court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support
and education for any child who has attained age twenty-one but who has not
attained age twenty-three if such child is domiciled in the home of a parent,
and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.
10. This subcommittee was chaired by then-attorney Beverly Weinger Boorstein, now
a Judge of the Middlesex Probate and Family Court.
11. The amended law reads as follows:
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 34. Alimony; assignment of estate; rights and funds
accrued during marriage; determination of amount of alimony or value of prop-
erty; health insurance.
Section 34. Upon divorce or upon a complaint in an action brought at any
time after a divorce, whether such a divorce has been adjudged in this common-
wealth or another jurisdiction, the court of the commonwealth, provided there is
personal jurisdiction over both parties, may make a judgment for either of the
parties to pay alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu of a judgment to pay
alimony, the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the
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Although it will probably take another ten years before the scope of this
amendment has been fully defined by case law, we are already seeing its
effect at the trial level in both contested and uncontested cases. The
areas specifically affected are the disposition of the marital home and the
setting aside of educational funds. There is growing consensus that, if
there are enough financial resources, the marital home should be pre-
served if possible if it is in the best interests of the child to do so. Addi-
tionally, some judges have taken the position that the statute permits
them to set aside funds in trust for future college expenses. In any
event, the statutory changes have sparked much discussion and renewed
emphasis on children's needs, even where there is not total agreement
on how to meet them. To foster this discussion, the Committee mem-
bers gave several seminars across the state to members of the bench and
bar. The purpose was not only to apprise them of the statutory changes,
but also to sensitize them to the needs of children and to foster ajudicial
construction of those needs which would incorporate the best interest
standard. These seminars were well received and promoted much dis-
cussion and implementation into pending cases. Appellate decisions
have supported this construction, including assessing children's needs
in the context of parental station in life.
12
On July 29, 1991, another bill was passed amending the child sup-
estate of the other, including but not limited to, all vested and nonvested benefits,
rights and funds accrued during the marriage and which shall include, but not be
limited to, retirement benefits, military retirement benefits if qualified under and
to the extent provided by federal law, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred
compensation and insurance. In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be
paid, or in fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned,
the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the
length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. Infixing the nature and
value of the property to be so assigned, the court shall also consider the present and future needs
of the dependent children of the marriage. The court may also consider the contribu-
tion of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value
of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a home-
maker to the family unit. When the court makes an order for alimony on behalf
of a spouse, said court shall determine whether the obligor under such order has
health insurance or other health coverage available to him through an employer
or organization or has health insurance or other health coverage available to him
at reasonable cost that may be extended to cover the spouse for whom support is
ordered. When said court has determined that the obligor has such insurance or
coverage available to him, said court shall include in the support order a require-
ment that the obligor do one of the following: exercise the option of additional
coverage in favor of the spouse, obtain coverage for the spouse, or reimburse the
spouse for the cost of health insurance. In no event shall the order for alimony
be reduced as a result of the obligor's cost for health insurance coverage for the
spouse.
(Emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Pare v. Pare, 565 N.E.2d 1195 (Mass. 1991) (court held that property
division following divorce was inequitable and that the husband was required to set aside a
portion of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home as security for future child support
obligation); LoStracco v. LoStracco, 584 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (court held
that marital home could not be sold following divorce because the children's psychological
and emotional well-being required stability); Dennis v. Dennis, 558 N.E.2d 991 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990) ("a judge may consider a child's 'standard of living' in deciding whether
the level of available support for that child is adequate.").
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port statute 13 extending the age until which an order of support for pur-
poses of education may be made from age twenty-one to age twenty-
three. 14 This bill was to prevent the stranding of college students on
the educational beaches when their support suddenly ebbed at age
13. The new legislation amended § 28 of MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208 and § 37 of MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 209. The amended law reads as follows:
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 208 § 28: Children, care, custody and maintenance provisions
for education and health insurance.
Section 28. Upon a judgment for divorce, the court may make such judg-
ment as it considers expedient relative to the care, custody and maintenance of
the minor children of the parties and may determine with which of the parents the
children or any of them shall remain or may award their custody to some third
person if it seems expedient or for the benefit of the children. Upon a complaint
after a divorce, filed by either parent or by a next friend on behalf of the children
after notice to both parents, the court may make a judgment modifying its earlier
judgment as to the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the
parties provided that the court finds that a material and substantial change in the
circumstances of the parties has occurred and the judgment of modification is
necessary in the best interests of the children. The court may make appropriate
orders of maintenance, support and education of any child who has attained age
eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one and who is domiciled in the
home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.
The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education
for any child who has attained age twenty-one but who has not attained age
twenty-three, if such child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally
dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to the enrollment of such child
in an educational program, excluding educational costs beyond an undergraduate
degree. When the court makes an order for maintenance or support of a child,
said court shall determine whether the obligor under such order has health insur-
ance or other health coverage on a group plan available to him through an em-
ployer or organization or has health insurance or other health coverage available
to him at a reasonable cost that may be extended to cover the child for whom
support is ordered. When said court has determined that the obligor has such
insurance or coverage available to him, said court shall include in the support
order a requirement that the obligor exercise the option of additional coverage in
favor of the child or obtain coverage for the child.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209 § 37: Support orders for children of separated parents;
provisions for education and health insurance.
Section 37. If the parents of minor children live apart from each other, not
being divorced, the probate court for the county in which said minors or any of
them are residents or inhabitants, upon complaint of either parent, or of a next
friend in behalf of the children after notice to both parents, shall have the same
power to make judgments relative to their care, custody, education and mainte-
nance, and to revise and alter such judgments or make new judgments. The pro-
bate court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education
of any child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-
one and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally dependent
upon said parent for maintenance. The court may make appropriate orders of
maintenance, support and education for any child who has attained age twenty-
one but who has not attained age twenty-three if such child is domiciled in the
home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance
due to the enrollment of such child in an educational program, excluding educa-
tional costs beyond an undergraduate degree. When the court makes an order
for support or maintenance on behalf of a child, and such child is not covered by
a private group health insurance plan, said court shall determine whether the
obligor under such order has health insurance on a group plan available to him
through an employer or organization that may be extended to cover the spouse
or child for whom support is ordered. When said court has determined that the
obligor has such insurance, said court shall include in the support order a re-
quirement that the obligor exercise the option of additional coverage in favor of
such child.
14. The following proposal is still pending in the Massachusetts legislature:
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209C, § 9, as appearing in the 1990 Official Edition, is hereby
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twenty-one before most of them had a chance to graduate. The resist-
ance with which this proposal was originally met subsided rather dra-
matically when it was pointed out to critics that the legislature had
previously changed the legal entrance age of a child into school from
five to six years of age with the inevitable result that the age of gradua-
tion from college had thereby been delayed one year. Therefore, the
majority of college students would not graduate until age twenty-two.
In addition to these enacted bills, three more are pending in the
Massachusetts legislature. They include an Act Relative to Guardians
Ad Litem;15 an Act Expediting Resolution of Legal Proceedings Involv-
amended by inserting after the first sentence of subparagraph (a) the following
sentences:
The Court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and educa-
tion for any child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age
twenty-one and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally de-
pendent upon said parent for maintenance. The Court may make appropriate
orders of maintenance, support and education for any child who has attained age
twenty-one but who has not attained age twenty-three if such child is domiciled in
the home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for mainte-
nance due to the enrollment of such child in an educational program, excluding
educational costs beyond an undergraduate degree.
15. The text of the proposed law is as follows:
AN ACT RELATIVE TO GUARDIANS AD LITEM
SECTION 1. Chapter 215 of the General Laws, as appearing in the 1986
Official Edition, is hereby amended by striking section 56A and inserting in place
thereof the following sections:
Section 56A. During the pendency of any proceeding, a justice of the pro-
bate and family department of the trial court may appoint a guardian ad litem to
investigate or evaluate any questions or issues raised in the proceeding and re-
lated to the care, custody or maintenance of minor children or related to any
domestic relations issue except where the investigation is for such issues gov-
erned by section sixteen of chapter two hundred and eight.
The court shall include in the written order of appointment a specific de-
scription of the role and duties which the guardian ad litem is to perform and
assume in the investigation or evaluation in the proceeding in which the appoint-
ment is ordered. The court shall designate the term of a guardian ad litem's
service and shall designate the guardian ad litem as one or both of the following:
(i) A Guardian ad Litem Evaluator; or (ii) A Guardian ad Litem Investigator.
When appointing a Guardian ad Litem Evaluator, the court shall specify in its
order who is to be evaluated and the purpose of such evaluation.
A Guardian ad Litem Evaluator shall be a psychiatrist, psychologist, licensed
independent clinical social worker or other appropriate mental health profes-
sional appointed by the probate court to evaluate the mental and emotional
health of the child or any party to the proceeding or any other mental health
issues pertinent to a determination of the best interests of the child and make
written recommendations and report thereon.
A Guardian ad Litem Investigator shall be an attorney, social worker or other
appropriate professional or lay person appointed by the court to conduct an in-
vestigation into the facts of the proceeding at issue and make written recommen-
dations and report thereon.
The court shall fix compensation for any guardians ad litem and all such
compensation and any expenses approved by the court shall be paid by the par-
ties or the commonwealth as ordered by the court.
A Guardian ad Litem shall have access to all records of the child which are
available to either parent, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
A Guardian ad Litem shall be given timely notice of any hearings in the pend-
ing case.
Within a time period specified in the order of appointment, the guardian ad
litem shall file with the court a written report detailing the results of the investiga-
tion or evaluation or any interim report as ordered by the court, setting forth any
recommendation, if a recommendation is requested by the written order of ap-
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ing Children in Need of Care and Protection; and an Act Clarifying
Child Abuse and Adoption Procedures.
The Committee continues its task of implementing the Commis-
sion's recommendations. Among other issues, we are studying revisions
to financial statements filed in divorce proceedings and proposed meth-
ods of establishing a fiduciary duty between spouses to report their as-
sets fully and accurately in divorce and the imposition of penalties for
failure to do so. It is the consensus of the Committee that these finan-
cial aspects have not been adequately recognized in assessing the best
interests of the child. The expense and time involved in complicated
discovery procedures inevitably involve a serious depletion of economic
resources that would otherwise benefit the family unit after the divorce.
As the Report noted, there was one final theme that transcends all
others, and this is the link between children's unmet legal needs and
children's poverty. At the time of the Report, children in Massachusetts
constituted thirty-eight percent of the poor. Other studies have corrob-
orated that poverty among children is growing.
Our ideal is to move beyond basic needs to the enhancement of the
full potential of each child. This is the best interest of the child. If this
cannot be realistically achieved all of the time, it should nevertheless
remain our goal. To achieve this goal we must forge a new ethic, an
ethic that recognizes the primacy of the child's interests.'
6
pointment. If any proceeding in which a guardian ad litem is appointed, the
guardian ad litem shall file a current report with the Clerk of Court or Register of
Probate no later than thirty days prior to any final hearing involving the place-
ment or custody of the child unless otherwise ordered by the court. The written
report shall be open to inspection by the parties and their counsel. Upon a re-
quest of the guardian ad litem or any of the parties, a judgment or order shall not
enter until the court has reviewed the guardian ad litem's report.
A Guardian ad Litem shall not act as the child's attorney. Upon a determina-
tion by the court that the best interests of the child would not otherwise be pro-
tected, the court may appoint special counsel for the child to serve as the child's
legal advocate. The court in such cases may assess the child's reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs against the parties or against the commonwealth.
16. Professor Mary Ann Glendon has characterized the idea that children's needs
should be considered foremost as the "children-first principle." See Mary Ann Glendon,
Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1559 (1984). This principle requires
that property division following a divorce should provide for the children's support before
the spouses' needs are addressed. In another work, Professor Glendon stated:
To apply this principle consistently in divorces involving minor children, would
mean that the judge's main task would be to piece together ... the best possible
package to meet the needs of the children and their physical custodian. Until the
welfare of the children had been adequately secured in this way, there would be
no question or debate about "marital property." All property, no matter when or
how acquired, would be subject to the duty to provide for the children. Nor
would there be any question of "spousal support" as distinct from what is allo-
cated to the custodial spouse in his or her capacity as physical custodian. In cases
where there is significant income and property left over after the children's needs
have been met, the regular system of marital property division and spousal sup-
port could be applied as a residual system.
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 95 (1987).
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CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE: AMERICAN
FAMILY LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
STEVEN MINTZ*
INTRODUCTION
May minor children sue their parents? Do children have a right,
independent from their parents' wishes, to choose where they will live?
May minor children be permanently removed from their parents' cus-
tody if the parents do not do an effective job of raising them? These are
among the questions that the nation's courts have had to wrestle with as
the nature of American family life has, in the course of a generation,
been revolutionized. I
In recent years, few subjects have generated more controversy or
evoked more perplexing ethical dilemmas than family law. Jurists have
had to grapple with the meaning of such broad and malleable legal con-
cepts as "privacy," "due process," "equal protection" and "the best in-
terests of the child." An explosion of family law litigation has forced
judges to confront a series of extraordinarily difficult questions: What is
a family? Who is a parent? What are parents' obligations? When and
how can the rights of biological parents be terminated? What consti-
tutes a child's best interests in custody and visitation disputes?
Today, half of all civil court cases involve questions of family law.
2
A widespread sense of dissatisfaction has accompanied the proliferation
of litigation over the family. Critics charge that family law decisions are
too unpredictable and arbitrary; that family law judges exercise exces-
sive discretion; that our present system of family law generates too much
litigation and that legal concepts like "the best interest of the child" are
so broad and undefined that they allow jurists to impose their own moral
preferences in their rulings.
3
Two broad perspectives dominate public discussion over family law.
One perspective, held by many conservatives, complains about the ap-
parent increase in judicial intervention in the internal functioning of
* Associate Professor of History, University of Houston. The author thanks Susan
Kellogg, Michael Grossberg, Tamara Harevan, Anne Hornsby, Susan Lehmann, Theda
Skocpol and Cindy Zollars for their comments and criticisms.
1. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981);
STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTION: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FAMILY LIFE (1988); EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY
(1986); Stephen J. Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual
Liberty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 316-60, (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff
eds., 1979).
2. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 228. See also Angel Castillo,judges Flip the Fam-
ily .llbum, N.Y. TIMES, May 3 1981, at E9.
3. Cf David L. Chambers, The "Legalization "of the Family: Toward a Pollr' of Supportive
Neutrality, U. MICH.J.L. REF. 805, 806-13 (1985) (discussing government intrusion into the
family).
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families. It regards the recent spate of family law litigation as a symptom
of an erosion of community. According to this view, the proliferation of
litigation reflects the breakdown of a broad ethical consensus within
American society and the collapse of traditional limits on acceptable be-
havior. Society has come to believe that every grievance should be cast
as a conflict of rights and that all social conflicts should be adjudicated.
4
A second perspective, held by many liberals, celebrates the growing
judicial concern with privacy and individual rights. This perspective re-
gards increasing litigation as an inevitable and essentially positive by-
product of a growing concern for individual rights and of dramatic
demographic changes-such as increasing rates of divorce and numbers
of working mothers-which have generated new kinds of conflicts de-
manding judicial intervention.
5
There are kernels of truth in both points of view; yet both perspec-
tives are profoundly ahistorical, and they obscure a fundamental para-
dox at work in family law. Two apparently contradictory historical
developments have occurred simultaneously in family law. One involves
a gradually growing emphasis on privacy and individual rights; the
other, a gradual increase in the involvement of the legal system in the
internal functioning of families. In the pages that follow, we will ex-
amine the changing role of law in regulating familial behavior from the
seventeenth century to the present, focusing on the transformation of
legal norms for marriage, divorce, parent-child relationships and cus-
tody and support obligations. What we will see is the way that two para-
doxical developments-a stress on privacy and equal rights and a shift
toward greater public involvement in internal family functioning-arose
hand-in-hand, each reinforcing the other. We will trace the emergence
of the idea that family members are individuals who have distinct inter-
ests, not reducible to the interests of a family patriarch; and we will see
how this idea contributed to the view that the state has a duty to inter-
vene in the family "in the public interest."
I. STATE, LAW AND FAMILY
Given the weakness of other institutional authorities, law has played
a particularly important role in American society. Law has provided an
arena of social and cultural conflict. It has served as a moral theater
where fundamental values have been defined and dramatized. It has fur-
nished a standard by which all forms of disputation are measured. Fi-
nally, it has served as a mediator between individuals and the state,
defining the limits of state intervention.
Yet for all of its obvious importance, American law poses difficult
conceptual issues. Law is, at once, an intellectual system with its own
4. See id.; see generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAM-
ILY BESIEGED (1977).
5. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The lyth of State Intervention in the Family,
18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
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commitments, forms and procedures; an ethical structure defining per-
missible behavior and ways of resolving disputes; and a social process in
which legal principles are established through the adjudication of many
individual cases. Not simply a mirror of society, the law is a semi-auton-
omous realm, partially responsive to statutory enactments, social prac-
tices and cultural values, and also to its own traditions and precedents.
In addition, the law is a powerful legitimizing force, which (in theory)
relegates conflicts to a special, abstract realm where decisions are sup-
posed to be made on an evenhanded, non-partisan basis, reflecting
broadly accepted notions of equity, fairness and impartiality.
6
An intensive look at the history of American family law can help us
to understand the critical social functions played by law in American so-
ciety. Such a study can also help us understand the changing relation-
ship between government and individual families and the relationship
between the broad social and cultural sources of legal change and the
more intrinsically technical sources of legal innovation. Since the earli-
est days of colonization, government has shown a special interest in the
family, enacting statutes to regulate familial behavior, empowering pub-
lic officials to oversee familial relations and intervene in internal family
functioning, assigning rights and obligations to family members and
conferring privileged status upon particular kinds of family units.




Over the past decade, scholars have engaged in a far-reaching effort
to reconstruct the legal history of the family. Although some of their
conclusions must remain tentative and subject to revision, this scholar-
ship has clearly identified the outlines of legal change.
A. The Colonial Law of the Family
The colonial law of the family varied sharply from one colony to
another, reflecting differences in religious ideology, regional economies
and demographic circumstances. Colonies actively involved in trade
with England, including Maryland, New York, South Carolina and Vir-
ginia, created chancery courts modelled on those in England. They re-
tained English common law principles more readily than Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, where religious ideas led authorities to
reject English common law and equity.8
During the seventeenth century, lawmakers in Massachusetts and
Connecticut revised English common law and created a system of family
6. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY
CONNECTICUT 1-10 (1987).
7. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND His-
TORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988).
8. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 185-
93 (1986).
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law embodying basic religious beliefs about how families were to be or-
dered and authority distributed, the nature of the marital bond and the
proper roles of married women and children. This body of law stressed
the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of familial relationships, con-
ceived of marriage as a civil contract and placed an emphasis on family
unity and interdependence, a wife's submission to her husband's will
and children's dependent and subordinate status.9
In accordance with their organic conception of society, Puritan Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut required all individuals to marry and live in
"well ordered" households, taxing bachelors and single women who
failed to marry, fining couples who lived apart from each other and re-
quiring unmarried persons to enter an established household as a
boarder or servant.' 0 Since marriage was regarded as a public act and
an alliance among families, town governments required brides and
grooms to submit to extensive community and family supervision. A fa-
ther had a legal right to determine which men could court his daughters
and a legal responsibility to give or withhold consent from a child's mar-
riage, though he could not "willfully" or "unreasonably" deny his ap-
proval. No couple could legally join in marriage without announcing
their intention to do so at three successive public meetings or by posting
a written notice on the meetinghouse door for fourteen days."I In all
colonies, however, a shortage of clergy and onerous regulations contrib-
uted to large numbers of "informal" marriages lacking legal sanction.12
Because Puritan lawmakers considered marital unity under the hus-
band a prerequisite of social stability and because they assumed that
husbands (or grown sons) would provide for their wives and widows,
they tended to eliminate certain English common law protections for
married women which assumed that husbands and wives had separate
interests within the family. Both Massachusetts and Connecticut re-
jected English ideas of separate estates for women, dower interest, pre-
nuptial contracts and suits in equity as well as certain common law
protections for women against coercion by their husbands. '3
In sharp contrast, in Maryland, South Carolina and Virginia, where
the death rate was higher and widows were more likely to be left with
young children, women received somewhat greater protections of prop-
erty rights as dower was extended to personal and real property. These
colonies also retained English protections against coercion by husbands
(by requiring wives to acknowledge their consent to the conveyance of
property in private examinations apart from their husbands). New York
9. Id. at 3-13; Marylynn Salmon, The Legal Status of Women in Early America: A Reap-
praisal, I LAW & HIST. REV. 129 (1983).
10. MIMi ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 53-54 (1988).
I1. EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 30-34, 83-84 (1944).
12. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 at
92-94 (1976).
13. See SALMON, supra note 8, at 185-93.
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and South Carolina also recognized the principle of separate estates for
women, allowing married women limited rights to own and control
property apart from their husbands.'
4
Although married women in colonial New England were legally
subordinate to their husbands, they did possess limited legal rights and
protections. Husbands who refused to support or cohabit with their
wives were subject to legal penalties. Because Puritans regarded mar-
riage as a civil, not a sacred, contract, they permitted divorce in cases of
a husband's impotence, cruelty, abandonment, bigamy, adultery, incest
or failure to provide. Massachusetts granted approximately forty abso-
lute divorces between 1639 and 1692; 15 another twenty-three divorce
petitions were brought to the Governor's Council from 1692 to 1789.16
In contrast, Maryland, New York and Virginia strictly opposed absolute
divorce with right to remarry, while allowing divorce a mensa et loro (sepa-
ration from bed and board) and private separation agreements. 17 In ad-
dition to authorizing divorce as a protection to women, Massachusetts
Bay and Plymouth colonies also enacted the first laws in the western
world protecting "marryed woemen . . . from bodilie correction or
strikes by her husband . . . unless it be in his own defense."' 18
The significance of these legal protections for women must not be
overstated. In practice, Puritan law reinforced a hierarchical and pater-
nalistic conception of the family. In order to obtain a divorce, a wife had
to prove that she had "acted dutifully" and not given her husband
"provocation."' 9 In a number of instances, authorities allowed hus-
bands to punish an abusive wife or a disobedient child by whipping.
Perhaps as a result of the emphasis attached to order and patriarchal
authority, women were more likely than men to be punished for adul-
tery, fornication and bastardy.
20
Even in cases of abuse, Puritan magistrates commanded wives to be
submissive and obedient, telling them not to resist or strike their hus-
bands but try to reform their spouses' behavior. 2 1 Women who refused
to conform to Puritan ideals of wifely obedience were subject to harsh
punishment including fines or whippings. Courts prosecuted 278 seven-
14. See id.
15. See LYLE KOEHLER, A SEARCH FOR POWER: THE "WEAKER SEX" IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 49-50, 77-79, 152-53 (1980); SALMON, supra note 8, at 58-80;
Henry S. Cohn, Connecticut's Divorce Mechanism: 1636-1669, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35
(1970); Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massa-
chusetts 18 WM. & MARY Q 586 (1976); Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social
Life Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records, 10J. Soc. HIST. 20 (1976); D. Kelly Weisberg,
Under Great Temptations Here: Vomen and Divorce Law in Puritan Massachusetts, in 2 WOMEN
AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 117-28 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982).
16. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of IWomen in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts,
supra note 15.
17. SALMON, supra note 8, at 58-68.
18. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 21-22 (1987).
19. Id. at 24. See also KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 136-60.
20. See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATrERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 31, 38 (1988).
21. See KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 136-46.
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teenth century New England wives for heaping abuse on their husbands.
In general, colonial New England courts valued family preservation
above the physical protection of wives and children, seldom granted
wives divorce on grounds of cruelty, only punished the most severe in-
stances of domestic abuse and generally meted out mild punishments to
men.22
New England law treated children, like women, as subordinate and
dependent beings. In exchange for paternal support, education and
training, children's service and earnings were their father's property. In
order to reinforce paternal authority, one law adopted by the Massachu-
setts General Court in 1646 made it a capital offense for "a stubborn or
rebellious son, of sufficient years and understanding [viz. sixteen years
of age], to not obey the voice of his Father . or mother."123 In Con-
necticut and Rhode Island, a rebellious son could be confined in a house
of correction. Rebellious daughters and sons under sixteen were sub-
ject to whippings. The Massachusetts code did extend certain minimal
protections to children. Just as the code outlawed wife beating, it pro-
hibited "any unnatural severitie" toward children.2 4
Since the family was the foundation stone of the Puritan social or-
der and disorderly families defiled God's injunctions, the larger commu-
nity gave fathers legal authority to maintain "well-ordered" families. If
they failed, the community asserted its responsibility for enforcing mo-
rality and punishing misconduct. If a family failed to properly perform
its responsibilities for teaching religion, morality and obedience to law,
then town selectmen had orders to "take such children or apprentices"
from neglectful masters "and place them with some masters .. .which
will more strictly look unto, and force them to submit unto govern-
ment."'2 5 Each year, courts tried a few dozen cases of spouse abuse,
cruelty to children and servants, threats against parents, child neglect,
adultery and, above all, fornication. 26 In 1648, Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony, fearing that "many parents and masters are too indulgent and neg-
ligent" ordered selectmen to keep "a vigilant eye over their brethren
22. See id.; see also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-31 (discussing the reluctance of the
Puritans to invade family privacy); cf. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 31-38 (dis-
cussing Seventeenth-Century family violence).
23. JOHN R. SUTrrON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1640-1981,at 10 (1988).
24. See MORGAN, supra note 11, at 78-79, 148; PLECK, supra note 18, at 25-28; SUTroN,
supra note 23, at 10-42; Lee E. Teitelbaum & LeslieJ. Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on
Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS AND
THE JUVENILE COURT 1-35 (Lee E. Teitelbaum & Aidan R. Gough eds., 1977); Lee E. Tei-
telbaum, Family History and Family Laws, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135 (1985).
25. Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 24, at 12. See also MORGAN, supra note 11 at 27,
78, 148 (noting similar rules).
26. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 22, 27-38; KOEHLER, supra note 15, at
136-60; PLECK, supra note 18, at 27-32; Henry Bamford Parkes, Morals and Law Enforcement
in Colonial .Vew England, 5 NEW ENG. Q. 431, 443-47 (1932); Linda Auwers Bissel, Family,
Friends, and Neighbors: Social Interaction in Seventeenth-Century Windsor, Connecticut
(1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University); cf ROGER THOMPSON, SEX IN
MIDDLESEX: POPULAR MORES IN A MASSACHUSETrS COUNTY, 1649-1699, at 169-89 (1986)
(discussing community control).
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and neighbors to see ... [that] their children and apprentices [acquire]
so much learning as may enable them perfectly to read the English
tongue and knowledge of the capital laws."'2 7 Between 1675 and 1679,
Puritan authorities extended public supervision of familial behavior by
authorizing the selectmen in every town to appoint tithingmen, "each of
whom shall take the Charge of Ten or Twelve Families of his
Neighbourhood, and shall diligently inspect them."
'28
To what extent did the seventeenth century New Englanders use
courts to encourage and enforce proper domestic behavior? Not as fre-
quently as popular attitudes about Puritans suggest. Only rarely did
courts become involved in cases of domestic violence. Only one rebel-
lious adult son was prosecuted for "reviling and unnatural reproaching
for his natural father," 29 and he was punished, not by hanging, but by
whipping. Similarly, only one natural father was prosecuted for exces-
sively beating his daughter. 30 Prosecutions for wife beating were rela-
tively infrequent. Between 1630 and 1699, 128 men are known to have
been tried for physically abusing their wives.3 1 The punishments for
wife abuse were generally mild, usually amounting only to a fine, a lash-
ing, a public admonition or supervision by a town-appointed guardian.
In two instances, however, colonists did lose their lives for murdering
their wives.
3 2
Although early New Englanders paid close attention to the domes-
tic and sexual behavior of individuals, prosecutions were generally infre-
quent, except in cases of repeated offenses, especially disruptive
behavior or in cases involving the indigent. In cases involving the indi-
gent, lawmakers separated children from parents and required them to
work for strangers. They also required paupers and their families to
wear the letter "P" on the sleeve of their outer garment, removed indi-
gent families out of town and compelled relatives, including grandpar-
ents, to support grown children or grandchildren at risk of fines or
imprisonment.3 3 Punishment of offenses was designed to strengthen
communal norms by bringing deviation into the public realm and elicit-
ing proper attitudes-shame and recantation-on the part of the con-
victed. Couples found guilty by a church court of fornication had to
repent publicly before their child could be baptized. Public humiliation,
confession and repentance affirmed the boundaries of acceptable behav-
ior.34 By the mid-eighteenth century, community regulation of the fam-
ily had dramatically declined due to rapid population growth, increasing
27. Teitelbaum & Harris, supra note 24, at 11.
28. MORGAN, supra note 11, at 149. See also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29 (discussing the
rationale behind, and the effectiveness of, such rules).
29. PLECK, supra note 18, at 26, 29-31.
30. Id. at 26-27.
31. KOEHLER, supra note 15, at 137.
32. Id. at 137-42. See also PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-31 (describing one instance of
wife abuse).
33. Bissell, supra note 26, at 106-29. See also D'EMILuO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at
27-32; PLECK, supra note 18, at 32-33.
34. Bissell, supra note 26, at 106-29.
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religious fragmentation, new ideologies emphasizing personal privacy
and the spread of market relationships that undercut paternalistic social
relationships. The breakdown of communal controls was manifest in ris-
ing rates of illegitimacy and premarital pregnancy, the abolition of many
church courts and declining legal prosecution of sexual offenses. By the
mid-eighteenth century, courts and town selectmen were less concerned
about married couples guilty of premarital pregnancy, and more con-
cerned about the economic maintenance of the illegitimate children
born to single women.
3 5
B. Family Law of the Poor
Even in the seventeenth century, a dual system of family law existed,
with one set of principles-of patriarchal authority, family unity, domes-
tic privacy and the primacy and inviolability of the family-applying to
most families, and a different set of principles applying to the families of
the poor. Four key principles characterized the colonial family law of
the poor: local responsibility for assisting poor families, outdoor relief
(that is, assistance for the destitute in their own homes), the legal obliga-
tion of family members to support relatives and apprenticeship of minor
children.
3 6
Eligibility for public relief was defined by settlement and removal
laws. Colonial settlement laws, which grew stiffer with time, authorized
local authorities to deny residence to newcomers who might become a
burden on the town, required newcomers without means of support to
post bond and barred property owners from selling land to newcomers
without prior approval by local authorities. 3 7 During the nineteenth
century, residency requirements for public relief were lengthened, and
penalties for those who brought the indigent into local communities
were toughened. In a number of cases, courts split up indigent families
and transported sick or elderly paupers across local boundary lines.
3 8
Other regulations empowered local officials to remove children from in-
digent and neglectful parents and apprentice them with a master. They
further required parents, grandparents, children and, in Massachusetts
and New York, grandchildren to provide support for poor relatives. 39
Even in cases involving the indigent, a broad stress on the primacy
of the family remained. During the colonial era, most indigent individu-
als received assistance in their own homes, although some elderly, wid-
owed, sick or disabled persons, who were unable to care for themselves,
were placed in neighboring households. It was not until the mid-eight-
eenth century that a small number of towns erected almshouses or work-
houses to serve individuals without families, such as vagrants,
35. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 32-34; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICAN-
IZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,
1760-1830, at 110-11 (1975); PLECK, supra note 18, at 29-35.
36. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 10, at 75-79; BLOOMFIELD, Supra note 12, at 99-104.
37. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 10, at 79-83; BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 99-104.
38. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 99-104.
39. See id. at 103-04.
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dependent strangers, deserted children or orphans. Yet even these in-
stitutions were modelled upon families; such institutions were built in
the style of ordinary residences and patterned after the organization of
the family.
40
C. The Early Nineteenth-Century Reconstruction of Family Law
During the first decades of the nineteenth century, American jurists,
legislators, litigants and legal commentators reformulated English and
colonial legal rules and doctrines dealing with families and created a
new system that used contract, gender and family status to structure
legal rights and obligations. This new set of rules, regulations and prac-
tices rearranged the balance of power within the home and dramatically
altered the relationship between family members and government. 4 1
The new system of family law embodied emergent republican no-
tions of what constituted a proper family. There was a new conception
of the woman's role, which defined the ideal wife and mother in terms of
piety, virtue and domesticity; a new sentimental conception of children
as vulnerable, malleable creatures with a special innocence and a roman-
tic conception of marriage based on free choice and romantic love.
4 2
A belief that choice of a spouse should be based on romantic love
rather than parental arrangement led judges and legislatures to make
matrimony easier to enter. State legislators lowered marriage fees and
authorized an increasing number of churches and public officials to per-
form marriages while courts rejected colonial rules that made marriage
licenses and parental consent necessary for a valid marriage. Judges
voided state statutes setting minimum age of marriage and reduced re-
striction on marriages among affines (such as marriages between a wid-
ower and his sister-in-law). They also tended to uphold the validity of
common law marriage-in sharp contrast to English courts, which re-
jected "irregular marriage" as invalid-on the grounds that a prohibi-
tion on informal marriages would throw into question the legitimacy of
such unions and "bastardize" many children.
43
A belief that the primary object of marriage was the promotion of
personal happiness encouraged jurists and legislators to increase access
to divorce and remarriage in instances of adultery, physical abuse or fail-
ure of a marriage partner to fulfill his or her proper role. In the early
40. Id. at 99-104; DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 3-56 (1971).
4 1. See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK, 70-112 (1982); BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 91-131;
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA, ix-xii (1985); Norma Basch, Invisible lomen: The Legal Fiction of Marital Unity in
Nineteenth-Century America, 5 FEMINIST STUD. 346 (1979).
42. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 3-25 (1980); JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800 (1982); MINTZ &
KELLOGG, supra note I, at 43-65; MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAM-
ILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 18-59, 145-85 (1981).
43. See GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 64-83.
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nineteenth century, the availability of divorce as a remedy to intolerable
marriages expanded as states transferred jurisdiction over divorce peti-
tions to courts. By the 1830s, a number of states adopted extremely
permissive divorce laws, allowing a divorce to be granted for any mis-
conduct that "permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and
defeats the purposes of the marriage relation." 44 In conception and in
practice, nineteenth century divorce law tended to reinforce contempo-
rary notions of wifely and husbandly behavior. Divorce laws were built
around the concept of spousal fault or moral wrongdoing, and in order
to obtain a divorce it had to be demonstrated that a husband or wife had
violated his or her domestic role in a fundamental way. In a typical di-
vorce, a wife sued her husband for nonsupport, intemperance and his
"indolent," "profligate" and "dissipated" behavior while she sought to
demonstrate her "frugality" in managing the home.
4 5
A view of married women as individuals possessing distinct rights
was apparent in the enactment of married women's property acts, which
gave married women limited control over property they brought to mar-
riage or inherited afterward, rudimentary contractual capacity and the
right to sue or be sued. 4 6 Despite these statutes, married women were
still treated as a separate and special class in the eyes of the law.
4 7
Courts held, for example, that ambiguous or intermingled assets be-
longed to the husband, that women's customary ways of earning money,
such as taking in boarders, did not meet the legal requirements of a
separate estate and that wives could not establish a separate estate with-
out their husbands' consent.
48
The new domestic ideology was also recognized in legal changes
involving child support, child custody and illegitimacy. During the mid-
dle decades of the century, New York state judges were the first to estab-
lish the principle that parents had a legal obligation to support their
children, reversing the old common law doctrine that parents had only a
nonenforceable moral duty to support their offspring. 49 Many courts
went even further and rejected the notion that fathers had an unlimited
44. DAVID BRION DAVIS, ANTEBELLUM AMERICAN CULTURE: AN INTERPRETIVE ANTHOL-
oc;Y 96 (1979).
45. See ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890: VicTro-
RIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 39-140 (1982). The arguments advanced in nine-
teenth-century divorce petitions reflected broader cultural ideas of womanhood and
manhood. Wives told the courts that they were chaste, modest, industrious, frugal and
orderly, while their husbands complained that they were unfaithful, slovenly, lazy and im-
provident. Conversely, husbands asserted that they were kind, thoughtful, affectionate,
temperate, industrious, self-controlled and sexually restrained, while their wives com-
plained that they were cruel, indolent, profligate, dissipated and unfaithful. Legal argu-
ments in divorce cases focused on such issues as sexual decorum, work habits and the
nature of family relationships. Id.
46. See BASCH, supra note 41, at 200-23.
47. Norma Basch's detailed study of married women and the law of property in nine-
teenth century New York found that judges severely restricted women's contractual capa-
bilities and strictly construed statutory provisions in order to maintain husbands' common
law right to their wives' earnings and services. Id.
48. Id.
49. BLOOMFIELD, sutpra note 12, at 119-20.
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right to their children's earnings and services, ruling that emancipated
minors had full control over their own earnings. A growing number of
judges also moved away from the common law principle that gave fa-
thers almost unlimited rights to the custody of their children. 50 By the
1820s, a growing stress on children's welfare and women's childrearing
abilities led American judges to limit fathers' custody rights. In deter-
mining custody, courts began to look at the "happiness and welfare" of
the child and the "fitness" and "competence" of the parents. 5 1 As early
as 1860, a number of states had adopted the "tender years" rule, ac-
cording to which children who were below the age of puberty were
placed in their mother's care unless she proved unworthy of that respon-
sibility.52 Nineteenth-century American law also broke with English
common law by extending many legal rights to illegitimate children and
making it easier to legitimate children born outside of wedlock by per-
mitting adoption.
53
D. The Paradox of the "Modern" Family
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a fun-
damental redefinition of the boundaries of domestic and civic spheres.
In the early seventeenth century, the family's functions were broad and
diffuse. It educated children, it cared for the elderly and ill, it trans-
ferred property and skills to the next generation and it was the economic
center of production. By the early nineteenth century, non-familial in-
stitutions assumed many of these functions. The middle class family's
roles grew narrower and more specialized: The family provided emo-
tional support and affection and contributed to the socialization of chil-
dren. 54  While in one sense the family became more private, by
appropriating the realms of feeling and emotion, this was essentially a
means geared to a public end. The family was supposed to serve the
political order by diffusing self-serving needs and instilling the values of
willing obedience, service and rational impartiality-the values of good
citizenship.
5 5
But what about families that failed to perform these critical public
50. See id.; GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 235-59; Michael Grossberg, Iho gets the Child?
Custody, Guardianship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMI-
NIST STUD. 235 (1983).
51. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 12, at 119-20; GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 235-60;
Grossberg, supra note 50, at 238-46 (1983).
52. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 248-50. See also Anonymous, 55 Ala. 428, 432-33
(1876); State v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa 373, 375 (1880); Landis v. Landis, 39 N.J.L. 274
(1877); State v. Baird & Torrey, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (1869); In re Pray, 60 How. Pr. 194-96
(N.Y. 1881); McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462, 466 (1879).
53. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 196-228; Michael Grossberg, Crossing Boundaries:
Nineteenth-Century Domestic Relations Law and the Merger of Family and Legal History, 4 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 799, 834-40 (1985).
54. JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 185-
86 (1970).
55. Lasch, supra note 4, at 3-4; Barbara Laslett, The Family as a Public and Private Institu-
tion: An Historical Perspective, 35 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 480, 487-89 (1973); Teitelbaum, supra
note 24, at 1141-81.
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functions? Perhaps the most striking development in early nineteenth
century family law was the development of a host of public and private
institutions designed to rectify family failures. Convinced that such fail-
ures were to blame for an alarming increase in violence, robbery, prosti-
tution and drunkenness, reformers responded by creating substitute
families such as public schools, houses of refuge, reform schools, YM-
CAs for young rural migrants to cities, orphanages and penitentiaries.
56
A blurring of boundaries between domestic and civic life emerged,
which encouraged the transfer to public agencies of moral prerogatives
and of the presumed benevolence and good will that had grown out of
kinship bonds. During the mid-1820s, Boston, New York and Philadel-
phia established the nation's first publicly funded children's asylums for
the moral rehabilitation of delinquent, incorrigible and neglected
youths. These houses of refuge separated children from "incompetent"
parents, removed them from the sources of temptation, pauperism and
crime and instilled habits of self-control through moral education, work,
rigorous discipline and an orderly environment.
57
The early nineteenth century houses of refuge set four important
legal precedents. The first was that public and private officials had a
right to act in loco parentis by removing children deemed unruly, incorri-
gible, in need of supervision, or abused or neglected and placing them
in foster homes or institutions where they would be rehabilitated rather
than punished. 58 The second precedent was the establishment of for-
mal distinctions between children and adults before the law. Drawing
upon the emerging sentimental conception of childhood, jurists held
that a child could not, "by reason of infancy,"' 59 be considered crimi-
nally responsible. Third, juvenile statutes placed non-criminal behavior,
including incorrigibility, habitual disobedience and vicious and immoral
behavior, under the jurisdiction of the courts. Finally, the new system
embodied two key characteristics of the modern juvenile justice system:
commitment ofjuveniles to institutions after summary or informal hear-
ings and indeterminant sentencing.
60
The early nineteenth century reconstruction of family law and the
creation of public institutions in the form of surrogate families repre-
sented a fundamental shift in the locus of cultural authority. On one
dimension, this involved a shift away from authority vested in household
56. DAVIS, supra note 44, at 40; ROBERT M. MENNELL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS IN THE AMERICAN STATES, 1825-1940, at 11-12 (1973); ROBERT S. PICKETr,
HOUSES OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OFJUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857, at 74-
75 (1969); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920, at 124 (1976); SuTroN,
supra note 23, at 43-89; Steven L. Schlossman,justice in the Age ofJackson, 76 TCHRS C. REC.
119 (1974).
57. ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 257-62.
58. JOSEPH M. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 41 (1971); SuTrON, supra note 23, at 45-49; Teitelbaum & Har-
ris, supra note 24, at 20.
59. HAWES, supra note 58, at 41; SUTrroN, supra note 23, at 45.
60. HAWES, supra note 58, at 41, 57; SurroN, supra note 23, at 43-46; Teitelbaum &
Harris, supra note 24, at 20.
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patriarchs to appointed or elected judges who received broad discre-
tionary authority to interpret law, investigate the moral fitness of parents
and act in children's supposed best interests. On a second dimension, it
involved a growing differentiation of law from other cultural authorities.
By the early nineteenth century, courts showed a reduced interest in en-
forcing Christian religious and moral values-such as blasphemy, pro-
fanity, lewdness and fornication-which became the exclusive province
of churches and voluntary reform societies; instead, courts increasingly
devoted their attention to disputes involving property and business.
Henceforth, when courts intervened in domestic affairs, most notably in
cases involving poverty or delinquency, public involvement was justified
on a new and explicitly secular ground, as an effort to rectify family
failure.
6 1
E. The Late Nineteenth-Century Reorientation of Family Law
In the late nineteenth century, legal priorities shifted away from in-
dividual choice toward social control. A rising divorce rate, a declining
middle class birth rate, changes in women's role and mounting concern
about child abuse and neglect all encouraged unprecedented arguments
for public paternalism and provided new justifications for intervention
in the family by secular authorities.
6 2
Eugenicistic, racist and nativistic ideas led many states to impose
physical and mental health requirements for marriage, outlaw polygamy
(in Idaho and Utah) and interracial marriages (primarily in the boarder
states and lower South), establish a waiting period before marriage, in-
stitute a higher age of consent and adopt procedures for public registra-
tion of all new marriages (by 1907, twenty-seven states required
registration).63 A growing number of states barred first cousin marriage
and other marriages between blood relations, and an increasing number
of judges refused to accept the validity of common law marriages. Con-
vinced that family limitation was an assault on the home, legislators held
abortion to be a criminal offense and restricted the dissemination of
birth control materials and information. The publication of an 1886 re-
port estimating that the United States granted more divorces than all
other western countries combined led many states to make it more diffi-
61. NELSON, supra note 35, at 110-11.
62. The late nineteenth-century perception of a crisis of the family had a number of
long-term causes. The climbing divorce rate reflected rising marital expectations and de-
mands, as a more companionate ideal of marital relationships spread. The falling birth
rate partly reflected the fact that in an urban, commercial society children were no longer
economic assets who could be productively employed. The emergence of a self-conscious
middle class concerned about social mobility also encouraged new limits on family size, as
did women's desire to free themselves from an unending cycle of pregnancy, birth, nurs-
ing and new pregnancy. Changes in women's roles added to the sense of crisis, as increas-
ing numbers of women attended high school and college, joined clubs, participated in
mixed-sex leisure activities and worked outside the home.
63. MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE-NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 461-72 (1977); GROSSBERG supra note 4 1, at 103-95; Michael Grossberg, Guarding
the Altar." Physiological Restrictions and the Rise of State Intervention in Vatrimoniy, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 197 (1982).
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cult to obtain divorces by raising the age of marriage, restricting remar-
riages after divorce, lengthening residence requirements for divorce and
reducing the grounds for divorce from over 400 to fewer than 20.6 4 By
1900, just three states-Kentucky, Rhode Island and Washington-per-
mitted courts to grant divorces on any grounds the courts deemed
proper. Through law, government articulated a series of moral ideals:
that marriage was a life-long commitment (by permitting divorce only
on grounds of serious fault), that sexual relations should be confined to
monogamous marriage (by prohibiting adultery, cohabitation, fornica-
tion and polygamy), and that the purpose of sexual relations was procre-
ation (by criminalizing sodomy and restricting access to contraceptives
and abortion).65
The increasing social control orientation of family law cannot be
reduced simply to a resurgence of moralism in the face of a perceived
crisis of the family; it also reflected the rise of a therapeutic conception
of law, which viewed families as instruments of the state, children as
public wards and the courts as proper vehicles for solving family
problems. The rise of a therapeutic view is most evident in new forms of
institutional intervention in the family that arose in the late nineteenth
century.
6 6
Societies for the prevention of cruelty to children (the first was
founded in New York in 1875) sought to assist orphaned, destitute, de-
serted and illegitimate children and rescue ill-treated children from neg-
lectful and abusive parents. Child labor and compulsory education laws
sought to take children out of the labor force and keep parents from
exploiting their children economically. To provide children with a more
wholesome environment, most cities established kindergartens and play-
grounds and removed wayward and homeless children from poorhouses
and other institutions, placing them instead in "family-like" arrange-
ments such as foster homes and apprenticeships. Public health reform-
ers sought to reduce infant and child mortality, pasteurize milk and cut
the death rate from such diseases as tuberculosis and diptheria. Other
reformers attacked the double standard of sexual morality and worked
to reduce rates of venereal disease. Still others advocated closing down
red-light districts and supported pensions for indigent mothers. "Child-
savers" and "family protectors" varied widely in their assumptions
about the propriety of religious or benevolent organizations running
child- or family-saving institutions; the appropriate role of the state and
private agencies acting as parens patriae and the relative merits of custo-
dial institutions and the family. They were united, however, by a convic-
64. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 108-09; Grossberg, supra note 63; J.P. LICHTEN-
BERGER, DIVORCE: A SOCIAL INTERPRETATION 154-87 (1931); ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT
EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA 4-7 (1980); MINTZ &
KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 126-27; JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 20-45 (1978).
65. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 107-13.
66. LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (1980).
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tion that many of society's most intractable social problems originated in
deformed or dysfunctional homes and that it was necessary to expand
the state's supervisory and administrative authority over the family.
6 7
Perhaps the most dramatic attempt to save the family was the move-
ment to prevent cruelty to wives and children. During the last third of
the nineteenth century, concern about family violence and child abuse
mounted, and philanthropists founded 494 child protection and anti-
cruelty societies. Several states passed laws allowing wives to sue sa-
loon-keepers for injuries caused by a drunken husband, and three states
(Maryland in 1882, Delaware in 1901 and Oregon in 1905) passed laws
punishing wife-beating with the whipping post. These late nineteenth
century reformers largely blamed cruelty to children upon alcohol and
the flawed character of immigrant men-in sharp contrast to their coun-
terparts of the 1930s and 1940s who downplayed male violence and
blamed abuse on mothers who nagged their husbands and children and
refused to accept the female role. After the turn of the century, the anti-
cruelty movement declined rapidly for two reasons: opponents were
convinced that the societies were prejudiced against the poor and the
working class and much too frequently removed children from their par-
ents' custody.
6 8
The extension of the state's authority over children was also appar-
ent in new policies toward "wayward" children. New legislation, draw-
ing on the old legal doctrine that the state had an obligation to protect
children from "imminent harm," gave public agencies the power to re-
move neglected and vagrant children from their parents, construct in-
dustrial-training and reform schools and invoke criminal penalties
against parents for abandonment, nonsupport and contributing to the
dependency or delinquency of a minor.
6 9
To provide care and supervision for neglected, delinquent and va-
grant children, philanthropic organizations, settlement houses and pri-
vate individuals established more than 450 charitable day nurseries in
working-class neighborhoods by 1910. The nurseries not only provided
custodial care for children whose mothers worked, they also sought to
"Americanize" immigrant children through instruction in proper man-
67. See generally LEROY ASHBY, SAVING THE WAIFS: REFORMERS AND DEPENDENT CHIL-
DREN, 1890-1917 (1984); GEORGE K. BEHLMER, CHILD ABUSE AND MORAL REFORM IN ENG-
LAND, 1870-1918 (1982); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE, (1986);
MIRIAM LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING OUT OF THE NEW YORK
CHILDREN'S AID BUREAU (1964); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION
OF DELINQUENCY (1969); DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980); SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST
INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1982); WALTER 1. TRATrNER, CRU-
SADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND
CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA (1970); Michael B. Katz, Child-Saving, 26 HIST. EDUC. Q.
413 (1986).
68. BEHLMER, supra note 67, at 11, 52, 136, 213; PLECK. supra note 18, at 69-121, 125-
63.
69. KELLER, supra note 63, at 465-67; SurroN, supra note 23, at 121-53; Douglas Ren-
dleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 233-36
(1971).
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ners, eating habits and personal hygiene. Many reformers viewed day
nurseries as a "more humane and less costly substitute" for orphan asy-
lums, where many working parents, lacking other forms of child care,
temporarily placed children. In New York City alone, parents placed
15,000 children in orphanages in 1899.70 The enactment of mother's
pensions in thirty-nine states during the Progressive era represented an-
other attempt to help indigent, widowed, separated, divorced and un-
married mothers to preserve their families.
71
By the beginning of this century, a new mode of discourse and a
new set of standards dominated discussion of government policy toward
the family. Jurists, charity workers, settlement house workers and other
professionals dealing with family problems evolved new notions of "pa-
rental fitness," "parental duties," "child welfare" and "children's rights
and needs" that justified state supervision of the family "for the protec-
tion of society, and the welfare of the child himself."'7 2 Along with this
change, a new therapeutic conception of law emerged, increasing formal
state involvement in family affairs, viewing parents as agents of the state
and giving judges more discretionary power to set standards of parental
fitness and child welfare. This new legal ideology involved a view of all
children-not simply poor or delinquent children-as wards of the state,
a broadening of problems demanding public intervention, an increase in
judicial discretion and a growing conviction that courts could resolve
domestic problems.
Nowhere was this viewpoint more apparent than in the reconstruc-
tion of the juvenile justice system. In an effort to give special attention
and rehabilitative opportunities to youngsters who broke the law, Illi-
nois established the firstjuvenile court in 1899. 73 By 1917, all but three
states had enacted juvenile justice legislation. Within these separate
tribunals for young people, informal hearings were designed to replace
adversarial proceedings and diagnostic investigations, psychological as-
sessment and rehabilitation were to replace judgments of guilt and inno-
cence and imposition of punishment. In these courts, however, young
people were deprived of constitutional safeguards that would apply in a
criminal trial. These included protections over the admission of hearsay
and unsworn testimony, criminal standards of proof, privilege against
self-incrimination and double jeopardy and right to bail and counsel. 74
The growing assertion of a special state interest in family welfare
during the Progressive era can also be seen in the establishment of the
first family courts. Family courts were to provide a less formal and less
70. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 129; LESLIE WOODCocK TENTLER, WAGE-EARN-
ING WOMEN: INDUSTRIAL WORK AND FAMILY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930, at
161-65 (1979); Virginia Kerr, One Step Forward-Two Steps Back: Child Care's Long American
History, in CHILD CARE-WHO CARES 159 (Pamela Roby ed., 1973).
71. MIrrz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 129-30.
72. GROSSBERG, supra note 41, at 248-50, 281-85; SuTToN supra note 23, at 142.
73. HALEM, supra note 66, at 220; SurroN supra note 23, at 121-53.
74. HALEM supra note 66, at 220; SUTTON, supra note 23, at 121-53; Roger C. Algase,
The Right to a Fair Trial in Juvenile Court, 3J. FAM. L. 292 (1963); Frank W. Nicholas, History,
Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. FAM. L. 151, 151-52 (1961).
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adversarial forum than the criminal courts for a broad range of family
problems including desertion, divorce, child neglect and maltreatment
and juvenile delinquency. First in New York City in 1910 and then in
many other municipalities and states, family court judges, assisted by a
professional staff of psychologists, social workers, probation officers and
divorce proctors, were charged with settling domestic conflicts, resolv-
ing marital disputes and reconciling marriage partners.
75
After 1920, a growing number of reformers, convinced that the
roots of marital breakdown lay in lack of communication and coopera-
tion, unsatisfactory sexual relationships and psychological maladjust-
ments, created new programs in sex education, marriage reconciliation
and counseling services and courses in family living. 76 Believing that
the law's adversarial approach to divorce was harmful both to spouses
and children, reformers also recommended changes in divorce proceed-
ings. The recommendations included mandatory counseling of parties
seeking divorce, nonadversarial divorce proceedings and greater availa-
bility of divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and incompatibility. Two
states-New Mexico and Oklahoma-revised their divorce statutes to al-
low divorce on grounds of incompatibility, and three other states-Ar-
kansas, Idaho and Nevada-shortened residency requirements and
liberalized divorce codes in order to attract couples seeking divorce.
7 7
From the early 1920s onward, family law was increasingly influ-
enced by psychological and clinical studies of the family. Custody law
was recast in light of new notions of "psychological parenthood" and
the importance of continuity and stability in caretakers (assumptions
which led jurists to frown upon joint and divided child custody arrange-
ments). 7 8 In divorce proceedings, judges tended to dilute stringent
legal statutes. In 1931, only seven states specifically permitted divorce
on grounds of mental cruelty, but judges in most other jurisdictions re-
interpreted laws permitting divorce on grounds of physical cruelty to
encompass such conduct as constant nagging, humiliating language, un-
founded and false accusations, insults and excessive sexual demands. In
these ways and others, psychological and clinical research was incorpo-
rated into family law.
7 9
One ironic consequence of the continuing academic and clinical re-
search into the family was that it increasingly threw into question certain
assumptions held by family professionals, most notably the emphasis at-
tached to preserving the family unit. Studies of divorce, for example,
raised penetrating questions about the psychological and emotional im-
plications of divorce for children. In the 1920s, authorities on the fam-
ily, using the case-study method, had concluded that children
experienced the divorce of their parents as a devastating blow that
75. HALEM, supra note 66, at 116-28, 220-21, 241-51, 280; MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra
note I, at 126-27.
76. Mirz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 125-29.
77. HALEM, supra note 66, at 129-57.
78. Id. at 136; MINTz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 107, 126-29.
79. HALEM, supra note 66, at 136; MAY, supra note 64, at 5-6, 30, 104.
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stunted their psychological and emotional growth and caused maladjust-
ments that persisted for years.80 Beginning in the late 1950s, a growing
body of research argued that children from conflict-laden, tension-filled
homes were more likely to suffer psychosomatic illnesses, suicide at-
tempts, delinquency and other social maladjustments than were children
whose parents divorced. The research further argued that the adverse
effects of divorce were generally of short duration and that children
were better off when their parents divorced than when they had an un-
stable marriage.8 '
Professional concern about child abuse and family violence also
grew, leading a growing number of physicians and psychologists to call
for expansion of child protective services and separating abused chil-
dren from their parents. In 1954, the Children's Division of the Ameri-
can Humane Association conducted the first national survey of child
neglect, abuse and exploitation. 82 Three years later the United States
Children's Bureau launched the first major federal study of child ne-
glect, abuse and abandonment. Child cruelty captured the attention of a
growing number of radiologists and pediatricians who found bone frac-
tures and physical trauma in children suggesting deliberate injury. After
C. Henry Kempe, a pediatrician at the University of Colorado Medical
School, published a famous essay on the "battered child syndrome" in
1962, legal, medical, psychological and educational journals began to
focus attention on family violence.83 It is not clear that the incidence of
abuse increased; certainly recognition and reporting of abuse increased.
Growing professional concern about child abuse led to calls for greater
state protection and services for abused and neglected children and
their parents.
84
F. Legal Regulation of the Family Today
Up until the mid-1960s, certain largely unquestioned assumptions
guided American family law. It was a basic, if generally unstated, prem-
ise of family law that the nuclear family had a privileged status and that
government could discriminate against non-nuclear families in granting
benefits. 8 5 Similarly, it was taken for granted that the father, as "head
and master" of his family, automatically gave his children his surname,
8 6
determined the family's legal residence,8 7 was immune from lawsuits in-
80. HALEM, supra note 66, at 158-232.
81. SAR A. LEVITAN & RICHARD S. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMERICAN FAM-
ILY? 69-72 (1981); HALEM, supra note 66, at 158-232.
82. PLECK, supra note 18, at 165-81.
83. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 17-24 (1962).
84. PLECK, supra note 18, at 164-81.
85. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 165 (1879).
86. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1945). See generaly
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 105 (1989).
87. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 256 P.2d 249, 250 (Ariz. 1953).
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stituted by his wife8 8 and was entitled to have sexual relations with
her.89 Other underlying legal assumptions were that marriages could
only be dissolved on grounds of serious fault, that following a divorce
young children were better off with their mothers unless the mothers
were unfit, that children were legally incompetent and subject to paren-
tal guidance and discipline and that states had the power to regulate
private sexual behavior and define the sexual norms according to which
citizens were supposed to live.
Since the early 1960s, all of these assumptions have been called into
question as new notions of privacy, sexual equality and children's rights
produced a revolution in American family law. The practical effect of
this revolution has been a gradual erosion in the traditional conception
of the nuclear family as a legal entity with its own distinctive rights.90
In recent years, courts have overturned older legal definitions of
what constitutes a family. In cases involving zoning and public welfare,
influential court decisions declared that local, state and federal govern-
ments cannot define "family" too restrictively, holding that common law
marriages, cohabitation outside of marriage and large extended house-
holds occupying the same living quarters are entitled to protection
against hostile regulation. 9 ' In other cases, the Supreme Court ruled
that government cannot discriminate against groups of non-related indi-
viduals living together in providing food stamps and that state legisla-
tures cannot designate one form of the family as a preferred form.
9 2
Meanwhile, courts and state legislatures have tended to weaken or over-
turn laws that assign individual responsibilities on the basis of family
relations, including laws that make children legally responsible for the
support of indigent parents or statutes that hold parents accountable for
crimes committed by their children.
9 3
At the same time that definitions of family grew broader and more
pluralistic, courts became increasingly willing to intervene in the inter-
nal functioning of on-going marriages. Until recently, it was assumed
that courts should not interfere in marital decision making except in
cases of divorce or separation nor interfere in the parents' discretionary
authority over the details of their children's upbringing, except in cases
involving neglect, abuse, delinquency or child custody.9 4 These as-
sumptions have recently been challenged, as courts have increasingly
88. See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *443; Kennedy v. Camp, 102 A.2d
596 (N.J. 1954).
89. See State v. Haines, 25 So. 372 (La. 1899) (holding that a husband cannot be found
guilty of raping his wife).
90. Glendon, supra note 1, at 1-7; StephenJ. Morse, Family Law in Transition, in CHANG-
ING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 319, 320-21 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979).
91. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 143-61; Morse, supra note 90, at 322-25.
92. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 143-61; Morse, supra note 90, at 322-25; Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. i (1974).
93. See MiNTz & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 232-33; W. Walton Garrett, Filial Responsi-
bilitY Laws, 18J. FAM. L. 793, 804-08 (1979).
94. Mary Ann Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections
of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM.J. CoMp. L. 1 (1975).
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stressed the equality of spouses and have held that minors have in-
dependent rights that can override parental authority. Invoking the
principle that all individuals have rights to privacy, due process and
equal treatment under law, courts have increasingly emphasized the sep-
arateness and autonomy of family members. Courts have held, for ex-
ample, that a husband's surname is not necessarily his wife's or his
children's, 9 5 that a husband's home is not necessarily his wife's domi-
cile,9 6 that spousal immunity is not inviolate 97 and that under certain
circumstances a husband can be prosecuted for spousal rape.98 In cases
involving children's rights, a number of courts have ruled that parents
do not have an absolute veto over whether minor girls can obtain con-
traceptives or abortions (while upholding statutes requiring doctors to
notify parents before performing abortions). 99
While judicial involvement in the decision making of ongoing fami-
lies has increased, the nation's courts and state legislatures showed a
decreasing interest in enforcing sexual norms. Beginning in 1965, the
Supreme Court, declaring that the constitution created a right to pri-
vacy, struck down a series of state statutes that prohibited the prescrip-
tion or distribution of birth control devices or that limited circulation of
information about contraception.10 0 In 1972, the Court extended ac-
cess to contraceptives to unmarried persons. 10 1 In 1973, it decriminal-
ized abortion, and in 1976 the Court held that a "competent" unmarried
minor can decide to have an abortion without parental permission.' 0 2
Since 1962, when Illinois became the first state to decriminalize all
forms of private sexual conduct between consenting adults, twenty
states have decriminalized private consensual sexual conduct and judi-
cial decisions in four other states have invalidated statutes making such
conduct a crime. 10 3 Today, two-thirds of the states have repealed stat-
utes prohibiting fornication, adultery and cohabitation outside of
95. See Commonwealth v. Lowell, 366 N.E.2d 717, 720, 721, 725 (Mass. 1977).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.02 (Page 1972)(stating that a husband's home is his
wife's domicile)(repealed 1974); Green v. Commissioner 305 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass. 1973).
97. Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969).
98. People v. Liberta 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
See generally Susan Estrich, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemptions and the 14th
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1258-60 (1986).
99. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); cf In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940, 942
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985)(upholding the right of a minor to associate with a lesbian).
100. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976). See also Morse, supra note 1, at 325-27, 349-50. Although the Supreme Court
greatly expanded liberty interests during the 1960s and 1970s, the present Court appears
to be moving toward limiting the further growth of such interests. See, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986).
103. State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d
47 (Pa. 1980); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). See generally G. SIDNEY
BUCHANAN, MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION 81-82 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 799, 950-51 (1979).
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marriage. '
0 4
By far the most dramatic changes in family law have involved di-
vorce. Beginning in California in 1970, no fault divorce statutes re-
placed laws that allowed divorce only on grounds of fault in every
state.' 0 5 Instead of holding a trial to determine whether a spouse was
guilty of a serious marital offense, no fault statutes allowed spouses to
obtain divorces by mutual consent or on grounds of incompatibility or
"irretrievable breakdown" of the marriage.' 0 6 Proponents of change-
largely lawyers and judges-argued that no fault divorce would create
less adversarial divorce proceedings, reduce perjury and bring law into
line with the social reality of sharply rising divorce rates.
10 7
Although advocates of divorce reform described the introduction of
no fault statutes as a technical modification of existing laws rather than
as a major legal reform, in fact the new statutes had far-reaching effects
on such issues as alimony, child custody, child support and the division
of property. The new no fault statutes undermined the traditional legal
assumptions that wives had a right to lifelong support, to retain the mar-
ital dwelling and to child custody. Under the new legislation, certain
preferences that had generally worked to the advantage of women were
eliminated. Temporary "maintenance" or "spousal support" replaced
alimony; the principle of equal or equitable division of property re-
placed the distribution of property on the basis of fault; and gender neu-
trality, and, in some cases, a presumption in favor of joint custody,
replaced the older presumption in favor of mothers in disputes over
young children. 108
One ironic consequence of the new statutes has been to contribute
to a sharp increase in the number of poor divorced women. The no
fault statutes have not, in practice, effectively aided most divorced wo-
men. Most divorces involve families with little property to divide.
Moreover, child support awards are often inadequate and compliance
with support orders is low. In fact, many women, especially older wo-
men, are able to find employment only in lowpaying sales, clerical or
service occupations. As a result, the household income of divorced wo-
men and their children tends to fall sharply after a divorce, while the
104. See Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions of Pre- and Extramarital Sex,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1660 (1991).
105. HERBERTJACOBS, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES (1988); RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE
IN WESTERN SOCIETY 619-34 (1988); LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1985);
Lenore Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, The Transformation of Legal Marriage Through No-Fault
Divorce. The Case of the United States, in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETIES: AREAS OF LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ETHNICAL CHANGE 143 (John M. Eekelaar & San-
ford N. Katz eds. 1979). See also HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83 (discussing divorce stat-
ute reform in the years 1966-1976).
106. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1983).
107. HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83; JACOBS supra note 105; Weitzman & Dixon, supra
note 105, at 143-53.
108. HALEM, supra note 66, at 233-83; JACOB, supra note 105; PHILLIPS, supra note 105,
at 561-72; WEITZMAN, supra note 105, at 15-28.
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husbands' income rises.10 9
The revolution that has occurred in family law since 1960 can be
viewed from two very different perspectives. On the one hand, this legal
revolution has extended gender equality, increased personal freedoms
and recognized a right to privacy. Courts and state legislatures have
eliminated certain historical preferences given to nuclear families and to
fathers, made divorce less adversarial and more accessible and granted
wives and children greater access to courts in family disputes. Yet at the
same time, a disparate group, which includs women's organizations and
"pro-family" conservative groups, has viewed these changes from a
much more negative perspective, arguing (in quite different ways) that
this legal revolution has produced hardship for many women and chil-
dren, undermined family stability and intruded on family autonomy in
decisionmaking.
III. SOURCES OF CHANGES IN FAMILY LAW
It is helpful to interpret transformations in family law in terms of a
shifting balance among five broad themes in public discourse on the
family. At each historical period, one finds a different balance in the
dominant ideology. One theme involves the changing functions of fam-
ily law. At certain times, family law has been essentially pedagogical; at
other times, essentially prescriptive; at still other times, protective of in-
dividual rights. A second theme involves the relative responsibility of
individuals, public and private institutions and the courts for enforcing
values. A third key theme involves the values upheld by family law. At
certain points in American history, family law has stressed marital unity
and family solidarity; at other times, personal choice and responsibility;
at others, family privacy and individual autonomy. A fourth fundamen-
tal theme is the form of legal intervention in the family, ranging from
non-intervention, which implicitly ratifies socially-assigned family roles
and power relationships, to the explicit extension of legal rights,
criminalization of certain acts and state-ordered mediation of familial
disputes. The final theme concerns changing family ideologies that ex-
tend from patriarchal and hierarchical ideals to more romantic and com-
panionate conceptions of familial relationships.' 10
For simplicity of analysis, we will examine transformations in family
law in terms of changes in the legal realm and changes in family and
society.
A. Changes in the Legal Realm
Over the past three hundred years, the functions of family law have
undergone a profound change, from pedagogical to therapeutic, from
109. PHILLIPS, supra note 105, at 628-30; WEITZMAN, supra note 105, at 70-73. Weitz-
man found that in California the share of property that wives received following a divorce
declined sharply after the adoption of the state's no fault divorce law.
110. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the .arket: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1487 (1983).
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prescribing to proscribing and fixing. In colonial New England, family
law was conceived in essentially pedagogical or symbolic terms, empha-
sizing exhortation rather than enforcement. Family laws were taken
word for word from the Old Testament. Yet while the realm of law was
defined more broadly than it is today, encompassing moral and religious
offenses as well as economic disputes or criminal offenses, most legal
punishments were by our standards quite mild. Punishments were not
designed to imprison or ostracize offenders, but to reinforce communal
norms and reintegrate offenders back into the community.
By the nineteenth century, the functions of family law had shifted.
Family law was increasingly conceived in instrumental terms, as a way of
resolving conflicts, enforcing agreements, assigning rights and promot-
ing socially desirable conduct. Jurists and legislators used new concep-
tions of contract, gender, and family status to restructure family law and
reformulate doctrines governing marriage formalities, divorce, alimony,
marital property, child custody, adoption and child support. Accompa-
nying this new instrumental conception of law was a persistent view of
law as moral discourse. Legal doctrines governing divorce, custody and
other aspects of family relationships were explicitly framed in terms of
ethical conceptions of fault and fitness.
In the twentieth century, conceptions of the functions of law again
shifted radically. Family law was increasingly conceived in secular and
therapeutic terms, reflecting a view that courts had the capacity to solve
family problems. Since 1960, expectations about what law can do have
risen even further. Increasingly law-like public schools and the tax
code-has been regarded as a social institution which could self-con-
sciously promote social change.
To a great extent, these changes in the functions of law reflect
broad historical changes in the legal profession. In the American colo-
nies, there were few professional judges or lawyers. Most judges were
lay people lacking formal legal training; often they were members of lo-
cal elites holding positions of authority in other community institutions,
such as church courts, and had many face-to-face relationships with liti-
gants. In their decisions, these jurists generally sought to reinforce a
consensus of opinions and express shared ethical principles.Il
By the early nineteenth century, the number of formally trained
judges and lawyers had sharply increased. These jurists were interested
in establishing principled rationales for legal decisions. They tended to
view law in increasingly instrumental terms, as a way of resolving con-
flicts and promoting socially desirable conduct. By the early twentieth
century, family law had become a specialized field within the legal pro-
fession, with its own courts focusing exclusively on resolving family-re-
I 11. Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in, THE PROFESSIONS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Nathan 0. Hatch ed., 1988); Patricia U. Bonomi, "Stewards of the
Mysteries of God' " Clerical Authority and the Great Awahening in the Middle Colonies, in PROFES-
SIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 29 (Gerald I. Geison ed., 1983). See gen-
erally READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Dennis R. Nolan ed.,
1980).
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lated problems such as desertion, parental neglect or maltreatment of
children, adoption, juvenile delinquency and divorce. These courts
were designed to offer a less formal and less adversarial mechanism than
the regular courts and to draw upon the advice of social workers and
psychologists. The shift to specialized jurists aided by psychology and
the social sciences helps to account for one of the most striking develop-
ments of twentieth century family law: the gradual rejection of the idea
that family law should be framed in moral terms such as fault and moral
fitness.
B. Social Changes in Society and the Family
Transformations in family law resulted in part from changes within
the legal system, but they also were the product of broader economic
transformations and changes in family ideologies, family functions and
gender relations. For example, the patriarchal character of law in colo-
nial New England was tied to particular religious ideologies and to the
predominance of a household system of production in which a father's
control of land and craft skills reinforced paternal authority. A father's
control over inheritance allowed him to exercise control over his chil-
dren's sexual behavior and their choice of marriage partners. In the
eighteenth century, a father's ability to transmit land to his children de-
clined, as did his ability to enforce obedience. A symptom of this de-
cline was a marked increase in children's discretion in deciding whom
and when to marry.'
12
The early nineteenth century reconstruction of family law was in
part the product of a fundamental transformation in the family itself:
the separation of production from other family functions and the isola-
tion of married women and young children in what contemporaries
called a "separate sphere of domesticity."' 13 As the middle class family
lost many of its earlier public functions as a center of production and a
mechanism for transmitting skills, and as married women were stripped
of traditional productive roles (such as spinning, weaving and
fabricating clothing), the functions and responsibilities of the family un-
derwent radical redefinition. Middle-class women gained new roles in
the domestic domain and childrearing. In colonial America, childrear-
ing manuals had been addressed to fathers; in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, in contrast, such tracts were written almost exclusively for mothers.
Gender and particularly the mother's role were at the heart of the redefi-
nition of boundaries of domestic and public realms.' 14
At the same time, conceptions of childhood underwent a radical
transformation. Children were increasingly regarded in a new light: as
special beings with distinctive needs and impulses. Childhood was in-
creasingly viewed as a period of innocence, growth, development and
preparation for adulthood. Whereas in the colonial period it was com-
112. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIVATE LIFE 73-115 (1988).
113. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 50-51.
114. MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 1, at 43-65.
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mon for parents to send off children at the age of eight or nine to work
as servants or apprentices in other households, a growing number of
nineteenth-century parents kept their sons and daughters home well
into their teens and even their twenties. Nineteenth-century parents
also made unprecedented efforts to shelter their children from knowl-
edge of such "adult" realities as sexuality and death. One justification
for this new emphasis on sheltering and nurturing children was a grow-
ing belief that "adolescence" (previously a rarely used term) was a par-
ticularly unsettled phase of life during which children were deeply in
need of paternal protection and supervision."1
5
The increasing emphasis in family law on equal rights and gender
neutral standards since 1960 is linked partly to the rapid influx of mar-
ried women into the workforce. This contributed to a new image of fam-
ily as an economic partnership in which husband and wife both share
burdens and contribute economically. Married mothers in the
workforce have risen from less than 20% in 1950 to 54% in 1980 and
over 70% today. 116
The recent emphasis on children's rights is in part a reflection of
the growing litigiousness of the broader society, in which every group
asserts its own set of rights. The growing stress on children's rights is
also related to an erosion in family structure that has undermined the
notion of the family as a single legal entity. The most recent census
figures indicate that the number of children living in single parent fami-
lies has grown significantly.' 17
A high divorce rate, continuing growth in female-headed families
and an increase in out-of-wedlock births have all contributed to radical
changes in American family structure. In 1989, the divorce rate -was
more than double the 1966 rate and three times as high as the 1950
level. 1 8 In each year since 1975, over a million children under age
eighteen have been affected by divorce.' 19 Largely as a result of the
high divorce rate, "[m]ore than one-half of black children lived in single-
parent homes in 1989."120
Also contributing to a rapid increase in single-parent families is a
rising rate of out-of-wedlock births. Out-of-wedlock births have climbed
from just 5% in 1960 to 23.4% in 1986.121 In recent years, single-par-
ent families, once dismissed as "problem" families, have grown progres-
sively more common. This is evidenced by the fact that 22% of
American children lived in a single parent family in 1989 as compared
with 10% in 1965.122
115. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDU-
CATION, YOUTH INDICATORS 1991: TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN YOUTH 3
(1991).
116. Id. at 46-47.
117. See id. at 28-29.
118. Id. at 16-19.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Id. at 2.
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Another demographic factor that has led to an increasing emphasis
on children's rights is a marked lengthening of the transition from youth
to adulthood. Women are beginning marriage at older ages. During the
1950s, women typically married at relatively young age; the average age
of first marriage was around 20.123 During the 1970s, the marriage age
rose rapidly and now stands around 24, higher than at any point since
1890.124 Meanwhile, young adults are living with their parents longer.
Between 1960 and 1990, the proportion of young adults ages 18 to 24
living with their parents increased by nearly 25%.125 Today, 53% of
these young adults are living with their parents. ' 26 This lengthening of
the transition period between youth and adulthood may have increased
the willingness of courts to accord children new legal rights.
CONCLUSION
Although it is always treacherous to draw lessons from history, a
knowledge of the history of family law can help us identify those ele-
ments of contemporary legal discourse that are particularly distinctive
and problematic. Two elements stand out: a de-moralizing of family
law, that is, a growing hesitance to discuss family issues in moral terms,
and an erosion of explicit legal presumptions governing legal decision
making, which has markedly broadened the reach of judicial discretion.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of contemporary legal
discourse on the family is the tendency to avoid terms that connote
moral blame or judgment. In addressing questions of divorce or child
custody, courts tend to avoid issues of fault or moral fitness. In cases of
child abuse or neglect, the trend in legal opinion is to allow intervention
in cases in which a child has suffered or risks physical or mental injury.
Today, family regulators are little concerned about questions that preoc-
cupied their predecessors, such as family formation and dissolution (in-
cluding limitations on marriage, common law marriage, legitimacy and
grounds for annulment or divorce) or the obligations of spouses. This
new view presupposes diversity in the characteristics and functioning of
families and rejects the earlier view that certain specific family roles
(such as the supposedly natural capacity of mothers for childrearing)
were rooted in moral, religious or natural law. Replacing the older
moral discourse is a discourse emphasizing equality and individual
rights. 127
Of course, to say that the drift in family law is away from explicit
moral judgments is not to suggest that the law does not make implicit
moral judgments. Prior to the adoption of no fault divorce statutes, the
law of marriage implicitly upheld a marital ideal involving lifelong sup-
123. Id. at 3, 14-15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3, 30-31.
126. Id. at 30-31.
127. Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1803-04 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84
MICH. L. REV. 430, 431 (1985).
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port and marital fidelity. This was done by making divorce obtainable
only on grounds of serious fault and requiring the breadwinner to pay
lifetime support in the form of alimony. Since divorce was obtainable
only on fault grounds, the spouse who was opposed to a divorce had an
advantage in negotiating a property settlement. The tendency now is to
avoid questions of fault or responsibility in dissolving a marriage or di-
viding marital assets. Contemporary notions of divorce law are much
less judgmental: either spouse is free to terminate a marriage at will for
almost any reason, after a divorce each spouse is expected to be eco-
nomically self-sufficient and termination of a marriage frees individuals
from most economic responsibilities to former dependents.' 2 8
One of the most striking characteristics of our current structure of
family law-with its rejection of earlier forms of moral discourse and its
acceptance of the terminability of familial obligations-is its tendency to
decontextualize individuals and to eliminate a sense of on-going respon-
sibility. Law is not simply an instrument of dispute adjudication; it is
also (as the Puritans and, later, nineteenth century jurists realized) a
powerful instrument of moral pedagogy, conveying important messages
about responsibility and obligation. Rather than stressing on-going re-
sponsibility, the law today tends to reinforce broader individualistic and
therapeutic currents in the culture, stressing self-fulfillment and individ-
ual happiness as the ultimate social values.
12 9
Earlier in American history, one of the basic functions of family law
was to articulate and reinforce certain widely-held standards and norms
about the family. In recent years, jurists have backed away from using
law and family policy to enunciate family standards and norms. Yet
value judgments remain implicit in the law, and the values that the law
currently tends to stress, such as the terminability of family relationships
and obligations, tend to undermine broader values that the society
claims to hold, such as the notion that having children entails responsi-
bilities that do not disappear following separation or divorce.
128. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 108-11.
129. See Walter 0. Weyrauch & Sanford N. Katz, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION,
496-98 (1983); Schneider, supra note 127, at 1814-19.
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The fundamental change from law which sought-to the extent the
law could-to uphold and sustain the institution of the family' to law
which facilitates its dissolution began less than twenty-five years ago.
2
Weitzman 3 has called the change a revolution, Glendon
4 and Jacob 5
have called it a transformation of the law. Jacob calls it a "silent revolu-
tion"-a revolution brought about by "experts" with little public discus-
sion.6 The revolution has been silent, in that until recently there has been
no public and little professional awareness of its impact. Consequences
have emerged 7 that were not within the horizons of the reformers. 8
Wallerstein 9 has commented on "how little we really know about
the world we have created in the last twenty years--a world in which mar-
riage is freely terminable at any time, for the first time in our history."10 But to
say we know little is not to say we know nothing. There is substantial
* Barrister and Solicitor, Moir Associates, Vancouver, Canada; University of To-
ronto (B.A., 1948); University of British Columbia (LL.B., 1951); Past President, Associa-
tion of Family and Conciliation Courts; Past Chairman, Family Law Section, Canadian Bar
Association, B.C. Branch.
1. In this Article, "family" means husband and wife in an existing or former marital
relationship and children of that marriage, if any.
2. No fault divorce in the United States began with California's Family Law Act, ch.
1608, §§ 1-32, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). See
also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its Aftermath
56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, I & n. 1. For the progression of no fault divorce statutes through
the states, see Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 79. The grounds for divorce vary from state to state. Wardle classifies 13 states as
"pure" no fault. Other states' statutes contain mixed grounds. Id. at 137.
3. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
4. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN TIE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).
5. See generally HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DI-
VORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988).
6. Id. at 15.
7. Some argue that the present high rate of divorce is a social phenomenon, not a
legal one. As to that argument, see infra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text. In this Article "reformers" include
all those who advocated and brought about change in the law. Principal sources of infor-
mation are Kay supra note 2, at 5 nn.14 & 16, citing the CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMM'N
ON THE FAMILY, REPORT 1-2 (1966); JACOBS, supra note 5, at 66-79 & nn.10-32.
9. Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein is Executive Director of the Centre for the Family in
Transition, Corte Madera, California.
10. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 297 (1989)(emphasis in original).
A recent Canadian study found that "[t]he rise of divorce . . . over the past twenty
years makes it appear that the institution of marriage, having held firm for centuries, is
being shaken to its foundations." JEAN DUMAS & YVES PgRON, Preface to STATISTICS CANADA,
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documentation of two consequences of the "free terminability of mar-
riage:" (1) the impoverishment of divorced women together with the
children in their care, 'l and (2) the risk of harm to children of divorce.
That there are other consequences of endemic family breakdown
broadly affecting society and the economy is apparent, but the available
data is insufficient to permit more than informed speculation about their
nature and extent. Indeed, it would be surprising if a revolution affect-
ing our basic institution did not substantially affect the social structure
and the economy.
The divorce revolution has brought with it grave consequences.
This Article will consider those in relation to children. Without dimin-
ishing the accomplishment of those single parents who, under great dif-
ficulties, do, it argues that our society does not know how to raise
children well-emotionally, economically, developmentally--except in a
secure institution of marriage. If that institution "has been shaken to its
foundation"' 12 in part, at least, because of no fault divorce,'5 the law
must be reconsidered if society and the economy are to function up to
their potential. 14
The Article will suggest that in the concern about symptoms rather
than causes, conventional scholarship in family law, and, in the
behaviourial sciences, has failed to address fundamental issues. I pro-
pose a different way of addressing them.
The Article does not offer solutions; that task calls for the knowl-
edge and insights of a broad spectrum of disciplines. I argue that the
DEMOGRAPHY DIVISION, MARRIAGE AND CONJUGAL LIFE IN CANADA: CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC
ANALYSIS (March 1992).
11. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 338. Weitzman found in her California sample that at
the time of her study, divorced women experienced a 73% drop in their standard of living
a year after divorce, whereas divorced men experienced a 42% increase. Weitzman attrib-
utes her well-known finding to no fault divorce. See also James B. McLindon, Separate But
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352-53
(1987) (a compilation of studies in other states in addition to McLindon's own New Haven
County, Connecticut study); H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Con-
straints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986). Weitzman has critics: See
JACOB, supra note 5, at 159-64; Herbert Jacob, Faulting No-fault, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 773-
81 (1986); Marygold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women
and Children, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759-72 (1986). But see Weitzman's reply, Bringing the
Law Back In, AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 791-97 (1986). The most penetrating critique of Weitz-
man is that ofJed H. Abraham, The Divorce Revolution Revisited: A Counter Revolutionary Cri-
tique, 9 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 251 (1989). The essential difference between Weitzman and her
critics appears to be the degree of impoverishment and whether it can be attributed to no
fault divorce. An effective support regime is inconsistent with the premises of no fault
divorce and, in any event, impractical in most family circumstances. A separated family is
economically inefficient. Two can live more cheaply as one.
12. Supra note 10, DUMAS & PRON.
13. See infra notes 100-126 and accompanying text.
14. The Article does not argue that a change in the law of divorce and ancillary relief
alone will diminish all the problems now affecting children. A whole spectrum of policy
issues needs correction: anti-child tax policy, the social support network, health, security,
physical security, education, housing and so on. There is an African saying that "it takes a
whole village to raise a child." Nevertheless, I argue that unless family law itself offers a
framework within which children can best be nurtured, a nation's capacity to correct the
broad spectrum of adverse policies will be diminished.
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policy choices are of great difficulty; that simplistic policy changes are at
risk of doing more harm than good.
II. THE RISK OF HARM TO CHILDREN OF DIVORCE
The National Centre for Health Statistics reports that in 1988, chil-
dren in single parent and step families were two to three times more
likely to have emotional and behavioural problems than those in intact
families. 1 5 Their academic achievement is significantly lower.' 6 There
is now a substantial literature reporting the results of empirical studies
of varying rigour and research design on the impact on children of the
divorce of their parents.1 7 This Article will review a few of the recog-
nized longitudinal studies that have implications in structuring legal pol-
icy.' 8 Given the different research designs, the data are not totally
congruent but they do converge on two points: (1) the separation of
their parents is profoundly traumatic for all children (except those in
highly conflicted or abusive families) and interferes with their develop-
mental progress for shorter or longer periods;' 9 and (2) a significant
minority of children of divorce do not recover and are chronically dis-
abled in their emotional, social and academic functioning.
20
A. The Data: A Sampling
2 '
The most frequently referred to study is that of Wallerstein and
Kelly,2 2 pioneers in empirical studies on the divorce process and its im-
pact on children. Starting in 1971 they followed sixty divorcing families
and their one hundred and thirty-one children ages three to eighteen
from Marin County, California, a white, privileged community.2 3 The
assumption at that time was that divorce was a brief crisis quickly re-
solved by the adults and children involved. Based on that assumption,
15. Nicholas Zill & Charlotte A. Schoenborn, Developmental, Learning, and Emotional
Problems: Health of Our Nation's Children, United States, 1988, 190 NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH
STAT. ADVANCE DATA (1990).
16. John Guidubaldi et al., The Impact of Parental Divorce on Children: Report of the Nation-
wide NASP Study, 12 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 300 (1983).
17. There are more than 700 reported studies. Interview with Dr. William F. Hodges,
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, in Halifax, Nova Scotia (Oct. 22,
1990).
18. In doing so, I rely in substantial part on Joan B. Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in
Children of Divorce: Converging Findings and Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 119
(1988) and Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long-Term Effects of Divorce on Children: A Review, 30J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 349 (1991).
19. Kelly, supra note 18, at 122; E. Mavis Hetherington, Stress and Coping in Children and
Families, in CHILDREN IN FAMILIES UNDER STRESS 7 (Anna-Beth Doyle et al., eds., 1984).
20. For the nature of the disabilities, refer to the studies. It is to be recognized that
there is no information about the children beyond the periods of study.
21. A summary of the researchers' findings risks making them appear less complex
than they are. The results and symptoms differ with age, gender, economic circumstances
and other factors. Nevertheless, these variations should not obscure the generality of the
findings reported here.
22. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980).
23. Id. The authors note, "[it may well be that there would be a considerably greater
emotional decline among children in a general population." Id. at 307.
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the authors' original intent was a short term study2 4 from crisis through
to resolution. As expected, they found the children to be acutely dis-
turbed at the time of divorce filing. To their surprise, however, and con-
trary to the then professional expectation, when they assessed the
parents and children eighteen months after the divorce filing, they
found a large number of the children were on a continued "downward
course." In response to the unexpected finding, the study was contin-
ued and the parents and children were assessed again five years after the
divorce filing.
2 5
In summary, at the five-year assessment, the study found that
notwithstanding the initial trauma of the children, about a third had re-
covered and were doing "especially well," 2 6 a "middle" group of less
than a third had resumed their developmental progress but remained
somewhat symptomatic, 2 7 and the disabilities of more than a third of the
children observed immediately post divorce and at the eighteen-month
checkpoint had become chronic.
2 8
Wallerstein continued to follow a group of the children, 29 then
aged eleven to twenty-nine, some for ten years and others for fifteen.
She reported her findings in Second Chances.30 She reports that over half
the children "emerged as compassionate and competent people," while
almost half were "worried, underachieving, self-deprecating, and some-
times angry young men and women." Boys of school age suffered a
wider range of difficulties than did girls at that age, but in young adult-
hood the differences dissipated "when many of the young women were
involved in maladaptive pathways including multiple relationships and
impulsive marriages that ended in early divorce."1
31
Two new phenomena became apparent: (1) the "sleeper effect"-
those who were doing "especially well" at the five-year checkpoint, in
24. The assessment was essentially clinical, using a variety of techniques, together
with interviews of parents, siblings and teachers. The children were initially screened for
their psychological health-that is, the study was skewed in favour of sound pre-divorce
adjustment. Id.
25. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 25, at 4-5.
26. Id. at 209.
27. As to the "middle" group at the five-year checkpoint, it was found that
"[allthough these youngsters had resumed their developmental progress, islands of un-
happiness or anger continued to demand significant portions of their attention and psychic
energy and to hamper the full potential of their development." Id. at 213.
28. The study:
[Flound 37 percent of all the children and adolescents to be moderately to se-
verely depressed. As at the eighteen-month check point, depression was the most
common psychopathological finding and was manifested in a wide variety of feel-
ings and behaviour, including chronic and intense unhappiness (at least one child
with suicidal preoccupation), sexual promiscuity, delinquency (drug-abuse, petty
stealing, some alcoholism, breaking and entering), poor learning, intense anger,
apathy, restlessness and, . . . a sense of intense, unremitting emotional
deprivation.
Id. at 211. Wallerstein later reported that at the five-year checkpoint most of these chil-
dren were on a yet further downward course. Judith S. Wallerstein, Children After Divorce:
Wlounds That Don't Heal, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 22, 1989, at 19, 20.
29. One hundred thirteen out of an initial group of 131.
30. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10.
31. Wallerstein, supra note 18, at 354.
[Vol. 69:3
NO FAULTDIVORCE
particular, girls who had now become young women, became sympto-
matic;3 2 and (2) the "over-burdened child"-the child who assumes a
parental role over an inadequately functioning custodial parent without
the buffering available from a functioning second parent.3 3 Particularly
disturbing for the purpose of this Article was that forty percent of the
nineteen to twenty-three year old young men remained aimless, had lim-
ited educations3 4 and had a sense of limited control over their lives.
3 5
Mavis Hetherington and her colleagues at the University of Virginia
followed a matched group of children, half from intact and half from
divorced families for six years following divorce.3 6 Children of divorce
were significantly more symptomatic3 7 than those in intact families at
each of the examinations. Hetherington and her colleagues found the
problems to be more severe and enduring for boys than for girls of di-
vorce and found that their socio-behavioural difficulties were not related
to income.
Guidubaldi and his colleagues conducted a longitudinal study of na-
tionwide, randomly selected matched samples, about half from intact
families and half from divorced families.3 8 Children from intact families
performed significantly better on socio-behavioural criteria and mental
health indices than did those from divorced families. The academic
achievement of children of divorce was much lower.
32. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 56-64; Wallerstein, supra note 28, at
42.
33. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 184-204; Judith S. Wallerstein, The
Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequences of Divorce, 30 Soc. WORK 116 (1985).
34. She reports on a number of well-to-do college-educated fathers who would not
support their children at college. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 10, at 154-60.
35. Wallerstein, supra note 28, at 42.
36. E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children in NON-TRADI-
TIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (Michael E. Lamb, ed., 1982);
E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarmiage on the Adjustment of
Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 518 (1985). Since then, Hetherington has
reported 40% of boys whose custodial parent remarries while the child is in early adoles-
cence develop "serious" psychiatric problems. GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 9, 1991, at A4; Heth-
erington, supra note 17. There was a total of 144 white middle-classed children in the
group, all four years old when first examined. The children of divorced families were first
examined two months after the divorce (together with the others), two years later and after
a further four years when the children were ten. The assessment was primarily through
standardized objective psychological tests-as opposed to the essentially clinical approach
of the Wallerstein and Kelly study.
37. There are convenient summaries of the symptoms in Kelly, supra note 18, at 123
and Wallerstein, supra note 18, at 351-53.
38. John Guidubaldi, Differences in Children's Divorce Adjustment Across Grade Level and Gen-
der: A Report from the NASP-Kent State Nationwide Project, in CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 185
(Sharlene A. Wolchik and Paul Karoly, eds., 1988); John Guidubaldi & Joseph D. Perry,
Divorce and Mental Health Sequelae for Children, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 531
(1985); John Guidubaldi et al., Assessment and Intervention for Children of Divorce: Implications of
the NASP-KSU Nationwide Study, in 4 ADVANCES IN FAMILY INTERVENTION, ASSESSMENT AND
THEORY 33 (John P. Vincent ed., 1987). There were 341 children of divorce and 358 from
intact families. The children of divorce were first tested, on average, four years after di-
vorce and two and three years later. Children from intact families, matched as to age and
sex were tested at the same times. There were standardized tests of socio-behavioural and
academic competence supplemented with information from parents, children, psycholo-
gists and teachers obtained in standardized interviews.
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Socio-behavioural scores did not vary when corrected for income;
those for academic performance did.3 9 As in the Hetherington study,
Guidubaldi found the disparity between divorced families and intact
families to be greater for boys than for girls. The disparity for girls de-
creased over the period of the study,40 that for boys increased.
There is a recent report based on two large data bases,4 1 one in
Great Britain, the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and one
in the United States, the National Survey of Children (NSC),4 2 which
suggests a different etiology of the problems of children of divorce.
Both studies sought a broad range of information other than about chil-
dren and divorce, but included in the report was information on divorce
in the cases in which it occured. There was information on pre-divorce
interspousal conflict in each of the studies.
The studies found the disabilities of children of divorce to be
greater than those of intact families. However, when pre-divorce
spousal conflict was taken into account, the statistical differences be-
tween the two groups (children of divorce and children in intact fami-
lies) disappeared.
The authors of the report (Cherlin and his colleagues) concluded:
"[T]hose concerned with the effects of divorce on children should con-
sider reorienting their thinking. At least as much attention needs to be
paid to the processes that occur in troubled, intact families as to the
trauma that children suffer after their parents separate.
'" 43
B. Analysis
As we have seen, all the studies found among children of divorce a
higher proportion of dysfunction than among children in intact families.
The longer range studies show the dysfunction is chronic among a mi-
nority of children of divorce.
Cherlin and his colleagues attribute more of the post-divorce dys-
function to pre-divorce family conflict than the others appear to.4 4 All
39. For the scores, see Guidubaldi, Differences in Children's Divorce Adjustment, supra note
38, at 202-24.
40. But note the "sleeper effect" observed in WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note
10, at 56-64.
41. Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Longitudinal Studies of Effects of Divorce on Children in Great
Britain and the United States, 252 SCIENCE 1386 (1991).
42. NCDS began as a survey of a total of all 17,414 mothers who gave birth in Great
Britian in one week in 1958. The study was not directed at children of divorce, but perti-
nent findings have been extrapolated from it. When the children were seven in 1965,
public health nurses interviewed their mothers using a standardized test. There were
reading and mathematics tests and behavioural assessments by teachers. Similar assess-
ments were made in 1969 when the children had reached eleven. Id. at 1387. The NSC
survey began in 1976 with a national random sample of 2,279 children between seven and
eleven. Standardized assessments of their behaviour were made through telephone inter-
views of their mothers. The mothers were questioned, inter alia, about interspousal con-
flict. There was a second round of interviews in 1981 when the children were between 11
and 16. Id. at 1388. The data available from both studies permitted a comparison of the
performance of children in intact families and children of divorce.
43. Cherlin et al., supra note 41, at 1388.
44. The Hetherington study divided both the divorced and intact families into intense
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agree that high levels of family conflict to which children are exposed is
detrimental. The difference, if there is a difference, is critical to the pol-
icy maker. If Cherlin and his colleagues are correct that a significant
part of the post-divorce dysfunction observed in children can be attrib-
uted to pre-divorce family conflict, then in the interest of children, theo-
retically, the law ought to encourage the divorce of conflicted spouses.
If, on the other hand, divorce and its attendant circumstances is the
more significant causitive factor of the dysfunction observed than is pre-
divorce conflict, then the law ought not to facilitate divorce as it now
does.
It may be that it is the degree of conflict that is crucial. There are
reasons to suggest that the conclusions of Cherlin and his colleagues,
important as they are to the policy maker, should be carefully examined,
if only to determine degrees of conflict:
(a) The data from the British NCDS4 5 was for the period from 1965
to 1969 when England and Scotland had rigourously fault-based re-
gimes of divorce. In England, adultery was the only grounds for di-
vorce; the remedy for cruelty was judicial separation.
The low rate of divorce reflected in the NCDS study,46 -two per-
cent47-among the parents of the cohort probably reflects the then law.
It may follow that the small number of children, the subjects of Cherlin
and his colleagues' report, came from the most highly conflicted fami-
lies. The experience of these children may not have been the same as
those of children from less conflicted families.
(b) In neither the British NCDS nor the American NSC did the chil-
dren get better, as might have been expected if the conclusions are cor-
rect. They got worse.4
8
(c) Kelly has found that the stereotype of intense spousal conflict
preceding divorce is not always accurate. Fifty percent of her group re-
and low-conflict groups. Hetherington found no negative outcomes attributable to pre-
divorce conflict among children who were sheltered from parental dispute--"encapsu-
lated" was her term. In the first year following divorce, the children of divorce functioned
less well than those in intact, high-discord families. At two years, the difference among
children in high-conflict intact families and those in low-conflict divorced families disap-
peared. Boys from high-conflict divorced families showed more problems than any other
group at all times. See Hetherington, supra note 36.
45. Cherlin et al., supra note 41.
46. Furstenberg and Cherlin estimated that 44% of children born between 1970 and
1984 in the United States lived in single parent families before they were 16 and that the
rate for children born in the 1990s may be as high as 60%. FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. &
ANDREWJ. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART
11 (1991). See also Neil G. Bennett, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1990. § 4, at 12.
A March, 1990 census survey found that in 1970, 40% of households had a married couple
and child or children under 18 as opposed to 31% in 1980 and 26% in 1990. Change in the
American Family, Now Only I in 4 is "Traditional," N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 30, 1991, at A19. For the
purposes of this Article, I need not discuss the complex subject of the rate of divorce. It is
sufficient to note that the rate is much higher than it was before no fault divorce.
47. Two hundred thirty-nine out of 11',658. This refers specifically to the instances of
divorce occurring when the children were between ages seven and eleven. Cherlin et al.,
supra note 41, at 1387.
48. Cherlin et al., supra note 41, at 1387-88.
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ported high conflict while twenty-five percent of women and thirty per-
cent of men reported little or no conflict.
49
(d) Wallerstein questions the reliability of market research methods
such as those of Cherlin and his colleagues.
50
(e) Wallerstein and Kelly selected their sample of children for psy-
chological health at the time of divorce. That is, the sample is skewed
towards sound pre-divorce adjustment. 5 ' Yet five years after divorce,
they found a high proportion of dysfunction.
(f) A non-specialist may speculate that there may be something to
be learned from the predominant reconciliation fantasies of children,
the intense, enduring longing for the absent parent. Is this feeling
among such a high proportion of children no more than bizarre masoch-
ism? Or are the children telling us that even if parents quarrel (absent,
of course, abuse or spousal violence), children's healthy development
needs both parents in an intact relationship?
None of the data I have referred to (or other data available) is con-
clusive. Yet a policy maker never has the luxury of certainty. If evidence
shows there to be a likelihood of wide-spread social harm,5 2 the con-
cerned policy maker cannot wait for certainty. She must be cautiously
aware of the limitations of the social and behavioural sciences without
ignoring what they have to tell.
C. The Contribution and Limits of Social Science
Lawyers and behaviourial and social scientists are from disparate
professional cultures. They think and speak with different languages,
or, sometimes, use the same words to express different thoughts. Their
implicit, unspoken, value systems are different. Each profession has its
own perception of reality (both of which are valid) and varying percep-
tions of what is relevant to the reality sought to be examined. What
lawyers think important, a clinician may not and vice versa. It follows
that communication between the professions is subject to misinterpreta-
tion and at risk of distortion.
Nevertheless, the insights and the developing knowledge of the so-
cial and behaviourial sciences are crucial to the development of a benign
family law and process, whatever the difficulties of communication. For
example, most mental health professionals of the 60s and 70s assumed
that divorce was a brief and transitory crisis from which adults and chil-
dren would recover and go on to a better, happier life. 53 All of the stud-
ies referred to show that assumption to be wrong for many people and,
49. Kelly, supra note 18, at 121-22.
50. Judith S. Wallerstein, 30J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1022 (1991)
(Dr. Wallerstein's reply to a reader's Letter to the Editor).
51. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22, at 328-30.
52. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (speculating as to the possible dimen-
sions of the social harm).




in particular, many children. The advice of the behaviourial sciences of
that time to the policy makers was greatly different than it would be
now.5 4 The policy maker must be not only cautious of the "trendy" in
the behaviourial sciences, she must be equally cautious of the "trendy"
in the law.
Similarly, the policy maker must be aware that the search for exact-
ness demanded by the behaviourial and social sciences necessarily limits
their inquiry. Fineman and Opie are correct when they say that "the
elevation of rationality as a primary virtue can result in the construction
of a model that depicts only a small segment of the 'real world'." 55 A
lawyer's perception of the "real world" is similarly limited.
The policy maker must also be aware that however rigorous the re-
search design of a behaviourial or social scientist, bias is inescapable.
5 6
The hypothesis of the researcher will necessarily structure the research
design and the data sought. Predisposition will necessarily affect the in-
terpretation of the data. Furstenberg and Cherlin, in discussing the data
that only a minority of the children of divorce become chronically
sypmtomatic say that "[t]he glass is either half full or half empty, de-
pending on one's point of view." 5 7 I illustrate my bias (as they have
theirs) when I question that policy makers should be content that as bad
as things are, they are not as bad as they might be.
The limitations of the studies referred to in this Article are readily
apparent. The sample sizes are necessarily small and some, arguably,
select. The longer the period of study, the smaller the sample studied.
The larger the sample, the more suspect becomes the methodology.
Nor can it be otherwise. It is impossible to conceive that resources can
be found to fund a nation-wide study to exclude all the variables or even
most of the variables of the human condition except the one under ex-
amination. If the problems illustrated by the data we now have are to be
addressed, society does not have enough time for the definitive study.
The foregoing brings out yet another cultural difference between
the sciences and the legal policy maker. The sciences necessarily seek
certainty. The policy maker, necessarily, if he is to serve the perceived
social need, must be content to act upon a preponderance of the best
evidence available. The evidence from the studies is that children of di-
vorce are at greater risk of harm than are children in the general popula-
tion. The question becomes: What are the dimensions of the problem?
D. Economic and Social Effects
There is little information on the consequences for the society and
54. Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act - and Some
Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 48-52.
55. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy .lak-
ing: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 128.
56. Id. at 124-30.
57. FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 46, at 69.
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the economy as a whole of endemic 58 family breakdown with its attend-
ant risk to children. There is some basis for speculation. Take, as an
example (but not as fact), the findings of Wallerstein and Kelly 59 that
more than a third of the children of divorce whom they observed be-
came chronically disabled in their functioning.60 Suppose those find-
ings applied across the general population. Suppose, further, that fifty
percent of children experience the separation of their parents. 6 1 This
would suggest divorce as a significant factor in disabling one-sixth of the
population. Society cannot afford that increase in the population of dis-
abled children. The figures are not offered as fact, but as a possible
guide to the dimensions of the problems observed. Even if the inci-
dence of disabled children of divorce is less than that found in the Wal-
lerstein and Kelly sample, it is nevertheless so high as to command
attention.
The economic component of the harm to children of divorce as an
isolated factor contributing to dysfunction has not been measured.
Guidubaldi found, as we have seen, that low academic achievement and
lowered IQ among the children of divorce was related, in part, to eco-
nomic factors, but that socio-behavioural problems were not.
In theory, adequate and enforced child support, adequate alimony
to the custodial parent or greater public subsidization of children of di-
vorce 6 2 could correct the economic component of the harm. As will be
discussed later, however, there is seldom enough private money to go
around (since a separated family is economically inefficient) and ade-
quate public subsidization is most unlikely.
The long-term consequences to the national economy of such a
large new group of under-functioning and malfunctioning children
(and, in the Wallerstein sample, young adults), must be serious, though
we do not yet have data on the macro-economic consequences.
Poor performance at school entry63 disadvantages the child's whole
academic career. Poor performance and limited education in later ado-
lescence and early adulthood must have already diminished the econ-
omy's human resources. Both have been measured in higher
proportions among children of divorce than among the general popula-
tion. The economy increasingly needs ever greater competence. This
new class of disadvantaged children appears unable to provide it. If the
problems have the dimensions they appear to have and diminish soci-
ety's and the economy's capacity to function, can a change in the law
alleviate them?
58. See authorities cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22, at 211.
60. A higher proportion of dysfunction emerged in later years. Wallerstein, supra
note 28, at 20.
61. See authorities cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. Children of divorce are subsidized through various welfare programs, but public
support is gravely inadequate.
63. John Guidubaldi &Joseph D. Perry, Divorce, Socioeconomic Status, and Children s Cog-
nitive-Social Competence at School EntrT, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 459 (1984).
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III. DOES THE LAW MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Is the present high rate of divorce a consequence alone of social
and economic influences? Or is the transformation of the law a contrib-
uting cause? The conventional wisdom holds that the change in the law
in the 70s and 80s had no influence on the rate of divorce. 64 The argu-
ment is that the fault-based divorce laws had become so subverted by
collusion and perjury6 5 that legislative abandonment of fault made no
difference. The rate of divorce, it is argued, increased in response to the
changing social and economic milieu, and the changed law made no dif-
ference. Marvell, contrary to the conventional wisdom, found a signifi-
cant correlation between no fault statutes and the rate of divorce
nationwide, but when the impact of changed law was examined state by
state, there was a significant correlation in only a minority of states.
66
Conventional wisdom is that the law does not matter, that people
will do what they will, regardless of the civil law, in response to the so-
cial and economic influences of the time. I am skeptical of such wisdom
for at least four reasons. First, the divorce rate from 1940-65 was essen-
tially stable (with a bulge in 1945-46 immediately post-war). The rate
doubled from 1965-76.67 This must surely be more than coincidence
when one considers that there was not the slightest public clamour for
more liberalized divorce-it was a silent revolution, a revolution
brought about by "experts" pursuing their own agendas, quietly.6 8 Sec-
ond, trend lines can be adjusted to show differing results. Third, under
which law is the rate more likely to increase: One that facilitates divorce
or one that does not? Finally, how could family law not have an influ-
ence? Approximately fifty percent of adults have been exposed to it.
There is no doubt that the rate of divorce would not have increased
as rapidly as it did following the introduction of no fault divorce had not
the social and, even more, economic conditions been favourable to it.
The economy was relatively prosperous, and women, increasingly, were
less dependent (but still dependant, the more so with children); the
moral imperative had diminished. However, as we have seen, it was not
these and other social and economic conditions which prompted the
change in the law.
64. See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 5, at 162 (citing studies). See also Thomas B. Marvell,
Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 LAw & Soc'v REV. 543, 544, 546-48 (1989)(review
of the research).
65. 1 am not aware of any data nor is it likely that any could have been found. My
experience in Canada in the 1960s suggests that the legal profession was not as corrupt as
academics seem to think. Nor do I have any reason to suppose that Canadian lawyers were
any more upright than those in the United States. Nevertheless, collusion and perjury did
happen. Note that collusive divorces, to the extent they occurred, were necessarily con-
sensual-conceptually and in terms of ancillary relief different from unilateral divorce.
66. Marvell, supra note 64; (citing Weiss & Willis, An Economic Analysis of Divorce Settle-
ments, unpublished, Population Research Centre, University of Chicago (1989)) (a positive
relationship found by a different method).
67. Wardle, supra note 2, at 139-41.
68. This is convincingly shown by JACOB, supra note 5, at 83. A 1982 poll showed,
inter alia, that a majority thought divorce laws should be more strict. Id.
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But there are other reasons to believe that the law makes a differ-
ence.6 9 First, in a pluralistic society (as we are said to be), increasingly
detached from other value systems, the law alone may in time become a
predominant source of values. If the law says, contrary to the cultural
perception of the marriage covenant, 70 that marriage is a transitory ar-
rangement severable at will by one of the parties to it, the law's percep-
tion, may in time, like Gresham's Law, change the former cultural
perception.
Second, the law has a regulatory function. 7 1 If family breakdown
creates a risk of doing harm to children, it is in society's interest that the
law do what it can in a free society to discourage it. The regulatory
power of civil law is limited. Law that seeks to impose a standard well
beyond the mores of the time will be evaded by one means or another.
The civil law cannot compel spouses to live together in harmony and
does not try. The law can, however, seek to encourage family stability
by financially penalizing the spouse who disrupts it and by rewarding the
spouse who keeps to the covenant (or, at least, securing, to the extent
possible, his or her economic interest). 72 Alimony was the principal
remedy73 under the old law before law reform destroyed its conceptual
roots.
74
The old law did what it could to encourage family stability. It penal-
ized a spouse erring in its eyes and secured the "innocent" spouse to the
extent possible. 75 With its theological roots, the old law was directly
interested in the rectitude of adults, but if family stability is in the inter-
est of children, the law did what it could to protect them. The truly
69. This argument rejects the positivist and relativist allegedly value-neutral school of
legal thought, at least as it might influence such a socially sensitive issue as family law. I do
not agree that the law should do no more than adapt itself to a perceived (or, more likely,
presumed) least common denominator of human behaviour-the "equity of the mean" as
Max Weber has called it. In this discussion, I am indebted to Mary Ann Glendon, in MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN
CHALLENGES (1987).
70. Marriage as a life-long commitment remains deeply rooted in our culture. There
is strong evidence that is so, including the fact that marriage remains a significant per-
sonal, family and community festival. Marriage vows, civil and religious, continue to in-
volve a serious life-long commitment. Popular literature, arts and advertisements assume
marriage is a lasting commitment. Notwithstanding the law's inducements to divorce,
about half of married couples stay married. This author does not find Bellah and his col-
leagues' assumption that there is a changed ethos of marriage wholly convincing in the
face of the evidence to the contrary. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
71. In this context, I equate its protective as well as its dispute-resolving function.
72. I do not here intend to suggest that there is an analogy between contract and the
marriage covenant. There is not. The attempt to suggest that there is has only served to
distort our thinking about family issues. Marriage is sui generis. See Mary E. O'Connell,
Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437 (1988); Carl
E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
197; Ira Mark Ellman, The Theoy of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1989).
73. In few urban families is property division an adequate remedy. Sanctions and
rewards of the civil law (at least in family cases) are not likely to be wholly effective for
families below the "middle" middle-class.
74. See authorities cited supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. Today, of course, the gender discrimination of former alimony law would have to
be removed.
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remarkable aspect of no fault divorce is that it is wholly adult-centred,
with the welfare of children subservient to adult interest. In that sense,
no fault divorce, in theoretically abjuring sanctions and rewards, does
what it can to encourage divorce because of the economic benefits to
one spouse or the other.
To what extent can the penalties and rewards of the law influence
marital conduct? We may be thankful that people, particularly in their
intimate relations, may not look to the law as their guide. Yet one won-
ders, as the knowledge of the present law's economic incentives to the
economically stronger spouse to divorce permeate the culture and the
law's values displace traditional values, whether the incentives will not
be increasingly acted upon.
Further, the law has an hortative function. In the classical view, it
was the purpose of law to promote virtue, a view which is now un-
fashionable 76 if only because, it is said, the state ought not to define
virtue in a diverse society. If, however, family instability puts children at
risk, I assume that there can be a broad consensus even in a morally
diverse society that the law ought to do what it can to encourage stabil-
ity. On such an issue law cannot be morally neutral. For the law to be
neutral about the welfare of children is to say, as essentially no fault
divorce law does, that their welfare takes second place to the "happi-
ness" of adults in the eyes of the law.
7 7
Further, Glendon, following Gertz and White, points out that
-[b]ecause law is also constitutive, it is incumbent on us to be attentive,
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible in the 'stories we tell,' the 'sym-
bols we deploy,' and the 'visions we project'. "78 In time, these stories,
symbols and visions may, as we have seen, displace other values of the
culture.
79
What stories does the present law tell? What is its message? It says,
among other things, that the marriage covenant is freely and unilaterally
terminable, that the welfare of children is subservient to the personal
fulfillment of adults, that a parent's affective relationship with his or her
children may be terminated at any time without cause at the will of the
other parent.80
76. But see, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 69; Schneider, supra note 72.
77. GLENDON, supra note 69, at 139; Schneider, supra note 72, at 236-37.
78. GLENDON, supra note 69, at 142.
79. For example, Chambers argues that with the waning sense of moral responsibility
of the non-custodial parent, perhaps unwillingly separated from his children at the will of
his former wife without cause, the law may be changed to eliminate child support or limit it
to a transitional period. David L. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Sup-
port, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614-15 (1982).
80. Furstenberg and Nord found that: (a) "marital disruption effectively destroys any
on-going relationship between children and biological parents living outside the home in a
majority of cases;" (b) less than half the children had seen the absent parent in a year; (c)
20% had not seen him in more than five years; and (d) normally when there is contact, the
relationship is social, not instrumental. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Christine Winquest
Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of Childrearing After Marital Disruption, 47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
895 (1985). A recent study in Canada and Scotland found significant structural and emo-
tional obstacles to anything like shared parenting after divorce in many cases. Edward
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Lastly, even if everyone cannot or will not respond to the exhorta-
tions of the civil law, if the message of the law is less than the culture's
ideal,8 ' then, as we have seen, that lesser norm, in time, can displace
other societal values in the same way that debased currency drives out
good currency. The analogy is more than theoretical: if family stability
is in the interest of a child and one parent seeks to achieve that ideal
while the other parent, with the permission of the law does not, the lat-
ter will prevail. That is, even if the civil law cannot compel socially bene-
ficial conduct, it can impede it if socially beneficial conduct is not
encouraged by the law.
If, as I have argued, the law does make a difference, why did the
family law reformers go wrong?
82
IV. THE FAILURE OF SCHOLARSHIP
8 3
A Canadian survey, Law and Learning,8 4 drew a distinction between
what it called doctrinal research and fundamental research in law.8 5
Doctrinal research analyzes law (and recommends change) within the
context of established doctrine. Fundamental research, in addition,
looks to the underlying social forces, the needs to be served, the prob-
able consequences of change and so on. In so doing, the fundamental
researcher in law will look not only to her own discipline but to the in-
sights that all other relevant disciplines can bring to bear.
For example, were fundamental research to be done on family law
reform, questions would be asked such as: What is the nature and pur-
pose of marriage and the family in the eyes of the state? To what extent
should the law in a free society intervene in marital and family affairs
and decisions? Such questions would inevitably lead into questions
about how the needs and welfare of children can best be served within
the framework of the law. In searching for answers, the researcher
would look to the sort of people brought together by the Ripon
Project.
8 6
Kruk, Psychological and Structural Factors Contributing to the Disengagement of Noncustodial Fathers
After Divorce, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 81 (1992). The Kruk study is important as
the first to examine reasons for the breakdown of relationships between children and non-
residential divorced fathers.
81. That is, assuming, as I do, that society as a whole still values the welfare of
children.
82. That they did is, I submit, beyond argument, if only because of the unanticipated
consequences. See Weitzman, supra note 3.
83. The thinking of the reformers is well outlined in JAcoB, supra note 5. But see Levy,
supra note 54, at 45: "The most unrelenting criticisms appear.., to have been designed
primarily to serve the theoretical or ideological agenda of the critic rather than some
sensible law reform agenda."
84. CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN LAW, LAW AND LEARNING,
REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF CANADA 65-72
(1983).
85. In French, recherches ponctuelles and recherche sublime, which may more clearly suggest
the distinction.
86. One recent, innovative and overdue response to the problems of the revolution
was a symposium in April, 1991, jointly sponsored by the American Bar Association and
Ripon College entitled "Family Law and the 'Best Interest of the Child'." A group of 40
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The law reformers did not do fundamental research. 8 7 Their focus
was on the correction of the ills wrought by fault-based regimes of di-
vorce-the exacerbation of acrimony thought to be implicit in adver-
sarial divorce; the perjurious, consensual nature of divorce law in
practice which was condoned by the courts. 88
Their correction was no fault divorce. It was a path they need not
have taken. But no fault divorce, necessarily, required a fundamental
reconsideration of the property, alimony and custodial regimes. This
the reformers undertook with admirable ingenuity. And today, their so-
lutions offer ample fodder for academics, a comfortable living for law-
yers, busywork for judges that is on occasion intellectually challenging,
as well as an ever-growing divorce industry. 89
As a result, the equitable jurisdiction states9 ° (and Canada, includ-
ing formerly community property Quebec) have been left with elaborate
and inefficient 9 i family property regimes resting on contrived rationales
of dubious tenability9 2 -rationales in the current jargon which boil
down to "contribution" and "partnership."' 93 A basic flaw in the ratio-
nales is that they are modelled on a theory of the marriage covenant that
no fault divorce denies, namely, that spouses will contribute, each in his
and her own way, and will be faithful to the partnership. Under no fault,
the faithful contributing spouse has no remedy against the spouse who is
unfaithful and/or non-contributing.
specialists from a number of disciplines-judges, lawyers, pediatricians, mental-health
professionals, child-development specialists, social historians, anthropologists, educators
and ethicists-were invited to consider what children need and fundamental changes in
law that can best foster their optimal development. Additional "Ripon Project" symposia
are in the planning stage. The Ripon Project is innovative. For the first time in North
America, a discussion of family law reform begins with fundamentals: What do children
need? What framework of law can best serve these needs?
87. But see Levy, supra note 54. The advisors to the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws included representatives of the social and behaviourial sci-
ences. Commissioners, advisors and reporters necessarily brought individual agendas to
the discussions. Further, it must be recognized that the advice of the social and
behaviourial sciences today with all that has been learned since the 1970s would be greatly
different than it was then. See JACOB, supra note 5; UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
9A U.L.A. (1979) and commentary.
88. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 91-97. Wardle questions whether no fault divorce
achieved its limited objectives. Id. at 97-112.
89. The phrase, "divorce industry" so far as I know, originated with Mr. Justice Ray-
mond Watson, formerly of the Family Division of the Australian High Court, one of the
pioneers in Australia in family law reform. It refers to the growing number of judges,
lawyers, mental health professionals, mediators, accountants, tax experts, appraisers,
evaluators, actuaries and so on who, under the legislation, have become necessary to serve
the industry.
90. I do not extend the analysis to community property states.
91. "Inefficient" as used here means costly to administer. Alimony, lump sum and
periodic, rid of some of the encrustations of the past, is the more efficient remedy, but is
inconsistent with no fault divorce.
92. A thorough analysis of the untenability of the theories is beyond the scope of this
Article. But see, e.g., 23 FAM. L.Q. 147-381 (1989) ("Special Issue on Property Division at
Divorce"). A critical reading of these essentially doctrinal analyses well illustrates the
point.
93. Even if the partnership analogy is misleading and distorting, it will be an insensi-
tive husband and an imprudent politician who denies that marriage is a partnership.
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The essential flaw in the theories is that they do not serve the social
need. In most urban family circumstances there is not enough property
to go around. Yet to be consistent with the premises of no fault divorce,
property division was necessarily put forward as the predominant eco-
nomic remedy for divorce, and alimony was relegated to an occasional,
short term, "bridging" remedy.
We, today, with the benefit of hindsight, may wonder that when fun-
damental change in the nature of marriage and the parent-child relation-
ship was in contemplation, the need to consider an equally radical
change in the family property regime in the interests of children was not
apparent. Alimony, much more clearly than property division, was cast
adrift from its former theoretical roots, its rationale, by no fault divorce.
If marriage is freely terminable at any time without cause; if, in the eyes
of the law, marriage is no more than a temporary liaison of two individu-
als for so long as it is convenient to both and who go back to their two
solitudes upon divorce, why should either have any continuing responsi-
bility for the other?
9 4
That alimony has uneasily survived its illogic under no fault reflects
the need for it. But an ancillary remedy without roots in a defensible
rationale consistent with law can, at best, give rise to inconsistent appli-
cation and, at worst, perceived injustice.
The loss of alimony as a viable remedy has a most direct impact on
children of divorce. For if a child's custodial parent is poor, so must be
the child.9 5 Nor, under the logic of no fault divorce can that poverty be
remedied by adequate child support under private law, 96 because its
logic demands that a custodial parent not share in any benefit to the
child.
In distinction, the rationale for the property and alimony regimes
under the old law, whatever its flaws, was soundly based in it. Marriage
was a lifelong covenant to be severed only for a grave breach. Until
death or remarriage, the "innocent" spouse (and children in her care)
were, in theory, entitled to what they would have enjoyed but for the
breach.
The changes in the custodial regime were, on the face of it, not as
far-reaching, but may have been, in substance, more profound. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act proposed the already recognized
"best interests" test as the guide in determining custody but recom-
mended that conduct, unrelated to the children, be removed from the
court as a discretion structuring factor. Thus, not only did no fault di-
vorce change the nature of the marriage covenant, 9 7 it changed the par-
ent-child relationship from one that was assumed to be sacrosanct (in
94. See authorities cited supra note 72 and accompanying text.
95. The positive relationship between family income and children's academic achieve-
ment and IQis well established. See generally supra note 63, at 466-67.
96. Even if there were enough monetary resources to go around. In most family cir-
cumstances, there is not.
97. See WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 366-68.
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the absence of grave misconduct) to one that is terminable for all practi-
cal purposes"8 by the other parent without cause.
The reformers did not intend to change the nature of the marriage
covenant or the parent-child relationship. But in their too narrow focus
on the ills of fault-based divorce, in their failure to do fundamental re-
search, to think fundamentally, the reformers, unwittingly, as we now
know, profoundly changed the parent-child relationship"9 and, to the
extent that the law has influence, changed the husband-wife relation-
ship, two relationships basic to the functioning of society.
Another gift of reform has been the most bizarre and thought dis-
torting jargon ranging from the offensive-"rehabilitative mainte-
nance," for example, to the misleading-"clean break," "partnership"
and "equality," words that become icons detached from the limited real-
ity which spawned them, which ignore the total reality and prevent us
from thinking clearly how to serve the underlying social need.
Consider "equality," a principal icon, for example. Surely it is now
the cultural perception that the equality of spouses is the very basis of
what marriage ought to be-equality of commitment, of management, of
obligation. But these words do not readily translate into words of law.
Men and women have differing needs 0 0 and the law's arithmetic equal-
ity does not serve them. Those who must show a proper reverence for
the icon "equality" at law, yet who recognize the differing needs, have
had to devise daedalian rationales for what might be called "asymmetri-
cal equality."' 0 '
Would we not think more clearly about what the law ought to be if
we were to call "a spade a spade" and recognize need for what it is? But
with need goes an obligation to meet it and such an obligation is outside
the context of no fault divorce.
With hindsight and more than twenty years of experience under the
premises of no fault divorce, we can better see their flaws than could the
reformers. And the hubris of that time is no longer with us. We now
better know that we must think fundamentally if we seek to change law
affecting the fundamental institution of society. It is to be regretted that
the now vast, and, for the most part, excellent, literature on legal issues
affecting the family remains doctrinally captive so that the remedies pro-
posed are no more than palliative and do not get to the root of the
problems we face.
V. REMEDIES
Of the many proposals to alleviate the risk of harm to children of
98. See authorities cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.
99. See JACOB, supra note 5, at 133 (Levy appears to have considered the custodial
issue in more depth than the Commissioners were prepared to accept).
100. O'Connell puts it neatly: "Women are not damaged men .. . [they] are not un-
damaged men either." O'Connell, supra note 72 at 506-07.
101. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for
Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q 279 (1989).
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divorce in the context of no fault, I will do no more than touch upon a
few broad categories. First, the economic component of the harm to
children' 0 2 was sought to be addressed in the federally required child
support guidelines. Overdue and prudent as that measure was, a recent
study has found that the changes brought about by passage of the guide-
lines have been modest. 103 The inescapable fact remains that separated
parenting is economically inefficient. In the majority of circumstances,
separated parents do not have the resources to support their children
adequately. 10 4 The extent of child poverty attributable to divorce is a
product of the high incidence of divorce. 10 5
Second, there have been recent congressional suggestions that the
"waiting period" for divorce should be increased to give couples time to
"sober up" (as one report put it) and consider reconciliation. 10 6 The
proposal has its flaws. Until 1985, a ground for divorce in Canada was,
in theory, three years consensual separation. In practice, the "waiting
period" was detrimental to women and children in that during the sepa-
ration period, they were denied some of the spectrum of remedies avail-
able on divorce.
10 7
There is no evidence that people do "sober up" during the waiting
period. The tensions and uncertainties of unresolved issues are not
conducive to reconciliation. Further, time reduces the chances of wo-
men for remarriage more than it does for men, and pre-divorce liaisons
are much more open to men than they are for women with children.
Nevertheless, there is some symbolism, some "message" in law that says
102. Which, as we have seen, is real but which has not been measured as an isolated
factor.
103. Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 345 (1991). The study
involved only three states: Colorado, Hawaii and Illinois, with different guideline models.
The results in other states may differ.
104. See generally Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1990).
105. It is to be recognized that the impoverishment of children of divorce is only one
corner of growing child poverty in general, which is so detrimental to the society of both
the United States and Canada and has such short and long run economic implications, if
only because you cannot educate a hungry child. Growing child poverty is the result of a
spectrum of changed social and economic policies: the unweaving of the support network
during the prosperity of the 1980s, tax and welfare policies increasingly detrimental to
children, family law and so on. See, e.g., U.S. Panel Warns on Child Poverty, N.Y. TIMES NA-
TIONAL, April 27, 1990, at A22 (citing a report of the National Commission on Children);
SYLVIA A. HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COSTS OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN
(1991). There has been an enormous transfer of wealth from the young (that is, those who
raise children) to the old in the last two decades. Iver Peterson, Why Older People are Richer
Than Other Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at E3. It is truly astonishing that during a
time when "family values" are on so many political lips (which we, apparently, are in-
tended to read) the tax exemption for children has been reduced. It was 42% of per capita
income in 1948 and is now 11%. Steven A. Holmes, Unlikely Union Arises to Press Family
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at A18. In Canada (before the imposition of the Goods
and Services Tax in 1990), a married couple earning the median income with two children
paid marginally more tax (100.1%) than a childless couple earning the same income.
106. See Holmes, supra note 104.
107. The result might be somewhat different in the United States. In Canada, divorce
and ancillary relief, custody and maintenance, are under federal jurisdiction. There are
some pre-divorce remedies under provincial jurisdiction.
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one cannot be quickly freed from the marriage covenant. It is question-
able, however, that longer "waiting periods" would reduce the rate of
divorce sufficiently to justify the detriments.10 8
Third, joint custody in various guises-from joint residential cus-
tody to a right on the part of the access parent to be consulted about
major decisions affecting the child-is now the statutory preference in a
majority of states. The rationale for joint custody rests on two concepts.
First, that children of divorce do best when they maintain a close rela-
tionship with both separated parents.' 0 9 Second, that parent and child
have a right to a continuing relationship after divorce. "Parents are For-
ever" was coined to express these two concepts." 0
Notwithstanding the broad acceptance of the idea of joint custody
and it attractiveness, there have been no long-range and few shorter
range studies regarding the impact of joint residential custody on chil-
dren. We know nothing (except that which can be speculated from theo-
ries of child development) about infants and joint custody-at a time
when parent-child bonding, if it is to occur, must occur.
Johnston and her colleagues conducted a study of children in post-
divorce conflicted families where there was court ordered joint custody
or frequent access. Their findings were grave indeed. A comparison of
that group and children in sole custody showed the former to be more
dysfunctional than the latter. l I
It seems clear that the automatic imposition ofjoint custody without
skilled and time-consuming assessment of the families can be detrimen-
tal to children. But, on the other hand, if as a rule of thumb, joint cus-
tody or frequent access are ordered only when there is agreement, the
non-residential parent is hostage to the continuing goodwill of the resi-
dential parent-an intolerable situation if there is to be equity to both
the children and the absent parent. Moreover, it makes an ass of the
law. 112
There are perhaps irremovable structural reasons for the findings of
Furstenberg and Nord l3 that divorce terminates the absent parent's
108. It is clear, of course, that if the full spectrum of ancillary relief were available
during the "waiting period," the separation would be permanent and the chance of re-
sumed cohabitation no greater than that of remarriage to one another after divorce.
109. See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 22. But see FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN,
supra note 46, at 73-76 (Furstenberg and Cherlin, with their different methodology, found
no correlation between children's adjustment to divorce and their relationship with an
absent parent).
110. The phrase is that of Meyer Elkin, formerly director of the Los Angeles County
Conciliation Court. Elkin was a pioneer and a leader from the 1950s on of the conciliation
court movement.
I 11. See JANET R. JOHNSTON & LINDA E. G. CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DY-
NAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT (1988); Janet R. Johnston et al., Latency Chil-
dren in Post-Separation and Divorce Disputes, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 563 (1985);
Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and
Frequent Access, 59 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576 (1989).
112. Experience suggests the sanction against the obdurate parent of losing custody is
seldom a realistic alternative. When patterns of separated parenting have been established
it is very difficult, and often impossible, to change them.
113. See Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 80.
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parent-child relationship in the majority of cases and that in the majority
of the remainder, the relationship is social, not affective. A recent study
of disengaged divorced fathers found substantial structural impediments
to continued parent-child engagement of non-residential fathers. A no-
table finding was that many fathers who were most engaged with their
children during marriage eventually ceased contact because their
profound sense of loss and bereavement as well as the artificial access
conditions made a continued truncated relationship too painful." 14
Fourth, therapists" 15 propose that the harm to children of divorce
that they have observed can be reduced therapeutically. In response to
the conciliation court movement 1 6 there are now court-connected
programmes in most jurisdictions of varying elaborateness conducted by
persons with varying credentials and skills to mediate or conciliate issues
involving children and their future parenting and to counsel parents and
children.
To say that there has been no overall" 7 assessment of such
programmes and their long-term results is not to diminish their value.
Social experience does not yet offer guidance in the difficult art of sepa-
rated parenting. There is no social knowledge and almost no empiri-
cally based clinical guidance in the even more difficult art of step-
parenting. Therapeutic programmes, even if they do no more than raise
some consciousness of the difficulties, must have value. There is no
doubt that in skilled hands (of which there are too few) some children
can be saved from harm.
Yet there is no evidence that such programmes, extended as they
are, have or can significantly reduce the incidence of harm to children of
divorce."l 8 It is doubtful that we have the resources in money or in
uniquely skilled personnel to be able to address the problem in all its
dimensions. In any event, if the law is counter-therapeutic, the law will
prevail.
There is another issue: state intrusion into parenting through doc-
trinal" 9 therapeutic intervention following divorce is now on a scale
114. Kruk, supra note 80.
115. "Therapists" is used here generically for lack of a better word to encompass all
those in "helping professions" of different disciplines who assist, in a number of ways, to
resolve the human issues of divorce and ameliorate the consequences.
116. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the nature and extent of the move-
ment, its ideological thrusts or to assess their merits. In general, the movement seeks to
humanize the divorce process, to observe and within the possible, correct the conse-
quences. It is interesting and perhaps regrettable that conciliation (to use the term
broadly) has had no legal analysis although through it, for the most part, judges in prac-
tice, if not in form, delegate decision-making involving children (but not their support)
and their future parenting to therapists.
117. See 30 FAM. AND CONCILIATION CTS. REV. (April, 1992) which is devoted to reports
on court-connected mediation and conciliation in California.
118. See, e.g.,Johnston, supra note 11; Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 80; Kruk, supra
note 80.
119. This refers to the fact that, of necessity, state administered programmes (e.g. me-
diation, conciliation, counselling, child custody assessment) must be doctrinally con-
forming within themselves. It does not mean that the programmes are necessarily
homogeneous across the nation-nor that the doctrines followed are necessarily "wrong."
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about which a free society might be uneasy, however benign the intent
and the therapeutic accomplishment.
In summary, the experience so far does not suggest that the contin-
uing search for the "best" custodial/access regime and therapeutic gui-
dance has or is likely to obviate the structural impediments to effective
separated parenting or to significantly reduce the incidence of harm to
children of divorce. That does not mean, given the present state of the
law, that we should not try or, in trying, ignore the risks of state intru-
sion that trying involves.
Fifth, Weitzman, 120 Glendon t2 ' and others propose what Glendon
calls a "children first" regime of property division, alimony and child
support to remedy the economic component of harm to children and the
economic deprivation of custodial mothers. Without going into the de-
tails, 12 2 they propose that the needs of children have a first call on the
income of the non-custodial parent and the family home. For example,
Weitzman proposes that a custodial mother be granted either title to the
family home or a right of occupation while the children are dependant.
Neither she nor Glendon recommend that a child's interest in family
property be expressly recognized but rather that it be derivative through
the custodial parent.
A "child first" policy is attractive conceptually, but there are sub-
stantial practical and theoretical impediments to it. It does not address
the psychic component of harm to children. It does not recognize the
economic inefficiency of separated parenting and would leave in effect
law which facilitates that inefficiency. However draconian its measures
against the non-custodial parent, in the majority of family circum-
stances, he will seldom have enough to maintain his family at an ade-
quate standard without public subsidization, 123 no matter what penury
is imposed on him.
What I call the theoretical impediments to a "child first" policy
However, following Bellah, Glendon says that the therapeutic culture "not only refuses to
take a moral stand, it actively promotes distrust of'morality'." GLENDON, supra note 69, at
108 n. 113. That is, in this context, it exalts perceived self interest at the expense of obliga-
tion to others or to the society. "Americans are seldom as selfish as the therapeutic culture
urges them to be." BELLAH ET AL., supra note 70, at 112. Thus, the crucial involvement of
the therapeutic community in family law decision-making reinforces the adult-centredness,
implicit in no fault divorce. As noted before, the law appears to be counter-cultural: the
cultural perception of marriage and family is on a "higher," less self-centred, plane than is
the law. It is, of course, an argument of this Article that the law's perception must, of
necessity, in time displace that of the culture.
120. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 379-87. Weitzman gives detailed proposals for reme-
dying the economic consequences of no fault divorce within its context, which are a more
or less unseverable "package." Id. at 357-401. The text refers to those most directly af-
fecting children, but all have an indirect impact.
121. GLENDON, supra note 69, at 91-104.
122. For example, that there should be three classes of marriage and divorce-short
childless marriages, those with dependent children and those involving older women who
have reared now independent children. Arguably, the details of the proposals are crucial if
one is to assess their effects, but they are beyond the scope of this Article.
123. Weitzman seeks an equalization of standards of living in the separated house-
holds. This would mean, in most circumstances, a significant reduction from that formerly
enjoyed by the children. WEITZMAN, supra note 3, at 380.
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within the context of no fault divorce are substantial. In operation, the
proposal would surely leave the adult self-interestedness of the custodial
parent with the benefits of no fault divorce and leave the non-custodial
parent to pay most of its costs. 124 The proposal is inconsistent with and
against the tenets of no fault divorce, namely, that each adult is equally
free to terminate a marriage at any time without cause, to equally share
in the acquests of it and each, thereafter, to have the fruits of her and his
individual efforts. 12 5 Law which is not equitably coherent within itself
cannot stand, however benign its intent. Finally, Wardle came more di-
rectly to the point of harm to children of divorce by tentatively propos-
ing that "divorces involving minor children [might be] excluded from no
fault divorce processes or be subject to more protective no fault divorce
procedures." 1
2 6
The Wardle proposal for different grounds of divorce when there
are children and when there are not, is of a different dimension than the
"child first" policy. Different grounds of divorce necessarily mean that
the marriage covenant at law changes once there are children. What
changes in the alimony, property and custodial regimes are suggested?
What would be the grounds of divorce? Would the pre-child marriage
be, in effect, only a trial marriage to become "real" only when a child
was born-with what impact on the alimony and property regime?
I argue that for the law to recognize differing classes of marriage
giving rise to differing grounds of divorce and differing economic enti-
tlements and obligations is to diminish the institution of marriage;
127
and that society's interest in the welfare of children is best and most
simply and logically served by sustaining that institution. The complexi-
ties of any other approach are formidable.
In summary, I submit that the ever more elaborate search for pallia-
tives will, in the end, be unavailing because they do not get to the root of
the problem, the high incidence of divorce facilitated by the law and the
consequent risk of harm to children.
128
Does not the question come down to this: If the law influences the
rate of divorce (as I argue it does) and if divorce puts children at risk and
they do best in an intact family (in the absence of exposure to abuse or
marked spousal conflict), should not the law do what it can to encourage
124. Weitzman's proposal for equalization of standards would, in theory, avoid the
problem. But maintaining the family home for children either by transfer to the custodial
parent or postponement of sale while the children are dependant (with all the practical
and financial difficulties involved) would be at the individual cost of the non-custodial par-
ent. This is true even if determining the respective standards of living included a right on
the part of the non-custodial parent to own or occupy a property equivalent to the family
home. Such duplication is within the means of only a few.
125. To state the proposition in its stark terms is to show its fallacy in the real world.
The reformers, of course, had to dilute the stark premise to grudgingly allow for the facts
that women are sometimes economically disadvantaged by marriage and that children are,
as the premises of no fault divorce would have it, an economic liability.
126. Wardle, supra note 2, at 133-35.
127. Bearing in mind, as Groucho Marx has told us, "that marriage is a great institution
but who wants to live in an institution?"
128. Together with other problems accompanying a high incidence of divorce.
[Vol. 69:3
NO FAULT DIVORCE
family stability, rather than facilitating instability? Finding the answer to
that question seems to be urgent.
VI. DIRECTIONS
A beginning, if not yet a substantial literature, calls for a changed
direction in the law, new law that encourages family stability. Bartlett
urges that family law ought to be based on "notions of benevolence and
responsibility . . . [that] reinforce parental dispositions toward generos-
ity and other-directedness .... ,,129 Minow says that the law must not
create "obstacles to affiliation;" that it should "nurture the relationships
between individuals that constitute families."' 130 Schneider would go
further in saying that the law of divorce (and, therefore, of marriage)
should emphasize the unity of spouses and not their separateness; that it
should emphasize their obligations to each other and not their auton-
omy.' 3 Hafen argues that the individualism of no fault divorce is, in
fact, counter-productive; that true freedom arises from and, for its exer-
cise, is dependent on belonging; that, in any event, a sense of belonging
is crucial to a child's capacity to become a individual.' 3 2 We know be-
yond doubt that these ideals, these aspirations, are just those under
which children can best be nurtured. The vitality of the society and its
economy, in turn, depends on the quality of their nurture.
What framework of law can best help people to try to reach these
ideals? Turning the clock back to a fault-based regime of divorce is, I
suggest, repugnant to most of us. Yet policy options based on "notions
of benevolence," that "nurture relationships," and "emphasize obliga-
tions, not autonomy" and which, at the same time, do not reintroduce
the flaws of the old law are not yet clearly apparent. To find them, is, I
suggest, a pressing need, and will require a reorientation of thinking
among legal scholars.
We must bear in mind Ronald Coase's caution in another context:
[I]n choosing between social arrangements within the context
of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind
that a change in the existing system which will lead to an im-
provement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of
others .... In devising and choosing between social arrange-
ments we should have regard for the total effect. This, above
all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.' 3 3
129. Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1988).
130. Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows:- Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 894.
131. Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 257.
132. Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. I, 3, 39-41.
133. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcON. I, 44 (1960). Dr. Coase was
awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics.
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FAMILIES, SCHOOLS AND THE MORAL
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD*
The seeds, as it were, of moral discernment are planted in the mind by him
that made us. They grow up in their proper season, and are at first tender
and delicate and easily warped. Their progress depends very much upon
their being duly cultivated and properly exercised.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Paper is concerned with the moral education of children. 2 It is
often asked whether morality can be taught. In higher education this
question is commonly converted to the question of whether morality can
be studied.3 This shifts the emphasis from teacher to learner. A major
theme of this Paper is that the schools, too, should reframe the question
of whether morality can be taught. Particularly at the elementary school
level, moral education is commonly regarded as a matter of "instilling"
or "implanting" moral values. Fearing moral indoctrination, many re-
ject the idea that moral education belongs in the public schools. But,
taking the cue from higher education, moral education in the schools
need not be a form of indoctrination. It can be much more like studying
morality than having moral values "implanted." But this requires ac-
knowledging, with Thomas Reid, that the "seeds of moral discernment"
are present even in the early school years. What is needed are opportu-
nities for children's powers of moral discernment to be "duly cultivated
and properly exercised."
Moral discernment is highly valued. We value it in ourselves and
others as a mark of reasonableness. 4 But, as Reid says metaphorically, it
* Professor of Philosophy and director of the Center for the Study of Ethics in
Society, codirector of the Center for Philosophy and Critical Thinking in the Schools,
Western Michigan University.
1. THOMAS REID, Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind, in PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 595
(1967).
2. I offer no definition of 'moral education.' Indeed, it is precisely controversies
about what constitutes moral education that fuels much of this Paper. I do hope that a
reasonably clear and plausible conception of the kind of moral education I favor in the
schools will emerge from my discussion. By 'moral' I mean, roughly, that which has to do
with right and wrong, good and evil, and virtue and vice. This includes a consideration of
principles, standards, rules, attitudes and sentiments that can plausibly be said to be
moral. Morality cannot be equated with religion, law, or social etiquette, however inti-
mately they might be related in some areas. By 'education' I mean to include a variety of
means of learning, ranging from formal, didactic instruction to learning for oneself.
Which end of this spectrum I favor in regard to moral education in the schools will, I hope,
become clear as the Paper unfolds.
3. See Daniel Callahan, Goals in the Teaching of Ethics, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 61-74 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980) (the emphasis is on students
as active learners rather than passive recipients of moral instruction).
4. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
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is only the seeds of moral discernment that are "planted in the mind by
him that made us."'5 We naturally look to children's caretakers, typically
their families, to protect these seeds while they are so tender, delicate
and easily warped. But this is the language of passivity. To understand
fully what Reid means by the seeds of moral discernment "being duly
cultivated and properly exercised," we must view children as agents, not
merely patients.
In some contexts "cultivated" implies passivity. For example, a
field is cultivated by a farmer. It does not cultivate itself. In an educa-
tional context teachers might attempt to cultivate appreciation and judg-
ment in their students. However, children can be encouraged to do this
for themselves. If moral discernment is a mark of reasonableness, it is
clear that at some point children themselves must begin to exercise their
powers ofjudgment-that is, develop a capacity to think for themselves.
In this they cannot remain passive.
6
In this Paper I promote a view that includes moral education within
the larger aim of helping children develop their capacity for reasonable-
ness. However, in doing so I must address the concerns families have
about the moral development of their children. These include worries
about whether it is the business of the schools to enter into the arena of
moral education at all. I argue that it is unavoidable that the schools do
so to some extent. The real question is how they can do so in a respon-
sible manner. An entering wedge is civic education, which aims at help-
ing children prepare for citizenship in a constitutional democracy.
However, this wedge opens up a much wider area in which children
should be given opportunities to, as Reid might put it, duly cultivate and
properly exercise their "seeds of moral discernment."
II. WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY?
Whose responsibility is it to duly cultivate and properly exercise
children's "seeds of moral discernment?" A short answer is: Those who
bear primary responsibility for the education of children. A moment's
reflection reveals that this short answer requires a rather lengthy expla-
nation. Who does bear primary responsibility for the education of chil-
dren? I will focus on three major candidates. The first is obvious, the
second is controversial and the third is typically underestimated, if not
overlooked entirely. They are families, schools and children themselves.
5. REID, supra note I, at 595. Some may balk at the theistic tone of Reid's remark.
God does play a part in Reid's account of morality. But nothing I say in this Paper re-
quires his theistic assumptions. The essential point here is simply that moral development
begins at a very early age and that its "seeds," as it were, will grow only in a suitable
environment. What the elements of such an environment might be is one of the major
concerns of this Paper.
6. This does not mean that children are to be regarded as adults. Moral discernment
requires experience as well as judgment. And there is much that young children are not
experientially or emotionally ready to confront. However, as will be shown later, many
have already developed a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of morality by the time
they enter school.
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Families are recognized by law to have a right to morally nurture
their children. For example, in exercise of this right, families may estab-
lish rules of behavior for their children, extend or restrict privileges,
monitor television viewing, read their children stories with moral
messages and take their children to the church of their choice. Families
can also fail to exercise this right responsibly. In cases of child abuse
(for example, severe beatings), legal intervention is justified. Although
abusive treatment may not be directly related to a parent's efforts at
"moral instruction," parental abuse of any sort can surely have an ad-
verse effect on the moral development of the child.
However, there are more subtle ways in which families can fail to
responsibly exercise the right to morally nurture their children. They
can simply fail to attend carefully to those aspects of their children's
lives that need moral nurturing. Young children may be left too much
on their own, they may be unloved even if they are not beaten, and so
on. Much of this may go unnoticed by others. And even when noticed,
it may be unclear to what extent, if any, legal intervention is permissible.
Still, we need not conclude that, as long as their behavior is shielded by
law, families are fulfilling the moral responsibilities they have to their
children. 7 Because a legally recognized right to morally nurture chil-
dren creates a protected zone for families, it seems reasonable to insist
that there is an accompanying moral responsibility to exercise that right
responsibly. 8 This is especially so given the obvious dependency and
vulnerability of children and the substantial legal power families have to
govern the lives of their children.
Of course, nothing said so far implies that only families have a legal
right to morally nurture children. Families may acknowledge that
others, too, have such a right by sending their children to accredited
private schools. What about the public schools? In the absence of an
approved alternative, the state legally requires children to attend the
public schools. Thus, the state accords public schools a right and re-
sponsibility to provide a major portion of the education of children. To
what extent, if any, should this be understood to include the moral edu-
cation of children?
Here opinion sharply divides. Oddly, the voices of children are sel-
dom heard or even represented in these disagreements. Yet, surely at
some point in their formal education, children become moral agents
with rights and responsibilities of their own. Full acknowledgement of
this strengthens the case for according public schools the right and re-
sponsibility to provide an environment within which the "seeds of moral
7. This point follows from the broader notion that moral and legal responsibility are
distinguishable. For example, if I agree to meet a struggling student in my office at 3:00
p.m., but cavalierly decide to play golf instead, this is a failure in moral, not legal,
responsibility.
8. Whether there is a legal responsibility as well is a more difficult matter, one best
settled by legal experts. In any case, for reasons given supra note 2, whatever legal respon-
sibility may exist now or through future changes in law, it is unlikely to reach as far as
moral responsibility does.
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discernment" can be, as Reid puts it, "duly cultivated and properly
exercised." 9
Because national surveys consistently reveal that more than eighty
percent of the parents in our society favor some sort of moral education
in the schools, we might be tempted to conclude that there already is a
virtual mandate for the public schools to place moral education explic-
itly on their agendas.' 0 However, because of the vast differences of
opinion about just what is to count as moral education, it is not clear
what, if any, mandate exists.
For example, many believe morality and religion are inseparable. If
they agree with the doctrine of the separation of church and state, they
may fear that "secular humanist" teachers will, unwittingly perhaps, un-
dermine the religious foundation of their children's morality. So, if they
nevertheless favor moral education in the schools, they will be wary of
just how this is to be done (and by whom). Others may simply insist that
moral education has no place in state supported, public schools. Pri-
vate, sectarian schools, however, are another matter, and that is where
they will send their children. Still others might wish to overturn the
doctrine of the separation of church and state so that moral education,
in full religious dress, may be brought into the public schools. I I
But even those who believe that morality and religion can and
should be separated in a public school setting may have very different
ideas about moral education in the schools. Some believe it is the job of
the schools to "indoctrinate" students with certain values. Their detrac-
tors object to this as reinforcing a kind of mindless absolutism. Others
favor "values clarification," the aim of which is to help students clarify
the values they already hold, while at the same time withholding critical
evaluation of those values. Detractors charge that this implicitly rein-
forces mindless relativism.12
Given these controversies, it is no wonder that some families insist
9. This statement is intentionally vague. What must be taken up below is what such
an environment should be like.
10. See, e.g., THOMAS LICKONA, EDUCATING FOR CHARACTER: How OUR SCHOOLS CAN
TEACH RESPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY 21 (1991) ("For more than a decade, every Gallup
poll that has asked parents whether schools should teach morals has come up with an
unequivocal yes. Typical is the finding that 84 percent of parents with school-age children
say they want the public schools to provide 'instruction that would deal with morals and
moral behavior.' ").
11. For a very constructive attempt to show how morality and religion can be distin-
guished without detracting from either, see Larry P. Nucci, Doing Justice to Morality in Con-
temporary Values Education, in MORAL, CHARACTER, AND Civic EDUCATION IN THE ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL 21, 27-33 (Jacques S. Benninga ed., 1991).
12. "Mindless absolutism" and "mindless relativism" should not be construed as rep-
resenting anything clear or precise. Those who use these expressions are speaking pejora-
tively of positions they (fairly or unfairly) attribute to their opponents. "Mindless," as
applied to both "absolutism" and "relativism," implies uncritical acceptance and applica-
tion. So, it may be alleged, "mindless absolutism" favors "implanting" universal, and pos-
sibly exceptionless, moral principles in children. Children are not invited critically to
evaluate these principles. Children are to be indoctrinated to accept and apply them, thus
circumventing their critical intelligence. Similarly, .'mindless relativism" allegedly encour-
ages uncritical acceptance of the view that "any moral opinion is as good as any other."
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that the moral education of their children is their responsibility, and that
the public schools should not interfere. However, I will argue that they
are mistaken in this. In making my case, I will suggest a path between
the contending parties that at the same time addresses their fears.
Three basic points can be made. First, moral education in the public
schools should, among other things, strive to help students become rea-
sonable persons. Reasonable people can deeply disagree about many
things, including religion. So, aside from any constitutional guarantees,
there is good reason for public schools to respect religious differences.
Second, helping students become reasonable persons is the most effec-
tive way of fighting the twin specters of mindless absolutism and min-
dless relativism. It would be odd to think of a reasonable person as a
mindless absolutist or relativist. 13 Whatever attraction such a person
might have toward any form of absolutism or relativism would involve
some degree of reflection or thoughtfulness. The best defense against
either form of mindlessness would therefore seem to be to help students
develop their capacity to be reasonable. Third, in a pluralist society
such as ours, families that attempt to "go it alone" with the moral educa-
tion of their children are unlikely to succeed-at least not in a way that
will serve their children well.
III. Civic EDUCATION: A LINK BETWEEN SCHOOL AND FAMILY
It should be noted that there is a place where the legitimate con-
cerns of public education and families clearly join. Public education in
our society is sustained by a political system committed to certain indi-
vidual liberties and democratic decision making.' 4 In turn, public edu-
cation is legitimately expected to help sustain that system by preparing
children for citizenship. This is the function of civic education, which
aims at helping students acquire the necessary understanding and skills
for effective, responsible participation in a constitutional democracy.15
What, then, are the values civic education should emphasize? Robert
Fullinwider suggests the following: the capacity to make independent,
rational judgments about civic matters, respect for the rights of others
and the capacity to discuss and defend political views that may differ
13. Any reflective form of absolutism can be expected to show some sensitivity to the
particular contexts within which moral judgement and choice are made. Any reflective
form of relativism is likely to embrace common values such as self-respect, respect for
others, fairness, truthfulness, keeping one's word and not harming others. Thus, neither
view could fairly be called "mindless."
14. See Robert K. Fullinwider, Science and Technology Education as Civic Education, in Eu-
ROPE, AMERICA, AND TECHNOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 197, 197-215 (Paul T.
Durbin ed., 1991).
15. For a detailed discussion of where civic education might best fit in the curriculum,
see Alita Z. Letwin, Promoting Civic Understanding and Civic Skills Through Conceptually Based
Curricula, in MORAL, CHARACTER, AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, supra
note 11, at 203, 203-11 (discussing educational materials developed by the Center for
Civic Education, a California nonprofit corporation that develops programs for both pri-
vate and public schools). See also Carolyn Pereira, Educating for Citizenship in the Early Grades,
in MORAL, CHARACTER, AND CIVIC EDUCATION IN THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL, supra note 11, at
212, 212-26.
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from theirs. 16
These civic values form an important part of the social virtue of
reasonableness. Civic education's concern for the reasonableness of
students joins with the family's concern for the moral development of its
children. This is so for several reasons. First, civic values such as re-
spect for the rights of persons are themselves moral values. Thus, no
clear separation of civic and moral education is possible. Second, as
Fullinwider amply shows, the dispositions that civic education encour-
ages do not, in fact, confine themselves to the civic arena. For example,
the ability to discuss and defend political views is not an ability to dis-
cuss and defend only that. Once encouraged, the critical thinking skills
exhibited in the civic arena are likely to show up anywhere. And, just as
these skills are assets in the political arena, they are assets in other areas
of life as well. 17 Third, families should desire their children to grow up
to be well-developed, moral persons. As will be shown, reasonableness
is a central feature of such persons.
Finally, we need to consider the perspective of children themselves.
They have a right to be given opportunities to become well-developed,
moral persons. 18 This right is as basic as the right to be given opportu-
nities to develop the ability to read, write or compute. Families that do
not want or do not care whether their children become well-developed,
moral persons pose a special problem. The failure of such families to
provide adequate opportunities, or their active interference with this en-
deavor, can only strengthen the case for the schools providing such op-
portunities. The case for schools doing this is even stronger if, as seems
likely, even the most conscientious families cannot by themselves pro-
vide adequate opportunities.
IV. A CASE FOR REASONABLENESS
I have referred to reasonableness as a social virtue. What does this
involve? Minimally, it can be understood to include those skills and dis-
positions encompassed by what educators refer to as critical thinking.
Robert Ennis succinctly defines "critical thinking" as "reasonable reflec-
tive thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do."' 9
16. Fullinwider, supra note 14, at 198. As authority for these ideas, Fullinwider cites
BRIAN S. CRITrENDEN, PARENTS, THE STATE, AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATE 13, 122 (1988);
AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 38-39 (1987); William Galston, Civic Education in
the Liberal State, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 89, 97 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
1989).
17. How else are we to understand the nationwide call for greater emphasis on devel-
oping critical thinking skills? This is not simply a call for critical thinking in civic
education. "
18. This is at least a moral right. Whether it can plausibly be construed as a legal
right as well is a question best left for legal experts. I would think that there should be such
a legal right, even if presently there is none. What respect for such a right would entail for
families, schools and others would still be subject to much debate. However, the impor-
tance of acknowledging such a right is that this recognizes children themselves as having a
claim in the matter.
19. Robert H. Ennis, A Conception of Critical Thinking-Il'ith Some Curriculum Suggestions,
NEWSLETTER ON TEACHING PHILOSOPHY (American Philosophical Association, Newark,
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Although admirably brief, Ennis's definition may be too narrow. Critical
thinking can also be used to make sense of what we read, see or hear and
to make inferences from premises with which we may disagree or about
which we have no particular view. Such critical thinking may lead one to
decide what to believe or do, but it need not.
20
In addition to his definition of critical thinking, Ennis provides an
elaborate taxonomy of critical thinking skills. This taxonomy is actually
broader than his definition would suggest. It includes dispositions to
seek clear statements of questions, to be open-minded, to seek as much
precision as the subject permits, to think in an orderly manner and to be
sensitive to the feelings and level of understanding of others. It also
includes abilities such as focusing on the context of an argument, de-
tecting unstated assumptions, clarifying arguments, making inferences
from premises and interacting with others in a reasonable manner.
It is clear from this list that critical thinking involves more than the
employment of "higher level" thinking skills, and more than clever or
skillful argumentation. Critical thinking involves thinking for oneself.
But it also involves thinking well-that is, exercising good judgment.
This means having reasons for one's judgments, or, as Matthew Lipman
puts it, having reliable criteria for one's judgments. 2 1
If the point of encouraging the critical thinking of children is to
help them become more reasonable, then moral education should be
seen as an explicit part of the broader educational agenda of the
schools. This is because reasonableness applies to morality as much as
to any other area ofjudgment and conduct. How reasonableness should
be understood in the context of morality requires special comment.
It should be especially noted that reasonableness in the context of
morality is not to be equated with rationality. Someone can be unrea-
sonable without thereby being irrational. A selfish person may (unrea-
sonably) take more than his or her fair share, likely at the expense of
others. Yet, from the standpoint of self-interest, this is not necessarily
irrational. A person may make excessive (unreasonable) demands and
yet not be irrational. A person might be unwilling to reason with others
about an issue or refuse to listen to others's points of view without being
irrational. But we may regard this as unreasonable. It is only when ra-
tionality is combined with fairminded regard for the views and interests
of others that reasonableness is present. Thus, reasonableness is actu-
ally a social virtue. As W.M. Sibley states:
If I desire that my conduct shall be deemed reasonable by some-
one taking the standpoint of moral judgment, I must exhibit
something more than mere rationality or intelligence. To be
reasonable here is to see the matter-as we commonly put it-
Del.), Summer 1987, at I (emphasis omitted). See also ROBERT H. ENNIS & STEPHEN P.
NORRIS, EVALUATING CRITICAL THINKING 3 (1989).
20. See Michael S. Pritchard, STS, Critical Thinking, and Philosopky for Children, it Eu-
ROPE, AMERICA, AND TECHNOLOGY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 217,
217-46.
21. MATTHEW LIPMAN, THINKING IN EDUCATION 114-42 (1991).
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from the other person's point of view, to discover how each will
be affected by the possible alternative actions; and, moreover,
not merely to "see" this (for any merely prudent person would
do as much) but also to be prepared to be disinterestedly influ-
enced, in reaching a decision, by the estimate of these possible
results. I must justify my conduct in terms of some principle
capable of being appealed to by all parties concerned, some
principle from which we can reason in common.
2 2
Ronald Dworkin provides a good illustration of the importance of
encouraging this sort of reasonableness in children:
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to
treat others unfairly. I no doubt have in mind examples of the
conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my
'meaning' was limited to these examples, for two reasons.
First, I would expect my children to apply my instructions to
situations I had not and could not have thought about. Second,
I stand ready to admit that some particular act I had thought
was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, or vice-versa, if one of
my children is able to convince me of that later; in that case I
should want to say that my instructions covered the case he
cited, not that I had changed my instructions. I might say that I
meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by
any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind.
23
It should be noted that Dworkin is not inviting just any kind of challenge
to his conception of fairness. Presumably it will have to be one capable
of convincing him that he was mistaken; and this implies that the chal-
lenge is accompanied with good reasons. Thus, both parent and child
are subject to the constraints of reasonableness. Like any parent, Dwor-
kin would like to believe that the examples of unfairness he has in mind
at any given time are reasonable. But he is not willing to hold that belief
in the face of convincing reasons to the contrary. As a reasonable par-
ent, he is open to the possibility that he might be wrong about some of
his examples. To deny this possibility (and reject evidence to the con-
trary) is to be willing to be wrong twice-and to wish that for his child as
well.
Of course, being a well-developed, moral person involves more
than reasonableness. But in our pluralistic society it may be difficult to
specify what else is essential. Not all values are specifically moral values,
and there is no reason to insist on uniformity across persons. But even
within morality there may be many different ways of satisfying plausible
criteria for being a well-developed, moral person, and reasonable peo-
ple might even disagree about some of the criteria. However, broad
consensus about some basic features in addition to reasonableness may
be attainable. Here are three candidates:
1. Self-respect;
22. W.M. Sibley, The Rational 'ersus the Reasonable, 62 PHIL. REV. 554, 557 (1953).
23. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
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2. A capacity to resist, if not overcome, egocentricity in circum-
stances calling for moral sensitivity and judgment; and
3. Commitment to other-regarding values (e.g., respect for others,
justice, beneficence), with appropriate supportive virtues (e.g., consider-
ateness, compassion, fair-mindedness, benevolence).
Although distinguishable, these features are not independent of one an-
other. In addition, each has a special relationship to reasonableness.
For example, someone who is seriously deficient in other-regarding val-
ues will not be regarded as a reasonable person. And someone who is
excessively egocentric will have distorted other-regarding values and,
thereby, lack reasonableness. Finally, the acknowledgement and appre-
ciation by others that one has the virtue of reasonableness can contrib-
ute to one's self-respect.
If the sort of reasonable person Sibley describes is the sort of per-
son families should want their children to become, it is a tall order, in-
deed, for families to "go it alone." Without the assistance of the kind of
civic education Fullinwider describes, how are children to develop the
capacity to understand and discuss views different from those they en-
counter in the smaller circles within which their families may try to en-
close them?
Nevertheless, families obviously play a crucial role in determining
the extent to which children grow up to be well-developed moral per-
sons. On the negative side, various forms of child abuse (physical and
psychological) can impede this development, as can parental neglect or
absence. Parental modelling of behavior and attitudes can have either a
positive or negative effect, as can that of other older family members.
2 4
If reasonableness is a desired outcome, then inductive modelling is likely
to prove most effective. This requires both exhibiting the desired types
of attitude or behavior and providing the child with reasons for embrac-
ing them. 25 Finally, on the positive side, the unconditional love that
parents have for their children is a fundamental source of self-respect
and self-esteem.
26
So, enroute to becoming well-developed, moral persons, children
need from their families good modelling, love, support and the absence
24. For convenience, I will refer to parents as the significant adults in family life. But,
I make no special assumptions about what constitutes a standard family. There may be
one or two natural parents present-or none. There will be at least one adult, however
related to the children. Beyond this, nothing I say is intended to support one particular
family arrangement rather than another. How families might best be structured is an in-
teresting and important topic, but is beyond the scope of this Paper.
25. For more on inductive modelling, see Martin L. Hoffman, Empathy, Role-Taking,
Guilt, and the Development of Altruistic Motives, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THE-
ORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES 124, 124-43 (Thomas I. Lickona ed., 1976).
26. 'Unconditional' may seem too strong, since parental love can be withdrawn under
some circumstances. However, what is meant by 'unconditional' is that the child does not
have to do anything or have any special qualities in order to be loved by his or her parents.
Such love is not conditioned by one's accomplishments or special characteristics. For a
good discussion of unconditional love and its importance for developing self-respect and
self-esteem, see LAURENCE THOMAS, LIVING MORALLY: A PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL CHARAC-
TER (1989).
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of abuse and neglect. However necessary these might be, they are not
sufficient. Taking only these elements into account, the child is largely
being portrayed as a patient-someone to whom something is happening
or for whom something is being done. But at some point the child as
agent must enter the scene. So, we might ask, when does the child "get
in on the act?" We need to ask not just what is to be done to and for
children, but also what might enable them to do things for themselves.
V. CHILDREN AS MORAL AGENTS
The four features of a well-developed, moral person outlined above
clearly portray the person as an agent, not merely a patient. To en-
courage the development of these features, it is important to recognize
the earliest appearance of those affective and cognitive capacities that
are essential to that development. 2 7 This has been precisely the agenda
of developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence
Kohlberg. 28 Their theories of moral development are so influential
among parents and educators that they warrant some attention here, for
these theories are as misleading as they are promising in suggesting how
moral development can be encouraged.
Piaget and Kohlberg offer encouragement to parents who worry
that their children's basic moral development is completed before they
even enter school. They reject this Freudian view in favor of the idea
that moral development is dependent on cognitive development. So,
basic moral changes can be expected to occur well into school years, and
even into adulthood. Of course, this may be unwelcome news to parents
who would like to minimize the influence of the schools and peer groups
on their children's moral development. But for many it is a relief to
know that their first, often fumbling efforts at parenting may not have
sealed their children's moral fate.
However, Piaget and Kohlberg accept Freud's view that, even well
into the early school years, children are basically self-centered. Morality
for young children is first grounded in the fear of punishment or loss of
love and then in an "instrumental egoism" of reciprocal exchange. 29
Even Carol Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg's neglect of the affective side
of moral development accepts the view that early childhood is basically
27. Roughly speaking, affective capacities are capacities for emotion and feeling,
whereas cognitive capacities are capacities for rational and logical thought. Just what rela-
tionships these capacities have to one another in the moral domain is subject to much
debate. See MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, ON BECOMING RESPONSIBLE 58-159 (1991).
28. For a discussion of Piaget's views on moral development, see JEAN PIAGET, THE
MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Majorie Gabain trans., 1965). Kohlberg's basic theories
are presented in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS
ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981) and LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT (1984).
29. "Instrumental egoism," for Kohlberg, is understood as "backscratching"-"You
scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." This is self-serving in the following sense: I will
do things that will benefit others, but only in the actual or expected return of benefits from
them. Thus, there is an expectation of fully reciprocal exchange of benefits and, therefore,
no unilateral sacrifice.
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self-centered in these ways.
30
Unfortunately, this view of the self-centeredness of young children
conflates egocentric and egoistic behavior. What is overlooked is the
possibility that much apparently egoistic behavior is only egocentric.
Egoistic behavior is self-centered in the sense that one is seeking some-
thing for oneself. Egocentric behavior is self-centered in the sense that
one does not fully understand or take into account the different perspec-
tives of others. Although someone's behavior on a particular occasion
can be both egoistic and egocentric, it need not be. For example, a
younger brother may buy a present for his older brother that is no
longer of any interest to the older brother. The older brother may then
permit the younger brother to use it. If we surmise that the younger
brother bought the present with precisely this in mind, his behavior will
be construed as egoistic. But it should be noted that this interpretation
assumes that the younger brother does understand the perspective of his
older brother. So, if he behaved egoistically, he was not entirely egocen-
tric. However, if the younger brother's thinking was basically egocen-
tric, he might not have behaved egoistically at all. Suppose the younger
brother failed to realize that his older brother no longer shared the same
interests. He might then have bought a present he mistakenly thought
would please his older brother. This would be egocentric but not egois-
tic behavior.
The extent to which young children are self-centered-and how this
is to be understood-is a central concern for child rearing. If parents
believe that their children will respond only to threats of punishment or
the withdrawal of love, what is reinforced is a morality of threats. The
longer this is reinforced, the more firmly entrenched it is likely to be-
come (and the greater the danger of its becoming abusive). If, as
Kohlberg suggests, children are responsive only to such threats well into
their early school years, how is it, we might wonder, that they ever ac-
quire genuinely other-regarding concerns? Kohlberg's apparent answer
is that at roughly age seven or eight children's social understanding is
transformed through further cognitive development. At this point they
are able to understand perspectives other than their own, thus enabling
them to empathize with others. However, seven or eight years of paren-
tal reinforcement of a morality of threats, plus another two or three
years in an authoritarian school environment are likely to make such a
transformation quite difficult.
Psychologist Martin Hoffman points out a fundamental problem
with Kohlberg's account:
It is . . . conceivable that a person could understand the social
order and see its functional rationality quite well, discuss moral
30. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan criticizes Kohlberg for overemphasizing justice, rights, du-
ties and abstract, universal principles. Equally important for morality, she argues, are
compassion, caring and responding to the needs of others, regardless of whether there is a
strict duty or obligation to do so. So, Gilligan contrasts what she calls a "morality of care"
with Kohlberg's "morality of justice."
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dilemmas of others intelligently and take the role of most any-
one-and still act immorally himself and experience little or no
guilt over doing so. Indeed, these social insights might just as
readily serve Machiavellian as moral purposes.a'
Not only is this conceivable, it is precisely how sociopaths are typically
characterized by psychiatrists. 3 2 Because Kohlberg supposes that young
children do experience guilt, it is clear that he is not thinking of young
children as sociopaths. However, apparently he is not thinking of their
experience of guilt as reflecting genuine concern about the well-being of
others. Instead, guilt is strictly tied to real or imagined threats of power
or punishment. So, Hoffman still has a point. If children are egoistic
from the outset and remain so until seven or eight, perhaps as they ac-
quire greater social understanding they will simply incorporate this
within their egoistic perspective. Thus, moral development could be
seen as a gradual development of enlightened self-interest-that is, a
more sophisticated form of egoism.
33
Finding this implausible, Hoffman offers us a different view of
young children. He provides convincing evidence that very young chil-
dren are capable of genuinely empathic responses to the distress of
others.3 4 These responses manifest some awareness of the very differ-
ent perspectives of others. They also seem to manifest a genuine con-
cern for the distress of others. William Damon's The Moral Child
presents further evidence of this from recent research on the moral de-
velopment of children.3 5 So, there is good reason to suppose that non-
egocentric and non-egoistic behavior is possible much earlier than
Kohlberg allows. Because both are essential to later moral develop-
ment, it is important for parents to be attentive and responsive to early
manifestations.
Recall Thomas Reid's observation that the progress of the "seeds of
moral discernment . .. depends very much upon their being duly culti-
vated and properly exercised."13 6 If parents believe their children are
not ready to accept non-egoistic reasons for behaving or not behaving in
31. Martin Hoffman, Moral Development, in 2 CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF CHILD PSY-
CHOLOGY 281 (Paul H. Mussen ed., 3d ed. 1970).
32. See WILLIAM MCCORD &JOAN McCORD, PSYCHOPATHY AND DELINQUENCY (1956);
PRITCHARD, Supra note 27, at 39-57.
33. PRITCHARD, supra note 27, at 119-23.
34. According to Hoffman, even infants give evidence of empathic responses to the
crying of other infants. However, at this stage infants apparently have no clear sense of
the distinction between themselves and others. So, he refers to this as "global empathy."
Still, as young children develop their understanding of the perspectives of others, empathy
becomes differentiated. This is not an escape from egoism, for it is only at this point that
ego itself clearly emerges. Now there can be concern both for others and self. Equally
important, non-egocentric understanding begins to develop much earlier than Kohlberg
suggests. Hoffman's earliest example is an 18 month-old child comforting another tod-
dler. There is little reason to suppose that very young children cannot respond to overt
expressions of adult distress as well. However, the understanding of more subtle and
complex forms of suffering no doubt must await appropriate cognitive development.
35. WILLIAM DAMON, THE MORAL CHILD: NUTURING CHILDREN'S NATURAL MORAL
GROWTH (1988).
36. REID, supro note 1, at 595.
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certain ways, they will not cultivate the "seeds of moral discernment" in
that direction. In fact, by substituting egoistic reasons in their stead,
parents may actually contribute to the warping of those "seeds." If chil-
dren are capable of non-egocentric thinking at a very early age, then
parents would do well to reinforce this and provide opportunities for
their children to develop this capacity. By assuming that their children
are not capable of non-egocentric thinking until well into their school
years, parents may actually reinforce and prolong the "tunnel vision"
that so often impedes the development of moral sensitivity.
Of course, it is implausible to suppose that an eighteen month-old
child's empathic response to the distress of another child incorporates
moral conceptions. However, the responsiveness and caring that are
present can be expected eventually to contribute to that child's moral
outlook-unless this is otherwise discouraged. Furthermore, the wait will not
be long. Richard Shweder, Elliot Turiel and Nancy Much provide evi-
dence that children as young as four have an intuitive understanding of
differences among prudential, conventional and moral rules:
In fact, at this relatively early age, four to six, children not only
seem to distinguish and identify moral versus conventional ver-
sus prudential rules using the same formal principles (e.g., ob-
ligatoriness, importance, generalizability) employed by adults;
they also seem to agree with the adults of their society about
the moral versus conventional versus prudential status of par-
ticular substantive events (e.g., throwing paint in another
child's face versus wearing the same clothes to school every
day) .37
Lest it be concluded that the basic story of moral development is
completed in the pre-school years after all, it should be emphasized that
this is just the beginning. Gareth Matthews nicely outlines what we
should expect to follow:
A young child is able to latch onto the moral kind, bravery, or
lying, by grasping central paradigms of that kind, paradigms
that even the most mature and sophisticated moral agents still
count as paradigmatic. Moral development is then something
much more complicated than simple concept displacement. It
is: enlarging the stock of paradigms for each moral kind; de-
veloping better and better definitions of whatever it is these
paradigms exemplify; appreciating better the relation between
straightforward instances of the kind and close relatives; and
learning to adjudicate competing claims from different moral
kinds (classically the sometimes competing claims ofjustice and
compassion, but many other conflicts are possible).
38
This may seem to place too much emphasis on the cerebral. What about
37. Richard A. Shweder, Elliot Turiel & Nancy C. Much, The Mloral Intuitions of the
Child, in SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: FRONTIERS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES 288 (John H.
Flavell & Lee Ross eds., 1981). See also Nucci, supra note 1I, at 22-26 (children as young as
two and one-half can differentiate between moral and conventional issues).
38. Gareth B. Matthews, Concept Formation and Mloral Development, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 185 (James Russell ed., 1987).
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the will, one might ask? What about matters of the heart? What about
behavior? However, what must be borne in mind is that typically the
kinds of reflection Matthews describes take place in contexts in which it
very much matters to the participants how issues are understood. There
may be concerns about sharing toys, distributing dessert fairly, doing
household chores or helping an elderly neighbor who is too ill to care
properly for her pet. There might also be concerns about all sorts of
issues at school-sharing materials, taking turns, school government,
privileges and rights, punishments and rewards, social relationships, and
so on. That is, sorting through and refining paradigms is not typically
just an intellectual exercise.
"That's just it," an objector might say, "the problem is that these
things do matter to children-too much, in fact. Children aren't ready
for reasonable discussion of such issues. Aristotle is right, first they
need to be habituated-their passions have to be brought under control
by good habits. Give them firm rules and reinforce them. Then, much
later, such matters can be discussed." This underestimates children in
two respects. First, it assumes that they do not already have some rather
stable moral dispositions by the time they enter school. Second, it as-
sumes that reflection and discussion can contribute little to the refine-
ment the dispositions that are already somewhat in place. It is again, to
view children as patients rather than agents.
Fortunately, there is now a great deal of empirical evidence that
these assumptions are not warranted. Ask any group of five to ten year-
old children what they think about lying or fairness, for example, and
marvel at the range of thoughtful responses. 39 It is often difficult to see
what basic moral distinctions they leave out that adults would put in.
For example, favoritism, taking more than one's fair share, not taking
turns, listening to only one side of the story,jumping to conclusions, not
treating equals equally (and unequals unequally), and the like are readily
volunteered as kinds of unfairness. These are staple fare in the lives of
children from a very early age-within their family structures, on the
playground and in school. That young children, like the rest of us, may
more readily recognize unfairness in others than in themselves does not
mean that they do not understand what fairness and unfairness are.
That they will later extend their conceptions of fairness and unfairness
to situations they cannot now understand very well (e.g., taxation)-and
that they will discover conflicts with other fundamental values-does not
imply that they do not now have access to moral concepts at their most
basic level.
Still, there is no necessary connection between moral thought and
action. A crucial part of the mix is the social environment. Because
39. See, e.g., GARETH B. MATrHEWS, DIALOGUES WITH CHILDREN (1984); MICHAEL S.
PRITCHARD, PHILOSOPHICAL ADVENTURES WITH CHILDREN (1985); see generally GROWING UP
WITH PHILOSOPHY 311-91 (Matthew Lipman & Ann M. Sharp eds., 1978) (collection of
essays regarding ethical inquiry in the schools); see also any publication of the Institute for
the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State College, New Jersey.
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families constitute only a part of that environment (especially once the
child is school-age), it is clear that any adequate account of how children
might grow into well-developed, moral persons must focus on much
more than the family. But the family itself plays a fundamental role. It
is to be hoped that families and schools can work together in encourag-
ing the moral development of children. However, two worries about
families should be mentioned-worries about families contributing
either too little or too much to the process.
First, the worry about too little: Families may provide little or no
love for and acceptance of their children. They may sustain an environ-
ment ranging from indifference to abuse. And they may provide little or
no good modelling. The causes may be various (e.g., poverty, lack of
education, family breakdown), but in such circumstances children are
bound to be shortchanged. Through a strong natural constitution,
strong support outside the family or good luck, many children in these
families will nevertheless grow up to be well-developed moral persons.
Many others, however, may not. External support from the schools, so-
cial services or the law may be helpful. In any case, it is unrealistic to
expect each family on its own to be able or willing to work things out in
the best interest of the child. Government, social services, schools and
family law must work together in trying to provide needed assistance.
Second, the worry about too much: Families can attempt to be too
supportive and protective of their children. A family may try to protect
its children from an external world perceived to be hostile to what the
family's adults most value and want for their children. Or, as already
mentioned, the family's adults may be convinced that moral education
belongs exclusively in the home. Thus, deliberate attempts by the
schools to undertake some of the tasks of moral education are viewed
with suspicion and may be vigorously opposed.
VI. EMPOWERING CHILDREN
The cost of keeping moral education out of the schools is likely to
be high. Deliberately or not, moral values are reinforced (or under-
mined) in the schools. Cheating is discouraged, respect for students and
teachers is encouraged, and so on. In short, educational institutions de-
pend for their viability on the acceptance of basic moral values, values
that may or may not match up well with values found in the corridors,
the playgrounds and the streets between home and school-or even in
the homes of some children. To expect all of this to work out well with-
out moral education being in any explicit way placed on the educational
agenda is quite optimistic.
It might be replied that these moral values are reinforced only to
enable schools to get on with their main business-educating students.
These are ground rules for the schools to function effectively. Distinct
from this, however, is the question of whether moral values should be
discussed within the curriculum itself. But, attempting to keep moral
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content out of the curriculum is equally hopeless. As Fullinwider states,
a school that attempted this would probably have to close down:
It could not teach children their native language since so much
of any natural language is about how to be and not to be. It
would have to deprive its students of all stories of human af-
fairs, since those stories are structured by evaluative concepts-
by ideas of success and failure, foresight and blindness, heed-
fulness and heedlessness, care and negligence, duty and dere-
liction, pride and shame, hope and despair, wonder and
dullness, competition and cooperation, beginning and ending.
But without stories of human affairs, a school could not effec-
tively teach non-moral lessons either. It could not teach about
inflation, log-rolling, scientific discovery, coalition-building,
paranoia, ecological niches, deterrence of crime, price controls,
or infectious disease.
40
Worse, anything resembling critical thinking would need to be elim-
inated from the schools as well. Thomas Reid notes that our "power of
reasoning, which all acknowledge to be one of the most eminent natural
faculties of man, . . . appears not in infancy."' 4 1 This capacity, like that of
moral discernment, also needs to be duly cultivated and properly exer-
cised. The recent hue and cry that the schools are failing to help stu-
dents develop critical thinking skills echoes Reid's observation. So,
there is a nationwide call for getting beyond rote learning. Hardly any-
one would oppose critical thinking in the schools-as long as it can stay
away from the moral domain. But it cannot be kept away.
An anecdote will illustrate the problem. A few years ago I visited a
fourth-grade class. I spent the half hour discussing assumptions with
the students. I gave them several "brainteasers" that can be solved only
if one examines unwarranted assumptions that block our ability to pro-
ceed. For example, six toothpicks can be placed end-to-end to form
four equilateral triangles only if we construct a three-dimensional pyra-
mid, rather than lay them all on a flat surface. 42 As long as we assume
we are restricted to a two-dimensional, flat surface, we will not be able to
solve the problem.
After class, one of the students told me a story. A father and son
are injured in a car accident. They are rushed to separate rooms for
surgery. The doctor attending the son announces, "I cannot perform
surgery on this boy. He is my son." The student then asked me to ex-
plain how the boy could be the doctor's son. I had heard the story sev-
eral years earlier, so I quickly answered the question. Some of today's
fourth graders still struggle with thisquestion for a while ("The first
father was a priest," "The doctor was his step-father"). But when this
was first aired on television's All in the Family, Archie Bunker was not the
40. Fullinwider, supra note 14, at 206-07.
41. REID, supra note 1, at 595.
42. The pyramid will have an equilateral triangle as its base, with each side of the
triangle being a toothpick. Each of the remaining three toothpicks can then have one of its
ends placed at one of the angles of the base triangle, while the other ends are brought
together at a single point. The result is a four-sided pyramid.
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only one who was stumped. A significant percentage of adult viewers
were as well.
Why did this fourth grader come up with this example? We had
been talking about assumptions, but none of my examples had any social
content. Here was an example resting on an unwarranted assumption-
an assumption that contains gender stereotypes. The student appar-
ently understood very well the basic point about assumptions. Then,
like any good critical thinker, she applied it in a novel way-a way that has
everything to do with moral education. So, even critical thinking about
seemingly innocuous "brainteasers" threatens to get out of control.
Given this, it seems best simply to face up to the task of moral edu-
cation, rather than act as if it could be avoided altogether. However,
something interesting happens when moral education is put on the main
agenda, rather than remaining on the hidden agenda. If schools explic-
itly acknowledge they are in the moral education business, how will they
defend themselves against the charge of indoctrination? Fullinwider
suggests that we see moral education as something like learning a vocab-
ulary, learning how to use words and concepts. This is much like Gareth
Matthew's suggestion that we view moral development more in terms of
enlarging concepts, as well as like Ronald Dworkin's notion of being
guided by a concept of fairness while working out particular conceptions
of fairness. As Fullinwider puts it, "A moral education supplies tools of
evaluation (a vocabulary) rather than a doctrine for adhesion
(dogma). ' '4 3 To this we should add that students need to be en-
couraged to use these tools in the classroom. That is, they need to be
encouraged to engage in evaluative thought-with each other.
When this is done in a mutually supportive atmosphere, what
evolves is a community of inquiry.4 4 In such a classroom each student is
regarded as having the potential to make valuable contributions to the
issues discussed. Students are expected to give reasons in support of
what they say, to listen to one another carefully, and to be responsive to
one another. This kind of learning environment can be expected to help
develop and refine the reasonableness of students. Such a community
of inquiry, Reid might agree, affords students opportunities to "duly
cultivate and properly exercise" their "seeds of moral discernment."
And this is what empowers students eventually to go on responsibly, on
their own, rather than under the watchful eye of teacher or parent.
To deprive students of such opportunities in the schools is to de-
prive them of an educational right as basic as any other. No one seri-
ously suggests that students should be legally required to go to school,
but that math and science education have no place there. Why should it
be any different if we substitute 'moral education' for 'math and science
education?' If the answer is that most parents cannot handle the math
43. Fullinwider, supra note 14, at 207.
44. For a thorough discussion of the idea of community of inquiry, see Ann M. Sharp,
What is a 'Conimunit' of lnquiry'?, 16J. MORAL EDUC. 37 (1987).
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and science education of their children all by themselves, the same is
true of moral education.
Moral education agendas developed exclusively in the home may
result in over-dependency of children on their families for moral sup-
port. The kind of autonomous, critical thinking that children are likely
to need once they leave the home to lead their own lives may be blunted
by a family that itself exhibits highly egocentric thinking. While not an
inevitable consequence of the morally insular family, the risk of children
emerging who are not well equipped to deal with the complexities of a
pluralist society is substantial. Finally, we should ask, what about those
children whose homes provide little, if any, moral support?
VII. CONCLUSION
Earlier I listed four features of a well-developed, moral person
about which we might expect there to be broad consensus. What has
emerged from subsequent discussion is that there are substantial obsta-
cles in the way of enabling children to achieve this end. These obstacles
are of various sorts, and they are formidable. A start, however, would be
to carefully identify them and determine what may be required to mini-
mize their severity-and to do so with a resolve to work toward making
those changes that are most likely to enhance the moral development of
children.
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FAMILY STRESS AND SELF-ESTEEM
CHARLOTrE REED*
The family, not the judicial or educational systems, or any social or
government entity, is the best agent for nurturing children and enhanc-
ing the self-esteem of today's youth. Unfortunately, the family is often
unable or unwilling to meet this task. Society continues to change, and
in the process many longstanding values disappear, leaving the family
with less direction and unity as a social entity. The changing structure
and function of the family is reflected in the various labels associated
with this social unit, including "dysfunctional," "reconstructed," "non-
traditional" and "blended."
Over the past twenty years, society raised a generation of physically,
mentally and often morally underdeveloped children. This generation
of youth remains plagued by high rates of malnourishment, obesity, aca-
demic failure, teen pregnancy, infant mortality, sex and drug related dis-
eases, drug and alcohol abuse, gang activity, homicide, suicide, violent
crime and low levels of competence and confidence. Accompanying
these factors is the chronically negative self-concept possessed by many
members of this generation of youth.
Jerome B. Dusek defined self-concept as "[o]ne's perception of the
self" and self-esteem as an "evaluation, from positive to negative of the
self-concept."' William Watson Purkey stated that "self-concept is a
complex, continuously active system of subjective beliefs about one's
personal existence. [Self-concept] serves to guide behavior and it en-
ables the individual to assume a particular role or stance in life."'2 Many
determinants influence the self-concept, including family structure, so-
cial class, maturation and cognitive competence. Purkey identified the
family as exerting the greatest influence on the manner in which chil-
dren perceive themselves and their abilities.3 Furthermore, Dusek's
summary of the available research clearly indicates that child-rearing
techniques, family composition, and parent-child identification or rela-
tionships are crucial to the adequate development of self-concept.
4
Many family characteristics are associated with children who possess
low self-esteem. Among these characteristics of the family are: (1) a
reconstructed or blended family structure; (2) an insufficient income; (3)
protected class membership; (4) poor or strained family relationships;
* Associate Professor of Education, Purdue University Calumet. This Article was
developed from my oral presentation at the "Family Law and Best Interest of the Child
Conference," which was held at Ripon College on April 12, 1991.
1. JEROME B. DUSEK, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 168 (2d ed. 1991).
2. WILLIAM WATSON PURKEY, INVITING SCHOOL SUCCESS: A SELF-CONCEPT APPROACH
TO TEACHING AND LEARNING 30 (1978).
3. Id. at 28.
4. DUSEK, supra note 1, at 156-61.
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and (5) parents who are unemployed, teenaged, overindulgent, overly-
strict, divorced, separated or single. 5 Children's low self-esteem is usu-
ally attributed to the complex interaction of several factors and not the
impact of a single factor. For example, an unfavorable family structure
alone does not cause low self-esteem, but this factor may contribute to
low self-esteem especially when accompanied by other factors including
poor family relationships and overly strict parenting.
Low self-esteem is identified more with the quality of experience in
the home environment than it is associated with the structure of the fam-
ily.6 For instance, some studies found that children from single-parent
households possess a level of self-esteem equivalent to those of two-
parent households, and self-esteem in both family structures is nega-
tively affected by disharmony in the home.
7
Schools also play an important role in self-concept development
through their programs, policies, personnel and processes. Much atten-
tion is focused on the significant relationship of teachers' attitudes and
behaviors to the students' self-concept. For example, when teachers
view their students as valuable, capable and responsible, and treat the
pupils accordingly, they encourage the development of positive self-con-
cept.8 Unfortunately, a great number of students, especially those who
are "at-risk" or differ from the cultural norm, languish in the classrooms
of disinviting teachers who do not believe these students hold the capac-
ity or motivation to learn. These teachers even doubt their own ability
to make a difference with such students because they believe the envi-
ronmental and emotional problems cannot be overcome.
Children and youth are labeled as "at-risk" because they are unable
to cope with stress without turning to drugs, sex, gangs, suicide, delin-
quency or other failings. At-risk children lack a belief in the efficacy of
their families and themselves. A disproportionate number of these stu-
dents differ from the cultural norm and are thus described as "culturally
different."
Culturally different and poor children are often evaluated and edu-
cated using a deficit model. The deficit model assumes that children are
less likely to succeed because they are inferior and may lack money, sta-
tus, a complete family, legitimacy, intelligence or motivation. This is not
a real model, but a mind-set based upon cultural, racial or economic
inferiority, which has given rise to such terms as "disadvantaged," "cul-
turally deprived" and "underprivileged."
In their book, William Watson Purkey and John M. Novak stressed
the importance of perceiving children as valuable, capable and responsi-
5. See generally DUSEK, supra note 1; PURKEY, supra note 2; Lawrence A. Kurdek & Ron-
aid J. Sinclair, Adjustment of Young Adolescents in Two-Parent Nuclear, Stepfather, and Mother-
Custody Families, 56J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 91 (1988); Barbara H. Long, Parental
Discord vs Family Structure: Effects of Divorce on the Self-Esteem of Daughters, 15 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 19 (1986).
6. DUSEK, supra note 1, at 300.
7. Kurdek & Sinclair, supra note 5, at 91; Long, supra note 5, at 19.
8. See PURKEY, supra note 2, at 27-28.
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ble. They also emphasized the necessity of sending youth intentional
messages confirming positive expectations and inviting children to view
themselves and their circumstances in positive ways. 9 Since perceptions
develop from experience within a particular environment, it seems im-
portant to focus more on improving the quality of children's exper-
iences in their various life environments than to denounce those
environments because they are characterized as single-parent, poor,
blended or culturally different.
Families are bombarded with economic, social, educational, and
physical and mental health concerns that contribute to their demise.
One scenario may involve an impending divorce, which is an open and
constant topic, creating an unstable and hostile environment where chil-
dren may either repeatedly witness, or be victimized in, verbally abusive
and violent episodes. Another scenario may be characterized by the lack
of money or employment, causing an unemployed, frustrated father to
abuse or desert his family or an emotionally distraught mother to ne-
glect or abuse her children. A third scenario may involve an employed
single parent and the difficulty he or she faces in securing adequate
childcare, resulting in inappropriate arrangements such as underage
children caring for themselves and other siblings. Although each scena-
rio could end with the dissolution of the family unit, there are remedies
that may be utilized to avoid dissolution. One common remedy utilized
to save the family from disintegration is the removal of the children
from the home for placement in foster or protective care. Such an ar-
rangement endures until the court is convinced that the natural parents
are willing and able to provide a safe and nurturing environment.
The plight of the American family cannot be ignored, nor can soci-
ety minimize the deleterious effects of the various conditions the family
has endured. The circumstances contributing to the breakdown of the
family include, but are not limited to: (1) a skyrocketing divorce rate; (2)
a rising number of single-parent households; (3) increasing unemploy-
ment and poverty; (4) ever-changing gender roles; and (5) an increasing
incidence of women in the work force. To this list, T. Berry Brazelton
adds the following factors that place stress on the family unit: (1) house-
holds comprised of two working parents; (2) the disappearance of the
extended family; (3) unclear cultural values; (4) inadequate surrogate
care; and (5) a poorly defined support system.' 0
The plight of the family is magnified by the impact of these factors
on African-American families. One report cites an alarming increase in
the following African-American family characteristics: (1) young, poor
and uneducated mothers; (2) absent fathers; (3) high infant mortality
rates; (3) abused and malnourished children; and (4) a lack of loving
9. WILLIAM WATSON PURKEY &JOHN M. NOVAK, INVITING SCHOOL SUCCESS: A SELF-
CONCEPT APPROACH To TEACHING AND LEARNING 96-98 (2d ed. 1991).
10. T. Berry Brazeton, Stress for Families Today, 9 INFANT MENTAL, HEALTH JOURNAL 65,
65 (1988).
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discipline and standards. I The family unit is at risk of dissolving as
these characteristics continue to pervade our society.
John S. Wodarski and Pamela Harris state that growing up today is
not like maturing in the 1960s.12 These researchers characterized that
period as one in which most children enjoyed relatively caring families, a
stable school environment and trusting adults in their lives.' 3 The au-
thors also assert that today's youth must cope with daily fears about
their uncertain futures and feelings of alienation. 14 For instance, it is
not uncommon for young urban children to fear molestation, abduction
or murder, especially when youth are prematurely exposed to drugs and
sex by uncaring and abusive adults.' 5
Certain family characteristics are associated with children and ado-
lescents who are particularly susceptible to unwanted pregnancy, sui-
cide, abuse, dropping-out of school and low self-esteem. These
characteristics include: (1) family structure; (2) education; (3) income
and employment; (4) race or culture; (5) family relationships; and (6) the
parents' age and marital status.
Some studies focused on family characteristics and situations in
which adolescents dropped out of school, while others addressed suicide
and teen pregnancy. One study found a relationship between academic
failure and family poverty, working mothers, single parenting and the
level of education attained by adult family members. 16 Another study
explored family relationships and suicide and found that experiences in
non-supportive and overly hostile environments, as well as a lack of em-
pathetic communication, contributed to the development of suicidal
personality characteristics. 17 Furthermore, parental discord and inten-
tional separations from the child were related to the incidence of adoles-
cent suicide. 18 A recent study associated teen pregnancy with family
conflict and a deficiency of love in the family relationship, finding that
pregnant teens held lower self-esteem and experienced feelings of
worthlessness to a greater extent than their non-pregnant peers.19 The
study noted that pregnant teens attempted to use their pregnancy to
influence their parents, eliminate feelings of isolation and loneliness,
11. See generally BLACK CHILD IN CRISIS (William E. Cote ed., 1987).
12. See generally John S. Wodarski & Pamela Harris, Adolescent Suicide: A Review of Influ-
ences and the Means for Prevention, 32 SOCIAL WORK 477 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See generally ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF Two
Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991) (presenting a biographical account of
the deplorable circumstances in which urban families live and the fears that the children in
these families experience).
16. Roy M. Gabriel & Patricia S. Anderson, Identifying At-Risk Youth in the Northwest
States: A Regional Database, Report No. CGO19889 (1987), available in ERIC Document Re-
production Service, No. ED282125.
17. Wodarski & Harris, supra note 12, at 477.
18. Id.
19. See Alice Sterling Honig, Developmental Effects on Children of Pregnant Adolescents, Re-
port No. PS012861 (1980), available in ERIC Document Reproduction Services, No.
ED217969.
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and gain attention. 20 The study also found that teenage parents were
often impatient, insensitive and irritable. 2 ' Teenage parents held un-
realistic expectations of their child's development, which often resulted
in physical punishment of the child. 22 While each of the studies found
significant relationships between these variables, it is important to rec-
ognize that the presence of one or more factors in an individual's life
does not necessarily lead to manifestations of at-risk behavior.
The role of the family in the development of positive self-esteem is
clearly established. Moreover, the need to involve parents in this devel-
opment is evidenced by the studies discussed above and informal obser-
vations made by parents and teachers regarding the present status of
our children and youth. The remaining question concerns the method
of furthering parental involvement in developing children's self-esteem.
Some qualities and parental behaviors that seem to promote posi-
tive self-esteem in children include: (1) mutual respect between parents
and children; (2) parents according dignity to their children; (3) parents
serving as positive adult role models for their children; and (4) parents
providing a home atmosphere that is conducive to the growth and nor-
mal development of all family members.
23
Jackie Patterson stated these qualities in a slightly different way
when she outlined four conditions necessary for the development of
positive self-esteem. Those conditions involve: (1) connectiveness,
which essentially equates to a sense of belonging; (2) models, which in-
dicate some form of guidance, values and morals; (3) uniqueness, which
provides a perception of positive self-worth and identity; and (4) power,
which establishes areas of self-governance and control.
24
William Purkey and John Novak concluded that positive self-esteem
is most likely to develop in a friendly, optimistic, respectful and caring
atmosphere.2 5 These educators assert that positive family relationships
are characterized by: (1) respect for individual uniqueness, emphasizing
the importance of relating to children as individuals who bring different
qualities and abilities to the family group setting; (2) cooperative spirit,
emphasizing the importance of working cooperatively for the benefit of
all family members while avoiding unnecessary competitive practices; (3)
sense of belonging, stressing the relevance of creating a caring environ-
ment and developing significant relationships to promote feelings of
unity and self-efficacy; (4) pleasing habitat, emphasizing the relevance of
providing a clean, safe and attractive environment for all family mem-
bers to enjoy; and (5) positive expectations, conveying the importance
of possessing positive beliefs about the potential success of each family




23. See generally DUSEK, supra note 1.
24. Videotaped presentation at Alverno College, Milwaukee, Wis. (Spring, 1989).
25. See PURKEY & NOVAK, supra note 9, at 27-28.
26. Id.
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family characteristics creates beneficial environments and relationships
and invites positive self-esteem.
Building upon these concepts, I suggested to parents that they in-
vite positive self-esteem by: (1) not trying to clone their brightest, most
social, athletic, musical or otherwise talented child, but allowing each
child to develop his or her own strength; (2) not placing children in
competition with each other, but rewarding them for working coopera-
tively for the general good; (3) not decorating their homes like museums
where children are not allowed to enter certain rooms or sit on the fur-
niture, but allowing the house to reflect the fact that children are an
integral part of the family and providing a happy, wholesome atmos-
phere; (4) not holding inappropriately high expectations of children, but
gearing expectations to their abilities; and (5) not spoiling children and
granting their every wish to prove your love, but providing parameters,
guidance, continuity, warmth and genuine love.
27
Norma and Gene Leach and Pat Schroeder compiled a tip sheet for
parents and suggested that parents could enhance their children's self-
esteem by creating a homelife fostering acceptance, trust, concern and
love among all family members. Among the seventeen tips were: (1)
provide consistent rules for behavior; (2) hold realistic expectations for
your children; (3) spend at least fifteen minutes conversing daily with
your children; (4) display your child's good work; and (5) help children
develop responsibility by assigning chores. 28 All of these tips appeared
in one form or another in popular magazines, books and pamphlets on
self-esteem, workshop materials for parents and teachers and televised
programs concerning self-esteem. This article invites a return to those
strategies, which were successfully employed by yesterday's families.
In conclusion, the preamble to the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child2 9 proclaimed that the child should mature in a
family environment and an atmosphere of happiness, love and under-
standing, which the convention believes would assure the complete and
harmonious development of the child's personality. This observation is
consistent with my earlier proposition that the family, not the courts,
schools, or other social or government agencies, is the best means for
nurturing children and enhancing their self-esteem. Therefore, those of
us in the "helping professions" must support families, from our various
vantage points in a sensitive and non-judgmental manner, and work co-
operatively with families in the best interest of children. Professionals
must set aside counter-productive views and condescending, inappropri-
ate, if not outright racist or classist, behaviors. We need to demonstrate
a concern for all children, beginning with the manner in which mothers
are treated before the children are born. We must care for the children
27. Charlotte Reed, Ed.D, Panel Presentation at the "Family Law and Best Interest of
the Child" Conference at Ripon College, Ripon, Wis. (Apr. 12, 1991).
28. Gene Leach, Norma Leach & Pat Schroeder, "Ways To Enhance Student Self-
Esteem: Tips For Parents" (1990) (unpublished class paper on file with the author).
29. ABA Center on Children and the Law, Preamble, Children's Rights in America:
United Nations Convention on Rights of Child Compared lWith United States Law (Dec., 1990).
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after birth, providing adequate food, shelter and clothing for families in
need or employment for heads of households. We must educate chil-
dren and their parents, and we must change the manner in which we
care for people when they become ill, hurt or troublesome. Finally, we
should modify how we handle the loss of childhood. Let us not repeat
the errors of the educational, legal, medical and social systems depicted
in such novels as There Are No Children Here.3 0 The persons described in
that novel ignored the needs of families and children, delayed necessary
services and programs and denied the existence of deplorable circum-
stances, until it was too late and there were no children there.
30. KOTLOWITZ, supra note 15.
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The entire legal profession-lawyers, judges, law teachers-has
become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the courtroom
contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers-
healers of conflicts.... Should lawyers not be healers? Heal-
ers, not warriors? Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired
guns? I
I. INTRODUCTION
The role played by the judge in our legal system is clearly defined
by the tasks to be performed. The perception of the manner in which
those tasks are to be performed, and the perception of the nature of the
process and its outcome, can be reexamined by judges.
The role of the judge2 as healer is of biblical dimensions, possess-
ing a history at least as long.3 Former ChiefJustice of the United States
Supreme Court, Warren Burger, has stated, "[t]he obligation of our
profession is, or has long been thought to be, to serve as healers of
human conflicts." '4 It should not be such a difficult concept to accept:
judges as actors in a process that restores people to their integrity and
overcomes undesirable conditions. 5 This role or perspective is entirely
consistent with a humanistic or humanitarian philosophy already held by
manyjudges. This Article suggests that the role and the process used by
judges can be reconceived as having a healing character and used to that
effect in the system of justice.
A judge is charged with the responsibility of deciding conflicts be-
tween individuals, companies and even governmental entities. This re-
AssociateJudge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Domestic Relations Divi-
sion, and President, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (1991-92).
* * Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center and Research As-
sociate to The Center for the Study of Youth Policy, University of Michigan, School of
Social Work.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of the Hon. Samuel S. Berger, whose life served as
a model and an inspiration.
1. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 66.
2. Judge: an appointed person who pronounces a decision in a dispute or context;
WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 626 (1977).
3. See generally Joseph Vining, Legal Affinities, 23 GA. L. REV. 1035 (1989).
4. Warren E. Burger, Isn't There A Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J., Mar. 1982, at 274. Bur-
ger states that "[miany thoughtful people, within and outside our profession, question
whether that is being done today. They ask whether our profession is fulfilling its histori-
cal and traditional obligation of being healers of human conflicts."
5. To heal: "[T]o restore to original purity and integrity." WEBSTER'S 9TH NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 558 (9th ed. 1987).
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sponsibility, besides being significant in its scope, is expected to be
administered within certain constraints. One commentator suggests that
judges "have a multitude of role-defined tasks that we expect them to
carry out with impeccable honesty, resolute evenhandedness, conspicu-
ous humanity, and a high degree of judicial wisdom."'6 A judge is re-
quired to be objective, and is not to let his or her personal emotions
enter into the decision making process. In addition to being objective, a
judge is expected to follow precedent, and to be consistent with the di-
rection of prior authority. Yet, at the same time, a judge is expected to
be compassionate, forgiving and understanding, particularly when ap-
plying judicial discretion. The perspective from which each individual
judge approaches this area of jurisprudence, his or her judicial discre-
tion, is the one area in which a judge is allowed sufficient flexibility to
display a humanistic philosophy.
In many forums, and in an increasing number of substantive areas
of the law, our system of justice can be found insensitive to, or uncon-
cerned with, the effects that the process has upon those who are served
by it. Judges concern themselves with the court system's negative im-
pact before beginning an effort to use the process for a result that is
positive.
This Article will first suggest some of the problems in the courts
which have a dehumanizing effect on the litigants. Then, based upon
the assumption that the judiciary is very much in control of the process,
we will suggest how to use the judicial process to effectuate a more posi-
tive outcome. We propose that it is through process, and the conceptu-
alization of process, that the judiciary can begin a significant shift
towards a healing effect in the system of justice.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Humanism
Humanism is defined as any system or mode of thought or action in
which human and secular interests predominate. 7 A humanist, or hu-
manitarian, is a person who promotes the welfare of others, 8 stressing
an "individual's dignity and worth and capacity for self-realization
through reason." 9
Significantly, judges are expected to be humanists. Justice John
Parker stated that ajudge should be "honest," "absolutely courageous"
and "a kindly man. ' 'i ° Numerous other qualities involving compassion
and sensitivity are considered prerequisites to good judging by many
lawyers and judges alike. 1
6. Andrew S. Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of the Tnial judge's Decision Making, 39
MERCER L. REV. 937, 938 (1988).
7. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 556 (1977).
8. Id. at 557.
9. WEBSTER'S 9TH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 586 (9th ed. 1987).
10. Watson, supra note 6, at 941 (quoting D. Jackson, JUDGES 8 (1974)).
11. Id.
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A judge's values are subject to exposure every time a decision
arises. The decision making process alone is enormously important and,
as such, is difficult for many. The decision making responsibility often
restricts a judge's desire or ability to be humanistic at the same time.
Because the decision making process is a structured task, performed
within the limited context of the facts and the applicable law, it is a pro-
tective construct. With a litigant's need for the careful objectivity of an
impartial decision maker, a judge might justifiably avoid exhibiting any
perspective from which an observer could determine the judge's per-
sonal views or concerns. For many, the relative anonymity of the robe
and the austerity of the legal structure are preferable when the alterna-
tives include expressing or pursuing personal values in judicial philoso-
phy or procedures that exceed the strict limits of the traditional
litigation setting. One commentator has suggested that "[b]y tradition
and often by temperament as well, judges usually choose to remain as
close to invisible as possible. Many of them believe that their role pre-
cludes acknowledgement of their own humanity."'
12
B. The Structure of the Current System
The structure of the current system impedes a humanistic approach
tojudging. 3 Former ChiefJustice Warren Burger has stated that "[o]ur
system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a
truly civilized people."' 14 Chief Justice Burger blamed, in part, the ad-
versarial system: "Our distant forbears [sic] moved slowly from trial by
battle and other barbaric means of resolving conflicts and disputes, and
we must move away from total reliance on the adversary contest for
resolving all disputes."' 15 Litigants in the system are assigned imper-
sonal names like "plaintiff" and "defendant," and speak to the court
through their attorneys. This formality depersonalizes the process and
limits any expression of sensitivity to individual concerns.
The overwhelming number of cases on court dockets further con-
tribute to the depersonalization and dehumanization that people experi-
ence when they enter the judicial system. "Overcrowded court dockets
and increasing costs to the judicial system may be a result of the 'inher-
ently litigious nature of Americans', but our courts have never been as
heavily burdened as they are now." 16 The concern for judicial economy
often interferes with efforts to avoid the perception of the system as dis-
12. Watson, supra note 6, at 950 (quoting D. Jackson, JUDGEs 8 17 (1974)).
13. There are some exceptions, however. For example, Judge Perry Edwards of the
Santa Clara County, California Juvenile Court system. Darlene Ricker, Esq., 19 STUDENT
LAw. 8, at 8-10 (Oct. 1990) (Judge Perry Edwards of the Santa Clara County, California,
Juvenile Court system promoted change which makes the California juvenile court system
more humanistic).
14. Burger, supra note 1, at 66.
15. Id.
16. Scott S. Partridge et al., A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Litigation,
31 Loy. L. REV. 221, 227 (1985) (footnote omitted) (quoting Marc Glantor, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: It'hat lVe Know and Don't Know (and Think Ile Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 10 (1983)).
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pensing assembly line justice, with the litigants appearing to be no dif-
ferent than any mass produced product.
Richard T. Andrias, supervising judge of the Manhattan Criminal
Court nightshift, noted that the 266,590 misdemeanors and felonies in
the year 1985 alone was "a horror show."1 7 Judge Andrias understated
his point when he said that "a judge can get worn down."'
' 8
The movement towards automation further contributes to deper-
sonalization, with computers reducing real life emotional tragedies to
electronic data on a screen. The growing size and complexities of many
court systems, moreover, aggravates the perception that one is on an
assembly line, since a given judge may only handle a small aspect of the
case before it moves on through the system. 19 This is less than satisfy-
ing for judges, as well, because they may never see or know the final
outcome. Removed from the results of their own labors, as well as the
people involved in the cases they have dealt with, it is understandable
that judges come to feel disconnected from the individuals who appear
in their courtroom. This disassociation helps the judge insulate him or
herself from the frustration of working in a fragmented process. The
net result may be a system that is judicially efficient, but one that lacks
humanism.
III. THE JUDGE AS HEALER
A. History
In many an historical setting, the court's role was viewed as that of a
healer. In the Bible, for example, judges were temporary and special
deliverers, sent by God to deliver the Israelites from their oppressors.
20
Throughout the Old Testament, there are references to judges.
These judges were originally "appointed" by Moses to be leaders and
caretakers for the Israelites. The direction to the judges was to adminis-
ter the Law of God in an impartial and fair manner. These laws were
those originally given to Moses by God.
2 '
17. John A. Jenkins, The Lobster Shift, 72 A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 1986), at 56 (profile of
Richard T. Andrias).
18. Id.
19. Though many court systems continue to use a vertical prosecution system of ad-
ministration, in which one judge handles each case from commencement to conclusion,
larger court systems, such as that in which the author, Snow, works in Cook County, Illi-
nois, have adopted administrative patterns which subdivide cases in procedural sections.
Judges are assigned the responsibility for cases at certain stages of their passage; for in-
stance, preliminary motions, pre-trials and trials. Some judges are assigned cases for spe-
cific substantive subparts of cases, such as parentage determination, child support
enforcement or orders of protection.
20. WILLIAM SMITH, A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE (Zondervan Publishing House,
1948).
21. 'The people come to me', Moses answered, 'to seek God's guidance. When-
ever there is a dispute among them, they come to me, and I decided between man
and man. I declare the statues and laws of God.' But his father-in-law said to
Moses,' [i]t is for you to be the people's representative before God, and bring
their disputes to him. You must instruct them in the statues and laws, and teach
them how they must behave and what they must do. But you must yourself search
for capable, God-fearing men among all the people, honest and incorruptible
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The Bible also expresses the mandates which Moses gave the judges
he appointed. Explaining how he instructed them, Moses is quoted
from one of his several public addresses:
I gave your judges this command: 'You are to hear the cases
that arise among your kinsmen and judge fairly between man
and man, whether fellow-countryman or resident alien. You
must be impartial and listen to high and low alike: have no fear
of man, for judgment belongs to God .... 22
[T]hey shall dispense true justice to the people. You shall not
pervert the course of justice or show favour, nor shall you ac-
cept a bribe; for bribery makes the wise man blind and the just
man give a crooked answer. Justice, and justice alone, you shall
pursue .... 23
When the issue in any lawsuit is beyond your competence,
whether it be a case of blood against blood, plea against plea,
or blow against blow, that is disputed in your courts, then go
up without delay to the place which the Lord your God will
choose. There you must go to the levitical priests or to the
judge then in office; seek their guidance, and they will pro-
nounce the sentence.
2 4
Also, in the Bible, mention is made of other leaders giving the same
type of mandate to their judges. For example, King Jehosphahat ofJu-
dah (king during Solomon's reign) gave the following instructions to his
appointed judges:
Be careful what you do; you are there as judges, to please not
man but the Lord, who is with you when you pass sentence. Let
the dread of the Lord be upon you, then; take care what you do,
for the Lord our God will not tolerate injustice, partiality, or
bribery.2
5
B. The Judge as Healer
Although it is frequently the administrative direction to judges that
they concern themselves with managerial skills, efficiency and the availa-
bility of support services, there is still room to consider the humanistic
perspective as one of the judge's most important tools.
In his commentary on Jewish Law, Moses Maimonides examined the
philosophy of judging therein espoused. Maimonides was himself a
judge and a physician. His commentary admonished judges to attempt
less radical procedures first, just as a doctor should in attempting to
men, and appoint them over the people as officers over units of a thousand, of a
hundred, of fifty or of ten. They shall sit as a permanent court for the people;
they must refer difficult cases to you but decide simple cases themselves .....
Exodus 18:15-22 (The New English Bible). The Bible contains the instructions given to
Moses as to what God's Laws are and how to apply them. See Exodus 20:1-22, Exodus 22;
Leviticus 19:1-18.
22. Deuteronomy 1:16-17 (The New English Bible).
23. Deuteronomy 16:18-20 (The New English Bible).
24. Deuteronomy 17:8-9 (The New English Bible).
25. Chronicles 19:6-8 (The New English Bible).
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
treat a patient. For judges, this means striving to effect a settlement
before taking over the decision making process.
26
The effort to provide an alternative to the traditional litigation pro-
cess for the resolution of disputes is particularly relevant in courts where
the parties would benefit greatly from judicial sensitivity, compassion
and individual attention. The courts where family matters are heard,
such as divorce and child related concerns, and the juvenile jurisdic-
tions, are natural arenas for a more humanistic approach. The specially
established juvenile court law and procedures suggest by definition the
incorporation of humanism in thejudicial process. In practice, however,
the intended results may not have been accomplished.
IV. TECHNIQUES
Humanism does not require great deviation from a judge's ap-
proach to the actual task of decision making. Humanism focuses more
on the choice of process and the use of this process. In practice, it is an
attitudinal enhancement. A humanistic approach includes such tech-
niques as the way the judge speaks and acts in the courtroom, the appli-
cation of the procedures used, the kind and amount of education the
judge seeks or obtains and the decisions ultimately made when applying
the law. These various techniques might be useful as tools for a healer/
judge.
Research done by Professor Tom R. Tyler into the concerns of dis-
putants and the ways in which disputants utilize dispute resolution pro-
cedures, has underscored the benefits of applying common standards of
interpersonal interactions to traditional judicial processes and other al-
ternative processes. Professor Tyler reminds us that "litigants are more
willing to comply voluntarily with decisions reached in ways that they
believe are fair."' 27 Professor Tyler summarized the responses of those
surveyed about the nature of fair process. Representation (participa-
tion) in the process, the ethical appropriateness of the behaviors in-
volved, the honesty of the third parties involved in their process, or the
perception that the third parties have not been dishonest, and the con-
sistency of outcomes (relative to others'), are the common elements that
affect litigant or disputant satisfaction with a process.2 a Though there is
a danger of diminishing the importance of these humanistic standards in
complex and serious litigation, Professor Tyler found that the value
placed upon these elements in the process did not decrease with the
relative increase of the importance of the issues. Clearly, these are ele-
ments judges should include in any healing approach to a given process.
26. Baruch Bush, Traditional Jewish Ethics and Modern Dispute Resolution Choices, Remarks
at Siyam Harambam Celebration, Madison, Wisconsin, 1986 (on file with the Denver Univer-
sit)v Law Review) (referring to Introduction to the Talmud, 122-23 (Judaica Press 1975)).
27. Tom R. Tyler, The Psvchologv of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, NEGOTIATIONJ., Oct.
1987, at 368 (citations omitted).
28. Id.
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A. Respect for the People
The essence of humanistic interaction is respect. The establishment
of a set of procedural tasks and rules for courtroom process has created
a context in which a judge can actually choose whether or not to show
respect for others in the courtroom. The established courtroom hierar-
chy requires respect to be shown to the court. The judge is in a position
to review that conduct on the spot. Those who have the authority to
review ajudge's conduct and temperament are not usually present in the
courtroom. The judge must, therefore, be self-monitoring. It is there,
in the courtroom, that a judge should begin to concern him or herself
with the effect of his or her behavior on the resolution of the issues and
his or her effect on the parties themselves.
Professor Tyler's study referred to this area of judicial behavior as
"ethical appropriateness." ' 29 The disputants surveyed in Professor
Tyler's study were concerned with the "degree to which the behavior of
third parties accorded with general standards of ethically appropriate
behavior. This included the interpersonal dimensions of the interaction,
such as rudeness or unneeded deprecation and disparagement, and the
more general comportment of third parties following standards of ap-
propriate interpersonal behavior.''30 Disputants' sensitivities to the re-
lationship between their personal dignity and feelings of self-worth and
the behavior of public officials towards them, is guidance for our
achievement of the goal of a more healing judicial process.
3 1
Respect for other people, litigants in particular, can be affirmatively
displayed in a number of ways. The words chosen and the tenor of their
delivery are obvious ways in which a judge can communicate respect for
those being served by the process. The atmosphere created by the
judge's treatment of all involved in the courtroom, including staff, law-
yers and witnesses, as well as litigants, is a good foundation from which
to demonstrate a further concern over individual human needs. The
generality of this standard can be converted to an individual judicial re-
ality by employing a self-checking technique such as the following: Im-
agine that a loved/honored one is seated in the back of the courtroom.
What would that person (about whom the judge cares greatly or for
whom the judge has great respect) think of the manner in which the
judge is treating the people in the courtroom? Further, imagine that the
same loved one is before the bench of another judge: How would the
judge want that person treated by any judge, vis-a-vis the questions of
human dignity and respect?
An important skill in interpersonal relations of any kind is the abil-
ity to listen. One of the essential components of communication is to
listen to the message the other party seeks to deliver. One may disagree
with the content of the message, but it is a demonstration of respect to
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the speaker to allow him or her to participate in the process. The lis-
tener can imply that the speaker is valued simply by listening to what he
or she has to say. This suggestion does not require that a judge ignore
the appropriate procedures and forms for hearing, but only suggests
that when it is time for a litigant to speak, the judge endeavors to listen.
A judge who is actively listening can demonstrate that in many ways.
One can simply display quiet and full attention. Frequently, ajudge can
demonstrate that he or she has listened by reiterating, in the ruling or
decision given, what the litigant has said. Professor Tyler concludes that
people experience a degree of satisfaction based upon the nature of
their participation in the decision making process. 32 By acknowledging
their thoughts and words, the judge can contribute to that satisfaction.
B. Empathy
The logical companion to a respect for the human beings served by
the court is the understanding of that which one observes in those
human beings. Rollo May defines empathy as the "experience of under-
standing that takes place between two human beings."3 3 It is his view
that empathy is the fundamental element of all healing. 34 Empathy is
both an active pursuit and a passive opportunity to be in touch with a
litigant's response to the facts, the process and the outcomes of judicial
proceeding. It is the additional element in a judge's choice of words,
gestures, process or decisions that, again, communicates that the other
person has worth in the eyes of the court. To be empathic is for some,
instinctive, natural. For others, the desire to operate from a base of un-
derstanding may require a determined effort to "put themselves in the
other man's shoes." May suggests that the very sharing of the feeling is
a part of the effective healing process.
35
Empathy is a particularly important quality for a judge who comes
in contact with children during the court process or whose decisions af-
fect children. Though it would be best to have a knowledge of child
development when assessing a child's status and the consequences of
the contemplated court actions on it, the empathic judge goes a long
way towards sensitive results by endeavoring to understand what the
child is feeling. Empathy for the child's parents will enhance the judge's
ability to estimate the complex family dynamics acting on the child as
well. The instinctive empathies many judges experience in family court
matters should be thought of as the basic tools, but are capable of being
sharpened by education, training and experience so that the effect on
children is optimal.
32. Id. at 370.
33. Rollo May, The Empathic Relationship: A Foundation of Healing, in HEALERS ON HEAL-
ING 108 (R. Carlson & B. Shield eds., 1989).
34. Id. at 108-10.
35. Id. at 109.
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C. Process Selection
The current trend in our courts, to shift away from traditional
courtroom adjudication and adopt alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques, offers judges the opportunity to demonstrate a healing attitude
towards the subjects before them by selection of process. Professor
Tyler's research and conclusions suggest that a more participatory,
more empowering format, such as mediation, is more satisfying to dis-
putants.3 6 Our own experience supports Tyler's conclusion. In addi-
tion, it is our observation that mediation helps disputants return to more
normal problem solving functions and restores to them some degree of
personal integrity. This is consistent with the definition of healing we
adopted earlier.
Some courts are experimenting with other techniques away from
the traditional litigation process for cases involving children and fami-
lies, in an effort to sensitize the process. For some that may mean elimi-
nating some or all of the formal rules of procedure to maximize the
litigant's participation and comfort. 37 For example, the Family Court of
New Zealand created its own unique, but less formal, set of rules to ac-
complish the goal of making the process more sensitive to people, where
disputes focused on family matters and children. 3 8 Other procedural
modifications might include rewriting court rules to embrace more of
the human needs and taking some proceedings out of the courtroom.
One procedure already established out of the courtroom is the set-
tlement conference, involving both the parties and a judge. The judge's
ability to participate in such a conference with litigants is clearly im-
pacted by the local legal culture and court rules. There is also concern
about the integrity of such a process when objection to the judge's bias
is made. Yet, there is so much to be gained and so much apparent satis-
faction as a result of the settlement conference, that it is worth the effort
to make them happen.
The opportunity for litigants to see for themselves the benefits of
compromise is perhaps the most prevalent result of the settlement con-
ference. Maimonides wrote: "It is the positive obligation for the judge
to say to the parties at the beginning of the case, 'Do you really want to
litigate this case, or wouldn't you prefer to work out a pshora.' -39 Mai-
36. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
37. Judge Anne Kass, District Judge, 2d Judicial District, New Mexico. Judge Kass is
currently using an innovative trial format when consented to by the participants. Rules of
evidence are somewhat relaxed and the parties have more informal opportunities to speak
and participate, particularly in matters relating to their children.
38. The New Zealand Family Court Act 1980 states: "10. Avoidance of unnecessary
formality-(l)Family Court proceedings shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid un-
necessary formality[.] (2)Neither judges sitting in Family Courts, nor counsel appearing in
such Courts, shall wear wigs or gowns." S. R. Cartwright, The New Zealand Family Court-An
Overview, 25 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. June, 1987, at 29. The author, Snow, had the oppor-
tunity to observe New Zealand's family court facilities during a tour conducted by the
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts. The court buildings housing family courts
are frequently in separate and informal settings away from the other court buildings.
39. Bush, supra note 26 (quoting Moses Maimonides, CODE oFJEwIssi LAW (commen-
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monides spoke of the preference for compromise because its results ex-
ceeded those of strict adjudication. In the adjudication of rights, each
party gets strictly what he or she is entitled to. In compromise, each side
becomes involved in the process of giving the other person more than
they perceive they are entitled to. In this way, compromise incorporates
the values of charity and righteousness. 40 Compromise would indeed
enhance the attitude of all disputants and is thus a worthy judicial goal.
D. Benefits to Judges
We have thus far focused on the values a healing judicial process
affords litigants. It is important, however, to consider the value of doing
healing work for the benefit of the judges themselves.
First, the attitude of the judge, who wishes to have a healing impact
on the disputes brought to court, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Wanting
to heal is itself such a philosophical shift that this alone creates a new
direction for the judge's energies and a new environment in the court.
Second, a shift of emphasis from outcome to process, as we have
described here, has a healing effect on the judge. The pressures im-
posed on a judge by the notion that the court's only product is a "right
decision" can become an enormous burden in the reality ofjudicial life.
To distance oneself from the value of the decision by increasing the
value of the process brings an unexpected relief to judges who relent-
lessly pursue the perfect solution in cases presented with very imperfect
possibilities. "The true healer merely gives the gift of healing but does
not watch over the patient to say in what form it is to be received."
'4 1
There is new self-esteem to be had for judges who shift to a healing
attitude and then observe the litigants' satisfaction with the results of
their efforts. For judges who have spent months or years in frustrating
and unsatisfying court situations, this might be just the surprising and
refreshing reward that they need to continue on. In addition, there is
Maimonides' notion that, to add the elements of charity and righteous-
ness to the act of giving, to give the other person more than just the
minimum of his or her rights, is a healing experience.
42
Finally, sharing in the healing experience, with or without the
achievement of another goal, is itself healing:
The mind that sees itself as whole and another as sick unques-
tionably requires healing. True healing is thus expressed
within the mind of the healer and not within the body of the
patient. When a healer sees that he or she is not separate from
the patient-and only love holds this vision-healing is already
accomplished. The mind that no longer struggles to contrast
itself with another, but looks happily upon its oneness with all
tary on the Mishneh Torah, Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Sanhedrin, Ch. 22, Halacha 4)). A
pshora is a settlement by concessions on all sides.
40. Id.
41. Hugh Prather, What is Healing?, in HEALERS ON HEALING 14-15 (R. Carlson & B.
Shield eds., 1989).
42. Bush, supra note 26.
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living things, has moved into that level of reality where healing
is constant. The healer has now received and accepted the only
thing that can be given away.
4 3
V. CONCLUSION
In today's court system, it seems difficult for judges to create and
practice the role of a healer. The overwhelming numbers and difficul-
ties of the cases, and the pressure to capitulate to a total depersonaliza-
tion of the process, threaten to deprive the judges' work of any
humanistic orientation. Yet, with a deliberate shift in attitude, individu-
ally or collectively, judges can establish, or hold on to, the humanistic
principles that people still value. To take on the role of healer is to
elevate the work of "judging" so that it generates satisfaction for all in-
volved in the judicial process.
43. Prather, supra note 41, at 16.
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